Showing papers in "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 1998"
TL;DR: Bermudez as mentioned in this paper argues that any explanation of fully fledged self-consciousness that answers these two questions requires attention to primitive forms of selfconsciousness, such as prelinguistic and preconceptual self-reference.
Abstract: In this book, Jose Luis Bermudez addesses two fundamental problems in the philosophy and psychology of self-consciousness: (1) Can we provide a noncircular account of fully fledged self-conscious thought and language in terms of more fundamental capacities? (2) Can we explain how fully fledged self-conscious thought and language can arise in the normal course of human development? Bermudez argues that a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) arises from the apparent strict interdependence between self-conscious thought and linguistic self-reference. The paradox renders circular all theories that define self-consciousness in terms of linguistic mastery of the first-person pronoun. It seems to follow from the paradox of self-consciousness that no such account or explanation can be given. Drawing on recent work in empirical psychology and philosophy, the author argues that any explanation of fully fledged self-consciousness that answers these two questions requires attention to primitive forms of self-consciousness that are prelinguistic and preconceptual. Such primitive forms of self-consciousness are to be found in somatic proprioception, the structure of exteroceptive perception, and prelinguistic forms of social interaction. The author uses these primitive forms of self-consciousness to dissolve the paradox of self-consciousness and to show how the two questions can be given an affirmative answer.
426 citations
TL;DR: Aristotle not only formulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, but also makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind as discussed by the authors, which is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought.
Abstract: Aristotle not only formulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, he makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind. His own solution, however, is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought. In fact, it is precisely because Aristotle regards this theory as inadequate that he goes on to argue for a distinct new ability he calls “phantasia.” The theory of content he develops on this basis (unlike Brentano’s) is profoundly naturalistic: it is a representational theory, formulated in terms of the causal powers and physical magnitudes of the body.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the deductive closure argument is compared with the underdetermination argument for independently motivated skeptical argument, and it is shown that deductive closures cannot be refuted without refuting underdetermination.
Abstract: This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles-an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without refuting the deductive closure argument In this respect, the deductive closure argument is the stronger of the two
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TL;DR: Fumerton's admirable defense of foundationalism depends upon some arguments against the possibility of the infinite regress of justificatory reasons as mentioned in this paper, and the arguments against infinitism do not succeed.
Abstract: Richard Fumerton's admirable defense of foundationalism depends upon some arguments against the possibility of the infinite regress of justificatory reasons. One reason for preferring foundationalism is, he claims, that infinitism (the view that justificatory reasons are infinite) should be rejected.' I will try to show that the arguments against infinitism do not succeed. Since a key ingredient in his rejection of infinitism is his account of inferential justification, I will offer some critical comments about that along the way. There is one important claim on which Fumerton and I agree that should be mentioned before I begin to discuss his rejection of infinitism. It is central to that discussion:
51 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that existing moral diversity between societies and within contemporary American society is strong evidence against moral absolutism, which is the view that there is basically a single true morality.
Abstract: Moral absolutism is the view that there is basically a single true morality. I argue that existing moral diversity between societies and within contemporary American society is strong evidence against moral absolutism. Although Blackburn announces near the end of his comments that he is a moral absolutist, he does not indicate how he would respond to what seems to me to be the rather strong case against moral absolutism.
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TL;DR: In this article, Kamm argues that saving five lives is indeed better than saving one, but she points out it does not automatically follow that, when faced with the choice between saving five and one, you ought to save the five.
Abstract: Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of Frances Kamm's Morality, Mortality, Volume ]1 deal with a classic problem. Suppose you are faced with the choice between saving the lives of five people on the one hand, and on the other hand the life of just one person who is not among the five. How should you choose? An obvious answer is that you should save the five, on the grounds that saving five lives does more good than saving one. But in his 'Should the numbers count?', John Taurek disagrees.2 He denies that saving five people does more good than saving one. He accepts that saving a particular person is betterfor that person than not saving her, but he denies there is an impersonal standpoint, neutral between people, from which saving five people is better simpliciter than saving one. He concludes you should toss a coin to decide whether to save the one or the five. This gives each person the same one-half chance of being saved. Kamm's argument in these chapters sets out from Taurek's article. In chapter 5 she argues, against Taurek, that saving five lives is indeed better than saving one. But she points out it does not automatically follow that, when faced with the choice between saving five and saving one, you ought to save the five. That would have the best results, but there may be considerations of right as opposed to good that determine you should act differently. Accordingly, having reached the conclusion in the domain of goodness that saving five lives is better than saving one, Kamm switches her attention to the domain of right. She particularly concentrates on fairness, which is one particular consideration of right. She gives us the most fascinating, detailed and complex examination of fairness I know. In the course of it, she proposes
TL;DR: This article argued that occurrent states of understanding are not states of belief of knowledge since a subject may fail to believe that a text or speech act means what she understands it to mean if she doubts the reliability or truthfulness of that understanding.
