Showing papers in "Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies in 2012"

Supercooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to Succeed

Abstract: Supercooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to Succeed Martin A. Nowak with Roger Highfield Free Press, 2011Through mathematical modeling and game theory, Martin Nowak of Harvard University highlights the crucial role of cooperation in human evolution. The problem of cooperation between two individuals (or groups) is illustrated in the Prisoner's Dilemma, wherein the best possible outcome for individuals would be to act in the name of self-interest, which, simultaneously, is the strategy of the other side. Collectively, however, cooperation would result in the best payoff. To the layman, then, self-interest mediated competition would appear to be the dominant mechanism in the struggle for survival and reproduction in a world of competing interests. From this purely abstract view, it would appear that augmenting the reproductive fitness of a competitor, while at the same time lowering one's own fitness through cooperation does not make sense. But it is now recognized that cooperation between individuals that comprise a breeding population or "gene pool" will enhance the survival of that community's genes, whether in the struggle to survive in the face of an adverse environment or in competition against rival groups for control over the same vital resources. Nowak points out a number of natural examples and mathematical models of cooperative interaction between would-be competitors. While mutation and natural selection remain the principle components of evolution, Nowak proposes "natural cooperation" as a "third principle" component. Although Nowak frames cooperation within a mathematical context, mercifully, the book is not heavy in mathematics.Nowak suggests that cooperation underlies the evolution of biological systems of wide-ranging complexity. At one end of the scale is the "primordial pizza," a random clustering on a hard surface (in contrast to the liquid substrate of the "primordial soup") of complex molecules, precursor substances of life, derived from simple chemicals. Sprinkled about the "pizza" are micro-environments shaped by interactions depending on molecules residing within that space. A form of chemical cooperation is envisioned as facilitating the replication of selected complementary molecules, thereby outcompeting molecules that do not replicate. Such self-replicating, selfcatalyzing molecules are envisioned as precursors to RNA. More extensive cooperation between replicating molecules and those that increase chemical reactions is presumed to give rise to further complex, long-chained molecules, including DNA. Around the "scaffolding" of interacting replicating molecules arose unicellular then multicellular organisms. Thus, in Nowak's view, cooperation is older than life itself.Cooperation is observed in complex systems, between cells within tissues and between organ systems within organism. Cooperation within a population, of either cells or organisms, may lead to "greater diversity by new specializations ... and new divisions of labor," and, in turn, greater network (or social) complexity. However, there is no guarantee that such a population will retain its stability over time. Non-cooperators, or "defectors," which spurn cooperation in favor of self-interest, will emerge (e.g. cancer cells). As defectors increasingly dominate a population, the network built upon cooperation collapses. Following the collapse however, a new social structure based on cooperation could re-emerge, and the cycle of growth and decline begins anew. Although the cycle is viewed primarily in the context of living organisms, this thinking could be applied to abstract systems in which cooperation and self-interest exists-economics and global warming appear several times in the book in this context. With the modern technology available to humans to solve problems related to fitness and survival, Nowak holds out hope that humanity will be able to extend periods of cooperation and shorten the period of defection or at least lessen its impact. …

Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010

Abstract: Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010 Charles Murray Crown Forum, 2012Over the past few decades, preoccupied with the minority underclass, the media and academia have largely ignored the white lower class, which has grown under the radar screen. The result of this omission is that "white" has become nearly synonymous for "affluent" in any mention from those sources. In Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010, Charles Murray seeks a more accurate perception, examining trends over the past several decades that have markedly changed the class structure in America.For Murray, America changed irrevocably on November 22, 1963 - the day President John F. Kennedy was assassinated. Prior to that watershed event, Americans, for the most part, shared a common culture and a common value system. They obeyed norms with remarkable consistency. Marriage was universal for all races and divorce was rare. Almost always, mothers stayed home to raise their children. Overwhelmingly, men were active in the labor force, as there was a strong taboo against idleness. Rates of incarceration were but a fraction of what they are today. And popular culture - even Hollywood - reflected this consensus.That common culture is now gone. In its stead, Murray sees the development of two distinct cultures - one functional and the other dysfunctional - that reflect the values and lifestyles of their respective classes. At the apex is the upper class, a "narrow elite" - numbering fewer than a thousand people - which runs the nation's economic, political, and cultural institutions. More numerous is the new upper- middle class, which Murray operationally defines as those people who are the most successful 5 percent of the adult population ages 25 and older who work in management, the professions, and in content- production jobs in the media. For the new lower class, Murray posits that there are no sharp edges for deciding who belongs and who does not. Nevertheless, he identifies, three categories that are problematical for America's civic culture: men whose income is below the poverty line (as measured by the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey); low-income single women with children; and "isolates" - that is, men who are making a decent living and women who are not single mothers but who are disconnected from the matrix of community life.Murray laments that the narrow elite - and increasingly the new upper-middle class - are woefully ignorant of the rest of America. By the late twentieth century, the best educated and most affluent increasingly segregated themselves from the rest of American society. To Murray, this balkanization is problematic, as he muses: "It is not a problem if truck drivers cannot empathize with the priorities of Yale professors. It is a problem if Yale professors, or producers of network news programs, or CEOs of great corporations, or presidential advisers cannot emphasize with the priorities of truck drivers."What accounts for this insularity? According to Murray, college education was instrumental in this elite segregation. As he observes, prior to 1960, the academic profile of freshmen admitted to elite schools was not much higher than it was for other colleges in the United States. However, a cognitive stratification occurred soon thereafter in which the brightest students flocked to the elite colleges and universities. This led to homogamy, or the interbreeding of persons with similar characteristics. In this case, young men and women of marriageable age found one another at elite schools and went on to produce intelligent children, which reinforced their cognitive advantages to the next generation. As a consequence, a disproportionate share of exceptional children now comes from parents who are already part of the broad elite. What is more, as Murray notes, the modern economy is far more rewarding of cognitive ability than it was in the past. Whereas, wage earners in the upper quartile experienced impressive gains from 1970 to 2010, wages for workers in the bottom half were flat. …

