Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1974"

Aristotle on Responsibility for One's Character and the Possibility of Character Change

Abstract: A ristotle's discussion of the voluntary and the involuntary occurs in Book III, chapters 1 through 5, of the Nicomachean Ethics. He is concerned to assess the conditions under which a) an action and b) a state of character can be called voluntary or involuntary. And he wants to make the important point that only voluntary actions and voluntarily acquired states of character are praiseworthy or blameworthy and that men can be held responsible only for these kinds of actions and states of character. In this discussion I am only concerned with Aristotle's views concerning one of the conditions under which men can be held responsible for their states of character although this has implications for his analysis of the nature of human action and the relation of knowledge to the virtues. If, under some conditions at least, men can be held responsible for their states of character, some related questions arise. Is it possible to act contrary to an established state of character? Is it possible to form contrary states of character by performing actions contrary to an established state of character? Is, for example, the habitual coward doomed to live out his state of character or is moral reform possible? In the opening lines of Book II, Aristotle implies that character change is possible. Moral virtue arises in men, unlike intellectual virtue, by habituation and thus

Socrates and Obedience

Abstract: Students of Plato have long puzzled over what seems to be a contradiction in the views expressed by Socrates in Apology and Crito. In Apology, Socrates asserts: (I) I shall not give up philosophy, even if the city commands me to doso. (Ap.29d)1 But in Crito, Socrates asserts or implies: (II) Every citizen (including myself) should obey every command of the city. (Cr. 50 a-53 a)2 From these two claims, it follows fairly straightforwardly3 that Socrates will give up philosophy and will not give up philosophy, if the city commands him to give up philosophy. This contradiction4 has called forth two responses from commentators:

Some problems concerning Knowledge in Plato's "Charmides"

Abstract: The following discussion is concerned mainly with the interpretation of four passages in the Charmides and no attempt is made at a full account of what is meant by 'knowledge of knowledge' (=7rL<0! ?zm6rp5)q or of how this might be related to the main theses of Socratic ethics. Nor is anything so bold intended as the elucidation of such philosophical questions as the dialogue deals with, but rather, with humbler aims and more restricted compass, the clarification of some obscure features of Plato's argument. The first passage deals with the formulation of the definition of temperance as knowledge of knowledge henceforward regularly called K.K., an abbreviation whose ugliness is perhaps less objectionable than the repetition of the full expression in Greek or English. Here, 165c-167a, I shall argue that there is not, as has often been stated and still more often implied, an illegitimate transition from 'knowledge of oneself' to 'knowledge of itself'. The difficulties here are resolved by reconstructing the proper order of steps in the transition and taking the major definition to be 'knowing what one knows or does not know'. The other passages are concerned with the utility of K.K., once this definition has been accepted for the purpose of the argument. At 169e I believe Plato has deceived himself into making the transition to 'knowledge of itself' which he, but not some interpreters, avoids at 165c-167a. The third passage is a mere detail, the meaning of -tpoac-drasnj'rau 170b, but only if this is understood can the force of Plato's argument be clearly seen. The fourth passage is the basic premise of Plato's argument that K.K. does not entail knowing what one knows, o'-rwov ?68e Lev C'MLarO0,u 'r68e 8' oux ma'rhn 170a. On this basis Plato argues that no bridge is possible between K.K. and a particular technique such as medicine. On the other hand he does envisage a limited utility for K.K. at 172b, thus allowing that a bridge of some sort is possible. This unacknowledged contradiction I explain with reference to the ambiguity of the basic expression 170a, for in 'of these things this one is knowledge, this one is not knowledge', the 'things' in question are unidentifiable

Prime Matter in Aristotle

Abstract: A ristotle argues that every change has something which underlies it (eg 190 a 31b 9). What underlies a change is the matter of that change (eg 1042 b 9-11). This has traditionally been taken to mean that, in every change, there is something which is first a part of the whole which precedes the change, and then a part of the whole which succeeds it; thus what underlies a change persists through it. When a substance alters in an accidental fashion the matter of the change is the substance itself, for that persists through the change. When the change involves the forming of a new substance from an old one, then the matter of the change is that which constitutes first the one substance then the other: thus if I turn an iron statue into cannonballs the iron is what underlies this change. Aristotle believes that the elements (air, fire, earth and water) can change into each other (eg 305 a 14-35). As there is no identifiable matter more primitive than the elements (305 a 14-35) there is a problem about what underlies such change. The traditional interpretation of Aristotle's treatment of this problem is that he posits a prime matter, a bare 'stuff', lacking all positive determinations, which is the matter of the elements and which makes elemental change possible. This prime matter is nothing but a potentiality which can exist only as actualized in some determinate matter i.e. in one of the elements and which is what persists when one contrariety is replaced by another and the identity of an element changes. I intend to defend the view that Aristotle believed in a prime matter of this sort. This venerable theory has twice been attacked in recent years. First it was attacked by H. R. King (Journal for the History of Ideas, Vol. 17, 1956), and then by W. Charlton in his edition of books one and two of the Physics (Clarendon Aristotle Series, Clarendon Press, Oxfoid, 1970) where it merits a special appendix. King has been