Abstract: A natural view is that linguistic understanding is a source of justification or evidence: that beliefs about the meaning of a text or speech act are prima facie justified when based on states of understanding. Neglect of this view is largely due to the widely held assumption that understanding a text or speech act consists in knowledge or belief. It is argued that this assumption rests, in part, on confusing occurrent states of understanding and dispositions to understand. It is then argued that occurrent states of understanding are not states of belief of knowledge since a subject may fail to believe that a text or speech act means what she understands it to mean if she doubts the reliability or truthfulness of that understanding. States of understanding, it is maintained, belong in the same epistemic category as states of perception and memory.
TL;DR: This article argued that the fundamental structure of the skeptical argument in Kripke's book on Wittgenstein has been seriously misunderstood by recent commentators and pointed out that the basic misunderstandings are widely shared by other commentators.
Abstract: This article argues, first, that the fundamental structure of the skeptical argument in Kripke's book on Wittgenstein has been seriously misunderstood by recent commentators. Although it focuses particularly on recent commentary by John McDowell, it emphasizes that the basic misunderstandings are widely shared by other commentators. In particular, it argues that, properly construed, Kripke offers a fully coherent reading of PI #201 and related passages. This is commonly denied, and given as a reason for rejecting Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein's text. Second, it is pretty universally accepted that Kripke's Wittgenstein is a 'non-factualist' about ascriptions of meaning. The article argues that, when Kripke's discussion is rightly understood and the content of 'non-factualism' is clarified, there is an important sense in which the skeptical solution is not committed to non-factualism.
TL;DR: The notion of world-directedness in one sense is intelligible only in terms of a normative context that is its primary home as discussed by the authors, and the notion of posture or stance that is correctly or incorrectly adopted according to whether or not things are thus and so.
Abstract: 1. The idea of world-directedness -that is, content in one senseis intelligible only in terms of a normative context that is its primary home. We must be able to work with the notion of a posture or stance that is correctly or incorrectly adopted according to whether or not things are thus and so. Only so can we understand the posture or stance as a judgement or belief to the effect that things are thus and so. (If we can make sense of judgement or belief as directed at the world in that way, we need have no trouble with other kinds of content-bearing postures or stances.) We might express the point like this: thinking that aims at judgement, or at the fixation of belief, is answerable to the world for whether or not it is correctly executed. And now a small step away from that abstract formulation takes us to a minimal, and one might think undisputable, empiricism: in the sorts of case that must come first for reflection on the very idea of directedness at the world, the world's verdict, to which thinking must be answerable if it is to be
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the existence of abstract objects is not causally relevant to the operation or state of the physical world, and they conclude that empirical science has a nominalistic content that captures its complete view of the world.
