Showing papers in "Middle East Journal in 1997"

Secularism and Islamism in Turkey : The making of elites and counter-elites

Abstract: There is an inherent power conflict between secular modernist elites and Islamist elites in Turkey today, which is fueled by two different worldviews and life-styles. However, because of the inclusionary nature of Turkish politics, the opportunity for social mobility, and the prevalent freedom of speech, Islamist movements have developed their own educated, technical and intellectual elites which resemble the secular modernist elites they criticize and oppose. This process of elite formation in turn leads to de facto secularization, independently from the intentions of the actors, as religion and professional careers follow separate and distinct paths. This article is an attempt to understand the contemporary debate between Islamism and secularism from the perspective of the formation and circulation of elites and counterelites. The concept of elite is used here to refer to those new social groups such as intellectuals and the technical intelligentsia (engineers and technicians)' which, through secular and modern education, have acquired a "cultural capital,"2 namely, a universal scientific language and professional skills. "Islamism" indicates the reappropriation of a Muslim identity and values as a basis for an alternative social and political agenda (to that of the state). "Muslim" is not synonymous with "Islamist," in the sense that the first expresses a religious identity and the latter implies a political consciousness and social action. Accordingly, Islamist counter-elites can be both actors in the Islamist movements and professionals and intellectuals aspiring for political power. Islamism, however, does not only denote membership in an Islamist political organization, but also suggests a sense of belonging and a group identity. The Turkish experience allows for an in-depth analysis of the conflict between secularists and Islamists. The reason is that Turkey has had a very long tradition of ruling elites which, since the end of the l9th century, have been engaged in reforming, modernizing and secularizing Turkish society while Islamists have challenged this essentially Western model of change. Since the establishment of an Islamist party, the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) in 1970, Turkish Islamism has been incorporated into the political system and legitimated by the parliamentary system. This party, known today as the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP), is currently the senior partner of a coalition government formed in July 1996.3 Turkey is a unique example in the Middle East where such a radical political change in the nature of the governing elites can take place peacefully and by democratic means. Democracy has been successful in Turkey; it has been internalized as a set of shared values by Turks and has become the norm of political behavior. Furthermore, the liberal administration of President Turgut Ozal (1983-91) introduced the institutions of a market economy and the privatization of the mass media. As a consequence, civil society and associative life have expanded, and non-governmental organizations have proliferated.4 These developments have taken place amid a lively public debate on issues of religious and ethnic identity, national unity, secularism and democratic pluralism. In short, the debate between the secularist Kemalist5 elites and the religious Islamist counter-elites on the direction of social and cultural change in Turkey is taking place in an environment accustomed to electoral politics and public debates that shape public opinion and influence government policies. In other words, the existence of alternative political parties and the freedom of speech and organization provide the best guarantee against authoritarian rule and totalitarian practices. This article discusses four major propositions: first, that secularism, as a non-Muslim way of life, has contributed to the making of the politically dominant Kemalist elites; second, that since secularism is often implemented by authoritarian elites in Muslim countries, there is a potential conflict of interest between democracy and secularism; third, that although Islamism as a political movement challenges the secular state, secularization has shaped the identities and practices of the new Islamist actors; and fourth, that it is in the widening of the public sphere of debate between Islamists and secularists that the basic principles of democracy are defined. …

Turkey''s Kurdish question: critical turning points and missed opportunities

Abstract: The deteriorating Kurdish problem in Turkey is neither new nor is it beyond resolution. This article focuses on two sets of occasions that help us understand the dynamics and chances for the resolution of the conflict.' The first set includes critical turning points which refer to periods of broad societal change often involving the institutionalization of new political arrangements that have had a direct or indirect impact on the evolution of the conflict itself. The second set is composed of opportunities that were missed to resolve the conflict. The violent struggle that pits the Turkish state against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the southeast, east and other parts of the country since 1984 has caused more than 20,000 dead. The insurrection continues to develop as more and more Kurds, in and outside Turkey, are politicized and mobilized by the spiralling violence. The Turkish military has devoted a third of its not so insignificant capabilities to the defeat of the PKK2 and, increasingly, the ramifications of this Kurdish revolt are being felt in Turkey's foreign relations, economic well-being, and domestic political stability. The Turkish military has conducted two large-scale military operations and numerous raids in northern Iraq since 1992, and the yearly direct cost of the insurrection can be estimated at anywhere between two and three percent of GDP.3 The PKK, at one point, was estimated to have some 10,000 well-armed insurgents and could command the loyalty of 50,000 militia and, according to government estimates, 375,000 sympathizers.4 The impact of the PKK-led insurgency has been devastating for the Kurdish populations of Turkey. Over 2,000 villages and hamlets have been destroyed by the security forces (and some by the PKK) causing some two million Kurdish refugees to be displaced in the last seven years.5 The resulting refugee flow has found its way to some of the main cities of the region, such as Diyarbakir, or to Mediterranean cities, such as Mersin and Adana, or to the main western cities of Istanbul and Izmir where large Kurdish populations already existed. None of these cities is equipped to absorb the flow of refugees whose skills are not adaptable to city life. In Adana, for instance, 80 percent of the youth among the migrants are unemployed.6 Militaristic policies, designed to reduce the insurgents' ability to resupply themselves with the help of the local population, have had some impact but may also have contributed to the PKK's recruitment among the displaced youth. THE KURDISH PROBLEM How then is the "Kurdish problem" defined and addressed by the Turkish state? The answer to this question has varied over time according to circumstances. When the problem is seen as one of external terrorism, then the state increases vigilance at its borders with military and security forces; when the problem is defined as one of internal terrorism, it becomes a question of security and police work to identify the sources of criminal activity; when the problem appears to be primarily economic in nature, then the response is increased state attention to economic development in that region. It is only when the problem is perceived as specifically Kurdish in character, based on Kurdish aspirations for an independent state, that no response can meet what the state considers to be an unacceptable demand. At that point the problem assumes the character of a zero-sum game between Kurds and Turks. Turkish policy is driven by the fear that any major concession to Kurdish demands, whether political, economic, or cultural will ultimately lead to greater demands at a future date that could culminate in the break-up of Turkey. The often invoked precedent for such an eventuality is the 1920 Sevres Treaty signed between the victorious allied powers and the Ottoman government that called, among other things, for interim autonomy for Kurdish areas of eastern and southeastern Anatolia with a view to independence. …

Can islamists be democrats? the case of Jordan: 1729

Abstract: In contradistinction to the usual arguments about Islamist movements being the greatest threat to democratic transitions in the Middle East, the argument below posits that the Islamist movement in Jordan has been a force for democratic expansion since liberalization began there in 1989. It has been so primarily because greater democratization has served its organizational interests. As the bestorganized political movement in Jordan, the Muslim Brothers have had the greatest interest in easing political restrictions that hindered the pursuit of their various policy goals. The past decade has witnessed growing interest in the issues of democratic transition and civil society in the Middle East. Such attention has unfortunately not been replicated in the wider social science community, where the outpouring of publications on democratization has largely ignored Middle Eastern societies. Part of the reason for the exclusion of the Middle East in this debate is the limited number of cases of democratic transition in the region and the limited extent of democracy in those extant cases. However, given the number of countries that have experienced some degree of sustained political opening in recent years, namely, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Morocco, and the rich theoretical issues involved even in 'blocked' cases such as those of Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, the exclusion of the region from the wider debate is remarkable. This present case study seeks to go beyond the stale question of whether democratization is possible in the Middle East. The question posed here is whether an explicitly Islamist movement-usually viewed as the greatest threat to any democratic opening in the region-can be a force for democratization.' Using a case study of the Muslim Brothers in Jordan and their political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), this article concludes that the Islamist movement in Jordan has been consistently in the forefront of democratizing the Jordanian polity since liberalization began in 1989. It has been so not because the movement is made up of Jeffersonian democrats, but rather because greater democratization has served its organizational and political interests. Focusing on organizational interest as a major explanatory variable can reveal how ideologically 'ademocratic' groups can strategically embrace democratization. ISLAMISTS AT THE POLLS In response to a series of crises in the late 1980s, culminating in the "bread riots" that started in Ma`an and spread elsewhere in the spring of 1989,2 Jordan began a process of political liberalization. Its democratization program was 'defensive' or `pre-emptive' in that it was a controlled, top-down affair, initiated to forestall more serious challenges to the political order in Jordan. In contrast to other countries in the region, Jordan included its powerful Islamist movement in the democratization process, directly challenging the idea that Islamists could not effectively participate in democratic politics.3 In the aftermath of the bread riots, King Husayn called for new parliamentary elections to be held in November 1989. Since political parties were illegal, candidates who participated in the 1989 elections had to run as individuals. Even so, the ideological tendencies of candidates were widely known, and publicized by the candidates themselves. The short campaign period (25 days), and the fact that the Muslim Brothers were the only established political grouping in Jordan, benefited the Islamist candidates. The Islamist movement dominated the election results, winning 32 of the 80 seats in parliament. If one were to subtract `quota seats' for minorities-Christians, Circassians and Chechens-then Islamists won 32 out of the 68 remaining seats open for competition, or nearly half the total number of parliamentary seats.4 Candidates of the Muslim Brothers were particularly successful, winning 20 seats while the 12 other seats were won by independent Islamist candidates. …

