Showing papers in "Military review in 2002"

The 21 Indispensable Qualities of a Leader: Becoming the Person Others Will Want to Follow

Abstract: Why do some people consistently inspire others to follow their lead? According to John C. Maxwell, author of 24 books and a regular speaker on the topic, its the character qualities they possess. In The 21 Indispensable Qualities of a Leader, Maxwell identifies these top traits as character, charisma, commitment, communication, competence, courage, discernment, focus, generosity, initiative, listening, passion, positive attitude, problem-solving, relationships, responsibility, security, selfdiscipline, servanthood, teachability, and vision--and then defines them in ways that readers can absorb and utilize. Each is covered in a separate chapter opening with a high-concept definition and continuing with relevant anecdotes, details on its meaning, suggestions for further reflection, and exercises for improvement. For example, in the section on vision (You can seize only what you can see), Maxwell describes how Walt Disney initially developed the theme-park concept after accompanying his daughters to a fun-filled but rather shabby amusement park. He then analyzes how Disneys resultant projects drew on his personal history while meeting others needs, and explains how readers must listen to several voices to develop successful foresight in a similar way. Finally, Maxwell suggests methods to articulate these visions and measure their implementation. --Howard Rothman

China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975

Abstract: CHINA AND THE VIETNAM WARS, 1950-1975, Qiang Zhai, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2000, 320 pages, $49.95/$19.95. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975; is one of many about Chinese involvement in the Indochina Wars. Qiang Zhai is one of the first to use recently opened Chinese archives; the many memoirs, diaries, and documentary collections published in China over the last decade; and secondary works based on archival sources. He concentrates exclusively on the policies and personalities of those involved in China's Vietnam policy. This is not a definitive study. Many American, Russian, Chinese, and Vietnamese archives are still closed, but it does begin to shed light on reasons for Chinese behavior during the period. Chinese support for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) is an important part of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) diplomatic history and the Cold War in Asia. Ho Chi Minh called the Chinese "comrades plus brothers" during the height of their influence. In the first 25 years of its existence, the PRC aided the DRV against France and the United States. With varying degrees of success, the DRV used Chinese models in the 1950s and 1960s to fight the French and rebuild the north after the First Indochina War. However, between 1968 and 1972, China adjusted its diplomatic strategy, and the SinoVietnamese alliance slowly fell apart. By 1975, the alliance was in disarray, and China faced the prospect of an alliance between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Zhai traces the course of the SinoVietnamese alliance and shows how events in Laos and Cambodia influenced Chinese policy toward Vietnam. He eschews impersonal social scientific models to explain change. Instead, he highlights the individual's role in making history, framing his discussion by identifying four interwoven motives that influenced Chinese policy: geopolitical realities; a sense of obligation and mission to aid a fraternal Communist party and promote Asian anti-imperialist revolutionary movements; personality; and using foreign affairs to promote a domestic political agenda. Zhai emphasizes Mao Zedong's role as a charismatic revolutionary visionary who set the general framework of China's foreign policy. Mao made the crucial decisions to aid Ho Chi Minh, confront U.S. pressure, accept or reject Soviet initiatives, and change Chinese policy toward the United States. His close associates implemented these decisions. …

Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly

Abstract: I will be damned if I will permit the U.S. Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war.1 Organizational structures that encourage the presentation of innovative proposals and their careful reviews make innovation less likely 2 THESE QUOTES ENGENDER two truisms about the military organizations of great powers: they embrace the big-war paradigm, and because they are large, hierarchical institutions, they generally innovate incrementally. This means that great-power militaries do not innovate well, particularly when the required innovations and adaptations lie outside the scope of conventional war. In other words, great powers do not win small wars because they are great powers: their militaries must maintain a central competence in symmetric warfare to preserve their great-power status vis-A-vis other great powers; and their militaries must be large organizations. These two characteristics combine to create a formidable competence on the plains of Europe or the deserts of Iraq. However, these two traits do not produce institutions and cultures that exhibit a propensity for counterguerrilla warfare. In addition to a big-war culture, there are some contradictions that derive from the logic that exists when a superior industrial or postindustrial power faces an inferior, semifeudal, semicolonial, or preindustrial adversary. On one hand, the great power intrinsically brings overwhelmingly superior resources and technology to this type of conflict. On the other hand, the seemingly inferior opponent generally exhibits superior will, demonstrated by a willingness to accept higher costs and to persevere against many odds. "Victory or Death" is not simply a statement on a bumper sticker; it is a dilemma that embodies asymmetric conflicts. The qualitatively or quantitatively inferior opponent fights with limited means for a strategic objective-independence. Conversely, the qualitatively or quantitatively superior opponent fights with potentially unlimited means for limited ends-maintaining some peripheral territory or outpost. Seemingly weaker military forces often prevail over those with superior firepower and technology because they are fighting for survival.' History offers many examples of big-power failures in the context of asymmetric conflict: the Romans in the Teutoburg Forest, the British in the American Revolution, the French in the Peninsular War, the French in Indochina and Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam, the Russians in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and the Americans in Somalia. This list is not entirely homogeneous, and it is important to clarify that the American Revolution, the Peninsular War, and the Vietnam war are examples of great powers failing to win against strategies that combined asymmetric approaches with symmetric approaches. However, two qualifications are necessary when generalizing great powers' failures in small wars. First, big powers do not necessarily lose small wars; they simply fail to win them. In fact, they often win many tactical victories on the battlefield. However, in the absence of a threat to survival, the big powers' failure to quickly and decisively attain their strategic aim causes them to lose domestic support. Second, weaker opponents must be strategically circumspect enough to avoid confronting the great powers symmetrically in conventional wars. History also recounts many examples wherein big powers achieved crushing victories over small powers when the inferior sides were injudicious enough to fight battles or wars according to the big-power paradigm. The Battle of the Pyramids and the Battle of Omdurman provide the most conspicuous examples of primitive militaries facing advanced militaries symmetrically. The Persian Gulf war is the most recent example of an outmatched military force fighting according to it opponent's preferred paradigm. The same was true for the Italians' victory in Abyssinia, about which Mao Tse-tung observed that defeat is the inevitable result when semifeudal forces fight positional warfare and pitched battles against modernized forces. …

