Showing papers in "Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations in 2013"

Women and Wars: Contested Histories, Uncertain Futures

Abstract: Women and Wars: Contested Histories, Uncertain Futures By Carol Cohn Polity, Cambridge, UK, 2012 256 pp., $26.95 ISBN-13: 978-0745642451REVIEWED BY KRISTEN A. CORDELLCarol Cohn's December 2012 anthology Women and Wars uses descriptions of the varied roles of women during conflict to push forward an agenda for full inclusion of their perspective in securing the peace. Women and Wars fills the vacuum left by the "women as victims" approach that characterized the early 2000's, with a diverse array of options for understanding the roles and perspectives that women have during conflict, including: soldiers, civilians, caregivers, sex workers, refugees and internally displaced persons, anti-war activists, and community peacebuilders.Over the last two years the expansion of information on women, peace, and security has been vast both within academia and policy circles. The space once characterized by "awkward silences,"1 between feminist researchers and security practitioners is closing rapidly - assisted by an improved understanding of why gender matters during conflict and post conflict. During the preparation of the 2011 U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, the U.S. government reached out to a consortium of civil society groups and academics, of which the author was a member. They were looking for "proof" (both empirical and anecdotal) that gender matters in stability operations, and data to show that women's equality is foundational to stability and security. Cohn's book is an excellent example of such proof. It is a series of well tested, field based examples of why gender matters during and after war.As founding director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, Cohn's access and professional history have led to a book the strengths of which lie firstly in its diversity of subjects (the roles of women in war), and, secondly, in its' diversity of effort (the chapter authors). An introductory chapter provides context and concepts, setting the stage for an inclusive understanding of peace and security. Individual chapters within the book are authored by well-known scholars and practitioners, regularly relying on real life examples of impacts and outcomes. Chapters are organized thematically and cover such issues as security sector reform, disarmament, sexual and gender based violence, returnee and refugee issues. As a result, the traditional lens through which womens' participation in conflict has been seen for so long, that of victimhood, erodes with each compelling and wellwritten chapter.Research has proven that the inclusion of women earlier in the process of peace building and peacekeeping leads to greater security for the state as a whole.2 We also know that gender parity plays a strong role in state stability. A 2005 study funded by the Canadian government assessing what factors make fragile states more so, concluded that "gender parity may play a strong and measurable role in the stability of the state"3 even when separated from other known correlations. In other words, it showed that it is not just a matter of more developed societies being more stable, and more developed societies also being societies marked by greater gender equity, but rather that gender equity may well increase stability.4 Inequitable societies (i.e. societies in which a portion of the population, principally women and/or ethnic minorities, are oppressed) show a much higher propensity to solve their international disputes by initiating violence and war.5 Countries with a lower level of gender equality are more likely to engage in violence, international crises, and disputes.6Transversely, research shows, as do many failed "nation building experiments," that leaving women out of rebuilding and renegotiating in the post conflict space has dramatically harmful impacts on the direction of society by reducing stability and prosperity.7 In other words, inclusivity begets stability. …

Train as You Fight Revisited: Preparing for a Comprehensive Approach

Abstract: In 1973 General William F. DePuy, first commander of the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), emphasized that it was necessary to expose soldiers to realistic battlefield conditions before they experienced actual combat.1 Doing this should improve the soldiers' preparation and thereby, in the long run, their effectiveness and efficiency. DePuy's belief was widely shared and led to the development of new training methods and a training philosophy that is often referred to as "train as you fight". Ever since, military training programs have continuously been improved and better shaped towards the real threats that soldiers were facing in the theater. A clear example reflecting the new philosophy was the establishment of the US Combat Training Centers (CTCs). The five pillars upon which the CTC program is based, require (1) that participating units be organized as they would for actual combat, (2) a dedicated, doctrinally proficient operations group, (3) a dedicated, realistic opposing force (OPFOR), (4) a training facility being capable of simulating combat conditions, and (5) a base infrastructure.2 This suggests that the main focus in training is to develop a combat ready force that is physically and psychologically prepared to fight and win wars.3 The dominant focus on combat readiness is also mentioned in a 2006 RAND report reviewing for the United States Army its leadership development. The authors concluded that whereas changes in operational environment were identified (e.g. "operations other than war"), "adaptation has centered largely on the more tangible elements and mechanics of war."4Indeed, as the RAND report mentions, many of today's crisis operations demand that political, economic, developmental factors besides the security ones have to be addressed simultaneously, because they are highly interrelated.5 Since this requires specific expertise and domain knowledge, global interventions are increasingly about coordinated and cooperative approaches of civilian and military actors, and state and non-state actors such as international and non-governmental organizations (IO/NGOs): a Comprehensive Approach to operations.This new and dynamic constellation of parties and disciplines, an ad hoc social system on its own, requires new competencies and skills in interacting with these diverse perspectives and understanding the complex interrelations. However, in most military training institutes, American and European alike, one observes only very limited incorporation of these new requirements.6 In some institutes (e.g. Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM)), cultural awareness has become one of the training objectives,7 while in others (e.g. CIMIC Centre of Excellence in The Netherlands) relatively small numbers of dedicated Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) personnel are trained to support the commander's mission. Just as within the CTCs, training focuses mostly on the development of combat ready forces. Readiness for operating in complex environments with civil, military and local actors and effectors is largely ignored, even though this is quite likely demanded in many current and future theaters - in addition to traditional (kinetic) warfare.Notwithstanding the importance of combat training, this article emphasizes the importance of fully incorporating a comprehensive approach to operations and involving professionals from relevant organizations in exercises. Such efforts are not only highly beneficial but also necessary for military units to properly prepare for the complexities of modern operations. This comprises coordination and integration with other government organizations, with civil organizations such as IOs and NGO, with representatives of other ministries (e.g. Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation) and with actors of the host nation such as local authorities.This article starts by laying down the multitude of actors that are involved in contemporary crisis operations. …

Sri Lanka's Rehabilitation Program: A New Frontier in Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency

Abstract: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LITE), sometimes referred to as the Tamil Tigers, or simply the Tigers, was a separatist militant organization based in northern Sri Lanka It was founded in May 1976 by Prabhakaran and waged a violent secessionist and nationalist campaign to create an independent state in the north and east of Sri Lanka for the Tamil people This campaign evolved into the Sri Lankan Civil War1 The Tigers were considered one of the most ruthless insurgent and terrorist organisations in the world2 They were vanquished by the Sri Lankan armed forces in May 20093 In order to rehabilitate the 11,6644 Tigers who had surrendered or been taken captive, Sri Lanka developed a multifaceted program to engage and transform the violent attitudes and behaviours of the Tiger leaders, members and collaborators5 Since the end of the LTTE's three-decade campaign of insurgency and terrorism, there has not been a single act of terrorism in the country Many attribute Sri Lanka's post-conflict stability to the success of the insurgent and terrorist rehabilitation programGlobally, rehabilitation and community engagement is a new frontier in the fight against ideological extremism and its violent manifestations - terrorism and insurgency6 Following a period of captivity or imprisonment, insurgents and terrorists are released back into society Without their disengagement and de-radicalization, they will pose a continuing security threat The recidivist will carry out attacks and politicize, radicalize, and militarize the next generation of fighters Furthermore, they will become a part of the insurgent and terrorist iconography To break the cycle of violence, governments of countries that suffer from terrorism must build partnerships with communities and other stakeholders in maintaining peace and stability Working with communities, the media, academic circles, and the private sector, governments should invest time and energy into mainstreaming the thinking of those who have deviated into ideological extremism and violenceSri Lankan Rehabilitation Program in Context: Global Rehabilitation ProgramsAs every conflict differs, there is no common template applicable to all rehabilitation programs Nevertheless, there are some common principles of rehabilitation Rehabilitation is about changing the thinking and behaviour of offenders Prior to the reintegration of former terrorists into mainstream society, offenders must move away from violent extremist thinking If themindset is locked into an ideology of intolerance and violence against another ethnic or religious community, strategies must focus on changing their thinking patterns In order to facilitate a shift within the offender, to a non-violent lifestyle, the violence justifying thought patterns must be identified, as well as the mechanisms that introduced, nurtured, and reinforced these thought patterns To facilitate this transformation of thinking, genuine and continuous engagement is required in both the custodial rehabilitation and community rehabilitation phases7Global rehabilitation programs can be characterized as developed, developing, and defunct programs The most developed programs are operating in Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Malaysia and Sri Lanka The developing programs are in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Colombia, while defunct programs are in Egypt, Yemen, and Libya8 Although publicizing their model as uniquely Sri Lankan, the program benefited from drawing practical lessons and applicable concepts from existing rehabilitation programs For example, the concept and term "beneficiary," used in Saudi Arabia to refer to terrorists undergoing rehabilitation, was recommended by Singapore to visiting Sri Lankan officials, who adopted it and subsequently shared it with Pakistani counterparts9In the process of creating a program that was applicable to Sri Lanka, existing global programs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were reviewed …

