Showing papers in "Pacific Historical Review in 1977"
TL;DR: One of the most abrupt turnabouts in federal Indian policy occurred during the liberal era of 1933 to 1953, when the Harry S. Truman administration reversed the approach of Franklin D. Roosevelt as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: ONE OF THE MOST ABRUPT turnabouts in federal Indian policy occurred during the liberal era of 1933 to 1953, when the Harry S. Truman administration reversed the approach of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The outlines of these contradictory policies emerged with unusual clarity during World War II in a clash over another ethnic minority, Japanese Americans. At issue in June 1942 was the sort of community to be encouraged at the Poston, Arizona, internment camp that the Bureau of Indian Affairs ran for the War Relocation Authority (WRA). Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier feared five or more years might elapse before the "bitter and shocking ordeal" of the Japanese Americans ended. He pledged that the Bureau of Indian Affairs would in the meantime encourage substantial self-government, cooperative economic enterprises, and traditional Japanese cultural activities. Collier hoped to make Poston a place where people would give themselves "utterly to the community" and provide for the rest of the
26 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the effect of the American anti-imperialist movement had on the Philippine revolutionaries and the guerrilla war being fought in the islands is discussed, but the authors were primarily interested in the American dimensions of the anti-IMO movement.
Abstract: HISTORIANS HAVE RECENTLY written books and articles about the anti-imperialist crusade that accompanied the SpanishAmerican War and the United States' conquest of the Philippines that followed it.' Stimulated by the seemingly analogous events of the Vietnam war, some authors have even attempted direct comparisons of the two conflicts.2 In all of these works, however, the authors have slighted the significant question of the affect that the American anti-imperialist movement had on the Philippine revolutionaries and the guerrilla war being fought in the islands. Admittedly, the authors were primarily interested in the American dimensions of the anti-imperialist
25 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors presented a history analysis of the East Asian Institute at Columbia University, a history colloquium at Temple University, and the Pacific Coast Conference of the Association for Asian Studies.
Abstract: Earlier versions of this analysis were presented to the history seminar at Stanford University, the seminar of the East Asian Institute at Columbia University, a history colloquium at Temple University, and the Pacific Coast Conference of the Association for Asian Studies. I am especially indebted for counsel to Dorothy Borg of Columbia University; Vic Carpenter, Mark Paul, and Peter Duus of Stanford University; Waldo Heinrichs, Herbert Bass, Russell Weigley, and Shumpei Okamoto of Temple University; Robert J. C. Butow of the University of Washington; Alvin Coox of San Diego State University; and Forrest Pogue of the Smithsonian Institution. The Committee for Research in International Studies and the Institute of American History helped support the research for the study.
17 citations
TL;DR: The anti-imperialist movement at the turn of the century was led by an older generation of leaders as discussed by the authors, who were characterized as "old gladiators" who were losing their stamina, and were being crowded out of the arena by younger, more vigorous, and more militant men like Roosevelt and Lodge.
Abstract: To AMERICAN HISTORIANS, the leading proponents of antiimperialism at the turn of the century were of an older generation. Those who gave the anti-imperialist movement "whatever strength and vitality. . . [it] had," Robert Beisner writes in Twelve Against Empire, were in their sixties and seventies. Such men, he maintained, were "unlikely to have great power of persuasion over a nation just entering a brave new century."' From comparisons of the ages of anti-imperialist and imperialist leaders, E. Berkeley Tompkins and Ernest R. May draw similar inferences. Tompkins characterizes the antiimperialists as "old gladiators," who, "while battle-wise, were losing their stamina, and were being crowded out of the arena by younger, more vigorous, and more militant men like Roosevelt and Lodge." May observed that many Americans probably
16 citations
TL;DR: The most important Japanese associations were the so-called "Japanese associations" as discussed by the authors, which assisted new arrivals through immigration stations, fought the exclusion movement, promoted social and educational programs, and, depending on the locale, even performed economic functions.
Abstract: THE MOST IMPORTANT ORGANIZATIONS of the Japanese immigrant generation in the United States were the so-called "Japanese associations." Wherever a significant number ofJapanese immigrants settled, whether in California, Oregon, Washington, or elsewhere, they established associations, which assisted new arrivals through immigration stations, fought the exclusion movement, promoted social and educational programs, and, depending on the locale, even performed economic functions. During the exclusion movement, especially after World War I, exclusionists attacked the associations as "a government within a government," alleging that the Japanese government, through its consuls on the Pacific Coast, controlled them, thereby forcing all immigrants to be obedient "subjects" of a foreign government.' The Japanese retorted
14 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that the United States initially chose not to present the American conflict abroad as an antislavery crusade, and as the war progressed, this tactic became increasingly self-defeating.
Abstract: O NE OF THE CENTRAL concerns in studies of the diplomacy of the American Civil War has been the relative importance of the slavery question in the determination and conduct of European-American relations. Most scholars agree that for various purely domestic reasons, the federal government initially chose not to present the American conflict abroad as an antislavery crusade. One school of historians argues that as the war progressed, this tactic became increasingly self-defeating. By emphasizing the preservation of the Union and not highlighting the moral differences between the Union and Confederate causes, the federal government lost liberal and working-class support in Europe, thus permitting conservative governments, whose leaders despised American democracy as much as they disliked southern slavery, to adopt programs that aided the Confederacy. Only after Lincoln committed the United States to the immediate aboliton of slavery in the South did the tide of European opinion turn and force European officials to retreat to a more neutral posture.'
13 citations
TL;DR: A new constitution was written by the Japanese as mentioned in this paper, which divested the Emperor of his divinity and renounced the maintenance of armed forces and war except for self-defense, and launched a purge of militarists, ultranationalists, and other "war supporters".
Abstract: lage the Japanese wrote a new constitution which, among other things, divested the Emperor of his divinity and renounced the maintenance of armed forces and war except (it was later argued) for self-defense; launched a purge of militarists, ultranationalists, and other "war supporters"; encouraged the growth of trade unions; gave the suffrage to women; laid plans for land reform and the dissolution of large corporations (or Zaibatsu). Yet as early as 1947 American policies in Japan shifted from emphasis on these far-reaching reforms towards restoring Japan as the economic workshop of the Far East. This "reverse course," as the Japanese label the increasingly conservative thrust of American occupation policy, is often explained in strategic terms as an American response to the revolution in China and the alleged threat of the Soviet Union.' Others view the reverse course largely in terms of the internal needs of Japan, particularly the need to remedy the
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10 citations
TL;DR: For many years, Hawaii had attracted the attention of American expansionists, including President Benjamin Harrison and his Secretary of State, James G. Blaine as discussed by the authors, who wrote to the President that "there are only three places that are of value enough to be taken that are not continental".
Abstract: FOR MANY YEARS Hawaii had attracted the attention of American expansionists, including President Benjamin Harrison and his Secretary of State, James G. Blaine.' In listing policy priorities in August 1891, Blaine wrote to the President that "there are only three places that are of value enough to be taken that are not continental. One is Hawaii and the others are Cuba and Porto Rico. Cuba and Porto Rico are not now imminent and
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9 citations
TL;DR: The border refers to the line of demarcation separating Mexico and the United States and the narrow land strips immediately adjacent to that line on both sides and extending to the limits of the U.S. counties and Mexican municipalities within the zone as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation. 'As used in this work, the term "border" refers to the line of demarcation separating Mexico and the United States and to the narrow land strips immediately adjacent to that line on both sides and extending to the limits of the U.S. counties and Mexican municipalities within the zone. In the historiography of the U.S.-Mixico border, the greatest emphasis is placed on international conflict and diplomatic relations between the two countries. Although listed in a broader multidisciplinary context, references to historical works dealing with the border may be found in Charles C. Cumberland, "The United States-Mexican Border: A Selective Guide to the Literature of the Region," Supplement to Rural Sociology, XXV (June 1960); and Ellwyn R. Stoddard, ed., "The Status of U.S.-Mexico Borderlands Studies: A Multidisciplinary Symposium," Social Science Journal, combined double issue, XII-XIII (1975-1976), 3-112. 2Attracted by the area's rapid population growth, increased urbanization, and incipient economic development, sociologists, economists, and geographers have accelerated their border research since the mid-1960s. Important works published in the last decade include William V. D'Antonio and William H. Form, Influentials in Two Border Cities: A Study of Community Decision Making (Notre Dame, 1965); David North, The Mexican Border Crossers: People Who Live in Mexico and Work in the United States (Washington, D.C., 1970); C. Daniel Dillman, "Urban Growth along Mexico's Northern Border and the Mexican National Border Program," Journal of Developing Areas, IV (1970), 487-508; Donald W. Baerresen, The Border Industrialization Program of Mexico (Lexington, Mass., 1971); Julian Samora, Los Mojados (Notre Dame, 1971); John A.
TL;DR: The relationship between the depression of 1920-1921, the Warren Harding administration's most immediate and pressing domestic problem, and the Washington Conference, its foremost venture in international diplomacy, was explored in this article.
Abstract: past stressed the interplay of three factors--the tensions created by the naval rivalry among England, Japan, and the United States; the Japanese threat to the Open Door in China; and domestic political pressures. Ignoring the full implications of Charles Beard's dictum that foreign policy represents the outward thrust of domestic economic forces, most historians have failed to understand the relationship between the depression of 1920-1921, the Warren Harding administration's most immediate and pressing domestic problem, and the Washington Conference, its foremost venture in international diplomacy.' Yet such a link did exist. Secretary of Commerce
TL;DR: In Los Angeles, the Mexican population of the city increased from about 50,000 during World War I to some 250,000 by the end of the 1920s and constituted between twelve and fourteen percent of the total population.
Abstract: IN THE PERIOD 1915-1930 thousands of Mexican workers and their families settled in Los Angeles. Officially, the Mexican population of the city tripled from 31,173 in 1920 to 97,116 by 1930. Unofficially, the number of Mexicanos in the city may have grown from about 50,000 during World War I to some 250,000 by the end of the 1920s.' Mexicanos constituted between twelve and fourteen percent of the total population of Los Angeles, although they were highly concentrated in several enclaves in the central and eastern sections of the city. Most of them found employment in unskilled work, yet like other immigrant workers in other large metropolitan areas, Mexican workers have generally been ignored by historians. Little is known about the dynamics of occupational and geographic stratification of Mexicans in the United States. Recently, historians have applied quantitative techniques to the study of the urban worker class, but for the most part, these studies-which make use of city directories, birth, marriage, and death records,
TL;DR: There has been a proliferation of studies dealing with American diplomacy during the Republican ascendancy, 1921-1933 as discussed by the authors, and despite the appearance of several overviews and many well-researched monographs, there is a notable absence of efforts to provide a systematic and scholarly analysis of American policy toward Europe during this era.
Abstract: DURING THE LAST three decades there has been a proliferation of studies dealing with American diplomacy during the Republican ascendancy, 1921-1933. Yet despite the appearance of several overviews and many well-researched monographs, there is a notable absence of efforts to provide a systematic and scholarly analysis of American policy toward Europe during this era. There have been, of course, general studies emphasizing either the isolationist or expansionist aspects of American diplomacy.' There also have been some important works on key policy makers, including Charles Evans Hughes, Frank B. Kellogg, Henry L. Stimson, Herbert C. Hoover, and
TL;DR: The Tongass National Forest as discussed by the authors is the largest forest reserve in the United States, covering four and a half million acres of islands and mainland, including most of the Alexander Archipelago, the group of islands which lie off the lower coast of Alaska.
Abstract: THE TONGASS NATIONAL FOREST is the largest forest reserve in the United States. Located in southeastern Alaska, it embraces four and a half million acres of islands and mainland, including most of the Alexander Archipelago, the group of islands which lie off the lower coast of Alaska. The rain-soaked forests of this area rise like a wall from the shores of the islands and mainland. The dense woods are nearly impenetrable, and the great trees grow to such heights that the tops are often shrouded in mist. It is a unique environment, today protected from the heedless axe and the unauthorized chainsaw by the full force of the federal government. The Tongass National Forest was created in 1902 by executive order of President Theodore Roosevelt, after the idea had been conceived and proposed by George T. Emmons, a retired naval lieutenant who had spent much of his life in Alaska. The circumstances of this unusual collaboration have been largely ignored by historians. Some writers, like Polly and Leon Miller
TL;DR: The prevailing interpretation of the origins of the Cold War were the strongly anti-Communist assumptions of Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech of March 1946 and George F. Kennan's apologia for the policy of containment in the July, 1947, issue of Foreign Affairs.
Abstract: UNTIL RECENTLY THE POINTS of departure for the prevailing interpretation of the origins of the Cold War were the strongly anti-Communist assumptions of Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech of March 1946 and George F. Kennan's apologia for the policy of containment in the July, 1947, issue of Foreign Affairs. Influenced by the increasingly bitter rhetoric of Cold War polemicists as well as by events, most American historians of the 1950s depicted the Soviet Union as the nation mainly responsible for the polarization of the postwar world.1 Communist revolutionary ideology merged with historic Russian imperialism to produce Soviet tyranny in eastern and central Europe and the threat of a Communist take-over in western Europe from 1945 through 1948. According to this view, the United States had anticipated the continuation of war-imposed cooperation with the Soviet Union after the Axis
TL;DR: In this article, the authors made use of occupational data to obtain a better understanding of the fluidity of American society during the nineteenth century, focusing on characteristics of mobility and persistence of urban residents in eastern cities.
Abstract: In recent years social historians have made increasing use of occupational data to obtain a better understanding of the fluidity of American society during the nineteenth century.1 This surge in popularity has improved considerably our understanding of the socioeconomic and spatial growth of the United States. While significant advances have been made in application and use of occupational data, much of the existing literature reflects a tendency to concentrate on characteristics of mobility and persistence of urban residents in eastern cities. Areas outside the eastern industrial region which have been examined from an occupational perspective are few; in fact, the Far West is noticeably absent.2 This neglect is most
TL;DR: The attitude of the United States Department of State toward Sun Yat-sen in the latter part of his career serve as a revealing example of American distaste for Third World revolutionary nationalism in the early twentieth century as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: THE ATTITUDES OF OFFICIALS in the United States Department of State toward Sun Yat-sen in the latter part of his career serve as a revealing example of American distaste for Third World revolutionary nationalism in the early twentieth century. Yet historians of American-East Asian relations have overlooked the significance and the complexity of the State Department's views of Sun. Scholars have generally described in a few paragraphs how American diplomats considered Asia's first modern revolutionary to be an unsavory opportunist or at best a fuzzy-minded and impractical dreamer who was not to be taken seriously.' It is true that, with the notable exception of