The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China

Abstract: The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China Jay Taylor Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011Jay Taylor is a Research Associate at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, having once served as the China desk officer in the U.S. State Department. When we consider the extensive original materials to which Taylor has had access, we can understand how it is that this very detailed, and yet readably accessible, chronological account of the life of Chiang Kai-shek is a substantial addition to the literature on modern China. Those materials, available through the Hoover Institution Archives, include the 56 years of Chiang's personal diary (the final portion of which was not released until the summer of 2009), and abundant memos and letters. Although the first Harvard University Press edition of this book came out in late 2008, Taylor added a Postscript in late 2010 to reflect those more recently released diary entries, which he reports have not contradicted any of the information conveyed in the original text.Chiang Kai-shek was, of course, one of the monumental figures of the twentieth century. His life, and the role he played at the center of China's history during the decades that followed the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, are essential pieces in the historical mosaic. This would make Taylor's biography of particular interest even if it were not made exceptional by the sources he has been able to employ.There are reasons, however, to see the book as both valuable and important while at the same time entertaining significant reservations about it. Taylor shows every indication of being a careful and meticulous scholar, and one who arrives at considerable objectivity by virtue of a basic fair-mindedness that precludes writing a partisan polemic. At the same time, however, he comes from an academic milieu that colors his perception of personalities and events and that atrophies his moral sensibilities. That academic milieu has long produced the conventionally accepted perception of Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek. As is well known, during the critical years that led to Mao's 1949 conquest of the Chinese mainland, a coterie of American intellectuals insisted that the Chinese Communists weren't really Communists at all, but were social democrats and "agrarian reformers." (John K. Fairbank, after whom the Fairbank Center at Harvard is named, was among them.) The result is that when Taylor undertakes to write a biography of Chiang, his conscientious narrative is sprinkled, here and there, with perversities of judgment that have been formed in this crucible, even though in various connections he has broken free of the conventional views.Taylor speaks of himself as a "moderate liberal and foreign policy pragmatist." This means that in the context of today's intellectual culture his views would be seen as eminently reasonable. It is necessarily jarring to its "moderate" consensus to observe, as we must, that its understanding, not just of Mao but of Communism much more broadly, has been colored by a reality-denying condonation. Consider, for example, the passage in which Taylor describes a dichotomy as having existed in the 1940s between "the rational and secular humanist strains of both the Western and Chinese enlightenments," on the one hand, and "the ultra-nationalism, racism, and absolutism of atavistic fascism," on the other. Whom does he place on the "rational and secular humanist" side of this dichotomy? - "the liberal democratic, the pragmatic authoritarian, and the Jacobin totalitarian." Thus, we are given to believe that the Communist regimes of Stalin and Mao, in the latter of these categories, stood on the "rational and secular humanist" side of the ledger. It is no doubt this orientation that prompts Taylor to give his readers a much understated description of Mao's "Great Leap Forward" in the late 1950s. Unless otherwise informed, a reader would have no idea that from 26 to 30 million people were starved to death in the largest atrocity in history. …

Bailout: An Inside Account of How Washington Abandoned Main Street While Rescuing Wall Street

