Showing papers in "Phronesis in 2004"
TL;DR: In the Phaedo of Elis as mentioned in this paper, a psychological model outlined by Socrates in this dialogue converges with the evidence we have (especially from fragments of the Zopyrus) for the author's own beliefs about the soul, including that non-rational desires were ineliminable epiphenomena of the body.
Abstract: Phaedo of Elis was well-known as a writer of Socratic dialogues, and it seems inconceivable that Plato could have been innocent of intertextuality when, excusing himself on the grounds of illness, he made him the narrator of one of his own: the Phaedo. In fact the psychological model outlined by Socrates in this dialogue converges with the evidence we have (especially from fragments of the Zopyrus) for Phaedo's own beliefs about the soul. Specifically, Phaedo seems to have thought that non-rational desires were ineliminable epiphenomena of the body, that reason was something distinct, and that the purpose of philosophy was its 'cure' and 'purification'. If Plato's intention with the Phaedo is to assert the separability and immortality of reason (whatever one might think about desire and pleasure), then Phaedo provides a useful standpoint for him. In particular, Phaedo has arguments that are useful against the 'harmony-theorists' (and are the more useful rhetorically speaking since it is only over the independence of reason that Phaedo disagrees with them). At the same time as allying himself with Phaedo, however, Plato is able to improve on him by adding to the demonstration that reason is independent a proof that it is actually immortal.
38 citations
TL;DR: The question of whether or not Epicurus was a psychological hedonist is addressed in this article, where it is argued that there is considerable evidence in favour of a psychological reading of Epicurean hedonism, evidence that includes some of the very texts that Cooper cites in support of the ethical reading.
Abstract: This paper addresses the question of whether or not Epicurus was a psychological hedonist. Did he, that is, hold that all human action, as a matter of fact, has pleasure as its goal? Or was he just an ethical hedonist, asserting merely that pleasure ought to be the goal of human action? I discuss a recent forceful attempt by John Cooper to answer the latter question in the affirmative, and argue that he fails to make his case. There is considerable evidence in favour of a psychological reading of Epicurean hedonism, evidence that includes some of the very texts that Cooper cites in support of the ethical reading.
34 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine Socrates' avowals and disavowals of knowledge in the standardly accepted early Platonic dialogues and present a novel interpretation that depends upon a fundamental adjustment in the interpretation of Socrates' utterances in the texts.
Abstract: The paper examines Socrates' avowals and disavowals of knowledge in the standardly accepted early Platonic dialogues. All of the pertinent passages are assembled and discussed. It is shown that, in particular, alleged avowals of knowledge have been variously misinterpreted. The evidence either does not concern ethical knowledge or its interpretation has been distorted by abstraction of the passage from context or through failure adequately to appreciate the rhetorical dimensions of the context or the author's dramaturgical interests. Still, six sincere Socratic avowals or assumptions of ethical knowledge occur among the early dialogues. Moreover, it is maintained that in a number of these texts Socrates is committed to the epistemological priority of definitional knowledge of excellence for pertinent non-definitional knowledge (for example, that knowledge of the definition of justice is necessary for knowledge of instances of justice). Thus, there are inconsistencies among Socrates' avowals and disavowals of ethical knowledge. It is argued that the most important recent attempts to resolve Socrates' avowals and disavowals of knowledge (for example, Vlastos's) fail. A novel interpretation is then offered that depends upon a fundamental adjustment in the interpretation of Socrates' utterances in the texts. The practice of assembling all of Socrates' topic-relevant utterances, divorced from context, and attempting to distill from these consistent philosophical principles is rejected as naive. In contrast, it is argued that Plato uses Socrates in various ways in various texts in order to achieve certain pedagogical objectives. Accordingly, Socrates' utterances do not all have the same hermeneutic status. On this depends the correct interpretation of Socrates' occasional avowals of ethical knowledge as well as the general epistemological, specifically ethical epistemological commitments that Plato intended to advance in the early dialogues. The paper concludes with an explanation of the function of Socrates' occasional avowals of ethical knowledge as well as an account of the ethical epistemological commitments that Plato intended to advance among the early dialogues.
