Showing papers in "Philosophical Investigations in 2022"
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TL;DR: In this article , the authors argue that IOLP is an overlooked yet valuable philosophical method grounded in our everyday experiences and concerns; and as such, Frank Ebersole is an important but neglected figure in the history of ordinary language philosophy.
Abstract: In this paper, we explicate the method of Investigative Ordinary Language Philosophy (IOLP). The term was coined by John Cook to describe the unique philosophical approach of Frank Ebersole. We argue that (i) IOLP is an overlooked yet valuable philosophical method grounded in our everyday experiences and concerns; and (ii) as such, Frank Ebersole is an important but neglected figure in the history of ordinary language philosophy.
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TL;DR: The Churchlands construe propositional belief as merely one kind of representation in the larger representational scheme as discussed by the authors , and the point here is not to deny belief, but to construe it as one of the, and possibly a very recent, sorts of representations that the brain uses, not the general or fundamental form thereof.
Abstract: Jim Slagle claims that eliminative materialism (EM) denies some of the mind’s self-evident properties, such as intentionality, qualia and the view that beliefs are real or veridical. I, herein, will argue that what EM denies is actually the folk psychological notion of belief, not belief as such. The Churchlands construe propositional belief as merely one kind of representation in the larger representational scheme. The point here is not to deny belief, but to construe it as one of the, and possibly a very recent, sorts of representations that the brain uses, not the general or fundamental form thereof.
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TL;DR: In this paper , it was shown that there are cases of non-propositional regulation that does not need propositions and propositional contents, which is called non-deontic and non-sentential regulation.
Abstract: When thinking about how human behaviour is regulated, one generally imagines a regulation consisting of norms linguistically expressed in sentences: that is, “sentential deontic regulation”. However, this notion of regulation is reductive because there are (non-deontic and) non-sentential forms of regulation. In this article, we do not restrict our investigation to (non-deontic and) non-sentential forms of regulation; we examine whether there are forms of (non-deontic) regulation that are even not propositional. In this regard, we advance the hypothesis that there are indeed cases of “non-propositional regulation”: that is, regulation that does not need propositions and propositional contents.
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TL;DR: In this article , the authors explain and defend some of Cora Diamond's thinking about the role of a kind of guides to thinking about ethics, and try to show that Diamond is not committed either intentionally or otherwise to relativism.
Abstract: This paper aims at explaining and defending some of Cora Diamond's thinking about the role of a kind of guides to thinking about ethics. Aids to thinking of this type can take a very general form but can also be applied in context-sensitive ways. Maria Balaska has raised the question whether Diamond manages to avoid relativism. Oskari Kuusela also criticises Diamond, focussing on whether talk of human equality can be said to correspond to reality. I will consider these objections in turn and try to show that Diamond is not committed either intentionally or otherwise to relativism.
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TL;DR: In the context of modern medicine, the placebo effect is a troublesome and controversial phrase as mentioned in this paper , which is why it is difficult to understand what it means in clinical practice and why it makes sense in research but not clinical practice.
Abstract: In the context of modern medicine, the placebo effect is a troublesome and controversial phrase. In this paper, I use investigative ordinary language philosophy to try to get clear on what it means. In so doing, I uncover three points. (i) The placebo effect makes sense in research but not clinical practice. (ii) To make the phrase make sense in clinical practice, we must manufacture a situation in which we can change linguistic habits. (iii) Such action is not necessary because in clinical practice we do better with other, more settled words and phrases.
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TL;DR: In this article , a new perspective is developed bringing together ideas from Aquinas and Wittgenstein: linking of the former's understanding of propria and the latter's account of criteria.
Abstract: Current discussions of self-knowledge focus on awareness of mental states, but a more ancient concern is with knowing one’s nature and with living well in light of that. Pursuit of this Socratic imperative has been associated with a tradition of self-identification contributed to by Plato, Plotinus, Augustine and Descartes. Their ideas are distinguished and discussed, but another perspective is developed bringing together ideas from Aquinas and Wittgenstein: linking of the former’s understanding of propria and the latter’s account of criteria. The nation of natural signs is adverted to in relation to Reid suggesting a third component to this perspective.
TL;DR: In this paper , the expressivist debate about whether avowals must also be viewed as assertions has been studied, and it has been shown that expressing first-person psychological utterances (firstperson utterances) can also be seen as assertions.