The End of Power; from Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn't What It Used to Be

Abstract: The End of Power; From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn't What it Used to Be By Moises Naim Basic Books, USA, 2013 320 pp., $27.99 ISBN-13: 978-0465031566REVIEWED BY AMY ZALMANThe title of Moises Naim's newest book is an apt summary of its basic thesis. The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn't What it Used to Be is about exactly that: how the large institutions and bureaucracies that have controlled territory, ideology and wealth for the last several hundred years have been compelled to cede this control to numerous smaller players.Although the book reviews a number of definitions of power, its consistent focus is on how institutional power in the modern period came to be defined in terms of size and scope. In modern times, the bigger you are, the more powerful you are. When Naim says that power is decaying - the book's battle cry - he means that our mainstream definition of power as bigness no longer holds true.Much of the book is spent detailing how "power got big," as Naim puts it, and the ways in which power as bigness has been challenged. We readers learn how this challenge has manifested itself in different institutions and spheres of activity. These include not only governments, militaries and private corporations, but also religious institutions, unions, philanthropic organizations and the professional media. While this approach admittedly can get a little tedious, its great virtue is in demonstrating how singularly unified our ideas about power have become. Regardless of the institution, it seems, we think that to be powerful is to be bigger than everyone else. We also learn how comprehensively the power of large institutions - regardless of their function - is being challenged.This breadth makes Naim's book an excellent go-to cross-disciplinary resource for current research on political power. In his view, all of these institutions are changing as a result of three interrelated phenomena, which he labels the "more, mobility and mentality revolutions." The "more revolution" describes the fact that there is "more of everything now ... more people, countries, cities, political parties, armies; more goods and services, and more companies selling them; more weapons and more medicines; more students and more computers; more preachers and more criminals" (54). This may be a bit of a simplification, as there are also fewer of many other items in the world; Naim's real point is that there are a greater number of healthier people whose basic needs for food, water, and shelter have been fulfilled. They are, as a result, less easy to control and have the ability to overwhelm systems.By "mobility revolution," Naim means that people, ideas and capital move around with greater ease than they once did, thanks to a variety of factors. For example, diaspora and immigrant communities alter the balance of power both within their own new communities and in the larger geopolitical balance by spreading ideas and passing remittances to their home countries. Finally, the "mentality revolution" describes the effect of these other two phenomena on how different populations in the world think. As a result of exposure to more places, and people, and ideas, we - general populations the world over - are less likely than in previous eras to accept received wisdom or show obeisance to traditional forms of power. We question our governments, our churches, and the rights of corporate firms with greater force and effect than previously.Naim's fundamental point is nuanced and subtle; it is that the environment within which power operates has changed in substantial and irreversible ways. As a result, even though many of the institutions and events that we observe on that landscape may not look so very different than in the recent past, their ability to operate effectively - to exercise their power freely - is not what it once was. …

Three Design Concepts Introduced for Strategic and Operational Applications

Abstract: Many discussions on design theory applications within military contexts often revolve around a small population of design practitioners using complex terms and exclusive language, contrasted by a larger population of design skeptics that routinely demand a universal, scripted, and complete examples for "doing design right."1 Design, a form of conceptual planning and sense making, continues to gain traction in strategic political and military institutions, yet faces misunderstanding, disinterest, and outright rejection from military strategists and operational planners for a variety of reasons. This article aims at moving this discourse toward how several design theory concepts are valuable for strategists and decision makers, and how select design concepts might be introduced and applied in a simple language where military practitioners can traverse from strategic intent into operational applications with tangible results. As a lead planner for the Afghan Security Force reduction concept and the 2014 (NTM-A) Transition Plan, I applied design to strategic and operational level planning using these design concepts as well as others.2This article takes three design concepts that do not exist in current military doctrine, provides a brief explanation on what they are, and how military practitioners might apply them in strategic planning and military decision-making efforts drawing from real-world applications in Afghanistan. Design theory, as a much broader discipline, spans theories and concepts well beyond the boundaries of any military design doctrine.31 introduce these non-doctrinal concepts intentionally to foster discourse, not to provide a roadmap or checklist on how to "do design" by simply adding these to all future planning sessions. What may have worked in one planning session on reducing Afghan security forces beyond 2015 may be an incompatible design approach for influencing Mexican drug cartels this year, or appreciating yet another emergent problem in Africa. Complex, adaptive problems demand tailored and novel approaches. Diplomats, strategists and operational planners across our military and instruments of national power might use these concepts, along with other useful design approaches, in their efforts to fuse conceptual and detailed planning in uncertain conflict environments.Narratives: A Different Way to Think about Uncertainty and ComplexityBoth our military and political institutions uses the term "narrative" in a literal sense within traditional planning lexicon and doctrine, whereas design theory looks to the conceptual work by literary historians and theorists such as Hayden White as a useful alternative.4 One definition does not substitute for the other; the military's tactical version is distinct from the post-modern one introduced here. We shall call these "design narratives" to make the distinction clear. These design narratives are not included in any military doctrine, which helps illustrate how incomplete our individual service efforts to encapsulate design are for military planners.White proposes that a design narrative is something beyond the direct control of an organization or society. We do not construct our narratives as a story unfolds, nor do we often realize that we perceive reality through powerful institutional filters that transpose symbols, values, and culture onto how we will interpret events unfolding.5 Instead, design narratives pre-configure (form in advance) how and why a series of events will form into a story.6 These stories have particular and often enduring meanings and structure that resonate within an organization or group due to shared values and culture. While the details within the narrative will contain the familiar specifics such as facts, information, plot structure, and the sequence of events that unite the information into a contained "story", they do not establish the overarching explanation. Instead, our organization pre-configures the information as a narrative unit, or genre, often regardless of the information as it unfolds in time and space. …

