Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1998"

The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem

Abstract: In this paper I argue that the "discovery" of the problem of causal determinism and freedom of decision in Greek philosophy is the result of a mix-up of Aristotelian and Stoic thought in later antiquity; more precisely, a (mis-)interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of deliberate choice and action in the light of Stoic theory of determinism and moral responsibility. The (con-)fusion originates with the beginnings of Aristotle scholarship, at the latest in the early 2nd century A.D. It undergoes several developments, absorbing Epictetan, Middle-Platonist, and Peripatetic ideas; and it leads eventually to a concept of freedom of decision and an exposition of the "free-will problem" in Alexander of Aphrodisias' On Fate and in the Mantissa ascribed to him.

Plato as "Architect of Science"

Abstract: The figure of the cordial host of the Academy, who invited the most gifted mathematicians and cultivated pure research, whose keen intellect was able if not to solve the particular problem then at least to show the method for its solution: this figure is quite familiar to students of Greek science. But was the Academy as such a center of scientific research, and did Plato really set for mathematicians and astronomers the problems they should study and methods they should use? Our sources tell about Plato's friendship or at least acquaintance with many brilliant mathematicians of his day (Theodorus, Archytas, Theaetetus), but they were never his pupils, rather vice versa - he learned much from them and actively used this knowledge in developing his philosophy. There is no reliable evidence that Eudoxus, Menaechmus, Dinostratus, Theudius, and others, whom many scholars unite into the group of so-called "Academic mathematicians," ever were his pupils or close associates. Our analysis of the relevant passages (Eratosthenes' Platonicus, Sosigenes ap. Simplicius, Proclus' Catalogue of geometers, and Philodemus' History of the Academy, etc.) shows that the very tendency of portraying Plato as the architect of science goes back to the early Academy and is born out of interpretations of his dialogues.

Plato and the Socratic fallacy

Abstract: Since Peter Geach coined the phrase in 1966 there has been much discussion among scholars of the "Socratic fallacy." No consensus presently exists on whether Socrates commits the "Socratic fallacy"; almost all scholars agree, however, that the "Socratic fallacy" is a bad thing and that Socrates has good reason to avoid it. I think that this consensus of scholars is mistaken. I think that what Geach has labeled a fallacy is no fallacy at all, but a perfectly innocent consequence of Platonic epistemology. The "Socratic fallacy" arises from the "Priority of Definition" principle (PD). Plato is committed to (PD) in the Meno . The Meno also contains a famous discussion of the difference between episteme and doxa (97a ff.). If we understand what Plato meant by episteme we can see that he must be committed to (PD); but we can also see that (PD) has none of the harmful consequences Geach attributes to it. Geach's view is indebted to Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. (PD) is implausible on this reading of the verb "to know," but not on Plato's. Plato claims that a demand for an explanation is appropriate wherever a claim to knowledge is made. Plato links the concept of episteme explicitly with the concept of logos ; the connection between the terms may have been analytic. It does not follow from the Platonic conception of knowledge, as Geach argues, that it is "no use" using examples to establish general definitions. All that follows is that one cannot know that an alleged example of a term T is a genuine example until one has a general account of what it is to be T. Without the stronger conclusion, Geach cannot establish that the "Socratic fallacy" is a fallacy.

Content, Cause, and Stoic Impressions

Abstract: Soulevant la question du contenu propositionnel des etats mentaux chez les enfants et les animaux non-rationnels dans le cadre de la psychologie stoicienne, l'A. montre que les Stoiciens etablissent plusieurs distinctions entre le contenu au sens strict et le contenu au sens large des evenements mentaux. Examinant la theorie stoicienne de la perception (aisthesis) fondee sur les fonctions de l'âme que sont l'apparence (phantasia) et l'assentiment, l'A. montre que la definition physique de l'impression et des relations causales developpee par Cleanthe et Chrysippe occupe une place intermrediaire entre l'interpretation austere et orthodoxe de M. Frede et son alternative defendue par R. Sorabji

Simplicius on the Meaning of Sentences: A Commentary on In Cat. 396,30-397,28

Abstract: At Categories 12b5-16 Aristotle appears to regard the referents of declarative sentences, such as "Socrates is sitting," as what later writers were to call complexe significabilia , i.e., items such as that Socrates is sitting . Simplicius' discussion of this passage in his commentary on the Categories clearly shows the influence of Stoic philosophy of language; but, if we follow the text printed by Kalbfleisch, Simplicius' commentary is seen to be a muddle of Stoic and Aristotelian elements, neither properly understood. It is possible, however, by making a crucial emendation to the text, to preserve the Aristotelian integrity of Simplicius' theory of meaning. On that line Simplicius would be adopting the view that a declarative sentence refers to a thought in the first instance and a complexe significabile in the second instance. This view is plausibly the upshot of combining the Categories text with the first chapter of De Interpretatione .

Euclid and the Sceptic: A Paper on Vision, Doubt, Geometry, Light and Drunkenness

Abstract: Philosophy in the period immediately after Aristotle is sometimes thought to be marked by the decline of natural philosophy and philosophical disinterest in contemporary achievements in the sciences. But in one area at least, the early third century B.C.E. was a time of productive interaction between such disparate fields as epistemology, physics and geometry. Debates between the sceptics and the dogmatic philosophical schools focus on epistemological problems about the possibility of self-evident appearances, but there is evidence from Euclid's day of a quite different response. The sceptical challenge provoked the development of theories explaining error formation, showing how illusions can be studied systematically and are subject to prediction. Such theories do not legitimate claims about the nature of the underlying entities perceived, but provide justification for forming expectations about future perceptions. While it overtly focuses on purely geometrical considerations, the Euclidean model of optics nonetheless provides support for certain views about the nature of vision and the physics of light. Moreover, by offering a model in which the image received is not thought to be a perspicuous mirroring of the object seen, Euclid may have helped promote a view of perception as something reconstructed from information received, not as a mere form transferred into the eye. The ancient sceptic may indeed have fulfilled his promise to promote inquiry by focusing attention on problems that escape the attention of a hasty theorist.

Plotinus on the seat of the soul : Reverberations of Galen and Alexander in Enn. IV, 3 [27], 23

Abstract: In «Enn.»IV, 3.23 Plotinus presents a vindication of the well-known tripartition-cum-trilocation of the soul advanced by Plato in the «Timaeus». His version of the platonic doctrine is marked by a strong spatial separation between the three parts of the soul - reason in the brain, will in the heart and desire in the liver. This is This article adresses two related questions: 1) Can this position be squared with the plotinian key doctrine that the soul is incorporeal and invisible? 2) What are the nature and provenance of this particular version of the tripartition, which, in this form, is not warranted by the platonic text? Plotinus enlists the support of the anatomical researches presented by Galen in his «On the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato». At the same time he adapts the latter's demonstration in such a way as to safeguard the unity and incorporeality of the soul. The parts of the soul are not in the three main bodily organs in an ordinary sense - only their activity takes place there. Plotinus arrives at this position through a clarification of the concept of arche as employed by Galen. His understanding of the soul's localisation is heavily indebted to Alexander's «On the soul» (De anima). Meanwhile he dissociates himself from the hylomorphism typical of both Alexander and (in a more latent fashion) Galen. Other features if his argument are explicable as motivated by the wish to emasculate th arguments used by Alexander in favour of the cardiocentric theory. The upshot is a sophisticated and improved defence of the Platonic tripartition which not only is scientifically up-to-date but coheres with some of Plotinus' most deeply held metaphysical convictions

Collecting the Letters

Abstract: In this paper, I reexamine Plato's method of collection and division, and specifically of collection. If collection and division are simply methods for mapping out genus-species trees, then it is hard to understand why Plato is so excited about them. But a close study to Plato's examples shows that these methods are something broader, and shows why Plato would regard collection as an important tool for coming to know elements in any domain of inquiry. In the first section I focus on a notoriously problematic example of collection from the «Philebus», Theuth's discovery of the letters of the alphabet; I show how Plato interprets this discovery as a process of collection, and draw conclusions about what Plato takes collection to be. In the process, I try to bring out Plato's analysis of what is involved in learning to read and write a language, which he takes as paradigmatic for other knowledge. In the second section, stepping back from the «Philebus» passage and applying its lessons, I describe the function of collection and division, for the late Plato, in coming to know elements, including the Forms, or the most basic Forms. Reflection on Plato's use of collection suggests a (relatively non-mystical) account of what it is to know non-complex intelligible entities, and of how we can come to know them. I also use Plato's descriptions of collection and division to suggest a platonic context for the notion of the separation of the Forms, to which the late Plat remains firmly committed

La tragedia, senza la catarsi

Abstract: E'difficile non trovarsi a sorridere di se stesso quando si presume di avanzare un'altra spiegazione per la catarsi di cui Aristotele parla nella definizione della tragedia in Poet. 6. Anche se il sorriso non mi e affatto mancato, tuttavia, facendo conto sulla comprensione del lettore per la debolezza umana oltre che sul suo spirito critico, proporro ora una spiegazione fondata sia sul riesame dei testi, sia su una riflessione intorno alla letteratura secondaria, specialmente la piiu recente, che sembra essere arrivata con l'ultimo saggio di S. Halliwell' a un punto di assoluta disperazione. Pur senza rifare la lunghissima storia della questione2 dovro tuttavia qua e la accennare ad alcuni momenti importanti della discussione. "La tragedia e imitazione di un'azione seria e compiuta, dotata di una sua grandezza, in un linguaggio addolcito da abbellimenti distinti in ciascuna loro specie nelle diverse parti, eseguita da attori e non solo raccontata, (un'imitazione) che mediante la pieta e la paura compie la catarsi di siffatte passioni": e la definizione di Poet. 6, 1449b 24-28. Bisogna notare che Aristotele la introduce come se essa fosse il risultato "delle cose gi'a dette" (1449b 23), il che e sostanzialmente vero per tutte le parti della definizione, ma non per la clausola finale: nei cinque capitoli precedenti infatti non si e mai parlato ne di pieta, ne di paura, ne' di catarsi; donde l'ipotesi di alcuni3 che la clausola sia un'aggiunta posteriore (molto disattenta, pero!) di Aristotele e c'e quasi da meravigliarsi che nessuno

Plotinus on the Structure of Self-Intellection

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that Plotinus offers us a new and interesting account of self-intellection. It is an account which is informed to some extent by a dilemma that Sextus Empiricus raised about the intellect being to apprehend itself. The significance of Sextus' dilemma is that it sets out the framework within which such a cognitive activity is to be dealt with, namely the intellect must apprehend itself qua part or qua whole, both of which according to him are impossible. Plotinus, I think, successfully gets around this dilemma and is able to explain how the intellect can think itself qua whole. In the process of doing so, he offers an account of self-intellection in which the thinking subject or thinker becomes active in terms of generating its intellectual content, namely itself; a move which is a break from the traditional Platonic/Aristotelian account of the intellect. The paper itself is set up as follows. I start by mentioning the dilemma which Sextus raises about self-intellection. Then I attempt, through an analysis of the noetic intellect's structure, to show how Plotinus is able to offer an account of self-intellection in terms of whole apprehending whole. I conclude with Plotinus' analysis of the light analogy as a means of explaining how this intellectual process works.

Remarks About Other Minds in Greek Philosophy

Abstract: Etude du probleme de l'inconnaissabilite des autres esprits dans la philosophie grecque representee par deux ecoles majeures: celle des Cyrenaiques (4-3 e siecles av JC) et celle de Theodose, un neo-pyrrhonien. Comparant la formulation epistemologique et ontologique du probleme chez les sceptiques anciens et dans la philosophie moderne post-cartesienne, l'A. montre que la conception ancienne de la conscience de soi et du pathos depasse certaines positions modernes prisonnieres des theories dualistes; en particulier, le relativisme de Protagoras, expose dans la premiere partie du «Theetete» de Platon, indique que le sens du probleme n'est pas seulement theorique, mais qu'il concerne a la fois le prive et la condition hedoniste d'une vie bonne

Communication, human and divine : Saloustious reconsidered

Abstract: Saloustius would approve of summaries as this. While his neoplatonic handbook, the «Peri theon kai kosmou», is often ignored as a laughably lightweight guide to philosophy, this article aims to show that Salioustius is a champion of communication. It argues that the practical tenets of neoplatonism, in themselves first-classs tickets to communication with the gods, are proffered in a manner that exemplifies the virtue of communication with men. The article analyses three subject-areas of the treatise. Section I discusses the author's insistence on the impassibility of divine nature, and how he explains this within a sympathetic, communicative cosmos. Section II assesses the role of Saloustius' daemons in relation to men and the gods. Not only where they essential intermediaries between humans and the divine, but they partly defined what it meant to be a human individual; following an Iamblichean paradox, deamons are presented both as connective and as individuating cosmic powers. Section III investigates Saloustius' discussion of myth, the longest and most original section of the treatise. It is argued that while some philosophers rejected myths as obscene distortions, and others embraced as allegorical representations of the truth, Saloustius combined these two ideas: the veiling of the truth was itself a revelation, this paradox being the ultimate representation of divinity. Allegory was not merely a means of interpretation, but was the very nature of revelation, and this applied not just to myth but all existence. While this article aims to counterbalance the greater interest shown by scholars in Saloustius' historical identity than in his philosophy, it also offers an Appendix which re-evaluates all the available evidence on this matter and outlines the relevant arguments to date. It is hoped that this assessment will prove the likely identity of the elusive Saloustius

Making things better: the art of changing things (Aristotle, Metaphysics Θ 2)

Abstract: L'A. propose une lecture de la «Metaphysique», Θ,2 d'Aristote qui s'interesse davantage a la question du choix technique pour l'artiste qu'a la question de la conduite de la vie en general a travers la notion de prudence. Developpant l'exemple du medecin incompetent sous les traits du Docteur Crippen et de Saint John Long, l'A. etudie la question des principes du changement, definis en termes des capacites rationnelles et de capacites irrationnelles, au regard de la fonction du logos et des notions de verite, contraire, phronesis et techne dans la connaissance pratique

Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy

Abstract: In 1993 M.O. Goulet-Caze and R. Goulet published a collection of papers which marked a major advance in the study of ancient Cynicism.' Six of those papers are reproduced, and nine others added, in an equally important collection2 which traces all aspects of the history and influence of Cynicism from Diogenes or Antisthenes (and even earlier: James Romm and R.P. Martin, on Aristeas and Anacharsis) down to Sloterdijk and the "student movement" of 1960's and 1970's Germany (Niehues-Pr6bsting; cf. his 343 on whether Rousseau was or was not a Cynic.) Attitudes to Tukhe, chance, changed from Bion of Borysthenes onwards (Goulet-Caze, 56, 78-9). R. Bracht Banham stresses the rhetorical aspects of Cynicism as a performance, and argues that the core value of Cynicism is not selfsufficiency beggars are far from self-sufficient but freedom, and especially freedom of speech. J.I. Porter analyses the position of Aristo of Chios, his relation to the literary kritikoi, his views on the unity of virtue, and the connection between his thought and Antisthenes' claim that only tautological predications are possible. Miriam Griffin makes a strong case for the importance of biography in ancient philosophy (42-3); and Goulet-Caz6 rounds off the volume with "A Comprehensive Catalogue of Known Cynic Philosophers" (389-413) which will become definitive. Dirk Obbink's magisterial edition of the first part of Philodemus' On Piety3 shows how much has been achieved by recent insights into how the sequence of fragments in a roll of the Herculaneum papyri can be reconstructed from the order in which they were listed, in two separate sequences each representing a semicylindrical slice of the roll, by the investigators who cut the rolls open. 0. shows that Philodemus' defence of Epicurean theology constitutes the first part of the treatise, the attack on poets and on philosophers of rival schools (to be discussed in a second volume) the second. In the text discussed here P. is concerned to dis-