The Political Economy of Syria under Asad

Abstract: The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, by Volker Perthes. London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995. xii + 273 pages. Bibl. to p. 290. Index to p. 298. $59.50. Reviewed by Steven Heydemann Studies of contemporary Syrian politics often reflect an uncomfortable similarity to Kremlinology-scanning figures on a distant balcony as they jostle for position. Although Syria has achieved an unusual level of international prominence (or notoriety) it remains severely understudied. Despite its regional influence, its (probably overrated) strategic importance, and the ready availability of policy experts eager to strut their expertise, we know relatively little about how Syria works. The lack of solid research has resulted in a serious deficit in our understanding of the nuts and bolts of Syrian politics, the dynamics of policy making, and how the country is responding to the pressures, strains and challenges of life in the developing world at the end of the 20th century. Symptomatic of the problem, we continue to debate whether Syria has any politics at all, or whether President Hafiz al-Asad runs the country single-handed, deciding everything from issues of war and peace, to which teacher gets the corner classroom in al-Thawra secondary school in Dayr al-Zor. Volker Perthes' outstanding study goes a long way toward overcoming this deficit. With his nuanced and deeply informed analysis of the Syrian political economy since 1970, focusing in particular on the period from the 1980s forward, Perthes adds significantly to our understanding of contemporary Syria and of Syrian politics. Based on extended periods of residence in Syria and on access to considerable primary source materialincluding many unpublished, official and semiofficial documents and numerous interviews-the volume is a major contribution to the research literature on Syria, and must be seen as the definitive study to date of Syria's political economy during the Asad period. Opening with a brief history of Asad's rise to power, Perthes then provides a thorough review of the current state of Syria's political economy, emphasizing the social and economic changes experienced by the country during the two-and-ahalf decades of Asad's rule. Subsequent chapters assess the consequences of economic change since 1970 on Syrian social relations and class structure; evaluate the institutional context and dynamics of Syrian authoritarianism, including the role of popular organizations, parliament, business groups, and the government; and examine the dynamics and politics of economic policy making. A final chapter considers the (rather dim) prospect that economic reform could lead to a process of political liberalization, and speculates about the future of Syria after Asad. Perthes handles his material deftly and is keenly aware of what happens underneath, within and outside of the formal processes and structures that make up Syria's political economy. He conveys a visceral sense of the sharp frustration and cynicism of those who have seen their living standards decline since 1970; of the political calculations of leading businessmen anxious to preserve their privileged-and highly lucrativerelations with powerful officials; of the stifling atmosphere of an authoritarian bureaucracy that rewards compliance and punishes ambition; of how economic decisions are taken in a system governed by the logic of regime survival rather than the logic of economic rationality; and how cabinet ministers adroitly manipulate Asad's divide and rule strategy to advance their own policy agendas. …

Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?

Abstract: Turkey's democracy has been consolidated by the inclusion of the religiouslyoriented into mainstream politics. This was facilitated by the increasing secularization of the Turks that made support for a radical religious revival less likely, and the increasing moderation of the worldviews of the religious groups themselves. The Refah Partisi (Prosperity Party, RP)' obtained the plurality of votes in Turkey's December 1995 general elections. In June 1996, the RP and the center-right secular True Path Party (TPP) formed a coalition government, and the RP's leader, Necmettin Erbakan, became prime minister for the first two years of the coalition. These developments caused consternation among many in Turkey, but, unlike the situation in Algeria, the military did not lift a finger to prevent them. Everybody, including the military, accepted the legitimacy of a government led by Erbakan. How has this uneasy marriage between democracy and Islam in Turkey been possible? In order to address this issue, we need to look at the relationship between Islam and democracy in Turkey from a historical perspective. Bernard Lewis has found some aspects of Islam incompatible with liberal democracy.2 Lewis has observed, however, that of the 46 states which were members of the Islamic Conference in 1993, only one, the Turkish Republic, could be described as a democracy in Western terms.3 Earlier, Lewis had expressed a guarded optimism about the future of democracy in Turkey: Twice before, in the course of their history, the Turks have set an example and served as a model for others-under the Ottomans, of militant Islam; under Kemal Ataturk, of secular patriotism. If they succeed in their present endeavor to create, without loss of character and identity, a liberal economy, an open society, and a liberal democratic polity, they may once again serve as a model to many other peoples.4 To use Juan J. Linz's terminology, in Turkey democracy has become the "only game in town;"5 no group with political influence and/or power, including the military and a great majority of the religiously oriented groups, would prefer an authoritarian regime to a democracy.6 Islam, on the other hand, has been integrated into Turkey's democracy in a myriad ways, while constitutional and legal secularism have been kept intact. Religious orders, movements, and sects have had representatives in the secular political parties as well as in the RP. On the other hand, Turkey's 1982 constitution, not unlike the previous 1961 constitution, stipulates that Turkey is a secular state and that this particular provision in the constitution cannot be repealed. The Constitutional Court can be activated by the president and by the political parties if these constitutional provisions are violated. In 1971, for example, the Court banned the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party, NOP), also formed by Erbakan in the previous year, for using religion for political purposes. Ultimately, the military constitutes the major deterrent to the establishment of an Islamic state in Turkey. The consolidation of democracy in Turkey, including the successful inclusion of the religiously oriented groups, has been a consequence of an interactive relationship between Islam and democracy. In the 19th century, Islam was given short shrift as a source for public policymaking while some key ideas of democracy were allowed to flourish. From 1923, when the Republic was founded, until the mid-1940s, democracy itself was gradually established. While people's religious feelings were respected, Islamists, defined here as those who wish to see Islam play a greater role in the society and/or the polity, were not permitted to have their own political organizations. From the mid-1940s to the present, as democracy became consolidated, Islamists have been increasingly reincorporated into the political system. This was helped by a gradual change of attitude on the part of the bulk of the Islamists from an anti-regime stance to a pro-regime one. …

Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, 1918-1985

Abstract: Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, 1918-1985, by Amir Hassanpour. San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1992. xliii + 468 pages. Bibl. to p. 520. $109.95. Reviewed by Ernest N. McCarus The author's stated aim in this study is to present a "case study" that provides "considerable detail about the relationship between language and nation-building" (p. xxviii). The book is not only a linguistic but also a socio-political and cultural study of nation building that focuses, in part, on language standardization and the role of the various central governments in language planning and designing language policies. The area of geographical concentration of the study is those parts of Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, since World War I, where the Kurdish language was spoken. The evolution of written Kurdish literature, however, is traced from the 17th century to contemporary times. A mass of documentation is provided to support and/or refute conflicting claims about the Kurds' status; indeed, the author is to be commended for his meticulous and painstaking care in consulting publications, official documents and reports, and in personally interviewing trend-setters in Kurdish literature, politics, etc. in the preparation of his study. His balanced judgment is also commendable. He presents 65 tables of background data, 42 figures illustrating Kurdish language books and documents, and 14 maps that feature aspects of the Kurdish speech area. Hassanpour notes the lack of any theoretical approach in Kurdish language standardization, but presents models based on other case studies and proceeds to a systematic analysis of the data. He is scrupulous in his definition of technical terms, symbols, concepts and methods. Early on, the Kurds themselves recognized the centrality of the Kurdish language to Kurdish ethnicity. The early leaders of Kurdish nationalism, the mullas Ahmadi Khani (1650-1706) and Haji Qadir Koyi (1817-97), argued that "Kurds could achieve freedom only if they took up two weapons, the pen (literary language) and the sword (state power)" (p. xxv). Khani composed what has become a Kurdish epic, Mam u Zin, as an allegory to mobilize the Kurds to unite against the Persians and the Ottomans who had begun to extend their control over the various autonomous Kurdish principalities. The Kurds never united, and, with the breakup of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, Kurdistan was cut up and divided among the five new nation-states. …

Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922

Abstract: Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922, by Justin McCarthy. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995. xv + 340 pages. Append. to p. 346. Bibl. to p. 357. Index to p. 368. $35. Reviewed by Howard A. Reed This book documents the hitherto inexcusably neglected fact that, in a wide arc around the Black Sea inhabited primarily by Ottoman Turks, Between 1821 and 1922, more than five million Muslims were driven from their lands. Five and one-half million Muslims died, some of them killed in wars, others perishing as refugees from starvation and disease (p. 1). They died mainly at the hands of Christians. This is original, powerful history. It fills a basic gap in the historiography of the region irresponsibly overlooked by previous historians. It hauntingly foreshadows contemporary tragedies in Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Chechnia, Iraq, Kurdistan, Palestine, the Sudan, and elsewhere. McCarthy is Distinguished Professor of History, a demographer and former department chairperson at the University of Louisville. His work contains eight chapters, enriched by 8 maps and 32 tables, based on research in British, French, Ottoman, and US archives and other sources. Estimates of human and material losses, which were massive, and of the numbers of surviving refugees consistently depend on conservative figures to reduce risk of exaggeration. McCarthy is judicious when dealing with these heretofore almost totally ignored, but essential, factors in the history of the impacts of nationalism and imperialism-in Greece, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Crimea, Russia, Anatolia, and Armenia (in historical sequence)-on the shrinking Ottoman Empire between 1821 and 1922. Chapter One, "The Land to be Lost," explains how a huge region bordering the Black Sea, most of which was within the Ottoman Empire around 1800 and inhabited by a large Muslim majority, was forcibly depopulated of most Muslims, who were replaced by Christians. This region was then lost by 1922, except for eastern Thrace and Anatolia, which became the Turkish Republic in 1923. McCarthy identifies three primary political causes of these fundamental changes: Ottoman economic and military weakness; nationalism among Ottoman Christians (notably Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs); and Russian imperialist expansion. He adds that the 19th and early 20th century histories of Anatolia, the Balkans and the Caucasus cannot be interpreted correctly unless these previously forgotten Muslim refugees and dead are considered. He reports that first the Greeks, in their revolt in the Morea from 1821 onward, then Russia, in the Crimea and Caucasus, established brutal patterns of planned ethnic and religious eradication. Muslim-owned livestock, seed and land were stolen and pillaged. Muslims were subject to forcible conversion and expulsion or murder, which were implemented by Armenians, Bulgarians, Russians, and others periodically through the Greek retreat from Anatolia in 1922. McCarthy omits the 16th century prototype for such genocide against the majority Turco-Tatars, carried out by Ivan the Terrible (1533-84) after the Muscovite conquest of the Kazan Khanate on the upper Volga in 1552. …

Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza

Abstract: Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza, by Ian Lustick. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993. xiv + 451 pages. Appends. to p. 456. Notes to p. 564. Index to p. 576. $19.95 paper. Reviewed by Anthony Bing Ian Lustick's Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza is an attempt to construct a theory to explain why and how states expand and contract. Using the examples of the relationship between Britain and Ireland in 1834-1922 and between France and Algeria in 1935-62, he attempts to illuminate the issues of state expansion and contraction in Israel. Using his model, he predicts that Israel will not stabilize its relationship with the territories it now occupies without disengaging from them, and that the outcome of the expansion-contraction process will less likely come from an agreement with the Arab world than as an outcome of a struggle among Jews inside Israel. The book was written before the Oslo negotiations, the Rabin assassination and the recent victory of Benyamin Netanyahu. If his theory is plausible, these recent events, which some might find surprising when viewed from a 1993 perspective, are not, in fact, unpredictable. It is often claimed that the only thing predictable about the Middle East is its unpredictability; however, one of the stimulating aspects of Lustick's analysis is his attempt to make order out of what often seems to be chaos. He does this by asserting that the nature of truth regarding the boundaries of a state is not absolute, not a given, but always contingent. Thus, from the very beginning of his study, he claims that neither withdrawal nor annexation are "inevitable" with respect to post-1967 Israel's relation to the West Bank and Gaza, nor is any political situation "irreversible." (In the Middle East, and, in fact, throughout the world, the "unthinkable" is often "thought," the "irreversible" is often changed.) What interests Lustick is how "embedded beliefs shape outcomes by excluding certain questions from appearing before the public as relevant" (p. 43), i.e., how ideological hegemony is established, and how states expand and contract when "ideological hegemony" and "regime thresholds" are crossed in contexts that are always subject to change. The regime threshold is reached when "a government interested in relinquishing the area finds itself more worried about upheavals, violent disorders and challenges to the legitimate authority of governmental institutions than with possible defections from the governing coalition or party" (p. 45). Lustick draws his threshold arguments from Antonio Gramsci, and uses Gramsci's terms "wars of position" and "wars of movement" or maneuver to explain the process whereby England ultimately separated itself from Ireland, and France separated itself from Algeria, after having failed to absorb these territories into their respective nation-states. ("A `war of position' entails political competition over which ideas and values will be accepted by leading strata of a state as the ,concrete fantasy' that will achieve hegemonic status.... Wars of movement', on the other hand, refer to the direct clash of interests that surround acute crises, when governments or regimes can change hands as a result of illegal or semi-legal actions by political groups" [p. 122]). Thus, Lustick sees the relation of Great Britain and Ireland as having moved: In the 1830s and 1840s the idea that Ireland was an integral part of the United Kingdom achieved ideological hegemony; in the 1880s, wars of position over the question of Home Rule for Ireland crossed the ideological hegemonic threshold; and in 1912-14 wars of maneuver crossed the regime threshold and led Great Britain to withdraw not only its opposition to Home Rule, but also to Irish independence (except for the six counties of Northern Ireland). …

Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change

Abstract: Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change, by Fatma Muge Gocek. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. vi + 141 pages. Append. to p. 143. Notes to p. 184. Bibl. to p. 208. Index to p. 220. $45. Reviewed by Jane Hathaway Fatma Muge Gocek's second book is an example of the continuing contribution of social scientists to historical writing on the Ottoman Empire; at the same time, it reinforces and amplifies her earlier work, East Encounters West.' In Rise of the Bourgeoisie, the author argues that the rise of a Westernized Ottoman bourgeoisie in the 18th and 19th centuries caused the decline, or demise, of the empire. This hypothesis would seem to clash with the current output of Ottomanist historians, notably Linda T. Darling, who challenge the very assumption of decline. In the course of her narrative, the author switches to the less historiographically charged term "demise," without, however, directly addressing the issue of terminology. The body of Gocek's book demonstrates that the Ottoman elite's adoption of Western, particularly French, merchandise during the 18th and l9th centuries generated a "bifurcated bourgeoisie." Military and civil service academies on the Western European model turned out an administrative bourgeoisie of primarily Muslim bureaucrats whose principal loyalty was not to the Sultan's household, as the Sultan had expected, but to the ideals inculcated in the bureaucrats by their Western education: motherland, state, and, increasingly, liberal democracy. During the 18th century, or even slightly earlier, Christian and Jewish merchants under Ottoman rule took advantage of European commercial penetration of the empire to form a commercial bourgeoisie that mediated between the Western European economies and their Ottoman clients. By the early 20th century, the administrative bourgeoisie had largely displaced the commercial bourgeoisie, paving the way for the emergence of a Muslim Turkish nation-state. Gocek portrays these two segments of the bourgeoisie as challenging the Sultan's authority by constructing and reproducing an institutional framework that transcended the Sultan's household, source of all previous political legitimacy. This paradigm seems to assume a static, unchanging sultanate desperately trying to preserve its traditional base against modernity. In fact, Sultan `Abd al-Hamid II (1876-1909) exploited Western technology to implement a modem police state uniquely able to monitor and control the alleged subversive activities of the new political bourgeoisie. Gocek's emphasis on the household as the key structure of pre-modern Ottoman society is laudable, albeit her view of household politics is highly centrist. Her narrative gives the impression that the Sultan's household somehow subsumed all subsidiary households within the empire, even though she acknowledges the challenge to the sultanic household offered by the "office-households" of Ottoman officials. …