Sri Lanka's National Security

Abstract: Sri Lanka is one of the most peaceful and stable countries in the world today. Its citizens enjoy the benefits of peace and have complete freedom and countless opportunities to build better futures for themselves. At the same time, Sri Lanka faces potential threats from various sources. Guarding against these threats and ensuring the safety of the nation is the first duty of the government, because national security is the foundation of freedom and prosperity. As such, the government needs to be fully aware of all the issues that impact the country in areas such as defense, foreign policy, economic affairs and internal law and order. It must formulate a comprehensive national security strategy to deal with them.A viable national security strategy must constantly align ends with means, goals with resources, and objectives with the tools required to accomplish them. The strategy needs to be aligned with the aspirations of the people, and it must have public support. Ideally, if comprehensive security is to be ensured, it requires the achievement of national cohesion, political and economic stability, the elimination of terrorism, the countering of extremism, and the formulation of effective responses to external challenges. The government must make every effort to keep aware of a continually changing situation and take appropriate action in response to new developments and challenges. It is only then that the safety of the nation can be assured.This article on Sri Lanka's national security concerns examines the following areas:* Sri Lanka's overall national security context;* The primary threats to Sri Lanka's national security at present; and,* The strategies being formulated in response to these threats.The Context of National Security in Sri LankaIn the early years of independence, national security did not need to be a primary concern of the government of Ceylon. As an independent dominion of Great Britain, and as a non-aligned nation with excellent relationships within and outside the region, Ceylon faced few pressing threats. As a result, the attention given to national security was minimal, as was the emphasis placed on the country's defense apparatus. The military was largely ceremonial. It only had to assist the government on occasions when there were issues such as public sector work stoppages or riots. The need to strengthen law enforcement and the armed forces to protect the nation against internal or external threats was not seen as a pressing concern. The attempted coup d'etat in 1962 further reduced the attention given to the defense apparatus by the government. Fearing that a strong military would be a threat to democracy, as had been the case in some neighboring countries during this period, funding for the armed forces was drastically reduced and recruitments curtailed.Ceylon's weak military was not in a good position to deal with the first major threat to its national security, which came as the 1971 Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) Insurrection (also known as the 1971 Revolt). Although investigations into JVP activities had been going on for some time, cutbacks to intelligence services, including the closure of the special branch of the police in 1970, had left the government largely unaware of the scale of the insurrection it was facing. The nation's military was not up to the task. In response to the government's appeals for help, India and Pakistan sent in troops to secure critical installations while essential equipment and ammunition was provided by Britain and the Soviet Union. Although the insurrection was successfully suppressed within a short time, it had many consequences. Perhaps the most crucial from a historical perspective was that national security became a much greater concern both for the government and for the general public. As Ceylon became Sri Lanka in 1972, upholding national security was one of its foremost priorities.In the late 1970s, Sri Lanka saw the emergence of the greatest threat to its sovereignty in the form of the terrorism of the Tamil separatist groups in the North and East. …

Military Leaders and Global Leaders: Contrasts, Contradictions, and Opportunities

Abstract: Leadership has long been a focal point of human curiosity but has recently gathered even more attention. As globalization becomes increasingly the dominant force in political, social, and economic affairs, leaders far and wide are being called upon to take on new roles and address emergent challenges. This trend may be most prominent in the arena of national security. In particular, military leaders must now interact with a broader range of social communities as engagements span national and cultural boundaries.1 While in the past, national militaries or their forces or branches acted alone, most of today's engagements involve coalitions, "partners", or joint forces. How do the traditional traits and characteristics of military leaders align with this new environment? This paper will examine several traits or characteristics of military leaders, compare them to those of other global leaders, and suggest ways to prepare military leaders for global leadership roles that go beyond parochial interests.Military Leaders: Character and SkillsOver the years, there has been a greater focus on what makes for good leadership as research results converge on the key traits, attributes, and prerequisites of effective leaders. At the same time, there has been a shared recognition that effective leadership combines elements of both art and science. The science derives from a process of identifying required leadership skills and building educational programs to promote those skills. The art of leadership derives from certain apparently innate attributes or traits such as perseverance or conviction. For leaders to be truly effective, they must have not just skills (competencies) or traits (characteristics), but both.2The study of military leadership has itself a lengthy history. Among its recurring themes is, "big man theory," according to which there are certain individuals just born to be military leaders, from Alexander the Great to Napoleon to George Patton. When it comes to the nature of military leadership in today's national security environment, there are several traits that appear to be universally essential. Among them are the propensity to make good decisions quickly, the capacity to act with conviction, and the ability to take a position, be it of policy or strategy, and compel it on others.3 Each of these characteristics is distinctive, but in the conduct of leading others they are not simply complementary but synergistic as well.Making Decisions QuicklyBattles may be won or lost at a moment's notice. When the circumstances arrive to attack (or retreat), an effective military leader must not delay but decide on a course of action and begin to implement it. If there is one trait that can undermine one's regard for a military leader, it is the inability to make a timely decision and then act quickly on the basis of that decision. Some of the explanations for why the U.S. Civil War lasted so long point to the indecisiveness of General George McClellan and his hesitation to take action against the Army of Northern Virginia despite the disproportionate power of the Union Army.Acting with ConvictionDecisions facing military leaders at the strategic, operational, or tactical level often have clear and direct implications for the health and well being of those under their command. One of the simple definitions of a leader is someone who has followers. Followers engage with leaders who are able to communicate the correctness of their decisions, and thus evoke within followers the strong sense or faith that the right course of action is being taken.4 A commander who is unable to demonstrate or show conviction is less apt to have followers who implement their orders with zeal, especially if their lives depend on the outcome. When General Robert E. Lee ordered the charge of Pickett's brigade up Cemetery Ridge at the battle of Gettysburg in 1863, he demonstrated conviction that the direct attack would break the Union line. …

In the Whirlwind of Jihad

Abstract: In the Whirlwind of Jihad By Martha Brill Olcott Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012 300 pp, $19 95 ISBIM-13: 978-0870032592 REVIEWED BY JOHN HERBSTUnderstanding the underlying dynamics of political and social life is not easy in any society and particularly in authoritarian ones The challenge is even greater when the society in question is remote and has been isolated for decades as Central Asia was under Soviet rule Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan emerged as reluctant independent states in 1991 when the Soviet Union dissolvedWe knew very little about these countries at that time Our knowledge of Central Asia has certainly increased since This is evident in the large number ofbooks and articles authored each year on the region; and also in the multiplication of Central Asian centers at universities across the Western world Despite this, we still have only a rough idea of the factors that produce political decisions and the motivations that drive the peoples of the region Much Western commentary on Central Asia is framed by our own political and societal experience: specifically the historic movement from a faith-based social order to a secular one and from monarchies to democracies Much writing on political life in Central Asia focuses on the region's struggle toward an open and democratic society and seeks to explain the absence of progressThe significant issue of the emergence of Islam in Central Asia is at times presented as an adjunct to this question The growing influence of Islam in especially Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is often presented as a consequence of the harsh authoritarian rule in Tashkent and its weaker variant in Dushanbe By this interpretation, the crackdown on the secular opposition in Uzbekistan is the decisive reason - or at least the one we harp on - for the growth of political Islam, because the mosque provides the most effective channel for dissent The fact that this analysis is also applied in the Arab world gives reason to pause and ask if this analysis is more about a paradigm in the mind of the analyst than the reality of the diverse regions being studiedFor this reason, any study that moves beyond our own paradigm in examining Central Asian society is valuable; and any study that gets a handle on the internal dynamics of the region is critical Martha Brill Olcott's In the Whirlwind of Jihad, a study of Islam in Uzbekistan, is the rare book that does that In a career that began in the late 1970's, Olcott has established herself as the dean of American scholars on Central AsiaIn the Whirlwind of Jihad takes the reader on a tour of the development of Islam in Central Asia and especially Uzbekistan She starts with the Islamic conquest of Central Asia early in the 8th century in order to underscore the point that Central Asia has been a critical part of the Islamic world and a center of Islamic learning from nearly the beginning Many luminaries of Islamic thought hailed from Central Asia including hadith scholar Imam Bukhari, and the philosophers Al Farabi and Avicenna Olcott notes that the relatively liberal Hanafi school of jurisprudence has predominated in Central Asia and Sufism has exerted a profound influence In short, a tolerant version of Islam took root in the region Of particular relevance to our subject, the Hanafi school accepted the idea that Muslims could be ruled by non-believers or infidels so long as Muslims could maintain their faith unhindered and had access to sharia (Islamic law)This line of thinking made it easier for the Muslims of Central Asia to accept Russian rule in the 19th century as it left the Islamic community free to practice its faith The establishment of Soviet rule in the 20th century was a different matter because of its suppression of traditional religion Indeed the Soviet period exerted a critical influence on the Islam that has emerged in post-Soviet Uzbekistan …