Abstract: Bailout: An Inside Account of How Washington Abandoned Main Street While Rescuing Wall Street Neil Barofsky Free Press, 2012When asked "what would you do if you were made a dictator?," the eminent Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises replied "I would resign," a response fully in keeping with his libertarian bent. We might well think that our answer would be the same if asked that question. But before resigning, a reluctant dictator-designate would do well to issue at least one edict: that every intelligent member of the society read Neil Barofsky's Bailout. If there is any one book that lucidly and engagingly tells the story of the U.S. government's response to the recent economic crisis and at the same time reveals the depths of American political and financial venality, it is Bailout.Without being a "Washington insider," Barofsky has been ideally situated to give an inside account of the massive bailout that began with the enactment of TARP (the "Troubled Asset Relief Program") in late 2008. He was named by President George W. Bush, and confirmed by the U. S. Senate, to be the "Special Inspector General of TARP" (thus, the acronym SIGTARP), and continued in that capacity under President Barack Obama. In all, he served as the inspector general from December 15, 2008 to March 31, 2011. While formally on the organization chart of the U.S. Treasury Department, Barofsky was intended to be, and was, an independent watchdog. As the book makes clear, his independence consisted of a tenacious refusal to be anyone's lapdog. Before he was appointed, he was a tough-minded prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney's office for the Southern District of New York, among other things going after the vicious narco-terrorist FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces) cartel in Colombia before proceeding to a major accounting fraud prosecution. One would hardly have expected President Bush, a Republican, to name Barofsky the SIGTARP, since Barofsky is a Democrat and had just contributed to the 2008 Obama campaign. (It is worth noticing this, because the book is nonpartisan in its scathing criticism of both administrations' coziness with Big Money and ham-handed administration of public business.)Even without counting the billions in American "stimulus" spending and voluminous "quantitative easing" by the U. S. central bank, the "financial bailout" has indeed been massive. U.S. government commitments have amounted to an amazing $23.7 trillion dollars (although Barofsky is quick to explain that a "commitment" is different from an actual pay-out, which came to what we might call a "mere" $4.7 trillion dollars before repayments reduced the sum to $3 trillion). Certain truisms come to mind: that programs of such size almost inherently rule out careful administration; and that gigantic piles of cash (called "Whales" by those in the know) will inevitably serve as powerful magnets attracting extraordinary cupidity. (Along these lines, but citing an instance in a totally different connection, Barofsky refers to "the pervasive fraud in the Iraqi reconstruction effort.") When the monetarist economist Milton Friedman was asked what he would do to stop a depression, he joked that he would get a helicopter and simply drop cash on the society. That pretty well characterizes the response of the Bush/Obama administrations to the financial crisis. What Barofsky describes is amazing - a blunderbuss approach with little supervision or caring about supervising, and much corruption, both "legal" and illegal.For most of us, the conundrum throughout the crisis has been: "How can we possibly know all that has been going on, both in detail and in broad overview?" In short compass, Barofsky's book supplies that need. He was centrally situated to witness the events as they unfolded and to have the information we all wish we had. Moreover, his independent mentality and outspoken tenacity make him the ideal observer. A cravenly observer whose reporting was skewed by partisan bias or who would shrink from the truth out of concern for his career would produce a book of little value. …

Free Trade Doesn't Work: What Should Replace It and Why

Abstract: Free Trade Doesn't Work: What Should Replace It and Why Ian Fletcher Coalition for a Prosperous America, 2011 editionThe old labels that squared "Free Trade" offagainst "Protectionism" hardly seem adequate in today's context, since old habits of thought about them will incline us toward a far too quick and simple prejudgment of an issue of great intricacy and importance. As everyone knows, developments in transportation and communication have in recent decades brought into existence the tornadic winds of global competition, exposing nations, firms and workers to rapid displacement by low-cost producers and workers from parts of the world that used to be effectively quite distant. To those who look only to "economic efficiency," this is praised as "creative destruction"; but those who focus on a desire of particular peoples or localities to retain or develop industries that will not be nullified by the distant competition will seek ways to prevent their being blown away. According to nineteenth-century economist David Ricardo's law of "comparative advantage," all economic actors are assured "something to do," but that something may be very different from the aspirations or the long-term capabilities of a given people.Ian Fletcher's Free Trade Doesn't Work is among the very best books on the subject. Although the candor of its title, which indicates a clear dissent from the prevailing faith in global markets, may turn many people away, the book is one that everyone, from whatever point of view, will profit from reading. (We say this on the premise that serious readers realize the intellectual insufficiency of reading only what they already believe.) While immensely informative about economic history, the book's main strength is in its straight-forward, in-depth discussion of the vitally important conceptual and policy issues that underlie the subject.It has become commonplace among those who see the flaws in the Ricardian analysis to praise the brilliance of Ralph Gomory and William Baumol's Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests (2000). Fletcher joins in this, his rationale being that "finally, someone has found a way to translate this eminently practical wisdom [of the anti-free trade position] into the abstruse mathematics economists are prepared to consider 'serious' economics." While we can see from this that the Gomory-Baumol contribution is indeed meaningful, it is a distinct advantage of the Fletcher book, so far as most readers will be concerned, that it eschews the "abstruse mathematics" and confines itself to a serious, albeit eminently readable, discussion in ordinary language.Educated at Columbia and the University of Chicago, Fletcher was a research fellow at the United States Business & Industry Council before becoming senior economist at the Coalition for a Prosperous America. The book's first edition, in 2010, was published by the Council, and the revised second edition by the Coalition.As one would expect, there is considerable information in Free Trade Doesn't Work about the United States' slipping economic condition, which has been marked by a hollowing-out of American industry that began as long ago as the 1960s. He talks about the loss of what was once a pronounced lead in high technology; about the shiftto financialization; about the loss of U.S. jobs, including those in engineering and architecture; and about the deindustrialization. When he asks "why are we doing this to ourselves?," he says that there is some free-trade fanaticism, but that the main factor is simply the near-universal naive belief that economists must be right in their adherence to the Ricardian faith. This is augmented, he says, by U.S. businesses' hewing closely to their individual interests, by the political clout of defense contractors, and by such venalities as that "fully half the American trade diplomats who leftgovernment service went to work for foreign nations." President Obama, he recounts, has played both sides of the free trade/protectionist issue according to what has been politically advantageous from time to time, but since his election has mainly acted according to free trade orthodoxy (such as by not renegotiating NAFTA as he had once stoutly affirmed that he would in a primary election-season debate with Hillary Clinton). …

