Showing papers in "Journal of Cognition and Culture in 2001"

Spreading Non-natural Concepts: The Role of Intuitive Conceptual Structures in Memory and Transmission of Cultural Materials ¤

Abstract: The four experiments presented support Boyer’ s theory that counterintuitive concepts have transmission advantages that account for the commonness and ease of communicating many non-natural cultural concepts. In Experiment 1, 48 American college students recalled expectation-violating items from culturally unfamiliar folk stories better than more mundane items in the stories. In Experiment 2, 52 American college students in a modie ed serial reproduction task transmitted expectation-violating items in a written narrative more successfully than bizarre or common items. In Experiments 3 and 4, these e ndings were replicated with orally presented and transmitted stimuli, and found to persist even after three months. To sum, concepts with single expectation-violating features were more successfully transmitted than concepts that were entirely congruent with category-level expectations, even if they were highly unusual or bizarre. This transmission advantage for counterintuitive concepts may explain, in part, why such concepts are so prevalent across cultures and so readily spread.

Folkbiology doesn't come from folkpsychology: evidence from yukatek maya in cross-cultural perspective

Abstract: Nearly all psychological research on basic cognitive processes of category formation and reasoning uses sample populations associated with large research institutions in technologically-advanced societies. Lopsided attention to a select participant pool risks biasing interpretation, no matter how large the sample or how statistically reliable the results. The experiments in this article address this limitation. Earlier research with urban-USA children suggests that biological concepts are (1) thoroughly enmeshed with their notions of naive psychology, and (2) strikingly human-centered. Thus, if children are to develop a causally appropriate model of biology, in which humans are seen as simply one animal among many, they must undergo fundamental conceptual change. Such change supposedly occurs between 7 and 10 years of age, when the human-centered view is discarded. The experiments reported here with Yukatek Maya speakers challenge the empirical generality and theoretical importance of these claims. Part 1 shows that young Maya children do not anthropocentrically interpret the biological world. The anthropocentric bias of American children appears to owe to a lack of cultural familiarity with non-human biological kinds, not to initial causal understanding of folkbiology as such. Part 2 shows that by age of 4-5 (the earliest age tested in this regard) Yukatek Maya children employ a concept of innate species potential or underlying essence much as urban American children seem to, namely, as an inferential framework for understanding the affiliation of an organism to a biological species, and for projecting known and unknown biological properties to organisms in the face of uncertainty. Together, these experiments indicate that folkpsychology cannot be the initial source of folkbiology. They also underscore the possibility of a species-wide and domain-specific basis for acquiring knowledge about the living world that is constrained and modified but not caused or created by prior non-biological thinking and subsequent cultural experience.

Evolution's Pedagogy: An Adaptationist Model of Pretense and Entertainment

Abstract: The portrayal of the actions of fictive characters for purposes of entertainment is a familiar phenomenon. Theories that seek to explain why we are attracted to such fictions and whether we learn from them have produced no consensus and no adequate overall account. In this paper, we present the hypothesis that entertainment relies on cognitive adaptations for pretend play. As a simplified model system, we draw on our field study of children's chase play, which is characterized by an elementary form of pretense. The children pretend, at first without consciously representing their pretense, to be chased by predators. The details of this behavior, widespread among mammals, indicate that the biological function of the game may be to train predator-evasion strategies. Chase play, we suggest, evolved in early mammals because it enabled cheap and plentiful resources to be used to train strategies for events that are rare, dangerous, and expensive. More generally, we argue that pretense is used to access spaces of possible actions in order to locate and practice new strategies. It relies on the creation of a simulated scenario and requires sophisticated source monitoring. The simulation is experienced as intrinsically rewarding; boredom is a design feature to motivate the construction of a more appropriate pedagogical situation, while the thrill of play signals optimal learning conditions. The conscious narrative elaboration of chase games involves an elementary form of role play, where we propose a virtual agent is created that tracks and acts on the memories required for coherent action within the simulation. These complex if familiar design features, we suggest, provide a minimalist functional and adaptationist account of the central features of entertainment: that it is fun, that it involves us imaginatively and emotionally, and that it has a tacit pedagogical effect. The model provides a principled and testable account of fiction-based entertainment grounded in evolutionary and cognitive processes.

