Showing papers in "J3ea in 2000"

Human Taste and Cognition in Tzeltal Maya Medicinal Plant Use

Abstract: Results of recent research strongly suggest that people find beneficial phytochemicals by selecting plants to use as medicinals and that taste plays a major role in this process. The research reported here involved an experiment performed with Highland Tzeltal Maya of Chiapas, Mexico to determine if bitterness served as a chemical cue for plants appropriate for treating gastrointestinal versus respiratory illnesses. Eight Tzeltal men and two women were asked to taste common medicinal preparations, describe the taste, and provide the name and medicinal use of the source plant. They were also shown dried specimens of the same plants and asked for taste, name, and use. Consensus analysis showed that participants had a good knowledge of medicinal plants and agreed about their use, but could not predict the use of individual plants based on taste alone. Bitterness was not correlated with any particular class of illnesses; probably because there is not enough resolution in human taste to deal with the diversity of chemicals that taste bitter but produce different physiological effects. The role of taste is more likely mnemonic than chemical-ecological, and functions in combination with other plant attributes and illness experiences to facilitate human cognition and communication. Results of this study suggest that prototype theory, in which a few plants serve as best examples of a subset of plants used to treat a group of illnesses, may provide a theoretical perspective for understanding how people reduce informational complexity and reconcile the very different domains of plant classification, epidemiological context, and illness experience. Introduction Anthropologists working in regions far from their homes quickly become familiar with new illnesses. Working with the Tzeltal Maya in the Central Highlands of Chiapas, Mexico, I have become personally acquainted with many of the gastrointestinal (GI) afflictions familiar to the people who live there. Recently, while experiencing an illness, I described my symptoms to a Tzeltal collaborator. He didn't consider himself a healing specialist. But without hesitation he claimed that he knew of a particular plant appropriate for relieving my symptoms and speeding my recovery, and he left to search for the plant. Within a half-hour he returned with a handful of leaves of a plant called balam k'in, which he crushed into a cup of cold water. He advised me to drink the bitter fluid all at once, and claimed that no further treatment would be necessary. Within eight hours my symptoms diminished, and by the next morning all evidence of the affliction had vanished. This was the fastest I had ever recovered from the GI distress that I experience all too frequently while working in the region. I later determined that the scientific name of the plant was Smallanthus maculatus, a member of the sunflower family (Asteraceae). Pharmacological studies have shown that extracts of the leaves of this plant are effective at killing bacterial parasites, such as Staphylococcus aureus, and controlling the spasms associated with cramping (Berlin and Berlin 1996). My collaborator was unimpressed with this "new" information. After all, the efficacy of the plant is common knowledge among the people who live in the area. The Tzeltal Maya, like most traditional people, have a complex pharmacopoeia involving hundreds of plant species. The degree of consensus among the population about the complex medicinal uses of around 200 of these species is remarkable (Berlin and Berlin 1996). The process of experimentation, discovery, and transmission of knowledge can be considered a process of ecological adaptation involving complex relationships between pathogens, phytochemicals in the ecosystem, and the biological and cultural constraints on human cognition and communication. These relationships allow one to ask interesting questions. For example, how are discoveries of medicinal plants made? …

