Showing papers in "Philosophy Research Archives in 1975"

On Truth by Convention

Abstract: In his early essay, \"Truth by Convention,\" W.V.O. Quine scraps a programme for a conventionalistic account of logic on finding that the very logic which he wishes to stipulate by conventional truth assignments is presupposed in the stipulation of his conventions. Recently, however, Carlo Giannoni has offered us a variant of the Quine programme which, he maintains, avoids Quine's initial pitfall by shifting the emphasis from truth assignment to the conven­ tional stipulation of inference rules. In the following essay I argue that Quine and, hence, also Giannoni have misconceived the problem of conventionalism in their accounts and that the Giannoni reconstruction is consequently to no avail. The alternative account of Quine's initial difficul­ ties which I offer is both incompatible with a classical conventionalism and Quine's own Duhemian conventionalism, while explaining these difficulties far more adequately than his account of them does.

What is an Apology

Abstract: In this essay I attempt to elucidate the concept of an apology. I begin by considering the way in which apolo­ gizing is characterized by Erving Goffman; and I argue that his characterization does not suffice to distinguish the apology from many other speech acts. I then offer my own analysis, according to which (roughly) a speaker is apolo­ gizing to his hearer for something if and only if in saying what he does he is 1) expressing regret about it, 2) ac­ cepting responsibility for it, 3) acknowledging it to con­ stitute an offense to his hearer, 4) expressing regret about it as such, and 5) making a gesture of respect to his hearer as a person with a right to be spared such mistreatment.

Hume's Appendix on Personal Identity

Abstract: The reasons why Hume expressed dissatisfaction concerning his own account of personal identity in the Treatise are unclear. Hume himself states them obscurely, and commenta­ tors have disagreed about what exactly it was that puzzled him. I offer reasons for thinking the sources of Hume’s retraction have not yet been understood, and propose a reading of the text of the Appendix which explains why he was dissatisfied. The key to the proper understanding of this text lies in two insufficiently appreciated facts: (1) that, for Hume, thoughts are perceptions too, and (2) that the unifying of perceptions can only be done by a perception of a higher level.

Kant on beauty as the symbol of morality

Abstract: The paper attempts to show what Kant means by his claim that "the beau­ tiful Is the symbol of the morally good" In Section 59 of the Critique of Judgment. Part I explicates his notion of symbolism in general and in­ cludes a subsidiary explication of his notion of analogy. Part II deals with some special problems which arise when he seeks to apply that general notion of symbolism to the particular province of the beautiful. The con­ clusions drawn are that Kant means the following: that in the very act of appreciating a beautiful object and making judgments of taste thereon, we have some awareness of ourselves as free, supersensible beings, which awareness is analogous to our awareness of ourselves as free moral agents; that any beautiful object can, in this sense, serve as a symbolic presen­ tation of the morally good; but that the symbolic relationship between beauty and moral goodness does not constitute an argument for morality or for the actuality of human freedom, for it rather presupposes our aware­ ness of such, nor should it sinply be conflated with the beauty of nature bridging the noumenal and the phenomenal aspects of our selves, which is a further issue.

Knowing Entails Believing

Abstract: Recently Colin Radford attempted to show primarily by examples that the entailment thesis that knowing entails believing is false. Both D. M. Armstrong and Keith Lehrer replied by suggesting, in effect, that Radford cannot justify his failure to consider unconscious belief. Here I show that neither Armstrong nor Lehrer succeeded in refuting Radford. But my exploration of their suggestion about un­ conscious belief leads to a complete reconstruction of Arm­ strong's principal example in terms of belief-constituting abilities. This reconstruction not only provides grounds for defending the entailment thesis, but also renders the thesis immune to Radford's examples and arguments.