Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 

About: Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal is an academic journal. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Supreme court & Government. It has an ISSN identifier of 0024-7081. Over the lifetime, 605 publications have been published receiving 1604 citations.

Sentencing without Remorse

Abstract: State court judges in the United States have a great deal of discretion in assessing punishments for criminal defendants. Over time, through either statutory pronouncement or precedent, state courts have considered a distinct group of factors in determining the proper punishment for a convicted criminal defendant. One of these factors is remorse. Many state courts have found remorse to be an appropriate mitigating factor to consider when assigning criminal punishment.1 However, many states have found the absence of remorse to be an appropriate aggravating factor when calculating an appropriate criminal punishment.2 Unfortunately, remorse has proven to be an increasingly ambiguous concept, which state court judges have had a great deal of difficulty applying in any coherent or consistent manner. Rather, reflecting the myriad definitions of remorse, state courts have found a myriad of reasons to find remorse present or absent, many of which are illogical at best. Remorse presents problems for both prosecutors and defenders. Prosecutors may confront a savvy criminal defendant who is not remorseful, but who claims remorse in order to obtain a reduced sentence and is proficient in saying the right things before a susceptible judge. Defenders face a perceived lack of remorse, which may result in a more lengthy sentence for the defendant who is inarticulate or fails to behave or speak in the manner the judge believes indicates remorse.

Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century

Abstract: The Law and Economics movement has been attacked from different directions. Words such as “dead,” “sick,” and “peaked out” have recently characterized its rational choice theories.1 One assault has come from economists who question these neoclassical economic theories’ unrealistic and simplifying assumptions about human nature. Over the past few decades, behavioral economists have empirically tested rational choice theory to assess the degree to which it accurately predicts outcomes.2 Under certain scenarios, rational choice theory gets it wrong. The majority of individuals, for example, acted generously by sharing a fair amount of money in contrast to the rational profitmaximizer’s sharing only the nominal amount, a penny, or spitefully by sacrificing money to punish unfair behavior whereas the rational profitmaximizer would reject the insult, and keep the money. At times, test subjects performed better without financial incentives and behaved worse with financial penalties.3 Rational choice theory would predict

Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of Interrogations Is the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions

Abstract: for their tireless advocacy for mandatory videotaping of interrogations; and Professors Richard Leo and Welsh White for their insightful comments during the development of this article. Further thanks are extended to

Designing Competition Law Institutions: Values, Structure, and Mandate

Abstract: Discussions of competition policy reform, both domestically and internationally, have typically focused on issues of substance, for example, appropriate rules for merger review, abuse of dominance, and horizontal arrangements amongst competitors. However, substantive policies must be mediated through the institutions that investigate, enforce, and adjudicate competition law issues and the decision-making processes that these institutions employ. As the legal realists long ago taught us, institutional and procedural differences are likely to generate widely different substantive outcomes, even with a similar legislative mandate.1 Over the past decade, the number of competition agencies around the world has proliferated dramatically, now numbering in excess of one hundred, rendering these differences of increasing salience in a global economy. In a recent paper prepared for the International Competition Network (ICN), Kovacic and Eversley note: Discussions about the implementation of competition policy tend to focus more heavily upon the question of what competition authorities should do than on the question of how they should do it . . . . Both older and newer competition systems have come to realize that a body of competition laws is only as good as the institutions entrusted with their implementation. The establishment of new competition systems and the refinement of older regimes have created a remarkable opportunity to consider the institutional prerequisites for the effective implementation of competition laws.2