Kuwait and the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change

Abstract: Because of Kuwait's rapid economic development in the past four decades, new social strata have emerged with new demands and aspirations. Education and expanded employment opportunities, government subsidies and assistance, travel, immigration, and television have all changed society and increased social mobility. These transformations, in turn, have polarized Kuwaiti society along certain traditional divides: city versus desert, Shi'a versus Sunni, old money versus new money, men versus women. This article examines the dynamic interactions and developments among various sectors of Kuwaiti society, including students, merchants, Shi'a, bedouins, women, and naturalized Kuwaitis. These have emerged, since the 1950s, as socio-economic groupings with distinct interests in the political composition and policies of the Kuwaiti government. In transitional societies such as Kuwait, where socio-economic changes are rapid, socio-economic groupings are very important. The nature of tension and coexistence, of power and powerlessness revolves around the identities of those socio-economic groups. While the groupings are distinct in certain ways, some of their characteristics overlap with those of other groupings, making some individuals members of more than one grouping. Students, merchants, Shi'a, bedouins, women, and naturalized Kuwaitis are examples of such overlapping groupings, which have emerged since the 1950s, and played a role in shaping the policies of the Kuwaiti government. These various societal groups are relevant to the political process because political organizations and parties in Kuwait have traditionally built their power bases on religious, ethnic, and tribal identification and social position. For example, Islamist forces in Kuwait today are trying to take advantage of the bedouins' conservative values and attitudes as well as their feelings of marginalization vis-a-vis the rest of the more established segments of urban society, in order to coopt them. The situation is similar for the Shi'a, whose status as a minority makes them the target of Shi'ite religious groups. In transitional societies, in particular, the relations between the state and society are complex. On the one hand, the state seeks to remain independent from internal social forces; on the other, those forces, which include the tribe, family, sect, region, and class, compete for control over state resources and power. This competition at times becomes intense, and affects the government bureaucracy and the society at large. There is also the possibility that the government may fall under the control of one particular group, the objectives of which may not reflect the needs of a society that is changing so rapidly. If that happens, the policies of the state may no longer contribute to the betterment of society but focus on maintaining the position of the group already in power. Such a scenario could lead to repression and absolutism, or to anarchy and instability. In societies shifting from absolute states to democratic forms of government, or from fragmented societies to more cohesive ones, the act of transition is a major factor affecting the relations between state and society. TRANSITION IN THE MIDST OF WEALTH Since oil began to be exported from the Burqan oil fields in Kuwait in 1946, Kuwait's socio-economic and political developments have been intricately linked to its oil industry. By means of its oil wealth, Kuwait developed from a tribal entity into a state, moving from subsistence to state-sponsored welfare, and from a nation of little importance to one of significant power in regional and international affairs. Oil lifted Kuwaiti society out of its traditional economic environment of hunting, pearl-diving and limited trade. The entire way of life of Kuwaitis changed in a very brief period of time. While in 1946 Kuwait's income from oil did not exceed $760,000, by 1971 it had risen to $963 million, and by 1977 to $8. …

The Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor

Abstract: The Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor, tr., ed. and annotated by Wheeler M. Thackston. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996. 447 pages. Chron. to p. 450. Select. Gloss. to p. 454. Refs. to p. 459. Indices to p. 472. $39.95. Reviewed by Iran B. Jewett The memoirs of Babur Padisha (1483-1530), founder of the Moghal empire in India, need no introduction. Almost everyone interested in the history and literature of India has heard of or read a translation of the autobiography of this remarkable man. Descended from Amir Temur on his father's side and from Ghengis Khan on his mother's side, Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur became the ruler of the small kingdom of Fergana in 1494 at the age of 12. The throne he inherited was not a secure one, and he soon found himself defending his domain from relatives as well as strangers. He suffered many defeats and triumphs and at one time found himself without a kingdom or even a home. But fortune smiled on him, and he was on his way to conquest and fame. Babur's memoirs are unique in many ways. Rulers, especially conquerors, are not given to introspection, and one does not expect them to write about themselves as frankly as Babur does. He is not ashamed to reveal his tender side and describes the occasions when he broke down and cried. One wonders at his prodigious memory for places and people; he names every meadow, village and town he ever visited and recalls the names of even the lowliest functionaries he encountered. His life seems to have been a series of battles and hairbreadth escapes from death, and he narrates these incidents with equanimity and an occasional flash of humor. His uncles on his mother's side seem to have fascinated him with their rough manners. They came to Babur's aid on several occasions with their Moghul soldiers but their help was a mixed blessing. The Moghal soldiers were always looking for booty; if they were winning, they looted the enemy, and if they were losing, they plundered their own allies. Though Babur had studied Persian literature and composed poetry in both Persian and Turkish, he wrote his memoirs in what is now called Chaghatay Turkish, the language which he spoke from childhood. He chose a simple and direct style which was quite different from the ornate prose in fashion at the time, and these characteristics are evident even in translation. Wheeler M. Thackston's English translation is based on the original Chaghatay text, and it is a worthy tribute to the royal author of the memoirs. …

Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation

Abstract: Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation, by Jacob M. Landau. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995. viii + 234 pages. Select. Bibl. to p. 260. Index to p. 275. $35 cloth; $14.95 paper. Reviewed by Paul B. Henze This attractively bound paperback is a reissue of a study that Israeli scholar Jacob Landau first published in 1981 (issued by Archon Press, Hamden, CT). He has added a final chapter. A diligent scholar, Landau surveyed a formidable amount of source material when he put this book together in the late 1970s, as his 1,206 original footnotes demonstrate. The original edition, nevertheless, had serious shortcomings. There were too many lists of personalities and publications and too little analysis, almost no discussion of the actual effect on politics and history of the broad group of people he called pan-Turkists. The political background of late Ottoman and Republican Turkey was inadequately sketched out. The complex story of the political awakening of the Turks and other Muslims of the Russian empire (which for the most part preceded the rise of nationalism among Anatolian Turks) was largely ignored. To the extent that these varied and complex developments were mentioned at all, they were all treated as manifestations of pan-Turkism, a doubtful approach. Not surprisingly, therefore, Landau's discussion of the activities of exiles from the Russian/Soviet empire, in Turkey after World War I, and in Turkey, Germany, and America after World War II, lacked perspective. There were factual errors as well. For example, Zeki Velidi Togan, one of the greatest of all Turkic scholars of the past century, was not a Turkestani. He was a Bashkir, born near Ufa, where the 100th anniversary of his birth was celebrated in 1990, with his son, Subide Togan, a distinguished economist at Bilkent University in Ankara, a guest of honor. Unfortunately, nothing has been changed in the first six chapters of the reissued book, not even the footnotes. This makes all the references at least 15 years old. The new 30-page final chapter, "From Irredentism to Solidarity," is disappointing. The title is a misnomer. Turkey never followed an irredentist policy toward the Turks of the Caucasus and Central Asia, let alone those of the Balkans and the Middle East. Does "solidarity" mean anything other than a sense of kinship, which is mutual in the case of most Turkic peoples and can be freely expressed now that communist prohibitions have disappeared? This final chapter is a hastily assembled hodgepodge of information of varying degrees of significance about Turkey's reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of six independent Muslim republics. None of the data is later than early 1993. …

Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt: Islamic Development, Private Initiative, and State Control

Abstract: Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt: Islamic Development, Private Initiative, and State Control, by Denis J. Sullivan. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994. vii + 160 pages. Notes to p. 177. Bibl. to p. 186. Index to p. 191. $29.95. Denis Sullivan's Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt is a pioneering study analyzing how private voluntary organizations (PVOs) interact with and present a challenge to the economic and political systems operating in Egypt today. Based on interviews in over sixty PVOs, and with officials in both Egyptian and foreign government agencies, the book posits four primary questions. These are: 1) Is social activism against state structures and strictures the solution to Egypt's socioeconomic and political problems? 2) Are Islamic and Christian groups substituting for the government in the realm of socioeconomic development? 3) If so, do these social organizations pose a significant alternative to the government? 4) Does the challenge presented by PVOs threaten the legitimacy of the regime? Sullivan hypothesizes that PVOs both challenge the government's role and threaten its legitimacy. In the course of "testing" these hypotheses, he examines two others. The first is that "small is better" in the sense that small development projects promote more tangible results than do large projects that target larger communities. The second is that "local is more legitimate"- people will more likely work with and listen to people from their own community. Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt is a well-written, well-organized book that consistently and persuasively argues that PVOs are successful in challenging the state's role in providing social welfare benefits because of the fact that they are both "small" and "local." After broadening his study to compare Egyptian PVOs with those in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, Sullivan concludes that Egyptian PVOs are a challenge, but not a threat, to the current system. Egypt's PVOs, and particularly its Islamic PVOs, are poised to challenge the current government to reform itself and to open itself up to greater participation, democratization and economic restructuring. They, furthermore, are in a strong position to influence a successor government if a threat surfaces from another quarter, such as a right-wing or religious military takeover. Sullivan's study lies at the heart of the most pertinent debate in Egypt today. The crux of his research concerns the changing nature of statesociety relations within the context of political turmoil and economic dislocation. To a large extent, this debate revolves around the degree of state control over Egypt's PVOs and the consequent implications for political stability and the success of economic reform. …

Women and Words in Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Literary Discourse