Ritual Intuitions: Cognitive Contributions to Judgments of Ritual Efficacy

Abstract: Lawson and McCauley (1990) have argued that non-cultural regularities in how actions are conceptualized inform and constrain participants’ understandings of religious rituals. This theory of ritual competence generates three predictions: 1) People with little or no knowledge of any given ritual system will have intuitions about the potential effectiveness of a ritual given minimal information about the structure of the ritual. 2) The representation of superhuman agency in the action structure will be considered the most important factor contributing to effectiveness. 3) Having an appropriate intentional agent initiate the action will be considered relatively more important than any specie c action to be performed. These three predictions were tested in two experiments with 128 North American Protestant college students who rated the probability of various e ctitious rituals to be effective in bringing about a specie ed consequence. Results support Lawson and McCauley’ s predictions and suggest that expectations regarding ordinary social actions apply to religious rituals.

Zafimaniry: An Understanding of What Is Passed on from Parents to Children: A Cross-Cultural Investigation

Abstract: Children (aged 7 to 16 years) and adults from a remote Zafimaniry village in eastern Madagascar were probed for their intuitive understanding of the biological inheritance of bodily features. They were told a story about a baby adopted at birth, and were asked whether, when grown, he would be more likely to resemble his birth parents or his adoptive parents in bodily traits, beliefs, preferences, temperaments, and skills. In spite of the fact that the Zafimaniry, like other Southeast Asian and Malagasy peoples, profess explicit beliefs concerning the fixation of individuals' properties that are at variance with Western folkbiology, Zafimaniry adults responded as do American adults on the task. Zafimaniry children, however, did not repond as did the adults, nor did they respond as did the majority of American children. Rather, they responded in the manner most consistent with what would be predicted, for children as well as for adults, from the ethnographic literature. That is, they tended to judge that an adopted boy would resemble his adoptive rather than his birth parents on virtually all traits, including bodily traits. The implications of these findings for current debates within cognitive science and anthropology are discussed.

Transmissive Frequency, Ritual, and Exegesis

Abstract: Certain aspects of the relations between ritual action and ritual meaning are determined by socially regulated cycles of transmissive frequency, via the highly structured operations of human memory. Evidence is presented in this article that: (i) the relative scarcity of spontaneous exegetical reflection and the relatively wide dissemination of standard official exegesis in routinized traditions, may be explained by the dynamics of implicit procedural memory and the opportunities afforded by repetition for the spread of stable theological/exegetical representations encoded in semantic memory; (ii) the relative scarcity or restricted distribution of official exegesis and the relatively high degree of elaboration of spontaneous exegetical reflection in rare and climactic rituals, may be explained by the dynamics of episodic memory. These arguments are shown to have potentially significant implications for epidemiological perspectives on cognition and religion.

How Ordinary Cognition Informs Petitionary Prayer

Abstract: Four studies (two experiments, a journaling study, and a questionnaire) conducted with American Protestant college students explored intuitions concerning petitionary prayer. Since Protestant theology offers little teaching on through which modes of causation God is most likely to act, it was hypothesized that intuitive causal cognition would be used to generate inferences regarding this aspect of petitionary prayer. Participants in these studies favored asking God to act via psychological causation over the biological and mechanistic domains. Further, in fictitious scenarios participants reported being more likely to ask a supercomputer or Superman to solve a problem through mechanistic intervention than God. These results are consistent with two previous findings: that God is often intuitively represented as having a single physical location (and it is not nearby); and psychosocial agents (such as God) are expected to require physical contact to act on non-agents.

The Development of Children's Beliefs about Prayer

Abstract: In this study we explored the development of children's beliefs about the concept of prayer. Three- to 8-year-old children were given a combination of tasks and structured interview questions designed to assess a number of basic aspects of their concepts of prayer. We also considered potential relations between children's concepts of prayer and two other explanatory systems — naive psychology and magic — by probing understanding of the roles of knowledge and thinking in prayer and by comparing beliefs in prayer to beliefs in wishing. Results revealed significantly more sophisticated concepts of prayer than found in previous studies, including an earlier understanding of its mentalistic nature. We propose a new developmental trajectory for children's understanding of prayer and discuss interrelations between children's religious beliefs and their developing ontologies.

Lies, Mistakes, and Blessings: Defining and Characteristic Features in Conceptual Development

Abstract: In this study, we examined the extent to which young children can be influenced by the perceived blessed status of an actor in their evaluations of behavior as a lie or mistake. Children aged 4 and 5 years attending Catholic schools in an urban center in Northern Italy were provided with a situation in which two girls in church were blessed with holy water ("blessed condition") or shook the priest's hand ("not blessed"). The girls were then placed in a setting in which each told a third girl that contaminated juice was good to drink: one deliberately lied and the other had no knowledge of the contaminant and made a mistake. Significantly more children judged both girls to have made a mistake in the blessed condition than in the not blessed condition. Their accuracy in distinguishing mistakes from lies in the not blessed condition resembled that reported in previous research in which traits such as blessedness (or its absence) were not assigned to the perpetrators. Thus children often perceived lying as uncharacteristic of the blessed whereas they applied the definition of lying as involving intentional falsehood for the not blessed. The results are discussed in terms of an early cultural cognition that involves beliefs about processes of purification and positive contagion.