Battle Command: Auftragstaktik and Innere Fuhrung: Trademarks of German Leadership

Abstract: Battle Command-the exercise of leadership in combat. Will technology lead military thinkers to reconsider existing notions of battle command? In this section, authors reflect on 21st-- century combat leadership. Major General Russel L. Honore examines two integrated leadership models under specific conditions of METT-TC. Lieutenant Colonel Marc LeGare explores how the Army's current digital command and control systems are creating new ways for commanders to visualize the status of units, to formulate courses of action, and to articulate intent and issue guidance. Colonel James K. Greer delivers an articulate discussion about emerging operational doctrine for the Objective Force. Lieutenant Colonel Scott R. McMichael concludes with a startlingly realistic picture of what technologically enhanced warfighting could look like. Yet, despite technology's influence, war remains a particularly human endeavor. Major General Werner Widder argues that the critical ingredient for success on the tomorrow's battlefield remains the soldier exercising judgment at the critical time and place in accordance with the commander's intent. IN MAY 1940, the seizure of the Belgian fortress of Eben Emael was critically important to the successful conduct of the French campaign by the German Wehrmacht in World War II. And yet, preparation and conduct of this special operation were entrusted to a first lieutenant of the paratroopers, which at the time was a branch of the air force. At his disposal were just 77 paratroopers. At the very beginning of this operation the glider aircraft of the assault force leader, First Lieutenant Rudolf Witzig, was forced to make an emergency landing in a field near Cologne, which was approximately 100 kilometers from the objective. The remaining aircraft flew on and landed inside Eben Emael. The paratroopers completed their mission, but under the leadership of a staff sergeant. During the landing approach to Eben Emael, another glider had to force-land approximately 60 kilometers from its objective. The assault section leader, Staff Sergeant Meier, took decisive action by appropriating two vehicles and then threading his way through the columns of the main attack divisions marshaled at the border. Reaching Maastricht, he crossed the Meuse River and advanced into the glacis of Eben Emael. He was prevented from storming the fortress by the canal surrounding it. So, he decided on his own initiative to attack the Belgian forces in the environs of the fortress. Wounded in the course of the fighting, Meier captured 121 Belgian prisoners of war, whom he turned in the following day against a receipt as proof that he had done everything in his power to complete his mission. In the meantime, Witzig had located another aircraft to tow his glider. Taking off again for Eben Emael, he landed inside the fortress, immediately assumed command of his assault force, and brought about the surrender of the Belgian fortress. The successful completion of this operation was an absolute prerequisite to ensure the Wehrmacht's rapid advance across the Meuse River and, thus, was essential to the rapid conclusion of the French campaign. The initiative and battle command skills of a first lieutenant and a noncommissioned officer were put to the test, and both gave an excellent accounting of themselves, for which they received the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, at the time, Germany's highest decoration for bravery.1 The action at Eben Emael is a particularly good example of Auftragstaktik-a leadership principle the German Armed Forces have practiced for 200 years. Auftragstaktik is a command and control principle that evolved during the 19th and 20th centuries. The tactical and operational military manuals of the German Army repeatedly refer to Auftragstaktik and call it the "pre-eminent command and control principle of the Army."2 In 1998, Auftragstaktik was codified once again in German Army Regulation (AR) 100/100 (Restricted), Command and Control in Battle, the bible of the German Army. …

Operational Art for the Objective Force

Abstract: Despite the concept of logical, in the place of physical, lines of operations in the 2001 version of FM 3-0, planners of the ongoing counterterrorism campaign face the same challenge as planners of peace-support operations in the Balkans. Today's doctrinal concepts for operational design hamstring planners' and commanders' abilities to design and conduct effective, coherent campaigns for operations across the spectrum of conflict in today's security environment. AS THE U.S. Army's Transformation to an Objective Force begins, a host of questions have emerged. What might the Army of the future be called on to do, where, against what opponents, and under what conditions? How will the Army operate in the future joint, multinational, and interagency context? What technological innovations will affect the future conduct of Army operations? How will the Army fight tactically? How will the Army conduct those campaigns and operations that are predominantly land in character; that is, what will be the operational art of the future? During a series of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) seminar war games and annual Army Transformation war games, observations began to emerge to suggest that warfare was not changing only at the tactical level; the conduct of the campaigns of the 21st century would be significantly different from those of the 20th century. Operational Art's Development Before considering the operational art of the future, it is necessary to understand the operational art of the present. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Army added the operational level of war and operational art to its doctrine, which became the AirLand Battle Doctrine of the 1986 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations.' The logic and necessity of the argument for operational art was so compelling that the joint community incorporated virtually intact the Army's doctrine into Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. The operational design construct of 1986 grew out of a sustained, detailed TRADOC study of military theory, history, and practice. The combination of insights and conclusions drawn from those three areas of study resulted in the doctrine that enabled the successes of Operations Just Cause in 1989 and Operation Desert Storm in 1990. Among the key theoreticians examined were Carl von Clausewitz, with his contribution of centers of gravity, fog, friction, and culmination; Henri Jomini, with his derivation of lines of operation and decisive points; and the Russians Triandifilov and Tuchachevsky, with their development of deep battle and the operational level of war. And, because it was the lens through which all activity was viewed at the time, the entire theoretical approach was grounded in Newtonian logic and linear determinism.3 The analysis of history that went into developing the operational-design construct for AirLand Battle was equally exhaustive. Study of Napoleon's campaigns reveals the concept of large-formation operations, and the development of all-arms corps that could fight and win a battle on their own, independent from the main army. Helmuth von Moltke's 1866 and 1870 campaigns demonstrated the importance of maneuver. Ulysses S. Grant's campaigns in the American Civil War provided insight into the dynamics of operations distributed in time and space but united in purpose. The German Army blitzkrieg and the Russian Army deep operations in World War II contributed further insight into arrangement of battles and military action in time, space, and purpose. In the area of practical application, the experiences of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 were coupled with Cold War preparations for the expected large-scale, high-intensity combat defending the Central Region of Europe against attack by the Soviet Union. Experiences such as repeated multicorps REFORGER exercises, deliberate war planning, and senior-leader war games provided a forum for understanding the challenges of operational maneuver of large formations. …