Changing of the Guard: Civilian Protection for an Evolving Military

Abstract: Civilian casualties can risk the success of a combat mission. While not new, this is a lesson US defense forces have had to repeatedly relearn. Historically, civilian protection and efforts to address harm became priorities only when external pressures demanded attention. As the Pentagon reshapes its defenses and fighting force for the next decade, continuing this ad hoc pattern in the future is neither strategically smart nor ethically acceptable.The budget submitted this year to Congress by Secretary of Defense Panetta charts a strategic shift toward smaller and more clandestine operations. Our forces will need to become leaner and more agile, able to take decisive action without the heavy footprint of recent wars. There are good political and economic reasons for this; certainly, maintaining a large military presence around the world is no longer feasible.Yet, as America loses its military bulk, it cannot afford to lose its memory as well. General Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called upon the military to "learn the lessons from the past decade of operations." One of those critical lessons is that strategic objectives and ethical leadership are undermined if civilian protection is not integrated into the military's overall approach. A growing body of research, including that conducted by this article's authors, shows that civilian casualties (CIVCAS) and the mishandling of the aftermath can compel more people to work against U.S. interests. Indeed, America's image has suffered for years under the weight of anger and dismay that a nation, which stands by the value of civilian protection in wartime, seemed indifferent to civilian suffering.Over time, U.S. commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan began to understand this calculus and took action. They began publicly expressing regret for civilian losses and offering amends for civilian deaths, injuries, and property damage, first in Iraq and then in Afghanistan. Military leadership realized that they could lower their civilian casualty rates if they recorded casualty statistics as a basis for learning, so they created a tracking cell in Afghanistan to do just that. Pre-deployment training back home began to include seminars on the civilian as the "center of gravity" and consequence management protocols, on top of the basic Laws of Armed Conflict. U.S. commanders made themselves accessible to civil society and, instead of immediately denying incidents of civilian harm, told the media they would investigate and recognize any civilian loss.These practices are marked progress in mitigating both civilian harm and its impact on the mission, and rise above the conduct of most warring parties in the world, helping to reestablish U.S. ethical authority in wartime. Yet not one of the practices above has been made into standing U.S. policy, despite how important they have proved to our combat strategy and ethos.As Washington shifts its focus from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism, and from largescale ground operations to more discrete and oftentimes-unmanned operations, the progress U.S. forces have made on preventing and mitigating civilian harm may soon be lost. Below, we analyze three of the Obama administration's new military priorities that have real implications for U.S. efforts to avoid civilian harm in future wars: increased reliance on special operations forces (SOF), new technologies including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and partnering with foreign allies to conduct combat operations. Applying hard-won lessons of civilian protection and harm response are critical to all three.Special Operations Forces Out FrontThe "smaller and leaner" fighting force of the future will emphasize special operations. SOF personnel are trained to be the best and most discriminate shooters in the world, due to the requirement to engage hostage-takers and terrorists in the midst of hostages or other civilians. However, some SOF actions in combat theaters can carry significant risk of civilian casualties. …

Regime Change without Military Force: Lessons from Overthrowing Milosevic

Abstract: "Gotov je!" ("He's finished!")-Serb resistance slogan, directed at MilosevicAfter a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama Administration has adopted a new defense strategy that recognizes the need to limit our strategic ends in an era of increasing limits on our military means.1 The strategy calls for armed forces capable of conducting a broad range of missions, in a full range of contingencies, and in a global context that is increasingly complex. It calls for doing so with a smaller defense budget. Opportunities for savings come from reducing the ability to fight two regional conflicts simultaneously and from not sizing the force to conduct prolonged, large-scale stability operations.Seemingly missing from the new defense strategy are the types of wars we fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both started with forcible changes in regime - the armed ouster of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein from their positions of power. In each case, the rapid removal of leadership was followed by lengthy counterinsurgency operations to bring security to the population and build up a new government. The duration and difficulty of these operations and their cost in deaths, destruction, and debt were not understood at their outset.Whereas past defense strategies foresaw the prospect of forcible regime change,2 the new defense strategy does not. Thus, absent a direct threat to U.S. vital interests, any future endeavors to oust unfriendly leaders are likely to be pursued by non-military means. U.S. military forces may play a supporting role at most. Libya and Syria demonstrate the new defense strategy in action. While regime change has been an objective, the United States has worked through partners and limited or ruled out the use of military force.If U.S. policymakers consider non-military regime change in the future, they may wish to look for lessons learned before Afghanistan and Iraq, lessons learned from the 2000 overthrow of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic. While the circumstances were unique and perhaps uniquely favorable to a democratic transition, many of the lessons are probably enduring.Deposing a Dictator3In 2000, Slobodan Milosevic, then president of what remained of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,4 set the stage for his own demise. He did so by calling for elections, seeking to bolster his legitimacy at home and abroad, while miscalculating his own ability to fix the results.Personally and politically, Milosevic had survived North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation Allied Force, 78 days of air strikes against Serbia and its forces in Kosovo the year before. While longer than the United States or its allies anticipated, the campaign of military strikes and non-military measures ultimately succeeded, compelling Milosevic to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, withdraw Serb security forces, and consent to the introduction of a UN administration and NATO-led force, but leaving Milosevic in place.Milosevic was a survivor. Despite instigating ethnic violence and genocide in Bosnia and Croatia in the early 1990s, he had emerged unscathed as leader of Serbia and signatory of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Many analysts predicted that the 1999 NATO air strikes would cement Milosevic's grip on power. Instead, Milosevic was weakened, his political legitimacy tarnished at home and abroad.Milosevic's confrontation with the UN and NATO isolated him internationally. He also faced growing opposition domestically. In September 1999, opposition rallies in twenty cities in Serbia urged Milosevic to resign. The police and army cracked down, but Milosevic's regime had difficulty suppressing opposition leaders and the student movement OTPOR - Serbian for "resistance." OTPOR, a loosely organized network of activists trained in peaceful resistance, used a variety of nonviolent tactics to excoriate the regime and build popular support.In January 2000, OTPOR organized an Orthodox New Year's Eve rally against Milosevic's rule. …

Redefining the Indirect Approach, Defining Special Operations Forces (SOF) Power, and the Global Networking of SOF

Abstract: Most military professionals and historians are familiar with the theories and concepts of air, maritime, and land power, but there has been little in the way of theory or concept as to what Special Operations power means and its strategic utility alongside those of the air, maritime, and land domains. Yet Special Operations Forces (SOF) must play a central role in several of the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces as projected in the Defense Strategy entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, such as countering terrorism, irregular warfare, and countering weapons of mass destruction. The importance of Special Operations to this new strategy was underscored in the accompanying remarks made by former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta during the January 5,2012, unveiling of the new defense strategy where he mentioned specifically, "as we reduce the overall defense budget, we will protect, and in some cases increase, our investments in special operations forces." Therefore, understanding the role of SOF power and how it fits within strategy is an essential prerequisite to successfully implementing the U.S. Defense Strategy.Recalibrating the Current S OF Interpretation of the Direct and Indirect ApproachesWithin the U.S. Special Operations community there has been a considerable amount of theoretical discussion, attempting to more clearly characterize the "indirect approach" as it relates to the "direct approach" in a Special Operations context. The familiar understanding in U.S. SOF circles generally associates the direct approach with direct action (DA), and the indirect approach with foreign internal defense (FID) or security force assistance (SFA). In some quarters current interpretations of these two approaches represent what is nearly a cultural schism within Special Operations due to the very different focus and skill sets associated with them. In order to understand SOF power, one first needs a recalibrated view of the direct and indirect approach frames of reference from a broader strategic vantage point.An informative start point for exploring these topics to better define and understand the strategic utility and value of SOF power is to revert back to first principles and reconsider the roots and origins of the indirect approach. Former British soldier, historian, and military theorist Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart is historically credited with defining the indirect approach in his work, the "Strategy of Indirect Approach," where he asserted: "...throughout the ages decisive results in war have only been reached when the approach has been indirect. In strategy the longest way round is apt to be the shortest way home."1 This indirect approach of Hart focused on targeting the balance or equilibrium of an adversary noting, "while the strength of an enemy country lies outwardly in its numbers and resources, these are fundamentally dependent upon stability or equilibrium of control, morale, and supply."2 The central premise of the indirect approach is to orient upon, target, and upset an adversary's equilibrium or balance to set up and enable follow-on decisive blows to be landed. Hart goes on to explain with an athletic metaphor that a direct approach without the preparatory shaping of an indirect lead is often a blunt and raw methodology that typically results in an adverse outcome; "In war as in wrestling the attempt to throw the opponent without loosening his foothold and balance can only result in self-exhaustion increasing in disproportionate ration to the effective strain put upon him. Victory by such a method can only be possible through an immense margin of superior strength in some form, and, even so, tends to lose decisiveness."3 From his historical analysis of the indirect approach vice the direct approach, Hart became convinced that, "More and more clearly the fact emerged that a direct approach to one's mental object, or physical objective, along the 'line of natural expectation' for the opponent, has ever tended to, and usually produced negative results. …

Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from a Decade of Operations

Abstract: The year 2001 began with the inauguration of a U.S. President deliberately aiming to shift the use of the military away from the numerous humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions of the 1990s toward responding to and defeating conventional threats from nation-states. The mood was optimistic, with the new U.S. National Security Strategy, recently put in place by the departing Clinton administration, citing widespread financial prosperity and conveying no sense of an imminent threat to the homeland.2 But this situation proved fragile: the events of a single day, September 11, 2001, altered the trajectory of the United States and the way it used its military over the next decade. A nation focused on countering conventional threats was now confronted by an enemy that attacked the homeland with low-tech means in asymmetric and unexpected ways-individuals armed with box-cutters using hijacked civilian aircraft.In the decade following 9/11, it became evident that the Cold War model that had guided foreign policy for the previous 50 years no longer fit the emerging global environment. Key changes included:* A shift from U.S. hegemony toward national pluralism* The erosion of sovereignty and the impact of weak states* The empowerment of small groups or individuals* An increasing need to fight and win in the information domain.In the midst of these changes, the United States employed its military in a wide range of operations to address perceived threats from both nation-state and terrorist groups; to strengthen partner nation militaries; to conduct humanitarian assistance operations; and to provide defense support of civil authorities in catastrophic incidents such as Hurricane Katrina. This wide range of operations aimed to promote and protect national interests in the changing global environment.In general, operations during the first half of the decade were marked by numerous missteps and challenges as the U.S. Government and military applied a strategy and force best suited for a different threat and environment. Operations in the second half of the decade often featured successful adaptations to overcome these challenges. From our study of this "decade of war," we identified 11 overarching, enduring themes that present opportunities for the nation to continue to learn and improve. In this article, we briefly summarize each of these themes.Lesson l: Understanding the EnvironmentIn operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, a failure to recognize, acknowledge, and accurately define the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, missions, and goals. The operational environment encompassed not only the threat but also the physical, informational, social, cultural, religious, and economic elements of the environment; each of these elements was important to understanding the root causes of conflicts, developing an appropriate approach, and anticipating second-order effects.3 Despite the importance of the operational environment, the U.S. approach often did not reflect the actual operational environment, with different components of the government undertaking different approaches. In addition, a nuanced understanding of the environment was often hindered by an intelligence apparatus focused on traditional adversaries rather than the host nation population.There were a number of examples where separate elements of the U.S. Government undertook different approaches based on their views of the nature of the conflict and operational environment. In Iraq in 2003, military plans included assumptions regarding the rapid reconstitution of Iraqi institutions based on the understanding that national capabilities had to be rebuilt to promote governance and stability. Yet the first two orders issued by the civilian Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) unexpectedly removed both host nation security forces and midlevel government bureaucrats, crippling Iraqi governance capacity and providing fuel for the insurgency. …

Securing the State: National Security and Secret Intelligence

Abstract: Consider the artist Michelangelo standing in front of a block of Carrara marble rough-hewn from the quarry. As he later described that moment, "I saw the angel in the marble and carved until I set him free." Sculptors need the patience to recognize that many small steps will be needed to realize their vision. The sculptor needs a strategic sixth sense that can continuously adapt the design to the conditions of the material while testing whether each small incision, however immediately appealing and easily achieved, will end up weakening the final structure. The sculptor needs the confidence to know that the design can be adjusted in response to the inevitable small slips and misjudgments made along the way. Call it the ability to hold the desired ends in mind while being continuously aware of the ways open for achieving them and the means that are at hand. Even the most technically skilled sculptor equipped with the sharpest chisels needs to have a clear sense of the end state - to see at the outset, "the angel in the marble" - that could be the final result of all the labor to come. That is the strategic cast of mind needed for planning modern counter-terrorism.In building a strategy for countering a terrorist threat there are certainly enhanced means available to governments today. The latest defense equipment technology - from advanced night vision devices, multi-spectral imaging, real time imagery fusion, all the way to high endurance drones armed with high precision missiles - gives forces assigned to counter-terrorism missions a reach and clout and an ability to shape the battlefield unimaginable to previous generations of warriors. New digitized sources of intelligence provide unparalleled insights into the movement and activities of individual suspects and their networks both domestically and overseas. At a tactical level there are these many new tools and much to be learned about how best to apply them.Yet, these very reassuring strengths can lead to a pursuit of immediate gains only to find later that they may be at the expense of risking longer-term goals. Measures taken with the best of intentions to neutralize terrorist threats overseas can through collateral damage build longterm hostility and provide propaganda opportunities that help breed future threats. Local security clampdowns on minority communities can discourage the flow of information to the authorities. Providing overseas military support for combatants against today's adversaries can end up arming tomorrow's enemies. Domestic security measures (such as restrictions at airports and major events) can over-tax the patience of the public. The search for pre-emptive intelligence on suspect individuals can lead governments into disproportionate intrusion by agents of the state into personal privacy and private life. The understandable desire to find ways of bringing terrorists to justice can strain the limits of the rule of law. In sum, there comes a point when the search for even greater security becomes burdensome and oppressive, and when the public will cavil at what it is being expected to give up to provide it. Yet, the public rightly sees the provision of security as government's first responsibility: government cannot avoid these dilemmas.How Much Security is Enough?It is thus not just the choices of ways and means that can be problematic, but also of the ends of counter-terrorism strategy. In essence, the issue again today, as for many countries in the past, is how much security is enough? How can government best set out to exercise its primary duty to protect the public in the face of a substantial terrorist threat, and yet also maintain civic harmony, uphold democratic values and promote the rule of law at home and internationally? The initial need to combat the jihadist terrorist campaign at home and abroad justified itself, robust measures have been taken and have reduced the immediate threat. The harder policy question that is now arising is in relation to the longer-term ends of counter-terrorism strategy: how much security do we think will be enough, in a world of competing priorities for government attention and resources and where terrorism, however dramatic, is only one of many risks facing the public that have to be managed? …

Inevitable Conflicts, Avoidable Failures: Preparing for the Third Generation of Conflict, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Operations