Sorting is not Categorization: A Critique of the Claim that Brazilians Have Fuzzy Racial Categories

Abstract: As a result of a spate of studies geared to investigating Brazilian racial categories, it is now believed by many that Brazilians reason about race in a manner quite different to that of Americans This paper will argue that this conclusion is premature, as the studies in question have not, in fact, investigated Brazilian categories What they have done is elicit sorting tasks on the basis of appearances, but the cognitive models of respondents have not been investigated in order to determine what are the boundaries of their concepts Sorting based on appearances is not sufficient to infer the boundaries of concepts whenever appearance is not a defining criterion for the concepts in question, as the case appears to be for racial and ethnic categories Following a critique of the methods used, I review a terminological and theoretical confusion concerning the use of the terms 'emic' and 'etic' in anthropology that appears directly responsible for the failure so far to choose methods appropriate to parsing the conceptual domain of 'race' in Brazil

Theistic Percepts in Other Species: Can Chimpanzees Represent the Minds of Non-Natural Agents?

Abstract: The present theoretical article addresses the empirical question of whether other species, particularly chimpanzees, have the cognitive substrate necessary for experiencing theistic and otherwise non-natural (i.e., non-physical) percepts. The primary representational device presumed to underlie religious cognition was viewed as, in general, the capacity to attribute unobservable causal mechanisms to ostensible output and, in particular, a theory of mind. Drawing from a catalogue of behaviors that may be considered diagnostic of the secondary representations involved in theory of mind (or at least theory of mind precursors), important dissimilarities between humans and other species in the realms of the animate-inanimate distinction (self-propelledness versus mental agency of animate beings), imaginative play (feature-dependent make-believe versus true symbolic play), and the death concept (biological death conceptualization versus psychological death conceptualization) were shown. Differences in these domains support the claim that humans alone possess the foundational and functional representations inherent in religious experiences.

Genomic Imprinting and the Cognitive Architecture Mediating Human Culture

Abstract: Genomic imprinting may be implicated in the origin and maintenance of the cognitive architecture required for cultural transmission. Relatedness asymmetries are expected to lead to increases in the receptibility of matrilineally transmitted information. This may help explain why maternal genes contribute preferentially to the neocortex. That is, maternal genes could influence biases in the transmission and/or acquisition of information. This perspective is complementary to gene-culture coevolutionary approaches.

On the possibility of different sorts of racial categories

Abstract: Inspired by his own Ž eldwork with Torguud nomads in Mongolia, Francisco Gil-White’s article “Sorting is not categorization” contributes to a long-running discussion about the speciŽ city of Brazilian racial categories in opposition to other racial categories such as those in the United States. He questions the heuristic value of Marvin Harris’ methodology and therefore doubts the substantive hypothesis based on the results of these methods — that Brazilians and Americans have a fundamentally different system of racial categories. Gil-White additionally proposes the opposite hypothesis — that Brazilian racial categories have much the same structure as those of the United States:

God is not in the Mirror

Abstract: In response to my paper on possible phylogenetic divergence in the case of theistic percepts, Gallup and Maser argue that an alternative — and more heuristic — approach to studying religious phenomena can be found in neuroanatomical mapping of cognitive functions that seem to play some role in this category of thought. On the one hand, the argument is sound and will probably come to be prescient; cognitive neuroscience should begin to emerge as an increasingly important player in the newly overlapping Ž elds of cognition and comparative religion. Indeed, initial strides have already been taken in just this area (Shaver & Rabin 1997). But on the other hand, it is somewhat misguided in that it implies that neurological methods are alternative rather than complementary ways to go about seriously studying the cognitive foundations of religion. The representational systems outlined in my article are inherently brain-based, and there is, as Gallup and Maser point out, reason to assume some degree of localization of the general aspects associated with them. Until comparative neuropsychologists are able to discern the seemingly subtle differences in the brains of humans and our closest living relatives, however, we can produce only admittedly speculative hunches as to the unique adaptive functioning of the neuroanatomical regions in question. However, it is worth pointing out that there are considerable morphological differences between humans and chimpanzees in precisely the area of the brain that is presumed responsible for allowing the attribution of mental states. The human prefrontal cortex has expanded substantially over the past 5-8 million years, is signiŽ cantly larger than homologous structures of the African great apes, and occupies more of the cerebral mantle (Povinelli