Using Tactical Decision Exercises to Study Tactics

Abstract: What is necessary to be performed in the heat of action should constantly be practiced in the leisure of peace. - Vegetius1 USING GAMES to train leaders is neither new nor revolutionary. Such methods date back to Sun Tzu.2 Although initially played principally for amusement, such exercises were soon found to be worthwhile for training and educating students for their respective professions. Today, many organizations use similar practices to develop leaders and prepare them for decisionmaking under actual conditions. Notables include the U.S. Armed Services and some law-enforcement and fire-prevention services. The variation of such games found effective for training subordinates in decisionmaking skills is the tactical decision exercise (TDE). The TDE provides an effective mechanism for developing individual ability to make decisions under physical and mental stress. While TDEs are not the perfect substitute for actual training and experience, they do serve to sharpen individual intuitive decisionmaking ability. In today's military, constrained as it is by shrinking budgets, personnel shortages, and numerous missions, TDEs provide leaders at all levels an opportunity to hone decisionmaking skills during scenarios that place the student-leader in stressful situations. Recently, there has been a resurgence of the TDE variety of war games. Experiences in peace operations have rekindled interest in the merits of using these role-playing scenarios to develop decisionmaking skills. History of Wargaming Who actually invented the first war game is unknown, but historians generally credit Prussian Baron von Reisswitz for being the first to move war games out of the entertainment realm and into the military. He designed the 1811 version of the game using scaled pieces to represent units. He later moved the game to a sand table containing features corresponding to actual terrain. Tthe pieces were no longer restricted to moving within the confines of the squares of a chessboard. Players could move the pieces freely within the capabilities of the respective units. The accompanying rules were also noteworthy because their foundation in military experiences of the day (Napoleonic Wars) added realism. Reisswitz's game became extremely popular in courts and higher echelons of society, yet never really took root within professional military circles.3 Many in the military were skeptical of the game's merits. In 1824, Reisswitz's son George, a lieutenant in the Prussian Guard Artillery, developed a more refined version of the game that included a number of improvements. He titled his version of the game "Instructions for the Representation of Tactical Maneuvers under the Guise of a War Game."4 The refined game included set-piece rules and incorporated actual topographical maps to represent the battlefield. The game gained widespread attention and eventually became a staple within the regiments. The game's intrinsic worth so impressed Lieutenant Helmuth von Moltke that in 1828 he founded a war-game club called the Kriegspieler herein. In 1857, as the chief of staff in the Prussian Army, Moltke pushed the use of wargaming throughout the army. During the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War, the heavily reserve- and militia-based Prussian Army soundly defeated the highly regarded French Army in a mere 5 months. The reversal of the balance of power in Europe was so rapid and unexpected that it shocked the world. Noted military historian Michael Howard writes that the nature of the Prussians' overwhelming victory was largely attributed to superior organization and education.6 Their remarkable military successes prompted many other countries to analyze and incorporate some of the Prussian reforms into their own military establishments, one of which was officer education through war games and staff rides. The United States also took note. In 1882, Major William R. Livermore devised the U. …

Military Leaders' Obligation to Justify Killing in War

Abstract: During the nation's worst conflicts, soldiers have wrestled with the morality of killing during combat Pete Kilner argues that leaders have a responsibility to train combat soldiers to kill during combat but leaders also have an obligation to explain the moral justification for such killing. He further argues that leaders must explain the morality of killing so soldiers can live with themselves in the years after combat. THE METHODS that the military currently uses to train and execute combat operations enable soldiers to kill the enemy, but they leave soldiers liable to postcombat psychological trauma caused by guilt. This is a leadership issue. Combat training should be augmented by explaining to soldiers the moral justification for killing in combat to reduce postcombat guilt. Soldiers deserve to understand whom they can kill morally and why those actions are indeed moral. Military leaders are charged with two primary tasks-to train and lead units to fight effectively in combat in accordance with the war convention and to care for the soldiers they command. Military professionals generally hold these two tasks to be complementary, accepting Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's statement that the best form of welfare for troops is first-class training. American military leaders have been very successful in creating combat-effective units. In response to the U.S. War Department's research indicating that less than half of World War II riflemen fired their weapons at the enemy in combat, the military instituted training techniques. These techniques-fire commands, battle drills, and realistic marksmanship ranges-resulted in much-improved combat firing rates. During the Vietnam war, similar research reveals combat firing rates of 90 percent.1 Unfortunately, this improved combat effectiveness has come at a cost to soldiers' welfare. The training techniques leaders have employed to generate the advances in combat firing rates have resulted in increased rates of postcombat psychological trauma among combat veterans. Training that drills soldiers on how to kill without explaining to them why it is morally permissible to kill is harmful to them, yet that is currently the norm. Modem combat training conditions soldiers to act reflexively to stimuli, such as fire commands, enemy contact, or the sudden appearance of a "target," that maximizes soldiers' lethality, but it does so by bypassing their moral autonomy. Soldiers are conditioned to act without considering the moral repercussions of their actions; they kill without making the conscious decision to do so. In and of itself, such training is appropriate and morally permissible. Battles are won by killing the enemy, so military leaders should strive to produce the most efficient killers. The problem, however, is that soldiers who kill reflexively in combat will likely one day reconsider their actions reflectively. If they are unable to justify to themselves that they killed another human being, they will likely, and understandably, suffer enormous guilt. This guilt manifests itself as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and it has damaged the lives of thousands of men who performed their duty in combat.2 This article argues that military leaders' important and legitimate role-transforming civilians into combat soldiers who kill to defend their country-- carries with it the obligation to help soldiers cope with the moral repercussions of their actions. If military leaders train soldiers to kill others in combat, they should also educate soldiers to live with themselves in the years after combat. Military leaders should augment current training by morally justifying killing in combat to soldiers.3 This education would improve the U.S. Army's mission effectiveness. Why Soldiers Deserve a Moral Justification for Killing Military leaders should be concerned with morally justifying killing in combat; it stems from their duty to care for their troops. …