Abstract: Women and Words in Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Literary Discourse, by Saddeka Arebi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. xii + 299 pages. Notes to p. 329. Bibl. to p. 346. Index to p. 357. $49.50 cloth; $17.50 paper. In this remarkable book, a gifted author and anthropologist introduces a world about which American readers know little and cannot even imagine-the world of Saudi women writers. Saddeka Arebi, herself a writer in her native Arabic, discloses in compelling narrative the turbulent, and at times precarious, literary politics challenging Saudi women writers. It is exciting to read how Saudi women, those suffering most from cultural restrictions among Arab women, have brought about transformations in their own situations and in gender discourse by joining peacefully into the battle of words about themselves! Within only a few decades women in Saudi Arabia have become their own voice of the voiceless. Debate about women in Saudi Arabia can never be the same again, one would imagine, as the subjects of discourse have joined the ranks of those discoursing. The monopoly of control over women and words by men has been broken through women's own actions in the "publication" of themselves and their words. The very fact that the `ulama (religious scholars) have issued fatwas (Islamic decrees) in response to women's writings is an indication of how seriously men have taken women's contributions to the dialogue about themselves and their place in society! On the Saudi scene, literary discourse is a battlefield where conflicting forces wield words as weapons to promote their own interests and policies. Women are at the center of this war. The Saudi `ulama, state and those pressuring for modernization, in their struggles for power and legitimacy, wield women as symbols, endlessly defining them and pronouncing on how their modesty and behavior demonstrate Saudi identity and Islamic commitment. Women are seen as "a gateway of Westernization" (p. 18). Thus, by controlling women and their words it is thought that men and all of society can be controlled as well. Since the 1960s, however, with the spread of education for females, women's voices have entered the literary fray. Women have become not only subjects of discourse, but active agents in defining history, society and gender by sending their words out into the public while remaining appropriately invisible themselves. The potential pitfalls for women of this active role are many. With sex segregation required, women cannot interact with non-related males and must avoid actions and topics which might threaten their reputation and family honor. The authorities would see publications advocating Western-style women's liberation as dangerous to the nation's welfare and reason for further restrictions on women. Arebi analyzes the work of nine main authors who represent a variety of literary genres and political stances in order to investigate how Saudi women writers cautiously resist dominant discourses. …

Iran''s economy and the US sanctions: 1276

Abstract: Since the early 1980s, Iran's Islamic Republic has been under various US economic sanctions as a punishment for alleged international transgressions. During this period, the theocratic regime has moved forward on many economic fronts, but has been effectively held back in its efforts to reach the pre-revolution level of national prosperity. US sanctions have had a part in the setback, but not a decisive role. While the regime may survive the enhanced sanctions, the economy is not likely to prosper without American and Western support. since January 1984, Iran's economy has been under various US economic sanctions of increasing scope and intensity. Starting with a ban on the sale of American arms and dual-use technology, the sanctions gradually expanded to the present level with a total embargo on all bilateral trade and investment, and were even extended to secondary boycotts, penalizing foreign companies investing in Iran's oil and gas sector. The economy's performance during the 13-year period has included some successes and many setbacks. Opposition groups have aggrandized the failures and blamed them on the regime's ineptitude, mismanagement, malfeasance, and corruption.1 Government officials, in turn, have accentuated their positive achievements, and attributed their shortfalls to matters beyond their control. Topping the list of the reasons for the regime's problems has been the "imposed" war with Iraq (1980-88), which was allegedly instigated by Washington. During that war, Baghdad is said to have been helped by American arms, intelligence information, and financial credit, while Iran was denied spare parts for its largely American-equipped armed forces. Global arrogance-a code phrase for the Washington-Tel Aviv axis against Iran-was repeatedly singled out as the root cause of Iran's economic difficulties.2 The purpose of this article is to review Iran's economic record and to examine the impact of US sanctions on the Iranian economy. There is no intention here to delve into several related but tangential issues3 such as the true global significance of the Iranian challenge and the appropriateness of the US response; the legality of US unilateral sanctions under the World Trade Organization's charter; the application of US jurisdiction to foreign companies outside America under international law; or the extent of Washington's rift with its allies and partners on the effectiveness of containment vs. dialogue.4 The focus here is on the sanctions' target and impact. WHY SANCTIONS? US coercive measures against the Islamic Republic have been advocated as a punishment for Tehran's alleged misbehavior. Washington has accused the Islamic Republic of attempting to export the Islamic revolution to other Muslim countries and promoting Islamic radicalism in such secular nations in the Middle East and North Africa as Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Tunisia, Turkey, and others, through direct and indirect assistance to local militant Islamic elements. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) and the Islamic Jihad (Struggle) in the Palestinian Territories, Hizballah (Party of God) in Lebanon, the Shi'ites Freedom Movement in Bahrain, Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) in Egypt, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, Hizb al-Mujahidin (The Party of Islamic Fighters) in Kashmir, Hizb al-Da`wa (The Call) in Iraq, and other assorted groups from West China and Central Asia to Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have been mentioned in the press as alleged beneficiaries. Tehran has also been accused of sponsoring or supporting international terrorism and subversion against its enemies and opponents.5 There have been blunt charges or dark hints in Washington's official circles regarding the Islamic regime's involvement in terrorist acts in Bangkok, Buenos Aires, Dhahran, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Tel-Aviv and elsewhere.6 Tehran's refusal to condemn HAMAS suicide bombers as "terrorists" has been cited as evidence of Iran's support for terrorism. …

Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Abstract: Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, by Norman G. Finkelstein. London and New York: Verso, 1995. 171 pages. Notes to p. 237. Index to p. 243. $18.95. Reviewed by Robert J. Bookmiller In this work, Norman Finkelstein attacks traditional, official and revisionist accounts of the Israel-Palestine conflict and challenges myths and mythmakers across the political spectrum. His stated purpose "is to use, as the foil of my critique, an influential piece, or standard body of scholarship...to point up the systematic bias of, as well as to make a modest contribution to, the extant literature"(p. 2). He succeeds in both goals. The "foils" or works utilized by Finkelstein are well known to those engaged in Middle East studies. They include: Joan Peters' From Time Immemorial; Benny Morris' The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949; Anita Shapira's Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948;' and the vast body of writings produced by former Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban. While the author does an admirable job of integrating these works into the larger discussion of image and reality, readers will be at a disadvantage if they are not familiar with the original studies. Finkelstein destroys Peters' already discredited thesis that the Palestinians residing in pre-state Israel were not indigenous but recent immigrants who came because of economic opportunities created by the Zionists. Through carefully documented and meticulously crafted arguments, he exposes Peters' book as "among the most spectacular frauds ever published on the Arab-Israeli conflict" (p. 22). What makes this essay salient is that it was originally penned in 1984 when Peters' book was reaping huge accolades-including the National Jewish Book Award. At that time, there were no articles critical of Peters' scholarship, and Finkelstein notes that it was difficult to publish any work critical of Peters' book in 1984. In a totally separate vein, the author also takes issue with Morris' revisionist view that the Palestinian refugee problem was born of war and not by some grand Zionist design. Morris argues that the Zionists did not expel the Palestinians with premeditation, as the Arabs allege, nor did the Palestinians leave at the urging of the Arab states, as Israel maintains. Finkelstein disputes Morris' middle-ground thesis and instead holds that there was much premeditation on the part of Zionist leaders, in order to create an exclusively Jewish state. Finkelstein also calls into account Eban's official version of Israeli history, in particular Tel Aviv's actions prior to the 1967 and 1973 ArabIsraeli wars. …

Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco

Abstract: Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco, by William A. Hoisington, Jr. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. xi + 207 pages. Notes to p. 253. Bibl. to p. 263. Index to p. 276. $45. Reviewed by Julia Clancy-Smith Historical memory of France's colonial moment in Morocco inevitably evokes the figure of Marshal Louis-Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934), the first resident general named to that country after the 1912 imposition of the French Protectorate. Indeed, Jacques Berque, the noted scholar of all things North African and a former colonial officer himself, opens his personal reminiscences, Memoires des deux rives, with an anecdote about General Lyautey presiding over commencement exercises at an Algerian lycee in 1907.' Lyautey's career and life have been the object of numerous books, articles, dissertations, and studies, including hagiographic accounts by French military writers and officers, who lionized the man as France's overseas empire began to crumble after World War II. And Lyautey himself wrote extensively about his own exploits and campaigns long before he was appointed resident general of Morocco, in April of 1912, by the French president, Armand Fallieres. The abundance of written and other kinds of historical data on Lyautey has rendered the historian's task rather more difficult, not least because what the Marshal preached or advocated as colonial policy was frequently very different from practice. A paradoxical individual who sincerely admired many aspects of North African Arab culture, studied Arabic, fretted over the corrosive effects of European civilization upon the Maghrib, and yet relied upon force majeure when faced with opposition to French rule, Lyautey presents his biographers with not a few intractable problems of interpretation. It is greatly to William Hoisington's credit as a scholar and historian that he has grappled so skillfully with the personality, real and legendary, of Lyautey, effortlessly weaving the colonial officer's own story into a much grander, more complex narrative of fin-de-siecle France, the culture of the military establishment, and French imperialism world wide. Hoisington's study is the first truly scholarly full-length biography of Lyautey in English, and it rivals the recent three volume work in French by Daniel Rivet.2 It is the product of years of painstaking research in at least six major archival collections, including the protectorate archives in Rabat, which have not been used extensively by scholars. It draws together numerous other sources of documentation that will be mined eagerly by those studying the French empire. Morocco at this critical juncture in time is treated in a systematic and sympathetic fashion, so that the Moroccans, and other North African figures and leaders, emerge fully as actors in the unfolding drama. Such a treatment is the mark, once again, of mature historical analysis, since Hoisington is able to deal with both sides of the colonial equation without consigning the colonized to a shadowy existence as mere supernumeraries. This is really a biography about two Lyauteys-the soldier-administrator who advocated the novel idea of "peaceful penetration" and "indirect rule," and a second, somewhat more elusive figure, who rashly proposed in 1891 that the army in the Metropole assume the role of a "vast field of social action" (p. 4), and later engaged the famous urban planner, Henri Prost, to safeguard Islamic Rabat's cultural patrimony against the inroads of modernity. To flush out the multiple dimensions of his life and thought, the author follows Lyautey in the first chapter from his early years at St. Cyr (1873), through his first encounters with L'Algerie Francaise in the 1870s and 1880s, and subsequent posting to French Indochina in 1894, followed by five years in Madagascar. These years and experiences solidified his views on the nature of empire as well as his definition of French colonialism's mission, which also coincided, as Hoisington shows, with the elaboration of a vocal colonial lobby in France supported by a parti colonial in the French legislature. …

Ankara's Baku-centered Transcaucasia policy: Has it failed?