Abstract: In Philosophical Investigations §244, Wittgenstein suggests that we understand avowals (first-person psychological utterances) as manifestations or expressions of the speaker’s mental states. An interesting philosophical theory, called e xpressivism , then develops from this Wittgensteinian idea. However, neo-expressivists disagree with simple expressivists on whether avowals are at the same time assertions, which are truth-evaluable. In this paper, I pursue the expressivist debate about whether avowals must also be viewed as assertions. I consider and reject three neo-expressivist objections against simple expressivism. Then, I offer my own account of why we should understand avowals as assertions.
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors present a collection of essays by Cora Diamond on Ethics, focusing on the role of concepts in the complexity of our moral lives, and on the way that presupposing a concept's shape before considering it in use can blind us to the role such a concept might play in the complex web of our own moral lives.
Abstract: Cora Diamond is an important and illuminating voice in contemporary philosophy, particularly in relation to the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and, as this collection aims to show, the subject of ethics. However, as Maria Balaska, the editor of Diamond on Ethics, makes clear in her introduction, it is somewhat misleading to frame the relationship between Diamond’s thinking and ethics as a discussion concerning some predetermined set of moral concepts with predetermined rules of engagement attached. Diamond shows us, time and again, and from different angles, that we conceptually blind ourselves to the richness of our moral lives if we delimit what pertains to talk on ethics before we even look to see what our moral lives might show us about ethics. As Balaska remarks, “we could say that Diamond’s work bears on ethics as a whole insofar as it aims to clarify what possibilities our forms of life open for us, the complexity of our lives with concepts, what arises as significant therein” (p. 1, original emphasis). This ongoing project is much in line with Wittgenstein’s (2001) remark in the ‘Preface’ of the Tractatus, “[i]t will only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will be nonsense” (p. 4). Diamond shows us, through careful attention to moral language in use, where the limits might be. It is fitting, then, that Diamond’s own contribution to the collection reflects on our relationship with concepts, and on the way that presupposing a concept’s shape before considering it in use can blind us to the role such a concept might play in the complex web of our moral lives. The concept in question here is that of an “openness to the unbidden” (p. 7), and Diamond introduces the notion of the “concept police” to warn us that even well-meaning police “on occasion go after an innocent” (p. 7). She sees Guy Kahane going “after an innocent” in his criticism of Michael Sandel’s conception of an “openness to the unbidden,” and the place such a concept might have in one’s life. While Sandel speaks of the concept in the context of what it might mean in relation to parenthood for the unbidden to be “worth affirming” (p. 8), Kahane argues that if Sandel really were open to the unbidden, then he would be open to everything that is unbidden in life, from weeds in the garden to debilitating diseases. According to Diamond, Kahane does not see the place that an openness to the unbidden might have in a life like Sandel’s because of what he takes to be a “proper understanding” of the concept and of what being open to it would entail (p. 10). Kahane’s claim that Sandel misunderstands a “proper use” of the concept blinds him from what Diamond shows us, the reader, to be a completely recognizable attitude towards an openness to the unbidden. We are invited here to see ourselves in Sandel’s concept of an openness to the unbidden, while Kahane’s “proper understanding” of the concept seems unreachable to us. Thus, in giving up here on a preconceived notion of what an openness to the unbidden as a concept must look like, we allow ourselves to look and see what shape the concept can look like in our moral lives. Following Diamond’s essay, the remainder of the collection is separated into five themes, most of which (expect perhaps the final theme) will be immediately recognizable to readers familiar with Diamond’s work: Concepts, Moral Theory, Animal, Human, and Narcissism. Each theme constitutes two original papers, each of which approaches a designated theme in a unique, yet recognizably “Diamondian” spirit. Beginning with ‘Concepts’, Roger Teichmann reflects on whether confused concepts result from being nonsensical or from having a “special meaning”, while David Cerbone sheds light on the depths to which the concept of “hope” is woven into the fabric of our lives via a reading of Albert Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus. Next, under ‘Moral Theory’, Oskari Kuusela defends Diamond’s view that there is no subject matter specific to ethics against Edward Harcourt’s claim that this in turn denies that moral concepts exist, while Garry L. Hagberg sheds light on the concepts of “adventure” and “improvisation” in our moral lives via a series of examples from music and literature. This is followed by ‘Animal’, where Alice Crary suggests that Leo Tolstoy’s discussion of visiting a slaughterhouse in ‘The First Step’ contains a form of Diamondian thinking in its depiction of an inherently ethical relation between animals and humans, while Ian Ground and Mike Bavidge explore the relationship between Diamond’s picture of moral