Transforming Army Learning through Communities of Practice

Abstract: THE ARMY TRAINING and Leader Development Panel's (ATLDP's) Officer Study Report identified numerous challenges that the Army is addressing as it transforms to the Objective Force. The report called on the Army to "establish new systems, models, and procedures from the best of existing programs to develop leaders for full spectrum operations."1 As one of its responses, the Army is developing a digital Warrior Knowledge Network (WKN) to support leader development. The WKN will be a web-based knowledge system that provides Army leaders and soldiers with tailored, timely, and relevant knowledge and information. The dominant structure of the WKN will be online communities of practice (COPs) that provide a powerful new model for knowledge sharing and learning. This article defines COPs and overviews their enormous potential for the Army, especially in the areas of leader development, doctrine, and culture.2 It is not an overstatement to say that COPs have the potential to transform the way the Army does business, helping it to become a knowledge-based learning organization that is even more able to educate and train its leaders, develop its doctrine, and inspire commitment from its people.3 Theory and Practice Although COPs have always existed, the Internet has enabled them to become exponentially more powerful. COPs are voluntary associations of people bound together by a shared passion for a particular practice.4 They are self-selected groups whose members come together to help each other by sharing professional knowledge, stories, ideas, and tools. Such communities seem to form naturally. For example, in antiquity, artisans formed corporations, and in the Middle Ages, tradesmen formed guilds.5 In the U.S. Army, recurring officers' calls and lunchtime discussions often foster small COPs. COPs are not defined by how their members communicate, which may be through journals, conferences, informal meetings, list serves, bulletin boards, and any other forms of communication. Rather, COPs are defined by conversations, relationships, and a spirit of collaboration that develop via various means of communication. The CompanyCommand.com website has become a functional COP for military company-level commanders.6 Visitors to the site are drawn by their shared passion for command. On the site, former and experienced company commanders share their command-related stories, ideas, and tools with current and future commanders. Commanders who have a question or problem can post it, inviting other members of the community-many of whom have helpful knowledge on the topic-to offer advice. Like an officers' call at the club, the website is a forum for leaders to informally share knowledge.7 Participants tell stories, offer and debate ideas, and look for guidance. There is no gatekeeper of knowledge. In this marketplace of ideas, everyone is free to speak, yet all are expected to use their own judgment to assess the quality of what they hear. In some respects, online conversations can elicit more candor than face-to-face communications do. Speaking without attribution, participants are more likely to offer unconventional ideas and say what they really think at the moment. "I can ask questions in this forum that are somewhat taboo within my own organization... [and] can get realworld answers from experienced officers who are not in my rating chain," one captain wrote to CompanyCommand.com. Participants find themselves assessing their hidden assumptions and ways of thinking when they air their ideas and receive feedback that challenges their thinking. Anonymity forces participants to focus on the quality of the ideas presented rather than on distractions such as their contributor's rank, position, or appearance. Another important and unique advantage of online discussions is that they are not constrained by time and space. Participants can engage in asynchronous discussions with fellow practitioners around the world, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. …

The Army and the Media

Abstract: The DOD Principles for News Media Coverage. . solidified three concepts: that open and independent reporting was the standard for combat coverage for the future that pools were to be an exception rather than the rule, and that voluntary compliance with security guidelines was a condition of access to US military forces. ... Of particular note is the recent addition of two very important concepts of which Army leaders need to be aware: security at the source and embedding. I have made arrangements for the correspondent to take to the field ... and I have suggested that they should wear a white uniform to indicate the purity of their character.' -Union General Irvin McDowell THROUGHOUT AMERICAN history, the esteem that Army leaders have held for the media has changed little. Just a few years ago, McDowell's remarks would have been considered popular and applicable, particularly in the post-Vietnam era. It seems, however, that attitudes are changing. At a 1997 conference of senior military leaders and members of the media, conferees agreed that relations between the military and the media were "perhaps the best ever."2 Although certain areas of tension and misunderstanding remain, consideration, facilitation, and cooperation characterize the current state of the military-media relationship. In recent military operations, the military has accommodated the media in a manner unprecedented since the Vietnam war. The operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia provide ample evidence that the military, in stark contrast to earlier operations such as Grenada and Panama, recognizes the value of allowing the media to cover military operations. The picture is not entirely rosy, however. A 1995 study of the military-media relationship conducted by Frank Aukofer, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, and Vice Admiral (Retired) William P. Lawrence showed sharp differences between the two institutions. The source of the disagreement appeared to be the "Post-Vietnam Blame the Media Syndrome."3 In the Aukofer-Lawrence study, more than 64 percent of military officers agreed with the statement, "News media coverage of the events in Vietnam harmed the war effort."4 This great divide between the two institutions continues to plague their relationship today. It is not the continuing angst over the Vietnam war's outcome that affects the militarymedia relationship today but, rather, its derivative effect: an ingrained cultural mistrust of the media throughout generations of military leaders. To dispel this mistrust, Army leaders must understand the historical and philosophical bases of the militarymedia relationship. Fewer than 30 reporters accompanied the entire invasion force to Normandy, France, on 6 June 1944. In contrast, more than 500 journalists appeared within hours to cover combat operations in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. At the beginning of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, more than 1,600 news media and support personnel were present, and some 1,500 reported on hurricane relief operations in Florida in 1992. Reporters provided live television and radio coverage of the night amphibious landing that marked the beginning of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 and the end of the UN operation during Operation United Shield in 1995. More than 1,700 media representatives covered the initial phases of peacekeeping operations in the American sector of Bosnia in 1996.5 During World War II, cooperation and commitment to a common cause characterized the relationship between the media and the military. John Steinbeck, a war correspondent of the time, put this characterization into plain words when he said, "We were all part of the war effort. We went along with it, and not only that, we abetted it.116 The War Department based the World War 11 military-media paradigm on censoring and strictly controlling correspondents. American military correspondents overseas were not allowed in war theaters unless they were accredited. …

