Showing papers in "Mathematical Social Sciences in 2022"

TL;DR: In this article , the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights representing their entitlements is considered, and a natural rule in this setting is the maximum weighted Nash welfare (MWNW) rule, which selects an allocation maximizing the weighted product of the agents' utilities.

TL;DR: In this paper , the authors propose an epistemic model that encodes players' belief hierarchies on choices and views, and use it to formulate the basic reasoning concept of common belief in rationality.

TL;DR: In this article , the authors present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable matchings in a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand.

TL;DR: In this article , the authors study the formation of networks in environments where agents derive benefits from their neighbours (immediate links) but suffer losses through contagion when any agent on a path that connects them is hit by a shock.

TL;DR: In this paper , the authors developed a directed technical change growth model with two stylized (European) countries, where the monetary policy, led by the central bank through a decline in the nominal interest rate, influences the R&D activity through Cash-in-Advance constraints and is limited by the zero nominal interest rates.

TL;DR: In this article , the authors study Nash implementation under complete information with the distinctive feature that the planner knows neither individuals' state-contingent preferences (payoff states) nor how they correspond to the states of the economy on which the social goal depends.

TL;DR: In this article , a new notion of coalitional equilibrium, the strong hybrid solution, was proposed, which is a refinement of Zhao's hybrid solution and is well suited to study situations where people cooperate within coalitions but where coalitions compete with one another.

TL;DR: In this article , a preference profile exhibits pairwise consensus around some fixed preference relation, if whenever a preference relation is closer to it than another one, the Kemeny distance of the profile to the former is not greater than its distance to the latter.

TL;DR: In this article , a restricted case of additive utility functions called generalized binary utility functions is proposed, which is a generalization of binary and identical utilities simultaneously, and a polynomial-time algorithm that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare and produces an EF1 and PO allocation for goods as well as for chores.

TL;DR: In this article , the authors consider piecewise and convex mixtures as two relevant tools to solve claims problems and explore which properties are preserved by mixed solutions, and propose to design mixed solutions according to the compromising degree, an endogenous parameter capturing the relative relevance of the rationing that agents have to share collectively.

TL;DR: In this paper , the authors study group control for consent rules in the setting of group identification restricted to domains of consecutive qualifications, and show that these decision problems, being NP-hard in general, become polynomial-time solvable under these restrictions.

TL;DR: The downward seasonal balance (DSB) criterion as discussed by the authors is based on a third-order stochastic dominance defined on finite sets of evenly spaced seasonal points (seasonal grids), which is used to assess whether a seasonal outcome of a sports league is more balanced than another.

TL;DR: The lexicographic complexity of an asymmetric binary relation on a finite set is defined to be the minimal number of ternary criteria sufficient to construct a 1 − 1 lexico-graph representation of that relation as discussed by the authors .

TL;DR: In this paper , the authors explore the behavior of present-biased agents, that is, agents who erroneously anticipate the costs of future actions compared to their real costs, and show that the ratio between the cost of the solutions computed by presentbiased agents and their real cost may differ significantly depending on the problem constraints.

TL;DR: In this paper , the authors explore an estimation of the prior probability of the thesis predicted by the Condorcet Jury Theorem (if there are enough voters, majority rule is a competent decision procedure) and conclude that, prima facie, it will fail almost surely.

TL;DR: The downward seasonal balance (DSB) criterion as mentioned in this paper is based on a third-order stochastic dominance defined on finite sets of evenly spaced seasonal points (seasonal grids), which is used to assess whether a seasonal outcome of a sports league is more balanced than another.

TL;DR: In this paper , the authors consider a general class of simple liability assignment rules under which the assignment of liabilities for losses arising out of interactions involving negative externalities can be coupled for some combinations of the levels of nonnegligence of the interacting parties and decoupled for other combinations.

TL;DR: In this article , a generalized game with infinitely many players and pseudo-utilities was established, and the weak α-core was defined and proved its existence theorem in this model, which is the basis for our game.

TL;DR: In this article , the Arrow-Debreu framework is replaced with a more parsimonious market framework, where the aggregate risk components of individual risks are exchanged through a highly reduced set of nonspecific securities, while the idiosyncratic risk components are insured through financial intermediation.

TL;DR: In this paper , the implications of sunk investments for social efficiency of downstream-entry in a bilateral oligopoly were studied and the possibility of socially excessive entry increases as the percentage of non-sunk investments increases.

TL;DR: In this paper , the authors propose a class of inequality indices which are continuous with respect to setwise convergence of probability measures and hence also to convergence in total variation and do not require the underlying distribution to possess any finite moments whatsoever.

TL;DR: In this paper , the authors study a standard duopoly model of simultaneous divisionalization and Cournot competition, assuming that firms have different marginal costs and divisions are costless, and they obtain that in equilibrium only the divisions of the efficient firm are active because price is equal to the marginal cost of the inefficient firm.

TL;DR: In this paper , a two-stage deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) with retrade is studied, where DA is played in the first stage, and a decentralized market opens in the second.

TL;DR: In this article , the authors used the executive functions of working memory and cognitive flexibility from the psychology literature to introduce a new way of understanding the decision making of these agents which is particularly appropriate for large or complicated tasks.

TL;DR: In this paper , the authors consider what Spence calls indices and show that if the costs of knowing the indices are not nil, they could play the role of resolving adverse selection in sequential Bayesian games.

TL;DR: In this paper , a family of choice representations inspired by the king-chicken choice procedure is proposed, in which an alternative x is chosen among a set of alternatives A if, for every other alternative y in A, either x is preferred to y or there is another alternative z in A such that x preferred to z, and z is preferred by y to y.

TL;DR: In this article , optimal voting weights in a two-tier voting system were derived for the Impartial Culture and Impartial Anonymous cultures, where each group has a representative in the council that casts votes on their behalf.

TL;DR: In this article , the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium with free disposal is considered. But the existence is not guaranteed, and it is not known whether the equilibrium can be found in a monetary economy with homogeneity of the excess demand function.

TL;DR: In this paper , the authors consider the problem of river sharing with incomplete information and show that, if each upstream agent's endowment of water is sufficiently larger than the downstream agents' endowment, then there exists an incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism that allocates the water efficiently.