life and ethological discoveries. Under ‘Human’, Stephen Mulhall considers Craig Taylor’s discussion of the connection between moral judgements and moralism as “a failure to recognize the humanity of the person being judged” (pp. 176-177), while Anniken Greve develops Diamond’s discussion of what a look between human beings can tell us about what is to count as a human being via a re-reading of Primo Levi’s If This Is a Man. These essays provide a series of fresh perspectives on topics those familiar with Diamond’s writing will feel to some extent at home in. Each essay in its own way sheds light on important aspects of Diamond’s writings on ethics, emphasizing the importance of taking seriously the need to look and see what is there in our moral lives, and to allow questions of the sense we make of moral concepts and our moral lives to be shaped by what we see when we look. This comes out in a particularly interesting way in the final two essays under the perhaps less familiar theme of narcissism. Richard Gipps begins by thinking about narcissism as a “tendency to a wishful fantasy of independence and self-reliance, invulnerability to vicissitude, and insulation from challenge,” and with the aid of Diamond’s notions of the “difficulty of reality” and the significance and character of the role of illusory imaginings in our moral lives, provides us with a “sharpening [of] our reflective understanding of what it means to suffer narcissism” (p. 224). Balaska’s own text then considers the possibility of making sense of thinking for which it seems obvious to say that thought has somehow gone off the rails. Balaska draws on the character of Hadoula (also known as Frankoyannou) from Alexandros Papadiamantis’ The Murderess and her thinking as she carries out a series of grisly murders of children, beginning with her own granddaughter. Balaska shows us that contexts in which reflection upon thinking that has gone “off the rails” or “up in smoke” might help us see the shape of morally detrimental concepts like “narcissism” in our lives. Hadoula “commits a hubristic violation of what we humans mean by death and life, twisting them so that they conform to her will” (p. 265). Nevertheless, Balaska claims, “we as readers can connect to or at some level understand the bearers of [these] thoughts” (p. 266). One understands Hadoula, according to Balaska, when one finds oneself “convinced by Hadoula’s impulses and worries, to find these in oneself” (p. 266). The key point, though, is that we must be willing to be open to seeing such connections if we are to illuminate moral thought. What Balaska shows us is that “openness to otherness is vital for the activity and what Diamond approaches as its guiding role” (p. 265). What both essays on narcissism show us, it might be said, is that it is important for moral reflection that we not only determine what is thought gone off the rails, but how or why such thought twisted itself away from the rails in the first place. Though I have predominantly reflected upon two contributions in the space of this short review, this is not to say that the texts I could only briefly mention here are any less worthy of the same attention and consideration, or that the myriad of connections between Balaska and Diamond’s texts and these other texts have been exhausted in my short remarks. There are many illuminating connections between essays placed under different themes. As Balaska notes, a central trait of Diamond’s approach is that “inquiring into ethics is interwoven with an inquiry into how concepts work, what it is to recognize someone’s humanity, the role that imagination plays in our attempt to understand the world, our shared life with non-human animals” (p. 5). Balaska has done well to present us with a collection of essays by a broad range of thinkers who help develop conversations on ethics and its place in our lives. It might be said that these essays are not designed to tell you what to think about ethics, but may act as a guide in your own thinking about ethics.1
TL;DR: Quilter et al. as discussed by the authors presented a full-text version of this article to share with friends and colleagues, using the link below to share a full text version of the article with their friends.
Abstract: Philosophical InvestigationsVolume 46, Issue 2 p. 270-274 BOOK REVIEW Michael McGhee, Spirituality for the Godless: Buddhism, Humanism and Religion ( Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021). x + 199, £98. hb John G. Quilter, Corresponding Author John G. Quilter jgpquilter@gmail.com School of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, Strathfield, New South Wales, Australia Correspondence: John G. Quilter, School of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, Locked Bag 2002, Strathfield, NSW 2135, Australia. Email: jgpquilter@gmail.comSearch for more papers by this author John G. Quilter, Corresponding Author John G. Quilter jgpquilter@gmail.com School of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, Strathfield, New South Wales, Australia Correspondence: John G. Quilter, School of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, Locked Bag 2002, Strathfield, NSW 2135, Australia. Email: jgpquilter@gmail.comSearch for more papers by this author First published: 15 November 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12383Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume46, Issue2April 2023Pages 270-274 RelatedInformation
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors argue that there are important respects in which Wittgenstein's notion of logical and conceptual truth is often thought to rival that of the logical positivists.