The Combined Action Program: Vietnam

Abstract: "Of all our innovations in Vietnam none was as successful, as lasting in effect, or as useful for the future as the Combined Action Program [CAP]," wrote U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Lieutenant General (LTG) Lewis Walt in his memoirs.1 British counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson said CAP was "the best idea I have seen in Vietnam."2 The program, undertaken by the USMC during the Vietnam war, was an innovative and unique approach to pacification. In theory, the program was simple; a Marine rifle squad would join forces with a South Vietnamese militia platoon to provide security for local villages. CAP's modus operandi made it unique. While assigned to combined units, Marines would actually live in a militia unit's village. CAP was a response to the conditions in Vietnam. As the senior command in the I Corps Tactical Zone, the Marines were responsible for securing more than 10,000 square miles of land that included the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. More than 2-1/2 million people lived in the I Corps area. Using the militia for local security made sense; there were not enough Marines to go around. The Marines and the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, disagreed on war strategies. U.S. Army leaders wanted to search and destroy the communists in the rural and less-- populated areas of South Vietnam; the Marines wanted to clear and hold the populated areas. CAP was a manifestation of the strategy the Marines felt best suited the conditions in Vietnam. With U.S. Marines living and fighting side-by-side with the Vietnamese people, CAP seemed to represent an effective, long-term, around-the-clock commitment to combating the Vietnamese communists at the grassroots level. CAP worked well in some locations; elsewhere, its results were transitory at best-with villagers becoming overreliant on the Marines for security. CAP's Origins CAP came naturally for the Marine Corps because counterguerrilla warfare was already part of the USMC heritage. From 1915 to 1934, the Corps had a wealth of experience in foreign interventions fighting guerrillas in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. For example, the Marines organized and trained the Gendarmerie d'Haiti and the Nacional Dominicana in Haiti and Santo Domingo from 1915 to 1934. In Nicaragua (1926-1933), the Marines organized, trained, and commanded the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. These organizations were nonpartisan, native constabularies the Marines commanded until host-nation forces could competently assume command.3 Senior USMC generals in Vietnam had studied as lieutenants such interventions-called "small wars." But more than that, As Commanding General (CG), Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, LTG Victor H. Krulak was responsible for training and readiness of all the Marines in Vietnam. As CG, III Marine Amphibious Force, Walt directed the operations of all the Marines in I Corps. Krulak and Walt began their careers during the 1930s and 1940s under the tutelage of such Caribbean Campaign veterans as LTG Lewis B. "Chesty" Fuller, Sr., and Major General (MG) Merritt "Red Mike" Edson. In Vietnam, Krulak and Walt applied the lessons they had learned about guerrilla fighting.4 When the Marines arrived in South Vietnam in 1965, they occupied and defended three enclaves in the I Corps area: Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai. CAP grew out of an experiment that Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) William W. Taylor's 3d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, conducted near Phu Bai.5 Taylor's infantry battalion defended 10 square miles and a critical airfield at Phu Bai. He knew his three rifle companies were not enough to defend that amount of territory. The local population lived in six villages, each nominally defended by a militia platoon. Taylor and his officers brainstormed ideas of how to improve the battalion's defensive posture. They looked to a previously unused resource-the militia platoons. Taylor's executive officer, Major Cullen C. …

Paraguay's Ciudad del Este and the New Centers of Gravity

Abstract: PARAGUAY IS landlocked, poor, a long way from everywhere, and seldom appears in the drama of international events but is nevertheless emblematic of our global security challenge. It has suffered crippling wars where governance has always been a challenge and where smuggling and criminal organizing is a tradition. Long disregarded by the great powers' intelligence and diplomatic services, it is now a place where international crimes like money laundering, gunrunning, migration fraud, and drug trafficking recombine and metastasize. In an age of great sovereign competitors, the United States pays attention to nations according to their development-their ability to mobilize as a nation and to make war as a nation. Now we are entering an age of uncivilized behavior in which we must focus on the lost geographies, the fertile ground for piracy and terror. Ciudad del Este, a boomtown on Paraguay's eastern border facing Brazil and Argentina, is an appropriate target for new concerns. Regional security scholars have aptly called it a nest of spies and thieves. Local security specialists assert that Ciudad del Este is not only a den of low-technology criminality but also a haven for international money laundering, with much of the money coming from the Middle East. It is a town of a quarter million inhabitants and an international trading center where the admixture of drug runners, terrorists, and pinstriped bankers trespasses on the sovereignty and safety of democratic countries and their citizens, thereby representing a threat to the United States and the region. There are other examples of ungovernable zones in the Americas that provide cover for terrorist groups, such as the Switzerland-sized area that Colombia granted as an official safe haven to a group on the U.S. State Department's list of terrorist organizations, but in Paraguay's Ciudad del Este, all the components of transnational lawlessness seem to converge. The Larger Context The turbulent political environment of Paraguay engendered lawlessness in Ciudad del Este. The country has suffered three coup attempts in the past 5 years. Popular army chief, General Lino Oviedo, who mounted a short-lived coup in 1998, was sentenced to 10 years in prison, then ran for president later the same year. While the supreme court declared Oviedo an illegal candidate, his running mate, Raul Cubas Grau, was elected president and quickly pardoned Oviedo. Cubas Grau resigned under pressure after the vice president was assassinated in March1999, leaving the presidency to Luis Angel Gonzalez Macchi who was next in line as senate president. Adding to the political turbulence, Gonzalez Macchi fired 18 generals and more than 100 other officers who had supported Oviedo. After a May 2000 coup attempt, GonzAlez Macchi terminated another 13 officers. Meanwhile, the party of Oviedo-supported Vice President Julio Cesar Franco maneuvered to impeach Gonzalez Macchi. The political tumult has done little to engender social and economic progress in Paraguay, and only Brazil and Argentina's influence have kept the democratic government afloat. I Needless to say, the government in Asuncion has had little time to concentrate on improving the rule of law in Ciudad del Este. According to Paraguayan police, about 70 percent of the 600,000 vehicles on the road in Paraguay are there illegally. Open markets provided by the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) membership help import stolen cars from Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.2 Brazilian police complain that Paraguayan criminals trade stolen cars for drugs, which are then exported to Europe and the United States. Recently, Gonzalez Macchi was exposed in the press as owning a stolen BMW, and his wife was then reported for having a stolen Mercedes. Both cars apparently claimed the same title document, which belonged to a Toyota. Understandably, Paraguay did not attend the American hemisphere forum on auto theft held in Bogota, Colombia, in October 2001. …

The Nature of Soldierly Trust

Abstract: The contemporary operating environment often throws soldiers into situations where they must quickly establish working relationships with complete strangers: soldiers from other tactical units, law enforcement personnel from federal agencies, and relief coordinators from nongovernment organizations. How is trust established quickly among those myriad groups? The author takes a close look and discovers what it takes to develop swift soldierly trust. MANY HAVE MARVELED at the military's successes since the Vietnam war debacle eroded Americans' trust in their government and in the U.S. Army. Performance in Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans did much to restore public trust in the Army as a competent, reliable, and ethical institution. When the sexual harassment and rape incidents at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, and the racially motivated hate crimes at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, again threatened to erode the public's trust in the Army, the Army countered with competent, reliable, and ethical actions. Today, the U.S. Army enjoys a remarkably high and consistent level of public trust.1 Obversely, soldiers have fluctuated in the amount of trust they invest in civilian citizenry, elected politicians, and senior military leaders.2 A social chasm, often called the "civil-military gap," has arisen from the public's unfamiliarity with and disassociation from the military caused by the general public's lack of contact with the military since the end of conscription. Politicians are also increasingly unlikely to have served in the Armed Forces; thus, they have difficulty relating to military culture and the soldier's working life. Senior military leaders appear to succumb too easily to their political masters and budget appropriators' whims, and there is a growing generation gap between junior officers and senior officers. These factors contribute to professional soldiers' trust of those who might direct them into harm's way. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently investigated trust within the Army's officer ranks. The study revealed that junior and midcareer officers mistrusted senior officers.3 Another contemporary study linked the issue of lack of trust to a gap between Baby Boomer and Generation X (Xer) officers.4 Xers "waited for the 'quality time' with their parents that seldom came and learned to trust only themselves. To the 'Xer,' authority was to be earned, not declared by position or fiat."5 Xer officers tend not to predicate trust in the Army on guarantees of lifelong careers or rank as do Boomer officers. So, trust among Army officers is more and more a function of generational values. Clearly, soldiers' trust in the institutional Army and in American political institutions is a serious and complex issue for the Army professional.6 In this post-Cold War era of complex peace operations, the Army finds itself working with an array of government agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Remarking on the competencies of government agencies and NGOs, more than one Army officer in Bosnia has said something to the effect: "Those guys couldn't coordinate anything past the squad level, while we're left holding the bag-trying to coordinate an entire nation-building effort." Trusting other agencies in the pursuit of common objectives is certainly not a strength of Army culture. Trust among peers has been a traditional value of the Army profession. The adage of "trusting your buddy to protect your flank" applies to many Army activities outside combat. However, this dynamic is changing with the advent of complex, dispersed, or noncontiguous operations and with the growing use of ad hoc teams formed on the ground as military operations unfold. Where formerly a soldier relied on a buddy to protect his flank, today the adage might be "trusting a stranger to protect your three-- sixty" because of the growing likelihood of never having met the fellow soldier, sailor, marine, airman, or even civilian who now controls that soldier's destiny. …

Integrating Women into the Infantry

Abstract: At the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, there were 13 women killed in action Of those, four were termed "hostile deaths " out of a total of 148 U.S. combat deaths. WOMEN HAVE NOT been given a chance to succeed on an equal footing with men in the military. Even after decades of reform, initiated by the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973, women are excluded from six principal job groups: infantry, armor, short-range air defense, cannon artillery, combat engineers, and special forces. Opponents of total gender integration point out that women cannot perform the physically demanding work these job groups require. Opponents also say that putting women into units where only men have traditionally served will jeopardize the Army's combat readiness by ruining unit cohesion. This article proposes that the U.S. Army integrate women into the infantry branch. It will dispel practical notions that a woman is too "weak" to do an infantryman's job and that her presence will destroy team spirit and ground maneuver units' fighting effectiveness. This article does not dispute those who believe it is wrong for the United States to send women to fight close combat battles, nor is it an advocate for those who wish to destroy gender barners simply because they exist. It acknowledges the personal nature of those points of view and avoids them altogether. Instead, this article assumes a sociopolitical climate in which only practical debate is waged about whether to integrate women into the infantry. The issue, then, is not about right and wrong but about suitability and feasibility. Can women do the infantryman's job, and how can the Army help them do it? The key assumption, here, is that American women would volunteer to become infantry soldiers if given the chance. Why Women in the Infantry? Ground combat units contain the only jobs closed to women in land-based military forces today. Before the AVF, which recruited women to replace some of the Army's postdraft manpower losses, women made up 3 percent of all soldiers in the Army. Today, women account for 14 percent of all soldiers and 20 percent of all recruits.1 They fly attack helicopters, command military police companies, drive infantry soldiers into combat on trucks, and "man" logistics bases far forward, or in the midst, of ground maneuver forces. In the past 15 years, women have been killed in combat. At the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, there were 13 women killed in action. Of those, four were termed "hostile deaths" out of a total of 148 U.S. combat deaths.2 Interestingly, two of those deaths occurred when an Iraqi Scud missile hit a temporary barracks housing combat service support units far behind the forward edge of the battle area.3 These deaths seem to back the notion that today's battlefield is no longer as well-defined as it once was. For example, U.S. offensive doctrine calls for attacking the enemy's lines of communication, in addition to his main defenses, to disrupt their combat forces' resupply.4 The theory is that, if successful, the enemy's maneuver forces will run out of rations, ammunition, and the will to fight, in that order. It is no secret that the United States' conventional threat uses the same doctrine. Our field trains, brigade support areas, and division support areas are the key objectives of conventional enemy attacks. It is also no secret that most Army women work in these areas. This doctrine transforms all soldiers-men and women-in field command and control and/or logistics areas into front-line combatants, at least in the enemy's eyes. Why attack through infantry and armor when the division rear can be penetrated? Of course, this says nothing about why women belong in the infantry. Proponents of giving women the right to serve in ground combat units usually use a combination of arguments: an equal opportunity to serve is every American's right; current technologies are genderneutral; and other nations allow women in the infantry. …

