Showing papers in "Journal of Strategic Studies in 1982"
TL;DR: In this article, a general theory of deception is proposed for military deception and strategic surprise in the context of strategic surprise, and the theory is extended to include deception in general theory.
Abstract: (1982). Toward a general theory of deception. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, pp. 178-192.
109 citations
TL;DR: Artifice is an important element of nearly all strategic deceptions as discussed by the authors, and it can also involve manipulating the context surrounding the statement in order to enhance its veracity, which is what we mean by artifice.
Abstract: The concept 'lying' encompasses that of 'cover'. To lie is also to withhold
information, but it is something more as well: a liar acts to deflect his victim
away from the truth, and thus lying highlights deception's positive side. Liars
create and perpetrate falsities and seek to fasten a victim's attention to them.
In the narrow sense, to lie simply means making an untrue statement, but in a
broader sense it can also involve manipulating the context surrounding the
statement in order to enhance its veracity.3 This is what we mean by artifice, an
important element of nearly all strategic deceptions.
34 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss deception and deception in the context of military deception and strategic surprise in the field of intelligence and deception, and present a survey of the literature. pp.
Abstract: (1982). Intelligence and deception. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, pp. 122-154.
30 citations
22 citations
TL;DR: The origins of the UK and the Dunkirk Treaty were discussed in this article, with the focus on the UK's role in the creation of the European Free Association (EFAs).
Abstract: (1982). Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The origins of NATO. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 236-247.
20 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, military deception, strategic surprise, and conventional deterrence: A political analysis of Egypt and Israel, 1971-73 Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol 5, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, pp 94-121
Abstract: (1982) Military deception, strategic surprise, and conventional deterrence: A political analysis of Egypt and Israel, 1971–73 Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol 5, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, pp 94-121
8 citations
8 citations
8 citations
TL;DR: The Versailles Treaty as discussed by the authors was superseded by the Armistice Treaty in 1919, and Germany was forced to disarmament from 1918 until 1920, and the right bank of the Rhine was demilitarized and the strategic Kiel Canal and several rivers were internationalized.
Abstract: I. Disarmament, 1918-1920
From 1918 until 1920, Germany was forcibly disarmed. Then, in January
1920, the Armistice was superseded by the Versailles Treaty. The formal
constraints on German war potential were severe. The right bank of the Rhine
was demilitarized. The strategic Kiel Canal and several rivers were internationalized. All overseas colonies were forfeit. Chunks of German territory
were ceded to France, Belgium and Poland. The Saar, Danzig and Memel
were placed under League of Nations supervision. And Germany was to pay
huge reparations, a sum later set at $33 billion.
7 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the Eastern arc of empire: a strategic view 1850-1950, is considered in the context of strategic decision making in the Middle East, and the authors propose a strategy based on this view.
Abstract: (1982). The Eastern arc of empire: A strategic view 1850–1950. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 531-545.
6 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a British ‘unofficial’ aviation mission and Japanese Naval developments, 1919-1929, were discussed, with the focus on the development of the Japanese fleet.
Abstract: (1982). A British ‘unofficial’ aviation mission and Japanese Naval developments, 1919–1929. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 416-439.
TL;DR: The Neutron bomb and enhanced radiation warheads were discussed in detail in this paper, where the authors considered the effects of enhanced radiation on the nuclear bomb and the nuclear warhead.
Abstract: (1982). The Neutron bomb — Enhanced radiation warheads. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 341-369.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a debate about Italian military efficiency: a debate on the extent to which the Italian military can be efficiently scaled up or scaled down, and present the following conclusions:
Abstract: (1982). Italian military efficiency: A debate. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 266-269.
TL;DR: In this article, military deception and strategic surprise in the Soviet Union were discussed, and the authors proposed a method for detecting deception in the form of surprise attacks, which is called deception-and-surprise.
Abstract: (1982). Soviet strategic deception, 1955–1981. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, pp. 40-93.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a debate about Italian military efficiency: a debate on the Italian defense efficiency: A debate. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 257-265.
Abstract: (1982). Italian military efficiency: A debate. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 257-265.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a debate about Italian military efficiency: a debate on the extent to which the Italian military can be efficiently scaled up or scaled down, and present a solution.
Abstract: (1982). Italian military efficiency: A debate. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 248-256.