Abstract: Wittgenstein's conception of logical and conceptual truth is often thought to rival that of the logical positivists. This paper argues that there are important respects in which these conceptions complement each other. Analyticity, in the positivists' sense, coincides, not with Wittgenstein's notion of a grammatical proposition, but rather with his notion of a tautology. Grammatical propositions can usually be construed as analyticity postulates in Carnap's sense of the term. This account of grammatical and analytic propositions will be illustrated by appeal to logical, conceptual and arithmetic truths. Its consequences for an analysis of corresponding modal notions will be indicated.
TL;DR: The authors show that Wittgenstein does not affirm the standard metre claim and historical facts about material length standards do not warrant deeper philosophical conclusions, and that references to material measurement standards in the literature gravely distort the actual metrological practices of developing and using such standards.
Abstract: Paragraph 50 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations famously says that there is one thing of which one can neither state that it is 1 m long nor that it isn't: the standard metre in Paris. Consensus appears to be that (1) exegetically speaking, Wittgenstein affirms this claim, and (2) systematically, whether or not one agrees with it, the practice of using a material artefact as a measurement standard has important philosophical consequences. In this paper, in contrast, we show that (1') Wittgenstein does not affirm the standard metre claim and (2') historical facts about material length standards do not warrant deeper philosophical conclusions. References to material measurement standards in the literature gravely distort the actual metrological practices of developing and using such standards.
TL;DR: The authors showed how the Mausoleum and career of the First Emperor can be understood in terms of political solipsism, so illuminating the nature and logic of centralized state building.
Abstract: It is not usually thought that Wittgenstein has much to show us about political power and the state. This essay disputes this claim by showing how the Mausoleum and career of the First Emperor can be understood in terms of political solipsism, so illuminating the nature and logic of centralized state building.
TL;DR: In Wittgenstein's manuscripts dating from 1929 and 1930, there are a number of entries on the notion of probability as mentioned in this paper , and it is argued that the standard interpretation, which claims that Wittgenstein adopts an 'epistemological view' of probability, significantly understates the importance of the development of the concept of hypotheses as a philosophical term of art.
Abstract: In Wittgenstein’s manuscripts dating from 1929 and 1930, there are a number of entries on the notion of probability. In this paper, I explore Wittgenstein’s manuscripts between October 1929 and March 1930 and demonstrate, first, that Wittgenstein completely rejects the assumption that probability statements are based on an a priori principle. Second, I argue that the standard interpretation, which claims that Wittgenstein adopts an ‘epistemological view’ of probability, significantly understates the importance of Wittgenstein’s development of the notion of hypotheses as a philosophical term of art.
TL;DR: This article argued that the so-called "Chapter on philosophy" in the Investigations §§89-133 contains negative and positive vocabulary and the use of various voices through which Wittgenstein employs his primary method of language games, thus providing a surveyable understanding of several philosophical concepts, such as knowledge and time.
Abstract: A significant discrepancy in Wittgenstein's studies is whether Philosophical Investigations contains any trace of positive philosophy, notwithstanding the author's apparent anti-theoretic position. This study argues that the so-called ‘Chapter on philosophy’ in the Investigations §§89–133 contains negative and positive vocabulary and the use of various voices through which Wittgenstein employs his primary method of language-games, thus providing a surveyable understanding of several philosophical concepts, such as knowledge and time. His positive philosophy aims to reorient our attention from understanding the theories on these concepts to understanding the concepts themselves, regardless of any theorisation.
TL;DR: The authors discuss the adjectival uses of the English word "right" in both ethical and non-ethic settings, and distinguish four distinct but related uses of "right", i.e., what is right is what conforms to a norm, or rule.
Abstract: In the following paper, I discuss the adjectival uses of the English word ‘right’, in ethical and nonethical settings. I distinguish four distinct but related uses. In the central use, which includes the typical ethical applications, what is right is what conforms to a norm, or rule. The emphasis can be on the norm itself, or on the conforming to the norm. The view I offer is not original. It is to be found in the works of T.M. Scanlon, T.H. Green, R.M. Hare and W.D. Ross.1
TL;DR: The authors argue that the lack of consensus is possibly due to an ambiguity in the ordinary concept of "talking to oneself", and that a new concept appropriate to Wittgenstein's dialogues is needed to properly understand them.
Abstract: A lack of consensus persists as to whom exactly the dialogues of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations are between: Wittgenstein and an interlocutor? Or perhaps a variety of interlocutors, none of whom can be identified with Wittgenstein himself? I argue here that this lack of consensus is possibly due to an ambiguity in the ordinary concept of “talking to oneself,” and that a new concept of “talking to oneself” appropriate to Wittgenstein's dialogues is needed to properly understand them. Wittgenstein is talking to himself—but he is doing so in the way we talk to other people.