Abstract: Turkey's initiatives towards Azerbaijan have been low-key because of Ankara's traditionally cautious diplomacy and its relatively modest short-term goals in the Transcaucasus. Yet the Turkish government's long-term goals are ambitious and include: 1) support for Azerbaijan's independence; 2) support for Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh; 3) prevention or restriction of Russian presence and influence in the region; 4) participation in Azerbaijani oil production and export; 5) a friendly-but not necessarily pan-Turkic-Azerbaijani administration. After the demise of the Soviet Union, many observers predicted that Turkey would compete with Russia and Iran for spheres of influence in the Turkic newly-independent states (NIS).' By late 1996, however, many of the same people were stating that Russia was now in a dominant position in its near abroad (the former Soviet republics) and that Turkey's economic, political and diplomatic resources had proved insufficient to allow it to play a major role in the region. Turkish diplomacy towards Azerbaijan, the most strategically located NIS for Turkey, also seemed to have failed to bring it the hoped-for political influence and economic benefits. Even during the pro-Turkish administration of Azerbaijani president Abulfaz Elchibey (1992-93), Turkey appeared to be unable to secure a strong foothold in Azerbaijan. The conclusion that Turkey's policy towards Azerbaijan and its neighbors has failed is both premature and based on mistaken assumptions. It has been only five years since the Soviet Union collapsed, and the NIS have just begun to stand on their own. Given the fact that Russian rule goes back to the early l9th century for Azerbaijan, it is clear that Ankara could not have achieved much in five years even if it had forcefully tried to replace Russia as the new "Big Brother." Second, Turkey's inroads into Azerbaijan and Central Asia have actually been very low-key, and the Turks-despite their rhetoric that the 21st century would be a Turkic century2-have done their utmost not to challenge Russia directly and to avoid provoking their northern neighbor. This does not mean, however, that in the long-run the Turks do not desire to expand their influence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia at the expense of Russia. Ankara considers Azerbaijan the most strategically located Turkic state: a gateway to Central Asia, a potential economic partner with huge petroleum resources, and a natural ally in containing Russian influence in the Transcaucasus. TURKISH POLICY VIS-A-VIS AZERBAIJAN This article will discuss Ankara's policy towards Azerbaijan taking into account the fact that Turkish initiatives toward Azerbaijan began only in 1991, and that Turkish goals vis-a-vis Baku were relatively modest.3 Turkey's policy toward Azerbaijan, in the past five years, has had a number of goals, including: Azerbaijan's independence; Azerbaijani sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, the mostly Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan; a friendly, but not necessarily pan-Turkic, Azerbaijani administration; preventing or at least limiting Russian return to Transcaucasia; and participating in Azerbaijani oil production and the export of a significant portion of Azerbaijani oil through Turkish territory.4 Although it may appear contradictory, Ankara believes that to accomplish these goals, good relations with Russia are necessary, even though they may be difficult to maintain.5 Post-Soviet developments indicate that Ankara and Moscow have widely diverging views on the future of Azerbaijan. Russia would prefer Azerbaijan to have a pro-Moscow government which would provide military bases for Russia and accept its troops as peace-keepers in Karabakh. It also would like to foster Azerbaijani dependency on Russia by becoming the sole outlet for Azerbaijani oil exports and by forcing Azerbaijan to accept a partnership with Russia in the production of off-shore Azerbaijani oil in the Caspian Sea. …

Faust without the Devil? the Interplay of Technology and Culture in Saudi Arabia

Abstract: The present article argues, in contrast with the prevalent view, that the massive import of modern technology has profoundly changed Saudi traditional culture. The change is seen in the culture's response to specific technologies, clock-based time and the rise of the modern city. Conventional accounts and, especially, Saudi and other Arabian Peninsula literary works are employed to construct this argument. The argument of profound cultural change is premised on the view that technology is a bearer of new paradigms of perception and action and that it is ambiguous, in spite of its having strong deterministic features. Saudi Arabia has been transformed, over the last three decades, from a traditional society to one in which life is textured by imported consumer technology. The bedouin encampment, tent, mud-house, and camel have yielded to the city, cement house, high-rise building, dishwasher, television set, car, and all the trappings that modern technology can supply. The body of the individual himself now is a technological 'site'. The Saudi writer, Mansur al-Hazimi, describes the Saudi man walking the streets of London with "his suit of pure English wool, his French tie made of fine genuine silk, his Italian shoes of the best leather, and his expensive Swiss watch," as being "a walking showcase of the industries of the entire world."1 The technology that inundated Saudi Arabia is essentially of the consumer type, except for the capital-intensive, petrochemical industry run largely by expatriates. It lacks backward and forward linkages: it neither takes from nor gives to local production or science. It is bereft of background and foreground, as if having descended from the heavens on a society that was not culturally prepared to receive it. Nonetheless, this technology is not mere hardware or "technofacts"; it also is a cultural instrument, a mediation between the individual and the world, a way of ordering the world. It presents the Saudis with alternative modes or paradigms of perception and action that challenge their own indigenous, traditional cultural norms. The present article is an exploration, an attempt to make sense of the interplay between technology and culture in Saudi Arabia. It seeks to demonstrate that technology transfer to that country has effected more than a passing change in its culture. The Saudi culture that will be presented here is a new culture in which the Saudis find themselves having to assimilate rapidly, and adjust to a vast array of technologies; and having to conceive of interpretations of, and confer symbols on, the technologies and the new environment. This view contrasts with a prevalent thesis that holds that the technological transformation has had little impact on Saudi culture.2 Perhaps because of the difficulty of conducting research in Saudi Arabia, and also because of a curious lack of interest in the question of technology in the Arab world among scholars studying this region, the relationship of technology and culture in the kingdom has received little attention. What exists is often no more than impressionistic and anecdotal accounts by journalists and technocratically and policy-oriented analysts. Such lack in scholarship can be partly remedied by mining the rich material in Saudi and other Arabian Peninsula literary texts. Many of the novels, short stories and essays by writers from that region that have come out in the last two decades grapple with the overall issue of modernity and the encounter of the indigenous culture with the world of technology. A dimension of this problem is frequently found in the poetry of the younger generation. Literature has the advantage over other types of accounts in that it can provide insight into how people perceive change, what it means to them, and how they cope with it. It portrays, moreover, a panorama of voices with varied experiences and perspectives, providing a safeguard against reductionist or simplistic explanations. …

National Autonomy, Labor Migration and Political Crisis: Yemen and Saudi Arabia

Abstract: This article explores the political and economic relationships in the 1980s and 1990s between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen as related to Yemeni labor migration and return migration in 1990. Saudi Arabia was home to about 2 million Yemeni labor migrants. This work force was reduced to about 1 million when oil prices declined. Yemen received substantial remittances which fueled consumption and autonomy among rural institutions. Governments came to depend on indirect taxation of remittances through customs duties. Local institutions were funded largely by donations from migrants and their families. Central elites at the national level pressured local elites who were weakened by the loss of revenue when labor migration declined in the 1980s. Central policies helped local areas adjust to declining funds. This enhanced national political power. In 1990 when Saudi Arabia shifted policy on Yemeni labor migration and Yemenis fled home the united North and South Yemen absorbed the massive return migration. The states control over society had increased sufficiently during the 1980s that Saudi Arabias desire to exploit local autonomous groups failed and a smooth unification of the two Yemeni populations proceeded. Yemen had been united for 3 months before the Saudi decision. Yemens decision to remain neutral in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict stimulated the Saudi action to threaten Yemeni migrants. Saudi Arabia tried again to undermine stability in Yemen when violence erupted in 1994; but Yemen was cohesive independent and secure and had a newly discovered oil reserve which buffered the Saudis efforts to influence events in Yemen.