Will Saudi Arabia Face an Energy Crisis

Abstract: Saudi Arabia holds the world' s largest proven oil reserves and the fourth-largest natural gas reserves. Despite these massive hydrocarbon deposits, the kingdom has launched ambitious plans to build nuclear reactors and to utilize solar power. This essay examines the reasons behind these initiatives and the efforts to establish the necessary technological infrastructure to implement them. This article argues that developing alternative energy resources is not enough to improve the nation's energy outlook, and that the Saudi authority needs to address the alarming surge in domestic consumption.Key Words: Saudi Arabia energy; Solar power; Nuclear power; Alternative energy development; Efficiency.For decades some energy analysts have claimed that Saudi Arabia's oil production has peaked and started declining. Matthew R. Simmons' book, Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy (Wiley, 2005) was a clear representative of this line of analysis. These arguments and predictions, however, have been proven pessimistic and inaccurate. In 2010 the kingdom produced more than 10 million barrels per day (b/d), 12 percent of the world's total production.1 In other words, Saudi Arabia was the world's second largest oil producer after Russia (which has 12.9 percent of world's total). These figures are a bit misleading. The fact is that with 5.6 percent of the world's proven reserves, Russia seems to be fast depleting its oil deposits. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia holds the world's largest proven reserves (19.1 percent), which means that the kingdom will remain a top oil producer much longer than Russia. Furthermore, the International Energy Agency and the Energy Information Administration, among others, project that a growing share of the world's demand for oil in the coming decades will be met by Persian Gulf producers, led by Saudi Arabia. Finally, since the late 2000s, the kingdom has maintained the world's largest spare capacity. This large capacity gives Riyadh a leading role in stabilizing global oil markets in time of natural or political crises.This rosy picture, however, does not tell the whole story. True, the kingdom is blessed with abundant hydrocarbon deposits, but these oil and gas deposits are not infinite. Another important side of the energy equation is the rapid rising Saudi oil consumption. In 2000 the kingdom consumed approximately 1.5 million b/d. Ten years later, it consumed about 2.8 million b/d. In other words, the country's consumption almost doubled within a decade. This trend has significant domestic and international ramifications. Simply stated, more domestic consumption means less oil available for export. Currently Saudi Arabia consumes approximately 23 percent of its oil production and 32 percent of its export. Oil revenues provide the backbone of the country's national income. Diminishing revenues would lead to economic stagnation and weaken domestic social and political stability. On the other hand, despite all the efforts to diversify the energy mix, the world still runs on oil and Saudi Arabia is the leading player. Less Saudi oil would push prices higher and deal a heavy blow to the fragile global economy.The good news is that this bleak scenario is not imminent. There is a small window of opportunity where this trend can be reversed. Equally important, the Saudi leaders seem to be aware of the challenge facing their nation and the necessity to take drastic actions to articulate and implement appropriate strategies. Ali al-Naimi, Minister of Oil, argues that using alternative sources of energy that are reliable and sustainable will free more oil for export and "reduce dependence on hydrocarbon resources and keep them as a source of income for a longer period."2This essay will examine Saudi Arabia's efforts to diversify its energy mix away from oil and to utilize alternative energy resources, mainly nuclear and renewable power. Several other countries in the Middle East (and elsewhere) are pursuing similar strategies. …