Abstract: Foreign internal conflicts clearly remain a permanent feature of the U.S. foreign policy landscape, especially since the United States regularly participates in efforts to stabilize countries affected by conflict and then helps them recover afterwards. Yet U.S. government officials and the American public in general have difficulty accepting the inevitability of U.S. involvement in such efforts.To ensure lasting progress and security in post-conflict situations, the United States must adjust its approach from a focus on large military operations to preparing adequately for small-scale, long-term interventions. Most U.S. military deployments since the end of the Cold War have been in "small wars" or what the Department of Defense once called "military operations other than war."1 Yet the military has usually been more prepared to fight large, technologically advanced wars than smaller contingencies that require greater integration with civilian capacities. As a consequence, each time the U.S. military is deployed to a complex-but "small"-emergency, it has had to relearn lessons on the ground about the best way to manage these types of contingencies. Civilian participation in stabilization and reconstruction efforts is likewise inevitable, but civilian institutions are even less prepared for such work than the military. Lessons learned over the last decade are only recently being institutionalized, through offices like Department of State's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). In part this is due to bureaucratic politics. But in large part it is because government officials, Congress, and the American public do not acknowledge that the civilian expertise and resources needed to do this work is inadequate relative to the demand.The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have colored perceptions about whether and how the United States should operate in conflict and post-conflict environments. In many ways, those wars were exceptional: the scale of effort, the number of troops deployed, the number of U.S. casualties, and the amount of money were all far higher than any other U.S. intervention since the war in Vietnam. Many in Washington have concluded that U.S. interventions will not come close to that size any time in the near future, and so the capabilities developed to participate in those conflicts need not be emphasized in future strategic decisions.In other ways, however, those conflicts brought to light the key challenges facing the United States as it participates in foreign internal conflicts at any scale. Problems have included civilian-military coordination, international civilian coordination, the inability of civilians to move freely and interact with populations in conflict zones, the inability to measure progress, the difficulty of translating tactical and operational success into strategic success, the desire to do for foreign partners what they should be doing for themselves, and the tendency to take shortcuts. In other words, the pathologies that exist in the U.S. response to the smallest conflicts were shown in high relief in these large-scale conflicts in a way that, in the popular imagination, has reflected poorly on the institutions and individuals involved in conflict, reconstruction, and stabilization operations.There is danger, however, to overstating how pervasive these pathologies are. In truth, those institutions and individuals had many successes and made many improvements within Afghanistan and Iraq and in smaller, less-visible conflicts outside of those theaters. In Afghanistan, for example, there has been a 43% reduction of enemy attacks over the past year; Afghan security forces, up 31% from 2010, now lead half of all combat operations; and school attendance rates for girls have increased 67% since 2001.2 In Iraq, there has been progress in transforming the security sector, and the decline in attacks on civilians has been noted by the United Nations report on the country situation. …

Rules of Engagement and Abusive Citizens

Abstract: The time has come to draw lessons from the war in Afghanistan. One major concern is how the U.S. military ought to deal with civilians who are sporadic combatants, and civilians who act, part of the time, as support forces for combatants (by serving as intelligence agents, manufacturing ammunition and bombs, supplying provisions and transportation, and so on). Discussion of this topic has often focused on ways to deal with those civilians after they have been caught fighting us and whether they should be treated as soldiers or as criminals, a matter that has not been resolved. (My own position is that they should be treated as a third category: as terrorists, subject to distinct rules and authority.)2 This article focuses on an earlier phase: when these civilians are still acting as combatants or supporting them.This article makes the case for a major change in the basic normative precept involved and for a new Geneva Convention, both needed in order to shift the main onus of civilian casualties where it belongs: to those who engage in combat (or help those who do) without adhering to the rules of war, which require that they separate themselves from peaceful civilians. While the U.S. and its allies should do their best to minimize collateral damage, instead of accepting the basic precept that we are the main cause of civilian casualties-highlighting our mistakes, repeatedly apologizing, and seeking to make amends-we should stress that insurgents who violate the rules of war are the main source of these regrettable casualties.We entered the war in Afghanistan with-and still labor under-an obsolete concept. This is hardly a rare phenomenon; the development of normative and legal dictates often lags behind changes in the facts on the ground. This time, the normative precept we labor under is that all civilians are innocent, peaceful people, women and children, farmers working their fields, people doing their thing at their desks and in their homes, who should be spared when armies collide. Normatively, respecting civilian life is associated with the concept of human rights, first among which is the right to life. This normative precept reflects the horror and guilt that followed WWII, in which the Nazis deliberately targeted civilian populations, especially during the London Blitz, and the U.S. and its allies deliberately fire-bombed Dresden, killing at least 25,000 civilians, started a firestorm in Tokyo that killed more than 80,000 civilians, and dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.The 1977 Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, which reaffirmed several protections for civilians in armed conflicts, reflect this precept, as did the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions as well as modern-day customary international law. However, these agreements and legal instruments largely assume that war takes place among nations, using troops that distinguish themselves from the civilian population through, for example, "the generally accepted practice of... the wearing of the uniform" (Protocol I, Article 44.7). The requirement that military personnel be identifiable as should be military encampments and vehicles, may sound like a minor, merely technical, matter. However, it is essential if civilians are to be spared. The fact that some civilians deliberately conceal their role as fighters was faced long before the war in Afghanistan, in numerous insurgencies and most notably in Vietnam. However, these facts have not resulted in a normative and legal reconceptualization. We therefore find ourselves engaged in Afghanistan in an asymmetric war between largely conventional troops and irregulars, trying to heed concepts meant for conventional warfare and often unwittingly reinforcing them rather than seeking to modify them. Indeed, obsolete precepts concerning civilian casualties led to a change in the rules of engagement in Afghanistan that sought to treat the problem by imposing new restrictions on our troops, thus further reinforcing the idea that we are the main source of the casualties and ignoring the fact that if the Taliban fighters separated themselves from the population, collateral damage from our actions would be minimized overnight. …

Talking to the Taliban 2010 - 2011: A Reflection

Abstract: When then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asked in early 2011 if I would become the United States' Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) - after the sudden death of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the first SRAP - she described the foundations Ambassador Holbrooke had laid to manage one of the most challenging tasks facing the nation. Secretary Clinton also said that she wanted to continue the experiment: having the SRAP organization prove that the "whole-of-government" philosophy - the idea that the United States must employ expertise and resources from all relevant parts of government to address the nation's most important challenges - was the right model for 21st century diplomacy.2 The SRAP team brought together experts from across the U.S. Government (and included several diplomats from NATO countries) to develop and implement integrated strategies to address the complex challenges in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region.Among the first things I learned when I arrived at my desk in February 2011, was that an allied government had put the United States in contact with someone who seemed to be an empowered representative of the Taliban, the Afghan insurgent group which the United States had removed from power in 2001, but which had ever since kept up a deadly war against Afghans, Americans and our allies, friends and partners.3 The contact was preliminary, but many in the White House and on the SRAP team hoped that this connection might open the door for the conversation everyone knew would be required if there were ever to be peace in Afghanistan: Afghans talking to other Afghans about the future of Afghanistan. Such direct talk had so far proven impossible because the Taliban refused to meet representatives of the government of Afghanistan. The intriguing opportunity offered by a direct U.S. conversation with the Taliban was that we might be able to create the context for the Afghan government and the Taliban to talk.This reflection on the two years (2011-2013) I was the SRAP is my attempt to tell part of the story of the conversation between the United States and the Taliban, an initiative that became central to the SRAP team's efforts during these years. Others will recall it from their own perspectives, and there has been subsequent activity of which I am unaware. I also draw preliminary lessons and ask questions that might help those who may yet try to return to a conversation with the Taliban and those who will surely be faced with the challenge of talking to other insurgents to try to end future conflicts. Much of the detail of the conversations and the personalities involved properly remains classified, although too many people have already talked too much about our effort in ways that made it harder to achieve our objective.The effort to sustain a U.S.-Taliban conversation was an integral component of America's national strategy in Afghanistan and a key part of the 2011-2012 diplomatic campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which was ordered, defined and described by President Barack Obama. The President's speech at West Point on December 1, 2009 was especially important: it was there that he ordered the surge of U.S. forces into Afghanistan and explained to the assembled cadets that, "We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens."4Secretary Clinton made the task explicit in a speech honoring Ambassador Holbrooke at the Asia Society in New York on February 18, 2011.5 In her address, the Secretary said that the military surge then underway in Afghanistan was a vital part of American strategy. Without the heroic effort of U.S. forces, joined by many allies, friends and partners, there was no chance of pursuing a diplomatic end to thirty years of conflict. Secretary Clinton also reminded her audience of the "civilian surge" underway in Afghanistan: thousands of courageous Americans from many U. …

Evolving Internal Roles of the Armed Forces: Lessons for Building Partner Capacity