Leader Competency and Army Readiness

Abstract: Leader-development doctrine has come a long way since General Bruce C. Clarke's day, whose article (page 2) on pre-information age tenets of successful combat leadership began this leadership section. So Colonel Moilanen's piece is a fitting close. Moilanen summarizes the competencies required of today's Army leaders and shows how those leader competencies form the bedrock of Army readiness. OUR ARMY IS PEOPLE.1 Today, the U.S. Army focuses on transforming an existing organization to produce a particular capability for rapid deployment and strategic responsiveness. The Army sustains a trained and ready land force for meeting responsibilities in a potential major theater war and significant challenges across the spectrum of military operations. These complex and diverse worldwide environments, from small-scale contingency warfighting to humanitarian assistance, also require an improved readiness for strategic responsiveness. Rapidly deploying competent and confident soldiers demonstrates the most effective method of shaping national, international, and global situations in ways favorable to national interests. In 1999, Secretary of the Army Louis E. Caldera said, "The implications are certainly far more than just platforms. They are organizational. And they're also people skills. [W]e are working on producing leaders for change, not just leaders who are doctrinally capable and competent leaders for warfighting, but leaders also for all kinds of missions that we are asked to be able to do today across the full spectrum, and who will have the capability to continue to deal with an evolving global situation in which the array of threats that you face goes across the entire spectrum, including the homeland defense-type issues and use of weapons of mass destruction."2 Success depends on leaders, soldiers, and cohesive teams as the Army transforms into a more strategically responsive, full-spectrum land force. Information-age technologies, enhanced logistics, and improved force-- projection means will support, but not preempt, the indispensable readiness value of leaders and the team climate they create. Leaders must be adaptive to ambiguous and changing situations. Soldiers must be comfortable in new multifunctional roles. Teams must be expert at rapidly integrating skills, knowledge, and attributes into united, synchronized, mission-tailored capabilities. Mental agility enhances the physical agility of current and future systems, platforms, and organizations. Progressive research and development provide enhanced ways and means to man and lead Army organizations in the 21 st Century. One immediate operational requirement is to transform Army strategic responsiveness by merging the lethality and survivability traditionally experienced in the heavy land forces with the agility demonstrated in light land forces. The outcome of this union, propelled by innovative and adaptive leaders, will provide a more mobile, flexible, rapidly deployable land power. Leadership Competencies and the Human Dimension The four main leadership competencies are conceptual, interpersonal, technical, and tactical. Values, attributes, and actions complement the four competencies. Using this leadership doctrinal baseline, an evolving combined arms training strategy (CATS) incorporates leader and team performance indicators with task-condition-standard criteria to assess and evaluate proficiency. Appendix B, "Performance Indicators," in Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, presents a listing and basic definition of leader performance areas.3 Ongoing practical unit application and supporting Army experiments will develop more precise measures of leader performance and team measures of effectiveness. Developing innovative leaders is critical during the Army's transformation. Leader development is one of six Army imperatives: doctrine, organizations, materiel, leader development, training, and soldiers. …

Operation Anaconda, Shah-I-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2-10 March 2002

Abstract: They just kept sending them into our meat grinder. We've killed sev-- eral hundred of them, but they just keep coming. -Major General F.L. Hagenbeck2 As of 2 March 2002, Operation Anaconda was the largest combat operation in Afghanistan of the War on Terrorism that began after the at-- tack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Major General F.L. Hagenbeck, commander of the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division, led the major effort to clean out remaining al-- Qaeda fighters and their Taliban al-- lies in the Shah-i-Khot Valley. The mission involved about 2,000 coali-- tion troops, including more than 900 Americans, 200 U.S. Special Forces and other troops, and 200 special operations troops from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, Norway, New Zealand, and Afghan allies. Operation Anaconda began before dawn on 2 March 2002. The battle area occupied about 60 square miles. The terrain is rugged, and the peaks have many spurs and ridges. The base of the Shah-i-Khot Valley is approximately 8,500 feet in altitude. The surrounding mountain peaks rise to 11,000 to 12,000 feet. Only small juniper trees grow on the mountain slopes. The actual snow line began about 100 feet above the valley floor. Mountain villages include the ham-- lets of Sher Khan Khel, Babal Khel, Marzak, Kay Khel, and Noor Khel. On the day battle began, the valley floor was sprinkled with small patches of snow. Temperatures hov-- ered near 15 to 20 degrees Fahrenheit.3 The opposition forces were mostly non-Afghan al-Qaeda and Taliban members although the force also in-- cluded some Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, and Pakistanis. Scattered groups, numbering as many as 20 members, including some family members, holed up in a 3,000-year-- old complex of mountain tunnels, caves, and crannies. The terrorists, who had come to the valley villages six weeks before the battle began, took control; pru-- dently, most of the civilians left. One Afghan villager said the people were told, "If you want to leave or stay it is up to you, but we're staying in those caves because they were ours in the holy war against Russia."4 The terrorists gave 700 sheep to the people of Shah-i-Khot for their troubles; others received bus fare. Predator drones and other CIA in-- telligence assets spotted the enemy assembling in groups south of Gardez, but rather than immediately attacking, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) let the terrorists gather to present a larger target. A small U.S. Special Forces detachment ac-- companied local Afghan commander Zia Lodin as his men entered the valley from the south and headed to Sirkankel to flush out suspected al-- Qaeda and Taliban forces.5 To the east and southeast of the combat area, Afghan generals Kamal Khan Zadran and Zakim Khan's units had responsibility for the pe-- rimeter. U.S. Special Forces teams were with each Afghan general to help coordinate operations. This noose of allied troops enclosed four specific combat zones. The two most significant zones were code-named Objectives Remington and Ginger. Reconnaissance forces slipped into the mountains a few days before the main attack was scheduled to begin on 27 February, but the operation was postponed 48 hours because of rainy, blustery weather. When the operation began, Zia ran into trouble. His 450-man unit was caught in a mortar barrage and pre-- vented from entering Sirkankel. Two of Zia's men were killed and 24 were wounded. Retreating under mortar and rocket fire, the Afghan column stumbled into a second ambush to the rear. U.S. Special Forces Chief Warrant Officer Stanley L. Harriman was killed. Most of Zia's trucks were destroyed, and his troops retreated to Gardez.6 The hole left by Zia's retreat had to be plugged. U.S. troops, who had been slated to block fleeing terrorists or hopscotch around the battle zone, were immediately dropped into the gap to await Zia's return. Elements of the U. …