Confidence Game: How a Hedge Fund Manager Called Wall Street's Bluff

Abstract: Confidence Game: How a Hedge Fund Manager Called Wall Street's BluffChristine S. Richard John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2010Many of the books about the recent financial crisis discuss the financial system in general and analyze the complex mixture of flaws and abuses that caused the debacle. Others approach the subject by telling the story of individual companies and personalities. Confidence Game is one of these, centering on a particular episode that serves as a microcosm that illustrates the whole. The story it tells is fascinating, notwithstanding this reviewer's opinion that it is longer and more detailed than it needs to be.In 1993, Bill Ackman and his fellow graduate of the Harvard Business School David Berkowitz co-founded the Gotham Partners hedge fund, starting with $3 million and increasing its assets to over $350 million by 2001. It appears that Ackman used the fund in part to engage in a rather odd but highly profitable pursuit. No one would expect the author of this book, Christine Richard, to match Victor Hugo stylistically, but as a bond market business reporter first for Dow Jones and later for Bloomberg News she has fashioned a readable, novel-like narrative that could well be described as the Les Miserables of the recent financial debacle. She follows Ackman from day to day as over several years he tormented - as in Hugo's book police inspector Javert stayed on the tail of Jean Valjean - a giant quarry known as the Municipal Bond Insurance Association (MBIA). Predicting MBIA's eventual downfall to all who would listen, Ackman shorted MBIA's stock and purchased, at a cost of about $10 million a year, almost two billion dollars' worth of "credit default swap" contracts (i.e., insurance contracts) that would pay offto his fund if MBIA took bankruptcy. In the end, as things came to smash during the financial crisis, his fund wound up making $1.1 billion from the shorting of the stock, as the credit-rating agencies stripped the MBIA of the triple-A rating that was essential to its business as a municipal bond insurer.Ackman made constant complaints against MBIA - in an October 2002 letter to his investors explaining why he was massively shorting MBIA's stock, to regulators, in talks with a Wall Street Journal reporter, in presentations to financial analysts, in a 66-page report, and, among other such contacts, in a letter to the board of directors of Moody's, one of the three large credit-rating agencies. Ackman explained in his letter to his investors that the gist of his criticisms was that "we believe [MBIA] has inadequate reserves, undisclosed credit-quality problems, aggressive accounting, and substantial unconsolidated indebtedness contained in off-balancesheet special-purpose vehicles." A thread that runs through the book is the question of whether Ackman was trying to manipulate the market, causing MBIA's stock to fall, so that his fund could profit from its decline. The somewhat surprising answer, as Richard explains, is that it is not unlawful as market manipulation to attack a company if everything that is said is true, even if the person making the attack and contributing to the company's decline in the market stands to profit from doing so.Although Richard focuses on Ackman's dogged contrarianism, it is a necessary and valuable part of her book to explain the intricacies of the business of insuring municipal bonds. It turns out that she can hardly do this without also explaining the vast multi-trillion dollar web of financial relationships in several of the different dimensions of the financial world. Her explanations make this book a combination of a Hugo-type novel and a primer for laymen about the financial crisis, each aspect interwoven with the other. We simultaneously follow Ackman's pursuit of MBIA and read Richard's descriptions of the incredibly complex financial world that was constructed in the few years immediately prior to the crash in 2008.If we are to understand all this, it is best to start by knowing just what sort of business MBIA conducted. …

Religious and Cultural Systems as Agents of Change in Developing Areas

Abstract: Do cultural and religious systems play a role in mobilizing for political and socio-economic change in developing areas? This is the overriding question of this paper. The central thesis is that cultural and religious systems do not only deeply form and inform the Weltanschauung of the vast majority of people in developing areas but also remain pervasive and vital institutions that can be used (or abused) in creating consensus and mobilizing society for change. This paper seeks to demonstrate how religious and cultural systems - theorized in the Geertzian and Tillichian sense as "meaning systems" - affect the way a society mobilizes for political and socioeconomic change. The paper points out that a recognition of the significance of religion as an agent affecting the direction of and potential for change in society has yet to penetrate mainstream development thinking and practice.Key Words: Culture; Religion; Developing world; Meaning Systems; Development thinking.1. Introduction'Far from being in decline in the modern world, religion is actually experiencing a resurgence.... The assumption we live in a secularised world is false.... The world today is as furiously religious as it ever was' (Berger, 1999: 3).After World War II, the field of development studies was cast exclusively in economic terms, with culture and religion shunted to the margins of international policy (Haynes, 2007: 1). This economic framing of development was underpinned by two fundamental assumptions: (1) that the rise of modernization will cause religion to sink into atrophy,1 crystallized by the Weberian (1978) formula of 'the disenchantment of the world/die Entzauberung der Welt,' and (2) that there should be a strict bifurcation between religion and politics (Denevlin and Rakodi, 2011; Cox, 1966; Haynes, 2007). Early modernization theorists saw religion as fundamentally incompatible with modernity (Casanova, 1994), while dependendistas2 deemed it so irrelevant as to merit only an occasional footnote in their writings (Handelman, 2002 Ver Beek (2002: 55) expresses consternation over the paucity of religious discourses in high-impact development journals. This led him to call religion a 'development taboo.' Denis Goulet (1980: 481) famously refers to these anti-religious and reductionist views as 'one-eyed giants' because 'they analyse, prescribe and act as if... human destiny could be stripped to its material dimensions alone.'However, hard-on-the-heels of the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the deepening of globalisation in the 1990s, the hitherto 'one-eyed' model of development underwent a striking volteface, with faith-based organisations (FBOs)3 gaining increased currency in modernity (Thomas, 2005; Fukuyama, 1999). This discernible religious turn in development was due, in part, to the failure of secular development trajectories to stem the tide of poverty and inequality in developing regions (Haynes, 2007:1), in what Scott Thomas (2000: 49) calls 'the crisis of modernity.' As articulated by Deneulin and Rakodi (2011: 46), 'it became clear that in the vast majority of developing countries the rapid growth that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s was not trickling down to reduce poverty.'Markedly, the World Bank study entitled Voices of the Poor, published in 2000, broke away from mainstream monetary analysis of poverty by asking so-called poor people themselves how they experienced poverty (Narayan, 2000: 222). Findings from Voices of the Poor curiously revealed (1) that religion permeates people's conception of wellbeing; (2) that the poor reposed higher trust in religious leaders vis-a-vis politicians, and (3) that the poor rated FBOs much higher than state institutions (ibid: 222-234). Voices of the Poor led to a multidimensional approach to poverty, one that took religion seriously (Marshall, 2001). At the behest of James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank (1995-2005), and the emeritus Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, the World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) was established to 'facilitate a dialogue on poverty and development among people from different religions and between them and the international development institutions' (see, http://www. …