The advent of electoral democracy in Morocco''s constitutional monarchy? The referendum of 1996: 171

Abstract: The 1996 constitutional referendum in Morocco was unprecedented in its establishment of a directly elected Chamber of Representatives. For the first time, a chamber of Parliament will be open to direct suffrage. To be sure, the conduct of future elections will be the true test of the government's commitment to political liberalization. Nonetheless, the 1996 referendum is a significant development and is a further indicator of the gradual political opening that the government of King Hasan II is pursuing in the 1990s. The referendum of 13 September 1996 to change the Moroccan constitution and create a directly elected Chamber of Representatives was an important development in Morocco, despite the fact that as the referendum approached, the outcome became more or less certain. The fact that the Ministry of Interior reported that 99.6 percent of the electorate approved the measure gave the appearance that this change had been mandated from the top. This article argues that the referendum was significant not because of the apparent unanimity of voter approval, but because of the debates and developments surrounding it. The creation of a bicameral legislative body, the Majlis al-Nuwwab (Council of Deputies), by means of direct suffrage, satisfied longstanding demands by King Hasan II's opposition. The two principal opposition parties, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) and the Istiqlal Party, had argued for years for a popularly elected chamber that would permit accountable and competitive government. Having finally achieved its objective, the opposition may find itself longing for the old system. In the past, opposition parties had derived significant political capital from their ability to criticize government policies. Under the new system they may find themselves the recipients of criticism. In the last four decades, the legitimacy of the government has been challenged both domestically and internationally.' The palace is opening up the country's political system slowly to counter criticisms by domestic opposition groups and parties that the monarchy is undemocratic and violates civil and human rights. By gaining the opposition's support for the reforms, Hasan hopes to counter or perhaps even co-opt the opposition, a tactic he has used in the past. The referendum was also pivotal at the level of international opinion. Although the juridical legitimacy of Morocco is hardly in dispute, international recognition of the stability of the government remains of paramount importance to the monarchy.2 Specifically, the government wants to emphasize the fundamental importance of Morocco's relationship with Europe. Hasan's son, the Crown Prince Muhammad, recently published his doctoral dissertation on the significance of that relationship.3 Furthermore, the signing in November 1995 of a Partnership Agreement with the European Union (EU) cemented Morocco's ties with Europe. Mediterranean countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey have been cast in competition with each other in their attempts to attract foreign investment and expand trade ties with the West. Consequently, Western opinion regarding a given country's political climate is a crucial factor in attracting those investments. The European Parliament's approval of the Partnership Agreement, on 5 June 1996, came only after a lively debate and a request by the Parliament that the European Commission, the executive body of the European Union, provide an annual report on the status of Morocco's human rights record. Thus, the perception of the Moroccan government as a stable, democratizing regime is of the utmost importance for Morocco's future economic development. In sum, the referendum satisfied a key demand of the opposition and may have opened a new era in Moroccan politics. The true test, however, will be in the conduct of elections to the Majlis scheduled for 1997 and in the content and efficacy of policy that emerges from the new body. …

The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940-1949

Abstract: 1. Open Economy Macroeconomics (New York: Basic Books, 1980). Frank Cass Publishers, 1995. x + 299 pages. Notes to p. 347. Bibl. to p. 352. Index to p. 358. $47.50. Reviewed by Neil Caplan This condensation of a seminal 1989 Hebrew work offers English-speaking readers the fruits of Joseph Heller's study of the clandestine world of Israel's pre-state underground. The "Stern Gang" referred to a radical terrorist movement first known as "IZL in Israel" (a breakaway group from the larger Irgun Zvai Leumi, the military wing of the Revisionist Movement), headed by romantic Zionist ideologue Avraham ("Yair") Stern. A year after Yair's murder at the hands of his British police captors in February 1942, several of his followers reconstituted their organization, thereafter known in Hebrew as LEHILohamei Herut Yisrael (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel). Given the inherent conspiratorial nature of his outlaw subject, one must admire Heller's ability to gain access to so much documentary archival material, to extract useful reminiscences from interviews with cooperative former activists, and to assemble his evidence with a critical eye. The result is an erudite text, but not easy reading. While previous authors have highlighted the group's terrorist actions, they have paid scant attention to the subtleties of its ideological development. Heller quotes from many of LEHI's leaflets and from the private correspondence of its activists to produce a detailed and authentic description which takes us beyond the bravado of the often self-serving and unreliable accounts recorded in survivors' memoirs. Heller believes that shifts in the organization's political orientation are best understood through an appreciation of the fact that Stem and his followers were the estranged disciples of Zeev Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement. Unlike their Revisionist mentors, Sternists defined "Britain" as the occupier of their homeland and the Hebrew nation's permanent "enemy." Nazi Germany was, to the Stem Gang, merely a transient "persecutor." In their search for an appropriate external ally, Stemists at first entertained the prospect of an alliance with Hitler or Mussolini before moving on, by the end of World War II, to seek the backing of the Soviet Union. In this last phase, LEHI portrayed itself as being part of the worldwide struggle against "Anglo-Saxon imperialism." One wonders whether, in view of its growing anti-Americanism, LEHI's efforts to gain public sympathy and set up support networks (for arms purchases, inter alia) in the United States deserve more attention than the passing mention Heller gives them. Heller's portrayal of the Stern Gang's various ideological shifts is necessarily complex. In the author's analysis, the terms "national bolshevism" or "leftist chauvinism" reflect most accurately the group's basic ideology during its heyday. Readers may be struck by the eclectic variety of legends and heroes that inspired the fanatical dedication of the group's members. Heroic role-models were found both in the distant and recent Jewish past (with negative ones taken from the alleged cowardly behavior of the Jewish ghetto councils in Nazi-occupied Europe) and in dozens of "national liberation" struggles in 19th- and 20th-century Europe and Asia. …

US security assistance to Egypt and Israel: politically untouchable?

Abstract: Since the 1970s, Egypt and Israel together have received the lion's share of worldwide US security assistance allocations: about $100 billion. This aid helped the United States achieve short-term political objectives, but several factors suggest a need to reduce or eliminate at least the economic portion of this assistance. Future levels of US security assistance, however, will be largely determined by a Congress that is receptive to real or supposed Israeli needs and to the appeals of select special interest groups. About 92 percent of the annual US expenditure for security assistance1 today goes to two countries: Israel and Egypt. Virtually all of Israel's foreign aid from the United States (excepting housing loan guarantees) and most of US aid to Egypt is security assistance. Since security aid constitutes about 45 percent of the entire US foreign assistance budget, it is a sizable sum. For many years, Israel has received annually at least $3 billion in security assistance: $1.8 billion in military aid under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, and $1.2 billion in economic aid under the Economic Support Fund (ESF). Egypt has received yearly amounts of about $2.1 billion in security aid: $1.3 billion in FMF, and $815 million in ESF.2 The US security assistance program was initiated in 1946 to counter the influence of the Soviet Union and its allies. This article assesses factors that have affected, and are likely to affect, US security assistance to Israel and Egypt in the post-Cold War environment. Developments in the Middle East, US strategic interests in the region, fiscal concerns, and public opinion are all pertinent considerations. Change, however, can come only through an American domestic political process in which Congress and powerful interest groups often play decisive roles. BACKGROUND From the late 1970s through fiscal year (FY) 1997, annual US aid to Israel and Egypt comprised between 33 and 43 percent of the entire foreign assistance budget. Aid to these two countries dominated the security assistance program during this period, and its prominence within that program increased after the end of the Cold War because, while aid to Israel and Egypt remained fairly constant, the overall security assistance budget declined when the program's core rationale for existence-containing the Soviet Union-disappeared. Total reported US aid (loans and grants) to Egypt by FY 1997 stood at $49 billion, 75 percent of which was security assistance. Total US aid to Israel (excluding $9.8 billion in housing loan guarantees) was more than $71 billion, about 90 percent of which was security assistance.3 Moreover, 30 percent of the entire US foreign affairs budget-which funds, among other things, all forms of foreign aid, the State Department and three other foreign affairs agencies, contributions to the United Nations and other international organizations, and the Peace Corps-is currently consumed by aid to Egypt and Israel.4 As stunning as these amounts are, they substantially understate the magnitude of the assistance. This is because these figures are in current, not constant, dollars (that is, inflation is not taken into account), and because they do not reflect the numerous special privileges accorded to Israel.5 When the value of these privileges is computed, an average of at least $500 million annually is generally added to the $3 + billion in officially reported yearly aid to Israel since FY 1985.6 Since the 1970s, the US government's rationale for aid to Israel and Egypt has become a virtual mantra, repeated by successive administrations. Declaratory US policy asserts that the aid is designed primarily to: secure "a just and lasting comprehensive peace"7 between Israel and its neighbors, especially Egypt; reaffirm the US commitment to a democratic Israel; promote regional stability by helping Egypt modernize its armed forces; and encourage sustainable development and a market-oriented economy in Egypt. …

The Wiles of Women/The Wiles of Men: Joseph and Potiphar's Wife in Ancient near Eastern, Jewish and Islamic Folklore