A Note on Aristotle's Absolute Ruler

Abstract: A ccording to Aristotle in the Politics, absolute rule, ie rule unrestricted by law, can be justified only in the case of a man or men of transcendent virtue Though Aristotle is clearly influenced by the arguments in Plato's Statesman, he gives much more emphasis than Plato does to the relative as distinct from the intrinsic qualities needed in an absolute ruler' To qualify him for absolute rule, a man's virtue would have to be not only very great but also far beyond that of the other members of his city The problem to be discussed in this note is the terms in which Aristotle describes this relative superiority of the absolute ruler2 The most commonly accepted view is that the ruler's virtue must surpass that of all the others put together3 This interpretation has been developed most fully by Braun4 who sees the justification of absolute rule as an application of what he calls Aristotle's 'Summierungsprinzip' or summation principle This is the principle Aristotle uses when he compares the political claims of two groups of people by summing their respective qualities For example, by applying this principle, he is able to give some support to the claim of the many to participate in deliberative and judicial decisions Individually, the many may be inferior judges compared with the few best men, but collectively, when their individual contributions are added up,

Arguments and Able Man Colud Refute: Parmenides 133b-134e

Abstract: In his polemic against the Theory of Forms put forward by the young Socrates in Parmenides 128 e-130 a, Parmenides does not save the best until last. After the probing questions about the extent of the Form-world and the nature of participation, after the fireworks of the Third Man Argument, there comes a curious argument that Parmenides himself hints is no good. At 133 b 4 and following, Parmenides says that only an intelligent and experienced person, one who feels no horror at the prospect of a long, drawn-out argument, would be able to uphold the position that Forms are knowable. It surely follows from this that Plato believed that Forms are knowable, and hence that any argument that purported to prove the contrary must be fallacious. In that the argument of 133 b-134 e does try to show that we cannot know the Forms, Plato must have believed that this part of Parmenides' polemic contains a subtle, but discoverable error. Cornford, in his Plato and Parmenides, agrees that there is an error in Parmenides' reasoning but not a subtle one. It is, he says, "almost grossly fallacious."" (One wonders about the qualification implied by the 'almost'l) The fallacy, according to Cornford, lies in taking the Form of Mastery as if it were "the master of Slavery or of anything else."3 One must not confuse Forms with their perfect instances. Unfortunately, Plato makes such a confusion many times. I do not propose here to rehearse the arguments showing that Plato, at least at one time, held the view that every Form possesses that quality with which it is associated. It is surely sufficient to mention that the Third Man Argument, which precedes the passage with which I am dealing, rests on precisely the same Self-Predication assumption.8 If Self-

Forms and first principles

Abstract: In this paper I shall present and discuss some arguments from the nerpl I e&v, and try to show that some commonly-held ideas about them are not well-based, and that they are more interesting than has been realised in revealing Aristotle's attitude to Plato. The arguments are those referred to by Aristotle at 990 b 17-22, which are given by Alexander in his commentary on the Metaphysics, 85. 21-88.2, and they concern problems for the holders of the theory of Forms over &pcxt or "first principles"'1. These arguments have only been assigned to the wep. tBec-ov recently. In form they seem to belong to the group of arguments to which Aristotle refers and which Alexander gives. It is their content which renders them controversial: they seem to import ideas which do not belong to the theory of Forms as it appears in the other arguments2, and which are commonly ascribed to Plato's "unwritten doctrines". Hence they were not accepted as part of the 7tpt Be wv in early studies like those of Karpp3 and Philippson.4 The first to argue for their inclusion was Wilpert, in an articles based on analysis of Alexander's exegetical habits. He discussed them also in his later book6. Ross, convinced by Wilpert's arguments, accepted them in his Oxford edition and translation of Aristotle's fragments. The ascription was

Unravelling Thrasymachus' Arguments in"The Republic"