Ethnic Conflict and Violence in Heterogeneous Societies

Abstract: Ethnic groups have tended to conflict since the beginning of the known human history, and the intensity of violent conflicts does not seem to have decreased during the last centuries. Why are ethnic conflicts so common across all civilizational boundaries and over time? Researchers have explained particular ethnic conflicts as being due to various political, cultural, and other environmental factors, but they have not yet been able to produce any theoretical explanation that could be tested by global empirical evidence. It will be argued in this paper that the universality of ethnic conflict can be traced to our common human nature, to our evolved disposition to ethnic nepotism. This hypothesis is tested by empirical evidence on a scale of institutionalized ethnic interest conflict (IC) and on a scale of ethnic violence (EV), which are intended to measure the degree of ethnic conflict from two different perspectives, and by the degree of ethnic heterogeneity (EH), which is used to measure ethnic nepotism, in a group of 176 contemporary countries. The results show that EH explains approximately 70 percent of the global variation in IC and nearly half of the variation in EV. These results leads to the conclusion that ethnic nepotism provides the most powerful theoretical explanation for the persistance of ethnic conflicts.Key Words: Ethnic nepotism; Ethnic group; Ethnic conflict; Ethnic violence; Ethnic heterogeneity; Human nature.The problem: How to explain the universality of ethnic conflict?Ethnic interest conflicts seem to be common in all ethnically heterogeneous countries of the world, but the nature of such conflicts varies greatly from institutionalized ethnic inequalities and more or less peaceful competition to violent clashes, civil war, ethnic cleansing, and genocide (cf., for example, Horowitz, 1985; Gurr, 1993; Hutchinson & Smith, 1996; Stavenhagen, 1996; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Toft, 2003; Harff & Gurr, 2004; Wolff, 2006). Ben Kiernan (2007) emphasizes that ethnic violence has probably been used by modern humans throughout the history, although empirical evidence from earlier periods is scarce. He refers to the history of genocide and extermination in ancient world, mainly to Sparta and Rome, and focuses on some examples throughout the world since the fifteenth century. The history of genocides implies that all nations have been more or less equally capable to carry out genocides and ethnic cleansings in appropriate circumstances. It is remarkable that nearly all genocides have been directed against other racial or other ethnic groups.Researchers have explained ethnic conflict by many kinds of factors, but they have not been able to agree on any common theoretical explanation. Ted Robert Gurr (1971, 1993) has used the principles of frustration-aggression theory to explain political violence. Donald L. Horowitz (1985) emphasizes the importance of group allegiances and comparisons. Anthony D. Smith's (1987) theoretical argument is that cultural pluralism and ethnic nationalism cause inter-ethnic tension and ethnic conflicts both between states and within states. Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1996) recognizes the existence of ethnic conflicts on all continents and comes to the conclusion that they may increase in number and intensity before they will wane and be replaced by other kinds of conflict. Michael E. Brown (2001) presents a long list of underlying causes of internal conflict, including various structural factors, political factors, economic-social factors, and cultural factors. Monica Duffy Toft's (2003) theory of indivisible territory emphasizes that the probability to resort to violence in conflict situations depends crucially on the settlement patterns of ethnic groups.In most of these theoretical explanations, the emergence of ethnic conflict is related to various environmental and cultural factors. A serious problem with such explanations is that it would be difficult to test them by empirical evidence because hypotheses are not clearly stated, because the number of variables is large, or because it is not clear how hypothetical concepts could be operationalized. …