Abstract: The Wiles of Women/The Wiles of Men: Joseph and Potiphar's Wife in Ancient Near Eastern, Jewish and Islamic Folklore, by Shalom Goldman. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. xxxiii + 148 pages. Notes to p. 168. Bibl. to p. 177. Index to p. 189. $16.95. Reviewed by Yedida K. Stillman This charmingly written, learned book will interest and delight scholars and educated lay readers alike. It investigates the motif of what may be one of the most often repeated and embellished stories in Near Eastern lore, the tale of the handsome young hero who resists seduction by the older woman-Potiphar's wife-who is mistress of the household in which he lives. He then is falsely accused by the spurned temptress, suffers unjustly, and is ultimately vindicated, rising to power, glory, and in some versions even to godhood. This romantic tale is best known today as part of the Joseph story in the Bible and the Quran and their homiletic literatures; but, as the author demonstrates, it is a universal tale with parallels and counterparts in many cultures outside the Near East and the Mediterranean. The author, Shalom Goldman, deftly wends his way through ancient Egyptian and Greek mythology, Biblical and Midrashic literature, the Quran, tafsir (exegesis of the Quran), and qisas alanbiya' (stories of the Prophets) literature. He applies the analytical methodologies not only of Biblical and Quranic studies, but of folklore, comparative literature and women's studies. While attempting to sort out the complex, intertwined relationships between variations of the Potiphar's wife motif in different civilizations and traditions, Goldman is careful to avoid the arid and futile task of trying to establish who borrowed what from whom and what is "original," "borrowed" or a "direct influence." Instead, he analyzes the principal narratives in their specific cultural context and demonstrates that they serve different functions for their respective audiences. For readers of the Bible, the Joseph story in Genesis is part, indeed a pivotal part, of the divinely planned historical epic of the Israelites. For readers of the Quran, on the other hand, Surat Yusuf (the chapter on Joseph) is an exemplum, a didactic narrative of example. For readers of the Iliad, the story of Bellerophon embodied Hellenic notions of honor, heroism and tragedy; while for readers of the Tale of Two Brothers,' the story reflected upon the Egyptian understanding of the interaction between the gods and men and the ultimate triumph of life over death and good over evil. Although these respective observations have been made by various scholars before (and in his detailed and informative notes Goldman proves his thorough familiarity with the secondary literature), it is to Goldman's credit that he has been able to expand upon them (at times, critique them) and integrate them into a broad and consistent overview. …

Privatization in morocco: the politics of development

Abstract: A successful privatization effort has heralded Morocco's formal break with the dirigiste economic policies of the past in favor of the disengagement of the state from certain social and economic obligations. It remains to be seen whether the government's objectives and its overall program of financial and economic liberalization can be implemented in the face of entrenched resistance within its own rent-seeking bureaucracy. Between the years 1988 and 1993 there were over 2,300 privatization transactions in developing countries, yielding US$96 billion in revenues.l The bulk of this activity was centered in Latin America and the Caribbean, while the Middle East and North Africa, remained relatively timid and obstinately tied to the state-centrist economic policies of the past. Certain countries in the region, however, began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to shed this dependence on the public sector, foremost among them the Kingdom of Morocco. Spearheaded by King Hasan II, the new economic platform in Morocco called for an increased reliance on private entrepreneurship and investment as the engines of growth for the future. An integral part of these reforms was the privatization program, which aimed at ceding a large percentage of the state patrimony to local and foreign interests. The Casablanca stock exchange was earmarked by the privatization ministry as a crucial vehicle for the transparent and equitable divestment of state enterprises to a broad group of investors within Moroccan society. In return, the "financial deepening" of the economy as a whole was expected to spur the creation of the necessary legal, regulatory, and financial infrastructure to support a new vanguard of private firms. Some sections of the Moroccan government also hoped that the privatization program would help the stock exchange become a cost-effective means of financing the emerging companies of corporate Morocco. Privatization and the development of a capital market were thus perceived as complementary and mutually reinforcing. This article will discuss the economic, social and political implications of privatization in Morocco. It maintains that first, the political struggle within the government between different interests both opposed to and advocating privatization has had a significant effect on the pace, success and popular perception of the Moroccan divestment program; and second, that privatization has done little to empower new groups within the society or reduce the glaring disparity in wealth between various sectors of the population. It is too early to say whether privatization has complemented the larger process of economic liberalization and financial deepening of the economy. EARLY STAGES OF PRIVATIZATION On 11 December 1989, the political commitment to privatization was codified into law by a vote in the Moroccan parliament of 78 to 45 with three abstentions. The extent of the divestiture program, however, was, and still is, a hotly debated issue, as opinions abound on the optimal strategic mix between public and private sectors. An initial list of 75 enterprises and 37 hotels, slated for divestiture by the end of 1995, was later augmented by the addition of two more firms and an extension of the deadline to the end of 1998. Of the companies on the list, the firms in the energy and financial sectors represented the highest share of their sectors' value-added. The transport, communication and mining sectors, all dominated by the state, were conspicuously absent from that list. As of the summer of 1996, 25 companies, among them Shell Oil and Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur (BMCE), and 17 hotels had been completely sold or partially divested, earning over 10.5 billion dirhams2 ($1.3 billion) in revenues for state coffers with an additional 2.2 billion dirhams ($270 million) in investment commitments.3 A familiar divestiture structure in Morocco, especially for larger state holdings, is the sale to a noyau dur, or hard core of shareholders, by direct negotiation or tender to provide management expertise and a possible capital injection. …

Thelebanese central bank and the treasury bills market: 2281

Abstract: Since their introduction in 1993, the securities issued by the Lebanese Treasury have had considerable success. But with returns sometimes approaching 40 percent, a strain has been placed on Lebanon's fragile economy as the internal debt hits record levels. Yet the Lebanese Central Bank has been paying spectacular rates despite a demand for Lebanese Treasury Bills (LTBs) which is far outstripping supply at the weekly auction. There is a concern that the Central Bank is playing conflicting roles in conducting and overseeing the auction. After a long and devastating war, Lebanon embarked, in 1992, on a massive reconstruction effort. The government estimates the capital needs for reconstruction to be around $14 billion over the next ten years, with the private sector expected to be the most important source of funds.1 To meet the challenge, Lebanon has borrowed on the international market and its foreign debt has been rapidly rising since the appointment of Rafiq Hariri as prime minister in October 1992. Lebanon's foreign debt, virtually non-existent up to 1994, grew by 67 percent to US$ 1.29 billion in 1995.2 Another $100 million Eurobond3 issue was launched, in May 1996, to raise money for reconstruction. This has put Lebanon's total current external debt at about $1.4 billion,4 a moderate figure relative to the country's size. More alarming, however, is Lebanon's internal debt, which has been rising almost exponentially. A report of the Lebanese Banks Association, a grouping of Lebanon's 79 banks, shows that the net internal public debt rose to about seven billion dollars in 1995.5 The Association's report adds that the rise in public debt represents a deficit of expenditures against revenues. Currently, the association estimates the public debt interest service payments at 45 percent of the government budget deficit. This means that $0.45 out of each dollar of deficit goes towards paying the interest on the debt. The remainder (55 percent) comprises the administrative and investment expenses. To finance its budget deficit, Lebanon is being forced to pay extremely high rates to borrow money. In turn, this is straining the government's public debt service payments, which are expected to continue to rise as a result of increasing interest rates on treasury bills. Some analysts question whether it is sustainable for the government to continue to increase the country's debt at such a high cost. There is serious concern that interest rates paid on Lebanese Treasury Bills (LTBs) and the rate of the market's growth cannot continue at the current pace. The sharp increase in public debt is a relatively recent phenomenon. The bulk of the increase can be traced to May 1993, when the Banque Du Liban, Lebanon's Central Bank, began weekly auctions of three-, six-, twelve-, and twenty-four months securities.6 The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), the government's macroeconomic planning arm, has estimated that public cumulative debt will continue to rise and peak at 90 percent of GDP at the turn of the century.7 The government, however, has no plan to shift its borrowing abroad, and plans to continue its reliance on the domestic market until it balances its budget a decade from now.8 LEBANESE TREASURY BILLS AND HIGH INTEREST RATES For dollar investors, the LTB market has been a very rewarding venture since 1993, because of the 25 percent rate of return in hard currency terms over three months. With these profitable rates, it is not surprising that international investors have been avid buyers of LTBs. The generous yield offered on these securities has enabled the Hariri government to achieve its goal of financing the reconstruction of the country's infrastructure without relying on foreign aid or assistance. At the same time, the LTB market has provided the central authorities with a powerful monetary tool to defend and stabilize a frail Lebanese pound (LP) against the US dollar. By controlling interest rates, the Central Bank has been able to make investments denominated in LPs more appealing to local and foreign investors, and, therefore, shore up the exchange value of the LP vis-a-vis the US dollar. …