Abstract: The end of the Cold War more than two decades ago created new international realities, along with hopes and expectations for greater peace and stability worldwide Part of that peace dividend was expected to be the result of a decrease in defense spending, with direct consequences for the size and functions of nations' armed forces As a result, in parts of the world that benefited from increased security, the changing security challenges and interpretations of what should be considered suitable tasks and roles of armed forces have led to "profound shifts in their core roles (which are) increasingly challenging long-held assumptions about what armed forces are for and how they should be structured and organized"2Governments and societies have been contemplating the appropriateness of newly defined or previously secondary purposes for their armed forces, which extend beyond their core role of national defense These include the assignment of a variety of external and internal military and civilian roles and tasks Some of these are performed as a subsidiary activity in support of operations under civilian command An examination of the internal roles of the armed forces in 15 Western democracies shows that armed forces assist in internal security provision mainly as a resource of last resort when efforts are required to respond to exceptional situations This is the case primarily during and after natural and humanitarian catastrophes as well as other emergencies that exceed the response capacities of civilian and hybrid security institutions Under the command and control of civilian agencies, the usually subsidiary operations of the armed forces are designed to enhance the capacity of civilian security providers in such situations3 What does this mean for armed forces in the developing countries in their indigenous state-building processes? What are the implications for donor nations from the North in their efforts towards "building partner capacity?"4This article is divided into six sections Following this introduction, the second section focuses on conceptual considerations as well as distinctions between internal and external security roles provided by armed forces The third section focuses on the empirical evidence obtained from the case studies examined for this article The most common internal roles are introduced and key driving forces behind the armed forces' engagement in internal tasks are highlighted The fourth section summarizes widely shared reasons behind the internal engagements of the armed forces The fifth section examines potential hazards and opportunities for utilizing armed forces for internal roles and tasks The concluding section discusses the mapping exercise's findings for donor countries' support of defense reform and security sector reform activities in the global South, particularly as they concern internal roles and tasks envisioned for the armed forces of partner countriesNew Challenges, New Roles for the Armed Forces?It has become a common assumption that the role of the armed forces, especially among consolidated Western democracies, is to provide security against external threats, while police forces are tasked with providing internal security, surveillance and order inside a country's borders The distinction between external and internal security, as well as between the respective responsibilities of individual public security institutions, has been well documented,5 even to the point of what Keith Krause calls a "seemingly natural division"6 Of course, this division was not the product of a coherent process, nor did it innately appear As Charles Tilly suggests, armies frequently served the purpose of consolidating wealth and power of princes, often at the expense of and in direct confrontation with the domestic population7 In fact, it is commonly understood that the demarcation of public security institutions' external and internal roles (in particular armed forces and police, respectively) was not generally accepted and normalized until "the spread of modern nationalism in the 19th century …

Putting State Legitimacy at the Center of Foreign Operations and Assistance

Abstract: It is a commonly expressed idea that a key goal of intervention in and assistance to foreign nations is to establish (or re-establish) legitimate political authority. Historically, even so great a skeptic as John Stuart Mill allowed that intervention could be justified if it were "for the good of the people themselves" as measured by their willingness to support and defend the results.1 In recent times, President George W. Bush justified his post-war emphasis on democracybuilding in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Middle East with the logic that "nations in the region will have greater stability because governments will have greater legitimacy."2 President Obama applauded French intervention in Mali for its ability "to reaffirm democracy and legitimacy and an effective government" in the country.3The experiences of Western-led state reconstruction in Cambodia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq among other places have been characterized by a belated recognition of the legitimacy imperative. In contemporary debates on a wide range of foreign intervention and assistance operations, legitimacy has come to occupy a central place in discussions of the domestic agenda of rebuilding that follows the external agenda that drives the initial intervention - stopping genocide, toppling a dictator, saving the starving, or establishing a transitional authority.Today, we take the rebuilding of domestic legitimacy so much for granted in our assumptions about foreign intervention and assistance that we often hurry onto the details. But it is worth pondering the question of legitimacy as an explicit aim of any foreign operation - military, economic, or civil - rather than one that we assume will automatically follow from doing a range of good deeds. What is legitimacy and why does it matter? Where does it come from and how is it regenerated over time? How could a foreign intervention improve the chances of it and how would we know if it was working? What particular strategies, management approaches, organizational tools, and policy instruments could an intervening party adopt in order to facilitate this aim?Following a brief summary of general findings on legitimacy, this article looks at how the legitimacy imperative has been variously articulated and integrated into the foreign operations of the U.S. military, international organizations including the United Nations, and various humanitarian organizations. It then asks what a "legitimacy strategy" would look like in assisting fragile states, post-conflict societies, and underdeveloped nations. This is addressed first at the policy level and then at the organizational level. Finally, these lessons are applied retrospectively to the American-led reconstruction effort in Iraq, identifying the challenges as well as successes and failures of that period.Legitimacy in TheoryLegitimacy is the right to rule. It is an acceptance by citizens that the political institutions and leaders who wield sovereign power over them have gained that power and are using it in a way that is consistent with the rules, laws, ethics, norms, and values of the political community, and enjoy their explicit consent.4 Legitimacy provides the state with a moral right to impose duties and expect compliance. A legitimate state is not necessarily a just one. But it is one where the struggle for justice takes place within the confines of a widely accepted institutional framework. A state that has lost legitimacy usually depends heavily on brute repression and faces resistance from large segments of the population.In datasets that measure state legitimacy for a large number of countries circa 2002 and circa 2008, there is a clear relationship between low legitimacy and a range of bad consequences; regime instability, state decay, and some types of internal conflict.5 By contrast, in states where legitimate political authority has been re-established - Uganda after 1986, Cambodia after 1991 - regimes gain resilience, internal conflict declines, and state capacity grows. …

Interagency Rebuilding Efforts in Iraq: A Case Study of the Rusafa Political District

Abstract: From 2004-2012, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducted 387 inspections and audits of U.S.-fimded projects and programs that supported stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq. Most of SIGIR's reviews focused on large-scale projects or programs. In a recent special report, SIGIR accomplished a novel study examining a particular part of the rebuilding effort. That report reviewed the remarkably diverse spectrum of programs and projects executed in a crucial geographic area in Iraq, the Rusafa Political District, delving into who built what and at what cost.The nature of this new report opens the door to deeper perspectives on what was actually achieved - and how it was achieved-by various U.S. government agencies operating during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). SIGIR elicited seven lessons-learned from the study, which conclude this article.1The primary source for our information on Rusafa's programs and projects came from the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS). As noted in previous SIGIR reports, the IRMS database, although the best available informational record on Iraq rebuilding, is gravely incomplete. IRMS contains but 70 percent of the programs and projects carried out by the United States in Iraq.To remediate this gap, SIGIR ferreted out additional data from the U.S. Army Center for Military History, the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) implementing partners, the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams' (ePRT) weekly reports, and personal records provided by individuals. Further, we interviewed Army brigade and battalion commanders who served in Rusafa, Army staff officers tasked with managing projects within the district, and civil affairs officers and ePRT members who served in the area. This gallimaufry of operator insights provided us with a useful bounty of primary-source testimonial evidence on Rusafa's rebuilding outcomes. Finally, we travelled to Iraq to interview two Iraqis who served on the Rusafa District Advisory Council. They provided a crucial continuity of insight that was missing from the U.S. side, given that U.S. personnel rarely served for much more than a year in Iraq. The varied assemblage of interviews we obtained collectively amplified and added to the IRMS database's conspicuously weak project information.The Rusafa Political DistrictLocated in the heart of Iraq's enormous capital city, the Rusafa Political District is one of eleven of the metropolis's political districts. With a population of approximately 435,000, the district is almost as populous as Atlanta, Georgia. Most of Rusafa's residents are Shia Muslims. Indeed, Shia comprise a majority of the residents in 40 of the district's 44 neighborhoods, with Sunni Muslims amounting to a majority in the other 4. The few Christians residing in Rusafa are clustered in isolated enclaves across the district.Rusafa houses ten Government of Iraq ministries, including the Ministry of Defense, and two major universities. It is also home to several large markets, most notably the sprawling Shorja Market, Baghdad's largest. The area is diversely marked by light industry, warehouses, slums, parks, ethnic ghettos, busy boulevards, dozens of Sunni and Shia mosques, and several Christian churches.U.S. Government Entities that Operated in RusafaFrom April 2003 until Operation Iraqi Freedom ended in September 2010, at least ten different Army battalions operated in Rusafa. Some were present for as few as 5 months, while a few served for nearly 15. The first ePRT in Rusafa opened at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Loyalty (located just outside the borders of Rusafa in an area called "New Baghdad") in May 2007, and the last one closed in March 2010."ePRTs" were an Iraq-unique innovation developed to improve interagency coordination on rebuilding programs. They generally were considered effective, but, as with the standard PRTs, their success commonly depended upon the quality of the team leader. …