Abstract: objects are causally relevant to the physical world, it follows that none of our mixed sentences express bottom-level mixed facts and, hence, that empirical science has a nominalistic content that captures its complete picture of the physical world-a nominalistic content that says that the physical world holds up its end of the "empirical-science bargain". Thus, I conclude that (NC) is true. To recapitulate, the argument for this rests on three premises, viz., (i) Abstract objects-if there are such things-are not causally relevant to the operation or state of the physical world; (ii) If (i) is true, then the mixed facts expressed by empirical science supervene on more basic facts that aren't mixed, i.e., that are either purely nominalistic (i.e., purely physical, or neurological, or whatever) or else purely platonistic; and 18 I suppose that one might claim that (3) tells us something else about Floyd, viz., that he stands in the belief relation to the proposition that Clinton is president. But this is just nitpicking: the point is that when we move from (3) to its nominalistic content, we do not lose any important part of our picture of Floyd. ATTITUDES WITHOUT PROPOSITIONS 815 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.176 on Sat, 09 Apr 2016 06:22:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms (iii) If the consequent of (ii) is true, then (NC) is true, i.e., empirical science has a nominalistic content that captures its complete picture of the physical world. And if what I have argued is correct, then it seems that (COH) is also true, i.e., that it is coherent to believe the nominalistic content of empirical science while maintaining that its platonistic content is purely fictional. This is all I really need to argue in order to block the Frege-Bealer-Schiffer argument for platonism. But it is worth pointing out that nominalistic scientific realism can be shown to be not just coherent but actually quite plausible. Before I do this, however, I would like to address two different worries that people might have about the above argument. First, one might be worried that a scientific anti-realist could use my argument strategy to motivate a view that endorsed the "macro-level content" of empirical science but rejected its "micro-level content". The worry, of course, is that this view is so implausible, that it undermines my argument strategy. The fact of the matter, though, is that my argument strategy cannot be used to motivate this view. The reason is that micro-level entities are causally related to macro-level entities. Indeed, if all the micro-level entities in the world suddenly disappeared, all the macro-level entities would disappear along with them. Moreover, empirical science predicts this, because part of its picture of the macro-level of the world is that it is composed of microlevel entities. Thus, empirical science simply doesn't have a purely macrolevel content that captures its complete picture of the macro-level of the world. Thus, there is no viable view that endorses the macro-level content of empirical science but not its micro-level content. Second, one might be worried that the claim that empirical science has a nominalistic content that captures its complete picture of the physical world is much more controversial than I have allowed, because it is essentially equivalent to the claim that empirical science can be nominalized. But this worry is just misguided: the claim that empirical science has a nominalistic content that captures its complete picture of the physical world is different from (and much weaker than) the claim that empirical science can be nominalized. The easiest way to appreciate this is to notice that empirical theories wear their nominalistic contents on their sleeves. The nominalistic content of a theory T is just that the physical world holds up its end of the "T bargain", i.e., does its part in making T true. Thus, while the claim that empirical science can be nominalized is highly controversial, the claim that it has a nominalistic content that captures its complete picture of the physical world is entirely trivial. Indeed, it is no more controversial than the claim that abstract objects (if there are such things) are causally inert. These remarks suggest that empirical science could have a nominalistic content that captured its complete picture of the physical world even if it
TL;DR: The authors distinguish two broad kinds of relevance of explanatory questions to morality, one internal to moral thought and practice, the other external to moral action and practice. But the real issue at stake in discussions of "moral explanation" is not because there is none, but because there are many.
Abstract: What is the real issue at stake in discussions of "moral explanation"? There isn't one. Not because there is none, but because there are many. We may distinguish two broad kinds of relevance of explanatory questions to morality, one internal to moral thought and practice, the other external. Internal. Commonsense moral frameworks and prevalent moral theories deploy a number of concepts which integrate normative purport and explanatory ambition. Such notions as moral obligation, moral virtue, and moral responsibility typically embody or presuppose models of action and its causation, often incorporating rather specific notions of cognition, motivation, and deliberation. Notions of intrinsic good and moral rightness are characteristically assumed to have "internal" connections with what is or could be intrinsically motivating for a judge or an agent. And moral reasoning is governed by a quite general principle of supervenience, which imposes a broad explanatory constraint on moral discourse: nothing can be good, or right, but that something non-moral makes it so. External. In any domain where we claim to discourse meaningfully or possess knowledge we must be able to meet appropriate conditions of semantic and epistemic access. Our best-developed models of such access involve causal-explanatory links between the domain in question and human cognitive activities and linguistic usage. Domains of purported knowledge where such links seem absent or problematic-such as mathematics, modalities, and universals-pose familiar skeptical challenges. And even where access appears less problematic, as in the empirical realm, skeptical questions arise about how we can obtain evidence for our hypotheses since they characteristically logically outstrip our evidential base. A leading approach to this problem is inference to the best explanation, pioneered by Gilbert Harman. But its applicability depends upon the hypotheses' contribution to explanation. Moral claims could not play their role in human action, judgment, and society were they not accessible through experience and intimately connected
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the nature of the phenomenon of "seeing the truth of a proposition" and develop a limited theory to explain it and apply it to the visual metaphor.
Abstract: Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can 'just see' that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied.
TL;DR: A Kantian critique of the Kripke-Putnam view can be found in this article, where four Kantian arguments against the essentialism of scientific essentialism are presented.
Abstract: According to Kant in the Prolegomena, the natural kind proposition (GYM) "Gold is a yellow metal" is analytically true, necessary, and a priori. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam have argued that on the contrary propositions such as (GYM) are neither analytic, nor necessary, nor a priori. The Kripke-Putnam view is based on the doctrine of "scientific essentialism" (SE). It is a direct consequence of SE that propositions such as (GE) "Gold is the element with atomic number number 79" are metaphysically necessary and a posteriori. Were Kant to travel by time-machine to the present and to consider (GE), however, he would regard it as metaphysically contingent; and even if he were able to admit it as necessary, it would be synthetic a priori, and not a posteriori. In these ways, the conflict between Kant and the scientific essentialists is a sharplydefined one: if the essentialists are right, then the Kantian theory of meaning, necessity, and a priori knowledge is wrong; but if Kant is right, then SE is wrong. As a prolegomenon to the development and defense of Kant's positive theory of natural kind propositions, this paper undertakes a Kantian critique of SE. Following the Introduction, the paper has three sections. The first section spells out the main theses and assumptions of SE. The second section, setting aside the semantic and logical components of SE, focuses on its epistemic and metaphysical components and offers four Kantian arguments against them. The final section offers Kantian "diagnoses" of the flaws in SE exposed by the four critical arguments.
TL;DR: The divergence thesis as discussed by the authors argues that practical and epistemic justification can diverge-that it can be reasonable to believe something, all things considered, even when believing is epistemically unjustified, and the reverse is widely accepted.
Abstract: The thesis that practical and epistemic justification can diverge-that it can be reasonable to believe something, all things considered, even when believing is epistemically unjustified, and the reverse-is widely accepted. I argue that this acceptance is unfounded. I show, first, that examples of the sort typically cited as straightforwardly illustrative of the "divergence thesis" do not, in fact, support it. The view to the contrary derives from conflating the assessment of acts which cause one to believe with the assessment of believing itself. I argue, too, that the divergence thesis cannot be rescued by appeal to the possibility of doxastic voluntarism. Finally, I argue that the general acceptance of the divergence thesis rests on a conception of justification, both practical and epistemic, which is seriously flawed.
TL;DR: The Limbo Man case as discussed by the authors is a character who has the option of putting off his life's being over without thereby increasing the goods in his life, by going into long unconscious periods from which he subsequently returns to consciousness.
Abstract: This precis will emphasize those parts of my book that my commentators have chosen to address, so I describe the first part most briefly. Its general topic is why death is bad and worse than pre-natal nonexistence. My basic aim is to consider supplements to the "deprivation account" according to which death is bad because it deprives us of additional goods of life. In order to heighten the contrast between death and pre-natal nonexistence, which also deprives us of additional goods of life, I consider not only asymmetrical concern for future versus past absence of goods, but the fact that death, unlike prenatal nonexistence is a decline (if life is good) from a good state and also takes from us what we have already had. In addition, I conceive of an imaginary character, the Limbo Man, who has the option of putting off his life's being over without thereby increasing the goods in his life, by going into long unconscious periods from which he subsequently returns to consciousness. I argue that it would not be irrational to prefer to live as the Limbo Man rather than as we normally do. If so, this suggests that putting off death is not desired only because it increases the goods in our life. From the Limbo Man Case, I conclude that the fact that death puts an end to our life once and for all is a separate evil we wish to avoid from its reducing future goods in our life. The point of the second part of the book is to develop a nonconsequentialist theory of the distribution of scarce resources. The first subproblem I identify is to develop a nonconsequentialist theory of interpersonal aggregation for situations in which everyone is as needy and stands to gain the same thing if aided, but we cannot aid everyone.' An example of this problem is whether to save a greater number of people rather than a smaller number of other people when we cannot save everyone. Some have argued that in this conflict