Abstract: There has been much discussion recently of the encounter between Thrasymachus and Socrates in Book I of Plato's Republic. I am not here concerned with whether Thrasymachus' arguments and Socrates' replies are valid, interesting and important though that problem is, but with the fundamental problem of deciding what exactly Thrasymachus is saying about so 81x%ctov, justice. Clearly, this is a necessary preliminary to the raising of any other question about Thrasymachus' arguments. Such an investigation may also contribute to our understanding of The Republic as a whole: given the structure of the dialogue, to know what Plato dissents from can provide valuable clues to what he assents to. In brief, my aim is to support Professor Kerferd's interpretation that Thrasymachus' doctrine is that "justice is the advantage of another".2 Kerferd's view has not been generally accepted. I shall argue that the standard view found in most commentaries, that Thrasymachus thinks "justice is the advantage of the ruler(s)", is open to major objections, and that Kerferd's interpretation is to be preferred because it avoids these objections. I shall argue further that some of the implications of Kerferd's interpretation provide additional

Plato and relativity

Abstract: The argument is, of course, a reductio ad impossibile of pluralism, 'a sort of succour for Parmenides' thesis' (128 c 6). But Socrates will not concede its second premiss. He responds with a 'distinguo': like things may be so either by being 'the very things that are like' (Oura Tro 6[LoLM, 129 b 1) or by sharing or partaking in the 'form of likeness' (el8O4 40OL6'n0o4, 129 a 1); and unlike things similarly. He goes on:

Rhetoric, Dialectic and Syllogistic Argument: Aristotle's Position in "Rhetoric" I-II

Abstract: In Rhetoric I-II Aristotle analyses the kind of reasoning used by orators. He suggests that rhetoric, the art of persuasion, has certain affinities with dialectic, the art of dispute. He also analyses how rhetorical reasoning falls short of the syllogistic reasoning which he explores at length in the Prior Analytics. The relationship of rhetoric to dialectic and to syllogistic argument is complex and difficult. In this paper I shall argue that Aristotle was himself unclear about this relationship, and that his lack of clarity explains certain obscurities in the Rhetoric which have troubled the commentators. The first point to consider is what does Aristotle mean by 'dialectic'. He expounds the method of dialectic in the Topics, which is a list of rules for debating exercises. The Greek term t67r6n literally means 'places', but Aristotle uses it in a logical context to mean something like 'grounds for argument'. He identifies '6rcog with =GoLxeLov in Rhet. 1396 b 20-21, and says in Met. B.2.998 a 25-7 and A.3. 1014 a 35 b 1 that a arotyeZov is a proposition whose demonstration is presupposed in the demonstration of other propositions. So a =odXLov or T67tog is a proposition whose truth is taken for granted in a number of arguments. (Cf. also a remark in Rhet. 1403 a 17-18: g,'L yocp CoOLX?LoV xXol 'r64oc et; 8n E?u that parallel lines do not meet; this proposition is the foundation on which all subsequent theorems are based. In the Topics, the Sr6not are grouped into four principal classes corresponding to the four kinds of predicables, namely, accident, genus, necessary property and definition. In order to use the '6mOL, one must be able to apply the doctrine of the predicables. For example, under the heading of 'accident' Aristotle includes the topic of asserting a predicate to be an accident when it is not really an accident (Top. II.2.109 a 34-5: Etq lkev 8& t6no; '6 ip,XCnetv et cT xa'&XXov 'vTWX -rpo67ov urapXov k mlipepBqx6g hr0oWcoxev). Thus if someone argues that justice is good in some circumstances but not in others, one method of refuting him is to show that justice is always and invariably good (i.e. that goodness is a necessary property of justice, not an accidental one).

A Note on "Pauline Predications" in Plato

Abstract: For to say this is to imply that (3) Snow is hot is always false:' there could never have been an occasion on which snow would be hot; hence (2) would be bound to be always true. Now in the Platonic ontology the nouns, "fire," "snow," and the adjectives, "hot," "cold," get their meaning by referring to their respective Forms. Some scholars have doubted or denied that things like Fire and Snow have a place in the authorized gallery of Platonic Forms. But it is not an eccentric view to hold, as I have held,2 that in the passage on "the clever aitia" in the Phaedo Plato treats Fire, Snow, Fever as et& on a par with ultra-respectable Forms, like Odd and Even. Proceeding on this assumption, I ask: How would Plato want us to understand the "is" in (1), (2), and (3)? Is he using the copula in the same way it is most commonly used in Greek (as in English) subjectpredicate sentences, sc. to indicate that the individual named by the subject-term is a member of the class of those possessing the attribute expressed by the predicate-term? This use of "is" may be conveniently indicated, after Peano, by the letter epsilon (for "=Lr"'), writing "Socrates c wise," for "Socrates is wise." It is beyond dispute that

