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Showing papers in "Middle East Journal in 1982"


Journal Article
TL;DR: The coming to power of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in November of 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of the same year, and the recent assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt have all contributed to an obsession with Islam on the part of the Western world as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The coming to power of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran in February of 1979, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in November of 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of the same year, as well as the recent assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt have all contributed to an obsession with Islam on the part of the Western world. In these reports, misunderstandings of Islam and its theories and practices are rife, fundamental errors concerning the history of Islam are continually repeated, and a very confusing picture of the historical and political perspectives which influence the views of Muslims is presented. Even more important, however, is the fact that much of what has been written-in both the popular and the serious press-treats these developments as representative of all Islamic "political" movements, and whatever changes in the theory and practice of Islam may be taking place in other arenas not currently afflicted with political violence are either ignored or misunderstood. In this essay, we wish to provide a brief historical introduction to the growth and development of modern Islamic reform movements, and then outline, using the example of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, some important developments which have taken place recently. Last, but not least, we will suggest what the non-Muslim world may expect in the near future if our analyses are correct.

49 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: The nature of Libyan politics and the appropriate American responses to Libyan foreign policy became subjects of heated debate in the United States during the Reagan Administration's first 18 months in office, with little appreciation of the historical context and domestic circumstances of the Libyan regime or of Libyan views of US-Libyan relations.
Abstract: The nature of Libyan politics and the appropriate American responses to Libyan foreign policy became subjects of heated debate in the United States during the Reagan Administration's first 18 months in office. Concern that the Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi represented-as he claimed-a genuine threat to American interests in North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean, perhaps even further afield, fueled discussion of appropriate American responses. Much of the debate about Libya and American policy took place, however, with little appreciation of the historical context and domestic circumstances of the Libyan regime or of Libyan views of US-Libyan relations. Libya's experience of the 20th century has provided its people and its leaders with rather dismal expectations about Western behavior in the international arena. Whether these perceptions are entirely fair is less important than the fact that Libyans can be expected to act upon them. General agreement in Libya on the fundamental inequity of the international system and on the necessity of its revision to the benefit of nonindustrialized countries did not, however, extend to support of many of the Qadhdhafi government's specific aims, or of most of its means. By the time the Reagan Administration took office in the United States, Qadhdhafi faced widespread opposition at home and no small measure of ridicule abroad. Failure to understand both these characteristics of the contemporary Libyan political scene-general sympathy with revolutionary movements and symbols, and simultaneously, specific local opposition to the ostensibly revolutionary Libyan government-led many Americans to misconstrue the consequences of American policy towards Libya.

17 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an account which takes us beyond the moral play in which Libya's leader is cast as the anti-hero, to a description of some of the country's modest socio-political successes in the post-coup era.
Abstract: Considerable US press coverage has focused on the more sensational side of Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's actions, and then mostly in the international arena Common explanations of his motives invoke an aberrant personality and fanatic religious character Recent confrontations between Libya and the US, most notably seen in the downing of Libyan fighter planes in the Gulf of Sirte and the subsequent exchange between President Reagan and Qadhdhafi over allegations of a Libyan assassination squad heading towards Washington, DC, only strengthen the negative American stereotype of the Libyan leader These altercations and the ensuing rhetoric unfortunately become the norm for American understanding of Libyans and Libya generally This paper is not an apologia for Qadhdhafi, since some of his actions can certainly be characterized as dangerous, even to the most fair-minded Rather, it is an account which takes us beyond the moral play in which Libya's leader is cast as the anti-hero, to a description of some of the country's modest socio-political successes in the post-coup era My purpose is to depict the changes in a particular segment of Libyan society which I know intimately That is the small, onceisolated Arabized Berber oasis community Augila (Awjila) in the east Libyan Sahara ' There I lived for nearly a year, before, during and after the September 1, 1969, military takeover which placed Qadhdhafi in power, and there I returned in the late 1970s My initial work in Augila was as a social anthropologist, while my first return visit, in 1977, was made privately from Cairo where I was teaching at a

6 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the political ideology of the Westernized wing of the Egyptian bourgeoisie through a study of the attitudes of its children, and find that they are the main constituency of the Sadat regime and the social force most supportive of its policy course: economic open door, de-Nasirization, peace with Israel and the American alliance.
Abstract: This study aims to explore the political ideology of the Westernized wing of the Egyptian bourgeoisie through a study of the attitudes of its children. For the purposes of this paper, the Westernized bourgeoisie is taken to be those professional, business and government elements of the upper and upper-middle income strata who have received Western education. This group has provided much of Egypt's socio-economic elite since modernization began because those with Western education have possessed the skills needed in this enterprise, and those with superior resources have had greater access to such education. Along with the military and bureaucratic wings of the state establishment-with which it overlaps-the Westernized bourgeoisie also constituted the main constituency of the Sadat regime and the social force most supportive of its policy course: the economic open door (infitah), de-Nasirization, peace with Israel and the American alliance. In the post-Sadat period, its views are likely to have a critical impact on the regime's direction. The Westernized bourgeoisie is thus important because it is now among the most socially and politically influential forces in Egypt. It is also worth study because it is a "limiting case": as the seemingly most proWestern, liberal, and "rightist" of Egypt's social forces, it provides a useful benchmark from which to make rough assumptions about the opinions of other groups in the Egyptian public. A study of this group can also be fit into a wider consideration of the role of the bourgeoisie in developing countries. Marxists usually see such bourgeoisies as negative forces: local clients of Western imperialism cut off from their own cultures, prepared to sacrifice the national cause to advance their own economic interests in collaboration with international capital and to seek protection from imperialism against the masses of their own country. Western liberal writers, on the other hand, tend to see the bourgeoisie as a progressive force with an affinity for free enterprise, thus a potential entrepre-

6 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: The authors examines some of the historic, regional and religious factors bearing on this prickly relationship and the implication of recent events for US policy toward Khartoum. But they do not discuss the relationship between Sudan and Libya.
Abstract: A little-known but strategic corner of northeast Africa returned to the headlines in 1981 following the arrival of a Libyan expeditionary force in Chad and talk of union between the two countries. Colonel Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi's withdrawal of the force in November has reduced immediate tensions, but Libyan-Sudanese relations still remain potentially volatile. The present article examines some of the historic, regional and religious factors bearing on this prickly relationship and the implication of recent events for US policy toward Khartoum. Sharing adjacent corners of the same desert, Libya and the Sudan have enjoyed tempestuous contacts ever since military coups put ambitious young officers in charge in both countries in 1969-Qadhdhafi in Tripoli and Ga'far Muhammad Numayri in Khartoum. While the Libyan leader supported Numayri against communist plotters in 1971, the Sudanese accuse the Libyans, with considerable justice, of being behind several anti-Numayri coup attempts later in the decade. The Libyan military occupation of Chad in December 1980, accompanied by reports of imminent Chado-Libyan "union," served among other things to bring the long-standing suspicion between Khartoum and Tripoli to a boil. It was therefore natural for former Prime Minister Hissene Habre, loser in the convoluted Chadian internal power struggle early in the year, to take refuge in the Sudan's frontier province, Darfur. Reports of Sudanese and Egyptian support to these Chadian elements soon followed. Libyan troops accordingly were deployed to eastern Chad in late spring. In August, Egyptian troops maneuvered near the

4 citations