30 citations
TL;DR: A review of the evidence shows that Chrysippus, like Epictetus, held ethical concepts to represent a special category of conception in that their formation was guaranteed by oikeiosis, that is, these represent a formal conceptualization of an innate tendency to distinguish between things fitting for one's constitution and things not fitting that all animals bring to their empirical experiences as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: A number of late Stoic sources describe either ethical concepts or a supposed universal belief in gods as being innate in the human animal. Though Chrysippus himself is known to have spoken of "implanted preconceptions" (e¨μϕυτοιπρολν´ψeιζ) of good and bad, scholars have typically argued that the notion of innate concepts of any kind would have been entirely incompatible with his theory of knowledge. Both Epictetus' notion of innate concepts of good and bad and the references to an innate belief in gods by other philosophers of the Roman era are thus generally held to be later developments, probably owing to a Platonist-Stoic syncretism. Review of the evidence, however, shows that Chrysippus, like Epictetus, held ethical concepts to represent a special category of conception in that their formation was guaranteed by oikeiosis . Unlike other concepts, that is, these represent a formal conceptualization of an innate tendency to distinguish between things fitting for one's constitution and things not fitting that all animals, according to the Stoics, bring to their empirical experiences. While the notion that human belief in gods is similarly innate does seem to have been a later development, it too was explained with reference to oikeiosis rather than resulting from a simple "syncretism."
27 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that close attention to the text and the sequence of argument supports the conclusion that Aristotle is speaking throughout De Anima of a uni fied human intellect, possessed of the properties Aristotle explicitly attributes to it.
Abstract: The perennial problem in interpreting De Anima 3.5 has produced two drastic solutions, one ancient and one contemporary. According to the first, Aristotle in 3.5 identi fies the 'agent intellect' with the divine intellect. Thus, everything Aristotle has to say about the human intellect is contained mainly in 3.4, though Aristotle returns to its treatment in 3.6. In contrast to this ancient interpretation, a more recent view holds that the divine intellect is not the subject of 3.5 and that throughout the work Aristotle is analyzing the nature of the human intellect. But this view contends that the properties Aristotle deduces for this intellect, properties that have encouraged the view that Aristotle must be speaking about a divine intellect, are in fact to be discounted or interpreted in such a way that they do not indicate the immortality and immateriality of the human intellect. In this article I argue that close attention to the text and the sequence of argument supports the conclusion that Aristotle is speaking throughout De Anima of a uni fied human intellect, possessed of the properties Aristotle explicitly attributes to it. This intellect functions diff erently when it is and when it is not separate from the hylomorphic composite. I argue further that it is Aristotle's view that if we were not ideally or essentially intellects, we could not engage in the diverse cognitive activities of this composite.
23 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a more faithful reading of the dialogue, arguing that the romantic interpretation of the Ion can be traced to Shelley's tendentious translation of it, and suggest that the contribution made by the Ion to the evolution of Plato's reflections on poetic composition, and particularly the reasons which later induced Plato to substitute the concept of mimesis for that of inspiration in his account of poetry.
Abstract: Plato's Ion , despite its frail frame and traditionally modest status in the corpus , has given rise to large exegetical claims. Thus some historians of aesthetics, reading it alongside page 205 of the Symposium , have sought to identify in it the seeds of the post-Kantian notion of 'art' as non-technical making, and to trace to it the Romantic conception of the poet as a creative genius. Others have argued that, in the Ion , Plato has Socrates assume the existence of a technē of poetry. In this article, these claims are challenged on exegetical and philosophical grounds. To this effect, Plato's use of poiētēs and poiēsis in the Symposium is analysed, the defining criteria of technē in the Ion and other dialogues are identified and discussed, and the 'Romantic' interpretation of the dialogue is traced to Shelley's tendentious translation of it. These critical developments lead to what is presented as a more faithful reading of the dialogue. In the Ion , it is claimed, Plato seeks to subvert the traditional status of poetry by having Socrates argue that poetry is both non-rational and non-cognitive in nature. In the third part of the article, suggestions are offered as to the contribution made by the Ion to the evolution of Plato's reflections on poetic composition, and particularly as to the reasons which later induced Plato to substitute the concept of mimesis for that of inspiration in his account of poetry.
20 citations
TL;DR: In Metaphysics Gamma 3, the firmest principle of all is identified as the principle of non-contradiction (PNC), and the main focus of Gamma 3 is the proof for this identification as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In Metaphysics Gamma 3 Aristotle declares that the philosopher investigates things that are qua things that are and that he therefore should be able to state the firmest principles of everything. The firmest principle of all is identified as the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The main focus of Gamma 3 is Aristotle's proof for this identification. This paper begins with remarks about Aristotle's notion of the firmness of a principle and then offers an analysis of the firmness proof for PNC. It focuses on some key assumptions of the proof and on the range and force of the proof. Aristotle closes Gamma 3 with the claim that PNC is ultimate in the sense that all other principles somehow rest on it. This, rather controversial, claim is given a defensible reading and shown to be central to the chapter's effort to establish PNC as the firmest principle of all. As such it completes the firmness proof and is not simply an appended remark.
20 citations
TL;DR: The authors discuss the dialogues between Protagoras, Theodorus and Socrates in Theaetetus and emphasise the importance for this passage of a dilemma which refutation is shown to pose for relativism at 161e-162a.
Abstract: ABSTRACr In this paper I discuss the dialogues between 'Protagoras', Theodorus and Socrates in Theaetetus 161-171 and emphasise the importance for this passage of a dilemma which refutation is shown to pose for relativism at 161e-162a. I argue that the two speeches delivered on Protagoras' behalf contain material that is deeply Socratic and suggest that this feature of the speeches should be interpreted as part of Plato's philosophical case against relativism, reflecting the relativist's own inability to defend his theory from attempts to refute it. I then discuss Theodorus' role in the refutation of Protagoras and argue that his voice is needed to get relativism disproved in the self-refutation argument of 171a-c. I conclude with a brief discussion of the image of Protagoras at 171d.
15 citations
TL;DR: The failure of Laches' first definition of courage cannot be explained by reference to the distinction between universals and particulars as discussed by the authors, but rather, it provides a paradigm of courage, which is inadequate because it fails to make clear how it is to be projected into other, nonparadigmatic cases.
Abstract: Laches' first definition is rejected because it is somehow formally inadequate, but it is not clear exactly how this is so. On my interpretation, the failure of this definition cannot be explained by reference to the distinction between universals and particulars. Rather, it provides a paradigm of courage, which is inadequate because it fails to make clear how it is to be projected into other, non-paradigmatic cases. The definition is interesting because it articulates essential elements of the dominant moral tradition, including both its normative content (it is is too conservative and aristocratic) and its form (it is sustained by a certain limited canon of ideals, idols, and images of excellence). Socrates' elenchus of this definition thus amounts to a challenge to this tradition.
7 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that Plotinus interpreted the notion of evil in Enn. I.8 as the outcome of an incongruent interaction of matter and soul, maintaining simultaneously that neither soul nor matter are to be considered as bad or evil.
Abstract: To most interpreters, the case seems to be clear: Plotinus identifies matter and evil, as he bluntly states in Enn. I.8[51] that 'last matter' is 'evil', and even 'evil itself'. In this paper, I challenge this view: how and why should Plotinus have thought of matter, the sense-making eσχατον of his derivational ontology from the One and Good, evil? A rational reconstruction of Plotinus's tenets should neither accept the paradox that evil comes from Good, nor shirk the arduous task of interpreting Plotinus's texts on evil as a fitting part of his philosophy on the whole. Therefore, I suggest a reading of evil in Plotinus as the outcome of an incongruent interaction of matter and soul, maintaining simultaneously that neither soul nor matter are to be considered as bad or evil. When Plotinus calls matter evil, he does so metonymically denoting matter's totally passive potentiality as perceived by the toiling soul trying to act upon it as a form-bringer. As so often, Plotinus is speaking quoad nos here rather than referring to 'matter per se ' (for Plotinus, somewhat of an oxymoron) which, as mere potentiality (and nothing else) is not nor can be evil. In short: matter is no more evil than the melancholy evening sky is melancholy – not in itself (for it isn't), but as to its impression on us who contemplate it. As I buttress this view, it will also become clear that matter cannot tritely be considered to be the αυτο κακον as a prima facie -reading of Enn. I.8[51] might powerfully suggest, but that the αυτο κακο&ν, far from being a principle of its own, has to be interpreted within the dynamics of Plotinus's philosophical thinking as a unique, though numerously applicable flaw-pattern for all the single κακα(hence the Platonic αυτο). To conclude, I shall offer a short outlook on the consistency of this interpretation with Plotinus's teaching on the soul and with the further Neoplatonic development of the doctrine of evil.
5 citations
TL;DR: The main object of the method of hypothesis introduced at Meno 86e ff is problem reduction as mentioned in this paper, which has generated an enormous secondary literature, and no interpretation can be said to be completely free from difficulty.
Abstract: The principal object of the method of hypothesis introduced at Meno 86e ff is problem reduction. Vlastos,1 p. 123, put it: ‘the logical structure of the recommended method is entirely clear: when you are faced with a problematic proposition p, to “investigate it from a hypothesis,” you hit on another proposition h (the “hypothesis”), such that p is true if and only if h is true, and then shift your search from p to h, and investigate the truth of h, undertaking to determine what would follow (quite apart from p) if h were true and, alternatively, if it were false.’ That much is clear.2 But almost everything else is obscure, thanks very largely to the obscurities in the mathematical example. This has generated an enormous secondary literature, and no interpretation can be said to be completely free from difficulty. The object of this paper is to attempt a new approach to that problem. I shall argue that the very obscurity of Plato’s mathematical example is one of its points.
TL;DR: The authors argued that Epicurus held a non-reductionist view of mental states that is in the spirit of Davidson's anomalous monism, and they argued for this conclusion by considering the role that normative descriptions play in the peritropē argument from On Nature.
Abstract: This paper argues that Epicurus held a non-reductionist view of mental states that is in the spirit of Davidson's anomalous monism.1 We argue for this conclusion by considering the role that normative descriptions play in the peritropē argument from On Nature 25. However, we also argue that Epicurus was an indeterminist. We can know that atoms swerve because we can know that we make choices that are up to us and this is incompatible with the ancestral causal determination of mental states by atomic processes. Epicurus escapes the traditional criticism of indeterminist libertarians because the swerve is not meant to explain how choices may be free. The anti-reductionist stance on the mental means that nothing about atomic processes could possibly explain any particular mental event. Moreover, because of the practical and therapeutic nature of Epicurean philosophy, it is not necessary that Epicurus provide an explanation of how the swerve subserves freedom of choice. We know all that we need to know for eudaimonia when we know that some choices are up to us.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a survey of Epictetus as a philosopher, stylist, and educator in a backward chronological order, starting in the early Empire and ending in the fourth century BC.
Abstract: Before handing over the responsibility for the book notes section on Hellenistic philosophy to Christopher Gill, I would like to take the opportunity to clear away my backlog and to discuss, along with a few books that were actually sent to me recently, one or two works which I should probably have covered earlier, but which I irresponsibly kept for a later occasion. Together they make for a remarkably interesting set. I shall discuss them more or less in a backward chronological order, starting in the early Empire and ending up in the fourth century BC. Pride of place may go to Tony Long's Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life.' There can be little doubt that this book will constitute a major point of reference for students of Hellenistic and early Imperial philosophy for many years to come. The number of footnotes has been kept down and bibliographical and other scholarly matters have been confined to appendixes at the end of the chapters. As a result this eminently readable survey of Epictetus as a philosopher, stylist, and educator will be accessible to nonscholars as well. More so indeed than Bonhoffer's classic 19th century monographs (Epiktet und die Stoa, and Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet) which this book will in many respects replace as the most authoritative and all-round treatment of Epictetus. One of the distinctive features of the book is the careful attention given to the structure and purpose of the Discourses and to Epictetus' educational strategies where, by contrast, Bonhoffer's Epiktet und die Stoa rather exclusively focused on the philosophical contents, with two (in themselves worthwhile) introductory sections on 'Das Wesen und die Bedeutung der Philosophie' and on 'Die Einteilung der Philosophie'. Also typical are L.'s focus on what he calls the 'distinctive power of Epictetus' voice' (p. 5) and the way he brings out the role of Socrates as Epictetus' favoured paradigm. When it comes to these points, there is a potential drawback one which,
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the refutation's logical structure, particularly the way Socrates juxtaposes the agreed-upon premises to derive a double or "chiastic" contradiction, and argue that the chiastic contradiction alone makes possible Socrates' refutation of Euthyphro's claim to expertise in the realm of to hosion.
Abstract: One of Euthyphro's proposed de finitions of to hosion says: '[T]he pious is what all the gods love . . .'. Scholarly analyses of Socrates' refutation of this de finition have focused on its validity or even its 'truth'. By contrast, this paper restricts itself to the refutation's logical structure, particularly the way Socrates juxtaposes the agreed-upon premises to derive a double or 'chiastic' contradiction. In this article, I lay out the details of Socrates' ingenious logical construction, without regard to its validity or fallaciousness, and argue that the chiastic contradiction alone makes possible Socrates' refutation of Euthyphro's claim to expertise in the realm of to hosion.