The Reconnaissance Squadron and ISR Operations

Abstract: To guess at the intention of the enemy; to divine his opinion of yourself; to hide from both your intentions and opinions; to mislead him by feigned manoeuvres; to invoke ruses, as well as digested schemes, so as to fight under the best conditions-this is and will always be the art of war. -Napoleon AS THE U.S. ARMY continues to transform and until the Objective Force is finally realized, the Army has made great efforts to field an interim force-the interim brigade combat team (IBCT). This Transformation force will lead the Army into the future. The IBCT is a force-projection force that can rapidly deploy anywhere in the world to protect U.S. interests or serve the needs of the National Command Authority and regional commanders in chief Designed specifically to conduct small-scale contingency operations in complex terrain against asymmetric tactics, the IBCT will be capable of responding to the country's needs. The IBCT is a unique and lethal combined arms organization comprised of three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance (recce) squadron, a field artillery battalion, a brigade support battalion, an antitank company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, and various other combat support elements. But, what truly makes the IBCT a lethal and effective combat force is its ability to achieve information superiority. With all elements in the IBCT connected via the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), every echelon can gain and maintain situational awareness (SA), and can quickly pass and receive intelligence information and mission orders. There are several unique aspects of the IBCT, but the most important is its ability to gain and maintain situational understanding of the battlefield. The primary means of achieving situational understanding is through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. ISR is defined as "the integration and synchronization of all battlefield operating systems to collect and process information about the enemy and environment that produces relevant information to facilitate the commander's decisionmaking."1 By achieving situational understanding, the brigade commander can best employ lethal and nonlethal effects to defeat an enemy force. Emerging doctrine addresses an additional element of combat power-information. The IBCT's ability to gain information superiority and maintain information dominance will be critical to future military operations in an increasingly complex battlespace. In the future, the IBCT will conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict from major theater war to small-scale contingency operations to peacetime military engagements-facing adversaries that will range from conventional military forces, to paramilitary and guerrilla forces, to terrorists and organized crime groups. Additionally, as these threats attempt to gain an advantage over U.S. forces, the enemy will seek to attack U.S. forces using unconventional and asymmetric attacks while operating in varying types of terrain, including not only open, rolling terrain but also urban areas and severely restricted mountainous and heavily wooded terrain. To ensure success on the future battlefield, commanders must achieve information superiority, defined as "the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."2 The ability to rapidly collect, process, and disseminate information enhances a commander's ability to make better military decisions, and command and control his unit. Each subordinate element in the IBCT contributes to ISR operations. Intelligence is "(1) the product resulting from the collection, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning the threat or environment, or (2) information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. …

Bearer of the Sword

Abstract: IN THE IMMEDIATE aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, U.S. President George W. Bush and his national security leaders articulated objectives for a wide-ranging war against terrorism. Months later, these objectives remain focused on destroying international terrorist centers, dismantling terrorist networks around the world, and punishing states that support terrorist activities. The al-- Qaeda terrorist organization-sponsors of the 11 September attacks and earlier terrorist assaults on U.S. people, property, and interests-remains a high priority. As al-Qaeda's principal bases and leadership cadres in Afghanistan were attritted and its Taliban supporters driven from power, U.S. planners began to direct resources and focus to other al-- Qaeda cells and associates operating in dozens of countries around the world. U.S. national leaders emphasized that these groups, and other terrorist organizations, constitute legitimate targets in the global war on terrorism. Among those targets receiving early attention from U.S leaders was a small, violent Islamic group that, despite origins in the 1979-89 Soviet-Afghan war, operates in the jungles, hills, towns, and coastal waters of the southern Philippines.1 This group is Abu Sayyaf, meaning "bearer of the sword" in Arabic. It has become noted for ambushing government forces, kidnappings, piracy, and frequently beheading captives. As this is written, Abu Sayyaf elements remain engaged in sporadic clashes with the Philippine Armed Forces and continue to perpetrate a mixture of political terrorism and banditry throughout the area. Its purported links to al-Qaeda and its asserted devotion to a radical, perverted form of Islam identify the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) as a vector of local terrorism that also has broader regional and international implications. Of particular concern is the prospect of further radicalizing other Muslim insurgent and proindependence groups in the Philippines and serving as a catalyst for analogous developments in Indonesia, Malaysia, and elsewhere. This article addresses the origin and activities of Abu Sayyaf, the operational environment in which it carries out its activities, and its influence on the Philippines and the region. Before examining Abu Sayyaf specifically, it is instructive to review briefly the historic continuity of Muslim insurgency in the Philippines; the U.S. experience in what was, 100 years ago, a new operational environment; and the current context in which Abu Sayyaf has sought to advance its goals. Moros, Insurgency, and the Operational Environment Twenty-first century Islamic insurgency in the Philippines, in many respects, is continuing a struggle that began in the 15th and 16th centuries. Islam arrived in the southern Philippines in the 14th century, spread aggressively from the Indonesian Archipelago by seafaring Muslim traders and teachers, and by the 16th century, had spread throughout the islands of the Sulu Archipelago into Mindanao, pushing farther north. These Islamic communities, constituting the southern Philippines, were based on their own developing concepts of authority, social relationships, and sovereignty.2 These communities collided violently with Spanish explorers seeking to establish lucrative colonies in the area based on supposed rich resources, trade routes, and a population converted to Catholicism. The Spanish called the Muslim people they found there Moros, or Moors, reflecting their old Muslim enemies in Europe and North Africa.3 While Islam was pushed southward and constrained by Spain, an armed, effective Moro resistance began immediately. It continued until 1898 when the United States defeated the Spanish in the Spanish-American War. The Moros emerged in 1899 with religious and cultural identities intact and, at the very end, enthusiastically wiped out isolated Spanish garrisons before U.S. forces arrived to take over. …