The Conceptual Utility of Models in Human Ecology

Abstract: Anthropology and bioecology are currently at a point in their development where researchers in both fields are working towards an integration, which can be described as a form of human ecology. Integration of such disparate disciplines is not easily achieved. Important steps which facilitate integration are the clear definition of terms relevant to the disciplines, and the development of a common framework which would allow the overlapping of domains of the disciplines. The objective of this paper is to contribute to an understanding of human ecosystems by discussing (1) the definition of human ecosystems, and (2) the use of models in illustrating the integration of bio-physical and socio-cultural components of human ecosystems. Icons from the systems modeling languages of H. T. Odum and J.M. Forrester are applied to the modeling of human ecosystems. Specifically, models of R.A. Rappaport's work with the Tsembaga Maring are discussed in terms of their depiction of the components of human ecosystems. Modeling allows one to conceptualize the complexity of human ecosystems, and is an important step towards a human ecology. Introduction In E.P. Odum's (1969) discussion of the development of ecosystems through their "lifetime," he makes it a point to focus part of his discussion on human ecosystems. Noting bioecology's historical omission of humans from ecosystem analysis, he called for a form of ecosystem analysis that considers humans as a part of, not apart from, nature. The recognized role of humans in ecosystem analysis has not changed much since then. Bioecologists continue to treat humans as external to their notion of system, searching for "undisturbed" and "pristine" ecosystems in which to conduct basic research. By focusing on the negative effects of humans on ecological processes, ecologists continue to reinforce the idea that humans are not "natural" biological or ecological entities. Some attempts have been made to integrate humans into ecosystem analysis, but progress among bioecologists is slow. Within conservation and applied ecology there are attempts to integrate humans into ecological systems. A recent book (McDonnell and Pickett 1993) reports a conference in which researchers approached humans as components of ecosystems. The National Science Foundation has recently provided funding to establish Phoenix and Baltimore as Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) sites, where the city itself is treated as an ecosystem. So, bioecologists are beginning to consider humans to be ecological entities, not simply external disturbance factors. Cultural anthropologists, beginning with the cultural ecology of Steward (1949) and White ( 1949) attempted to develop ecological models of human systems. Although these models included energy and (implicitly) matter, they tended to exclude much of the non-human environment. Like bioecology, they also tended to avoid addressing the need to model information. Other cultural anthopologists, like Rappaport (1968), and archeologists (cf. Flannery 1968, Kowalewski et al. 1983), attempted to formalize the modeling of human systems, but this approach began to lose favor by the early 1990s. Current biocultural and life-history approaches (cf. McElroy 1990, Hill 1993) have tended to downplay the systems approach and limited the scope of analysis to a few key variables. If our goal is to gain a complete and useful understanding of human ecology, we still need to develop approaches that incorporate human systems, the non-human environments, and the ephemeral nature of information in human decision making and non-human ecological function. In this paper, I attempt to integrate several concepts and ideas that contribute to our understanding of human ecosystems. I will begin by defining some terms relevant to human ecology. Then I briefly discuss some shortcomings of the bioecological treatment of humans. Lastly, I discuss the role that modeling can play in working toward an integration of the physical, biological, social, and cultural components of human ecosystems. …

Anthropological Evolutionary Ecology: A Critique

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to critically evaluate Anthropological Evolutionary Ecology (AEE) as a paradigm by utilizing the method for theory framework developed by Pickett et al. (1994). While AEE can contribute in some ways to our understanding of human behavior through methods and techniques derived from neo-Darwinian theory (as well as current approaches in animal behavior and decision theory), AEE as a paradigm remains theoretically ill-equipped for the study of human ecology. This critique will focus on Anthropological Evolutionary Ecology, however, references will be made to Biological Evolutionary Ecology (BEE) since AEE relies heavily on theoretical components derived from BEE. Introduction A critique of Anthropological Evolutionary Ecology (AEE) as a theoretical paradigm should begin with a definition of paradigm. Following Kuhn (1970), the definition reads: a paradigm is the world view, belief systems, series of assumptions, methods, techniques and exemplars for problem solution held in common by a scientific community. The critique here is meant to apply to AEE as a theoretical paradigm in general, often referred to as evolutionary behavioral ecology and to its submodels and subtheories, in particular optimal foraging theory and life history theory. The critique is divided into seven sections, closely paralleling the structure of Figure 1. This scheme depicts the general components of theory and their degrees of development. Basically, as theory develops, it changes in two major ways: 1) through the addition of theoretical components (see rows in Figure 1); and 2) through the refinement of components (see columns in Figure 1). This scheme shows both increase in the number and refinement of components as theory matures. The column headings from left to right represent increasing development of theory, whereas the rows from top to bottom indicate increasing completeness of theory. Box 1 describes the major components of theory that are referred to in the rows of Figure 1. Box 2 describes the stages of maturation depicted in the columns of Figure 1. During the early stages of theory development, the emphasis is on the addition of components. By the consolidating stage of theory development all of the components are in place. Subsequently, refinement of components is emphasized. Thus, as theory develops, it becomes more and more complete, by the addition and refinement of theoretical notions, constructs, derived constructs, and structure. Increasing richness of components is a hallmark of maturing theory. For AEE, notions, assumptions, facts, and hypotheses developed early, with assumptions being the first to be fully developed. But notions are not yet fully explicit, and confirmed generalizations, models, translation modes, domain and the framework are still in the process of being refined. The stages of maturation depicted in the columns of Fig. 1 can be thought of as an idealized developmental sequence. Theory change is actually often chaotic, reflecting a combination of different empirical pursuits and different subtheories, and in the case of AEE, more complex or highly derived components have not yet accompanied simpler ones. Draw-ing on other theories for components has also resulted in transfer problems, where those components have acquired different meanings and interpretations problematic in their new context. Nonetheless, the key idea is that the jobs a theory is able to do depend upon its stage of maturity (Box 2); that is, the richness of its roster of theoretical components and their refinement. As a theory begins to take shape and to be used it often becomes clear that existing components must be replaced or refined. Theory may emerge from pre-theoretic notions by adding components, without showing much refinement. At the consolidating stage basic conceptual components are refined, empirical content is refined and expanded, derived conceptual components are added and refined, and the theoretical framework and structure begin to take shape. …

The Significance of the Category 'Insect' for Folk Biological Classification Systems

Abstract: In most human societies, the term 'insect' denotes a category that includes organisms other than those of the Linnaean class Insecta, such as bats, snakes, toads, spiders, lizards, scorpions, and slugs. Such a pattern of ethnozoological classification occurs because human beings tend to project feelings of noisomeness, danger, disgust, and disdain toward some non-insect animals (including people) by allocating them to the culturally determined category 'insect'. Metaphors related to this lexeme highlight the negative aspects that are normally associated with real or imaginary perceptions of 'insects'. This article briefly discusses this cultural pattern. It is suggested that researchers who carry out inventories of biological diversity should take into account the ethnocategory 'insect' during their studies, especially if they are collaborating with members of traditional communities. "Categories are linguistic constructs which enable a culture to give some order to its universe, organize collective perceptions, and bear out relationships between beings and phenomena." (Greene 1995) Introduction The way people perceive, identify, categorize, and classify the natural world intervenes in the way they think, act, and feel in relation to animals. Cross-culturally, humans perceive and group as 'insects' members of the scientific class Insecta and non-insect animals by transferring qualities associated with cultural constructions of the category 'insect.' This lexeme is often used to designate an ethnocategory that includes organisms such as rats, bats, lizards, snakes, toads, vultures, mollusks, earthworms, scorpions, and spiders, among others (Brown 1979, Posey 1983, Laurent 1995). In Greene's conception (1995), 'insects' can be seen as a representational category since they become metaphorical realizations of other beings or their qualities. For example, the Mofu people of northern Cameroon project their own social and political behaviors upon insects in their environment, especially the ants and termites. There is a type of ant known as jaglavak that is considered to be the Prince of the insects (Seignobos et al. 1996). In another example, Suva (1998) has found that of 264 animals that appear in popular expressions, about ten percent were insects. In general, human beings demonstrate attitudes and feelings of disdain, fear, and aversion toward invertebrates and 'insect'-like animals. According to folk perception, "insects are everything that are useless" (Dias 1999). That's why 'insects' are commonly killed. Ramos-Elorduy (1998) has claimed that negative stereotypes of insects (Linnaean category) can be traced to prejudiced attitudes that associate insects with aboriginal people. More positive attitudes towards invertebrates can be found when these animals possess esthetic, utilitarian, ecological or recreational values (Kellert 1993). Different reasons for a consistent human aversion towards insects and other invertebrates can be found in the literature (Kellert 1993). One of these has raised the hypothesis of an innate fear of potentially dangerous insects, which was generalized to include other invertebrates. Another explanation is the association of invertebrates to illnesses and human habitation. A third suggests human alienation to creatures so different and distinct from our own species. To Laurent (1995), the general shape, the morpho-ethological aspects, and the negative sensations attributed to the animals are reasons that explain man's aversion to the invertebrates, particularly to the insects. However, the reasons for which animals other than insects are also named as such have not been recorded in a systematic way. Categorization of animals from different scientific taxa using a single linguistic label constitutes a pattern of ethnozoological classification discussed by Costa-Neto (1999) through the Entomoprojective Ambivalence Hypothesis. Humans tend to project feelings of harmfulness, danger, irritability, repugnance, and disdain toward non-insect animals (including people) by associating them with the culturally defined category 'insect. …