Aristotle on Rational Action

Abstract: A consideration of the many pages Aristotle devoted to a close J and painstaking scrutiny of theoretical reasoning gives rise to regret that he did not also write a Prior and Posterior Analytics on practical reasoning. In sharp contrast to his work on the theoretical syllogism, which is investigated systematically and in great depth, his work on the so-called practical syllogism' is unsystematic and unsustained. Yet this work, for all its fragmentariness, has hardly, if at all, been overtaken by subsequent philosophers. Certainly the huge strides taken by logicians in recent decades, in the course of which they have tucked the Prior Analytics into a corner of the lower predicate calculus2, compare impressively with the occasional shuffling that goes on within the field of practical reasoning3. One tempting explanation of this very uneven progress made by logicians is that Aristotle did after all say all there was to be said about practical reasoning, but left substantial gaps in his work on theoretical reasoning. Yet this view prompts the question as to why there is so very much to say about the one kind of reasoning and so very little about the other. Another explanation, which I think is closer to the mark, is that the entities with which practical reason deals are at once more complex and more elusive than are the entities which are the concern of theoretical reasoning. One consequence of this would be to make practical reasoning more difficult than its theoretical counterpart to symbolise. This is important, because logic is severely restricted so long as it remains unsymbolic. The purpose of this paper is to scrutinise one particular obstacle to the symbolisation of practical reasoning, in the light of Aristotle's own writings on the subject. At the end of

Individuals in Aristotle's "Categories": Two Queries

Abstract: M vR r. Barrington Jones, in his recent article in Phronesis,I has suggested a new way of solving the standing debate about the nature of non-substance individuals in the Categories. Mr. Jones' article suggests some exciting new approaches to the Categories, but I would like to put forward two difficulties I find with the way he proposes to cut through the main problem. In the Categories, but nowhere else, there seem to be individuals in non-substance categories, corresponding to primary substances. WhIat sort of thing are these non-substance individuals? According to Ackrill2 they are non-repeatable individual instances of (for example) a property. An example would be the particular instance of white exhibited by this paper: it is peculiar to this piece of paper and will perish when it does. According to Owen3 they are the most specific types of (for example) a property. The white exhibited by this piece of paper and all the paper in the same batch would be an example: it can continue to exist when this piece of paper perishes, as long as some other piece of paper from the batch continues to exhibit it. I shall not go into the controversy that has arisen over these differing interpretations of Aristotle. I have the more limited objective of examining the way Jones proposes to restate the terms of the debate. If Jones is right the alternatives just sketched represent a false dichotomy: the new solution supersedes them both. It is merely the proffered new solution that is my concern. Jones begins from the fact that "the term 'individual' is glossed as 'what is one in number"',4 and goes on to explain this in terms of Aristotle's analysis of "one" in Metaphysics I.6 In I Aristotle analyses

Straight and Circular in Parmenides and the " Timaeus"

Abstract: W hen Plato describes the sphere as the most perfect of all figures at Timaeus 33 b-c he is echoing a notion which pervades the whole of Greek literature: namely, that the circle and the sphere represent what is complete, perfect, and all-encompassing. Hesiod's completed universe, for example, is spherical in shape; the "sphere of the heavens" and the "cycle of time" are often referred to in drama and history.1 Among the Presocratics, Anaximander's map of the world indicated a circular surface, and the circular motion of a vortex may have been part of his cosmological scheme; Empedocles' rounded sphere enjoys a circular solitude; for the Pythagoreans, contemplation of the circular motion of the heavenly spheres and of the harmony produced thereby imparts harmony to the soul of the contemplator; in Alcmaeon's philosophy the soul imitates the circular motion of the stars and heavens; and Anaxagoras' Nous operates as a cosmological principle which causes the circular motion that orders the universe. Orderliness both in human thought and in the universe is interpreted as circular perfection; as Guthrie remarks,2 "the analogy between the regularity of motion in a circle and psychic functions, especially reason, must be accepted as natural to Greek thought." For both Parmenides and Plato true thought pertains to "Being", and opinion and sensation pertain to "appearance."3 In the present discussion I shall attempt to show generally that (1) in Parmenides' poem and in the Timaeus, both cosmology and epistemology are dealt with schematically, i.e. in terms of shapes that the notions of straight and circular are applied both to the universe and to men's thought about it; and that (2) both philosophers make extensive use of the principle that "like knows like." More specifically I intend to suggest, through an analysis of the language and imagery of the texts in question, that the following points hold good for both works: