Showing papers in "Philosophical Investigations in 2021"
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TL;DR: In this article, an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
Abstract: © 2021 The Authors. Philosophical Investigations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
13 citations
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TL;DR: This paper examined which idea of phenomenology Austin had in mind when he coined this term, and what light this sheds on his method and argued that the key to answering this question can be found in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, which Austin must have been familiar with.
Abstract: In his late ‘A Plea for Excuses’, John L. Austin suggests labelling his philosophy ‘linguistic phenomenology’. This article examines which idea of phenomenology Austin had in mind when he coined this term and what light this sheds on his method. It is argued that the key to answering this question can be found in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, which Austin must have been familiar with. Merleau-Ponty presents phenomenology in a way Austin could embrace: it is a method, it aims at description and uses reduction, it is a non-idealistic study of essence and interprets intentionality as ‘operative’. In this light, Austin’s method can be appreciated more fully.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the inferences in play in such cases are in no position to epistemise their conclusions, and they argue against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood.
Abstract: A number of philosophers have recently proposed several alleged cases of “knowledge from falsehood,” i.e., cases of inferential knowledge epistemised by an inference with a false crucial premise. This paper examines such cases and argues against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood. Specifically, I argue that the inferences in play in such cases are in no position to epistemise their conclusions.
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TL;DR: The authors argue that primitive normativity can be understood in either of two ways: a no conception version and a local conception version, and reject the "no conception" account of normativity in favour of a "local conception" of a rule expressed in context-dependent demonstrations and examples.
Abstract: Both anti-reductionist and reductionist accounts of linguistic meaning and mental content face challenges accounting for acquiring concepts as part of learning a first language. Anti-reductionists cannot account for a transition from the pre-conceptual to conceptual without threatening to reduce the latter to the former. Reductionists of a representationalist variety face the challenge of Fodor’s argument that language learning is impossible.
This paper examines whether Ginsborg’s account of ‘primitive normativity’ might provide some resources for addressing these issues. I argue that primitive normativity can be understood in either of two ways: a ‘no conception’ version and a ‘local conception’ version. Rejecting the ‘no conception’ account of normativity in favour of a ‘local conception’ of a rule expressed in context-dependent demonstrations and examples provides one response to Fodor’s argument. It also provides anti-reductionism with at least one stepping stone to learning full-blown linguistically articulated concepts based on a more primitive local form of normativity.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed a method to find a suitable solution to the problem of the lack of a suitable infrastructure for the construction of a road network in rural areas of the United Kingdom.
Abstract: این پژوهش با هدف تعیین مؤلفههای نظریه کوانتومی و با جستجو در دادههای اولیه منابع گزینش شده بر اساس پاردایم کوانتومی و با روش پژوهش هرمنوتیک فلسفی، در پی این سوال بوده است که از دیدگاه کوانتومی، یادگیری چگونه اتفاق میافتد؟ نظریه کوانتمی در مقابل نظریه سادگی شکل گرفته است. در حالی که نظریه سادگی تحت تاثیر فرهنگ مدرنیته و دیدگاههای دکارت و نیوتن قرار داشت که اعتقاد داشتند میتوان پدیدهها را به سادهترین شکل خود کاهش داد، نظریه کوانتومی بر کلگرایی تاکید دارد و معتقد است که کل اجزای هستی، پویا و در ارتباط تعاملی با یکدیگر هستند. کاهشگرایی دکارتی باعث شد به ارتباطات خطی بین پدیدهها توجه شود و بر اساس آن معتقد بودند پدیدهها قابل پیشبینی و کنترل و در نتیجه دارای قطعیت هستند اما دیدگاه کوانتومی به جای سادگی و روابط خطی به پیچیدگی و درهمتنیدگی روابط توجه دارد. مباحث مربوط به یادگیری کوانتومی تحت تاثیر نظریه کوانتومی شکل گرفتند. و با تاکید بر کلگرایی، درهمتنیدگی و ارتباط تعاملی و پیچیده بین پدیدهها هم به ظرفیتهای عینی و بیرونی و هم به ظرفیتهای ذهنی و درونی توجه کردند و تحت تاثیر دیدگاههای روانشناختی شناختی به ظرفیتهای نیمکره چپ و راست مغز در یادگیری توجه کردند. این دیدگاه به تفکر کوانتمی، یادگیری در کلاسهای پرشور و نشاط و مشارکتی، یادگیری از طریق حافظه خودآگاه و ناخودآگاه و پردازش دادهها و مفهومسازی آنها و چرخه مجدد پردازش مفهوم به عنوان داده ورودی، یادگیری دیداری، شنیداری و حسی حرکتی، یادگیری با توجه به ذهنیت و ارزشهای یادگیرنده، توجه به زمینه و بافت رویداد و یادگیری و به طور کلی به روشها و فرآیندهایی که توجه به کل پدیده و درهمتنیدگی را در موضوع یادگیری مد نظر داشتند منجر شد.
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TL;DR: This article investigated Wittgenstein's lifelong semantic framework and concluded that ethical sentences are meaningless expressions, which can only be used to ostensively point out conditions of meaningfulness, and assessed the implications of this conclusion for understanding the seven cryptic remarks on value and ethics in TLP.
Abstract: In Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus (TLP), Wittgenstein gave ethics the same semantic status as logic. This paper first investigates this claim from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s lifelong semantic framework. This reveals that ethical sentences are meaningless expressions, which can only be used to ostensively point out conditions of meaningfulness. Secondly, the paper assesses the implications of this conclusion for understanding the seven cryptic remarks on value and ethics in TLP. Using the connection between will and value in TLP and will and sentence interpretation in Philosophical Investigations, it is suggested that Wittgenstein held lifelong views on value and ethics
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