Needed in the Context of the Renewed Popularity of Keynes's Ideas: An Analysis of his Errors

Abstract: This paper provides a detailed exposition of Keynes’s theory of why depressions occur in a market economy, doing so by allowing Keynes himself to describe his theory, for which the article draws mainly from The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. The basic reason Keynes gave for why depressions occur is that there is too much saving and too little consumption and investment. After explaining his theory of depressions, the article proceeds to show the major errors Keynes commits. These errors include believing that falling wage rates lead to decreased spending and a lower rate of profit, believing more investment leads to a lower rate of profit, equating gross values with net values, and equating saving with hoarding. This paper is relevant to current events in which governments around the globe have used various Keynesianinspired “stimulus packages” in an attempt to help economies recover from the financial crisis and recession of 2008.

Father Presence in a Community and Levels of Violent Crime A Dynamic beyond the Arm of the Law

Abstract: The perception of the influence of the American father-figure upon his developing children has undergone several revisions since the middle of the 20th century. Academic literature and government policies have tended to minimize or marginalize his influence - qua father - as either supernumerary or irrelevant. This article suggests that the father-presence correlates strongly with lessened violence in a community whereas the absence of a father is also strongly correlated with elevated levels of violent crime within that community. The predictability is found both concurrently and with a generation lag. Although correlation does not equate to causation, and other factors affecting the respective types of families may play all or part of the causal role, the correlations are highly suggestive that paternal presence is at least a contributory factor.Key Words: Violent crime; Unemployment; Non-marital births; Fatherchild relations; Father-absent families; Father-present families; Family contributors to violent crime and promiscuity.The image of the father figure in the United States has been, in effect, a kaleidoscope that has been repeatedly turned by academics, the literati, and policy makers within the last half century.1 This article addresses the relationship of the presence and absence of fathers (1) to violent crime committed by male children and (2) to the promiscuity of female children, a relation that, in turn, involves the criminal justice system.BackgroundUntil very recently - the latter part of the 20th century - the social father was a given in virtually any and all societies around the globe.2 Two very distinct and opposing interpretations are now given about what the father's role may be within the United States today (and, indeed, within any other society with an industrialized or service-oriented economy).First, the argument is made that fathers in the past have served the dual roles of protector and provider, both essential to the survival of their wives as well as their children, but that current governmental protectors, viz. local police, state police, the National Guard, and the nation's armed forces, have efficiently and successfully undertaken the role of protector. The husband/father, who is less well trained for this role, is not needed. Similarly, governmental agencies, through local, state, and federal programs, have made death from privation and malnutrition extremely unlikely. Hence, the father's role of provider can also be supplanted either by working mothers and/or by governmental agencies. The argument finishes with the conclusion that social fathers in an industrialized, service-oriented, informationbased economy represent an anachronism and are best understood as being somewhere between supernumerary or optional.An opposing view argues that the sheer omnipresence of social fathers strongly infers important functions of fatherhood that transcend differences in economies, religions, political structures, ecologies or diets.This article initially examines the second position and argues that, across generations, social dynamics lend an inherent advantage to the public safety of those communities that adheres men/fathers to the mother-child dyad and lend an inherent disadvantage to the public safety to those communities that systematically exclude men from the status-role complex of the social father. Framed a little differently, it is argued that those communities that keep the nuclear family intact will have more of a ply of public safety than will the communities whose expectations view the social father as either superfluous or optional. The focus of this inquiry is more upon the relationship between father absence/presence and rates of (violent) crime and not upon making value judgments about social desirability or about appropriate versus inappropriate lifestyles.3This article then addresses a (presumed) lack of developmental theory that would cogently and parsimoniously link the increased absence of a community's on-going biological and residential and social father with an elevated level of violent crime a generation later. …

The Cultural and Political Economy of Recovery: Social Learning in a Post-Disaster Environment