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TL;DR: The full-text version of this article can be found in the link below to share a fulltext version with your friends and colleagues as mentioned in this paper . But the link is limited to a single user.
Abstract: Philosophical InvestigationsVolume 45, Issue 4 p. 385-386 Issue InformationFree Access Issue Information First published: 08 September 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12318AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume45, Issue4October 2022Pages 385-386 RelatedInformation
TL;DR: In this article , the authors argue that one of the most salient and popular proposed solutions (championed by John McDowell), which argues that rule-following is grounded in "custom,” "practice" or "form of life", remains unsatisfactory because part of this proposal is the rejection of further "theory" (commonly attributed to Wittgenstein) which seemingly makes it impossible to substantiate the claim of how customs, practices or forms of life ground rules and private language.
Abstract: This paper deals with Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox, focussing on the infinite rule-regress as featured in Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. I argue that one of the most salient and popular proposed solutions (championed by John McDowell), which argues that rule-following is grounded in “custom,” “practice” or “form of life, remains unsatisfactory because part of this proposal is the rejection of further “theory” (commonly attributed to Wittgenstein) which seemingly makes it impossible to substantiate the claim of how customs, practices or forms of life ground rule-following. I argue that this conundrum can be solved by introducing Wilhelm Dilthey’s overlooked notion of objective spirit as the objectivated sediment of historical human communality. This proposal allows us to substantiate Wittgenstein’s hints at the connection between rule-following and customs, practices, and forms of life without introducing “problematic theories.” Combining Wittgenstein’s views with Dilthey’s notion of objective spirit results in a solution that is neither skeptical nor straight, but therapeutic.
TL;DR: In this article , a full-text version of the full text version of this article is shared with the link below to share a fulltext version with your friends and colleagues, including a link to share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume45, Issue3July 2022.
Abstract: Philosophical InvestigationsVolume 45, Issue 3 p. 381-384 Book Review Christensen, Anne-Marie Søndergaard, Moral Philosophy and Moral Life ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). pp. x + 226. Hardback (ISBN 978-0-19-886669-5) price $70.00 Christopher Hamilton, Corresponding Author Christopher Hamilton christopher.hamilton@kcl.ac.uk King’s College London King’s College London Strand London WC2R 2LS UK christopher.hamilton@kcl.ac.ukSearch for more papers by this author Christopher Hamilton, Corresponding Author Christopher Hamilton christopher.hamilton@kcl.ac.uk King’s College London King’s College London Strand London WC2R 2LS UK christopher.hamilton@kcl.ac.ukSearch for more papers by this author First published: 20 February 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12348Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume45, Issue3July 2022Pages 381-384 RelatedInformation
TL;DR: In this article , Springsted et al. presented a full-text version of this article with a link to share a fulltext version with your friends and colleagues with the help of the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of Use.
Abstract: Philosophical InvestigationsEarly View BOOK REVIEW Kotva, Simone, Effort and Grace: On the Spiritual Exercise of Philosophy, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. 230+xvi pages Eric O. Springsted, Corresponding Author Eric O. Springsted eospringsted@aol.com Center of Theological Inquiry Princeton, Princeton, New Jersey, USASearch for more papers by this author Eric O. Springsted, Corresponding Author Eric O. Springsted eospringsted@aol.com Center of Theological Inquiry Princeton, Princeton, New Jersey, USASearch for more papers by this author First published: 15 November 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12382Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation
TL;DR: In this article , the authors argue that non-moral truths entail moral ones, and that moral claims do have truth values which are objectively true or false, but this objectivism does not entail non-relativism.
Abstract: I argue below for the view that non-moral truths entail moral ones. I first argue that moral claims do have truth values which are objectively true or false. I then argue that this objectivism does not entail non-relativism. I produce a simple possible worlds argument for the entailment view. I then give some examples where p entails q but many intelligent people have thought it does not, and where it does not, but many intelligent people have thought that it does. I also try to evaluate a somewhat neglected argument by Hume. In the final section, I further consider some moral and meta-moral opinions.
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TL;DR: The full text version of this article can be found in the fulltext version of the article as discussed by the authors , but the link to the full text can be used to share it with others.
Abstract: Philosophical InvestigationsVolume 45, Issue 2 p. 105-106 Issue InformationFree Access Issue Information First published: 01 March 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12316AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume45, Issue2April 2022Pages 105-106 RelatedInformation