Abstract: The Cultural and Political Economy of Recovery: Social Learning in a post-disaster environmentEmily Chamlee-WrightRoutledge, 2010.The Cultural and Political Economy of Recovery focuses on the nature and causes of social order through the lens of post-disaster recovery. In 2005, many Gulf Coast residents watched as their homes were destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. Beyond the physical structures in their lives, however, considerable damage was done to their way of life. Their social systems were devastated and it was a long journey to rebuild their lives from scratch. To better understand how societies respond to disaster and are (in some cases) able to recover, economist Emily Chamlee-Wright conducted hundreds of extensive interviews with the affected citizens, many from Mississippi and Louisiana, as well as evacuees living in Houston.As an economist of the so-called Austrian School, her ideas are influenced by F.A. Hayek and Ludwig von Mises. This is important because Austrian economists mostly focus on the role of market prices in shaping economic processes. Individuals can often make rational decisions regarding the allocation of resources so as to obtain the greatest satisfaction, but the social problem of directing resources after a major disaster is far more complex. This book explores how individuals behave when they the cannot rely on market prices to guide them.While economists often attempt to investigate how cultural factors affect economic behavior, Chamlee-Wright suggests that such studies often falls out of focus. She asserts that to understand society, we must use qualitative methods in addition to the more routine quantitative approach used by economists. She charges that to the vast majority of economists qualitative methods are quite foreign, but she presents a forceful case for their merits. She implies that economists must learn about the give and take between what they know (or think they know) from their training, and what they can learn in the field. We found this approach refreshing and found that the interviews conducted were critical to the book. Use of first-hand accounts brings individual concerns of residents to the table and adds a personal perspective on the effects of Katrina on the community.Through her many interviews, Chamlee-Wright finds that a postdisaster context presents a social coordination problem. The private sector cannot align the expectations of displaced residents, nor can it overcome the high costs and greater uncertainty of the people who return to the damaged area.. More simply, in extreme situations like Hurricane Katrina processes we would usually rely on become overwhelmed. For example, Chamlee-Wright finds that the post- Katrina reconstruction problem is largely social. Residents were uncertain as to what others would do. Communication between evacuees was scarce and the decision to return contains a viscous cycle. Many people wanted to wait for others to return or businesses to rebuild before making the decision, all the while businesses waited for residents to return before reinvesting and rebuilding.Of course, the problem is that if everyone waited, nothing would have materialized. Chamlee-Wright shows that it was civil society that stepped up by making commitments to long-term recovery. Community leaders such as Doris Voitier, the Superintendent of the St. Bernard Parish Public School District, pledged to the community that the recovery process would begin. …

Challenges to Primary School Enrolment in the Gambia

Abstract: This study examines the challenges to primary school enrolment in the Gambia. The study employs a convenience research sampling method where 277 respondents from the school communities participated. The study finds that demand factors are more important than supply factors in explaining primary school enrolment in the Gambia. The main factors identified by the study include; home chores and child labour (symptoms of poverty), religious beliefs, and community involvement. Accordingly, to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG-2) objective, a collective approach that is not only comprehensive and promotes stakeholder involvement in both the policy formulation and implementation is required.Key Words: The Gambia; Primary School; Education in Africa.1. IntroductionAll over the world, it is acknowledged that education is vital to economic, social, and political development (Durosaro, 2007; Alaba, 2010). African governments have continuously emphasized the role of education for their citizenry as a means to social and economic progress (Keriga and Bujra, 2009). Mbelle and Katabaro (2003) assert that education is an important component of human capital, and explains the varying levels of national economic growth. The authors note that improvement in the quality of human capital enhances productivity and absorptive capacity hence improving overall output levels. Even more important, investing in human capital improves social mobility by promoting equality of opportunity. It is not surprising therefore that nations of the world devote a sizeable portion of their Gross National Income to develop the education sector.Investment in education is generally done at three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary or higher. Primary education equips a student with basic skills and is defended from both human rights and publicgood perspectives. Secondary and higher education mainly aim at meeting global challenges in science and technology as well as organization of production processes and markets (Mbelle and Katabaro, 2003). This study focuses on primary education, which is the foundational level of the educational system because it is aimed at developing basic literacy, numeracy, and communication skills and because primary education directly benefits the rural poor (Syngellakis and Arudo, 2006).In light of the benefits of primary education, Handa (1999) has argued that few policies, if any, are as universally accepted as that of raising primary school enrolment in poor countries. Access to education, however, is still a problem for many developing countries. The problem is even severe in rural communities where high adult illiteracy contributes to high poverty levels. In realization of the important role which education plays as an agent of national development, there has been agitation for more functional and qualitative education all over the world. This agitation and concern for quality education is reflected in the inauguration of Education for All (EFA) in Jomtien (Thailand) in 1990 and Dakar in 2000, and as currently expressed in MDG-2 (Shibeshi, 2005; Alaba, 2010).To meet the MDG-2's 2015 target, government policies and development projects have aimed at increasing primary school enrolment by focusing on the supply side of schooling: for example, through abolishing school fees, investing in teaching, infrastructure and resources, and introducing mobile schools in remote areas (United Nations, 2010). Such programs are necessary but they are not sufficient to guarantee increases in school attendance (Handa, 1999; Galabawa, 2001; Mbelle and Katabaro, 2003; Keriga and Bujra, 2009).A United Nations' report in 2008 suggested that the net primary school enrolment ratio has only recently reached 71 per cent (even after a significant jump in enrolment that began in 2000) and that about 38 million children of primary school age in this region are still out of school. In a later study, a United Nations report (2010) indicated that primary school enrolment was only 76% in Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) while close to 100% in East Asia and Latin America. …