The Arab Spring: Safeguarding U.S. Interests for the Long-Term

Abstract: The "Arab Springs" that are underway throughout the region share some common features, including the yearning and visible desires for a variety of "Freedoms From": freedom from the oppression of dictators and their stooges, freedom from economic exploitation, and freedom from censorship, to name a few. At the same time, these countries have not even begun the national dialogue on what they want "Freedom For." Do the peoples of this region want democratic competition or the replacement of one oligarchy for another, market or statist economies, full freedom of expression, or limited national and individual discourse?In our view, as the United States looks at the region, we need to acknowledge several realities:* The transitions taking place in the region may well last decades, not simply years;* Each country will choose its own path;* The United States and other nations can shape that path, but only through a carefully calibrated set of policies and programs, recognizing that the nations in transition will ultimately assert sovereignty over their own futures;* The stakes for the United States and its allies are high: while "success" may not provide all the U.S. wants, "failure" would have significant negative long-term consequences for U.S. interests, including vital security interests;* These transitions are indeed historic, and as such, provide an historic opportunity for the U.S. to shape a new Middle East;* While U.S. economic opportunities for the future may lie in East and South Asia, threats to the U.S. national security interests will continue, if not increase, in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. As attractive as pivoting to Asia/Pacific may be, the U.S. must keep a sharp focus on the MENA region for many years to come.As a new administration takes office, a reset of the U.S. approach to the MENA region is in order. The first step is to reaffirm the values that will guide our policy toward the region, with a clear restatement of those values publicly and privately to both new and older leaders in the region. The second step is to complete a country-by-country comprehensive analysis of its strategic interest to the U.S., its trajectory toward success or failure, and the ability to effect positive change that prevents failure and preserves and preferably enhances U.S. interests. The third step is to develop those policies and programs that will best ensure that failure is avoided and U.S. interests are preserved and sustained. The fourth step is to have a full, straightforward dialogue on the short and long-term values, policies, strategies and programs with Congress and with regional leaders. Unless this program achieves buy-in by both, it cannot be sustained.Countries under transition have been encouraged by the $770 million regional fund proposed by the last administration and still under debate in the Congress. That fund should be approved, reaffirming the United States' commitment to shaping a path toward success for the MENA nations in transition. At the same time, how these funds and bilateral programs are developed should be guided by the approach outlined above. Thinking regionally, while acting bilaterally will best serve U.S. interests in the long run.Part I: The Arab Springs in HistoryAssessments of the "Arab Spring" by Western scholars and commentators have been extremely divided. Optimists have predicted a paradigm shift in which overthrown dictators will be replaced over time throughout the region by representative democracies that guarantee human rights. At the other extreme, some argue that these movements signal the rise of Islamists bent on establishing societies and polities in strict compliance with Sharia law, with minorities and women in particular losing their rights and freedoms.Two years on, we have found that nearly all the early predictions - both optimistic and pessimistic - have missed the mark. …

Building the Capabilities and Capacity of Partners: Is This Defense Business?

Abstract: The new defense strategy, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," released in January of this 2012, makes clear the mandate for the Department of Defense to continue, in fact to increase significantly, its abilities to improve the capabilities of partners around the globe. In his cover letter to the guidance, President Barack Obama directs us to "join with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity." Likewise, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in his preface, stresses that the department will focus on "strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions."This is not traditional guidance for the Department of Defense. Such guidance usually focuses on how to fight and win the nation's wars. But after more than ten years of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in these times of impending steep fiscal reductions the utility of partners who can share the burden of defending their countries individually, and their regions collectively, has come to the fore. This guidance displays the degree to which the department in general, and the Geographic Combatant Commanders in particular, have come to recognize the value in helping partners improve their capability to govern their own territories.These efforts to help partners defend themselves, and by extension defend us, are gaining greater acceptance across the defense department, within the Executive Branch, and within the Congress. They are evolving from being considered a collateral duty, or a "nice to do if you have the time" - to becoming a principal component of our Phase Zero military activities. During Phase Zero the department conducts military operations and activities designed to shape the strategic environment, build local solutions to security challenges, and decrease the chances of our having to deploy major force packages later on in the crisis. The strategy parallels the well-proven household adage "a stitch in time, saves nine."Partner capability building is not cheap. But, when contrasted to the costs of deploying U.S. forces for combat operations costs pale by comparison. By way of example, DoD has spent approximately $2 billion during the sixyears that Section 1206 resources have been available for equipping and training partners. For the surge in Afghanistan we spent $30 billion to deploy 30,000 troops for 18 months - or $1 million per man. Preparing others today to be able to govern and defend their territory may result in our not having to deploy major conventional formations to confront instability or associated threats tomorrow. This approach holds the promise of being far less expensive in both U.S. blood and treasure.Additionally, the new defense strategy recognizes the continued threat that al-Qaeda (AQ) terrorists and other non-state actor threats represent, and the importance of capable partners in those fights. "For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to take an active approach to countering these threats by monitoring the activities of non-state threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish control over ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary."The key goal of this approach is to deny the use of ungoverned spaces to the terrorists and other illegitimate non-state actor networks by enabling the host nation government to expand the footprint of its governance to match the footprint of its sovereignty. If the global footprint of governance could match the footprint of sovereignty there would be no ungoverned territories. Malign non-state actors could only bed down with the compliance of the hosting government, thereby shifting solutions back to a more traditional foreign policy calculus between states. The strategic objective is to close as many ungoverned spaces as possible - squeezing the malign networks into fewer and ideally less hospitable safe havens. …

Towards a Taxonomy of Militaries in Contemporary Africa

Abstract: "What a society gets in its armed forces is exactly what it asks for, no more no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces, it is looking in a mirror; the mirror is a true one and the face that it sees will he its own. "General Sir John Hackett2The African development and governance picture is today highly differentiated with some countries developing successful democracies while riding a wave of growth, others facing outright institutional failure, and a great number in-between. Critical to understanding the different paths that countries have taken, and the likely even greater divergences in the future, is the relationship between civilians and soldiers. Starting soon after independence in the early 1960s, the seizure of power by soldiers was emblematic of the problems African states faced in promoting good governance. Now, at a time when most soldiers are back in their barracks, economic growth has accelerated and democratization has progressed. However, the picture varies greatly from country-to-country. In this paper, we develop a taxonomy of African militaries to understand why some countries have better civil-military relations than others, what is the likely path in the future, and the potential role, if any, for outsiders. African militaries are characterised, just as African states themselves, by different capacities and civil-military records.While sub-Saharan Africa has enjoyed the best post-independence growth decade on record during the 2000s, at over 6%, it remains an exceedingly poor continent, with an annual per capita income level of just over US$1,200 (in current terms). The patterns of growth have however been highly differentiated between states: some have got richer, while others have faltered or failed. This is, however, overall a positive phenomenon, showing that African countries no longer fall into a single category (if they ever did), but, as in other developing regions, there are all kinds: performers and failures; big and small (which usually perform much better in Africa); landlocked and littoral; autocratic and democratic (by now the overwhelming majority). In particular, Africa's larger and resource rich countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria, for example) have generally had a poor development record since independence, which in part is due to the extent of territory and the complex make-up of their societies, consisting of many groups within a single state, which has made effective governance that much harder.The state of democracy is also healthier in Africa today than 20 years ago, with more than 40 countries regularly conducting multiparty elections although, again, across the region there are significant variations in the integrity of these elections. Extreme predatory warlordism, once evident in Sierra Leone and Liberia, is also apparently on the decline. However, there are, as will be argued, less obvious but no less insidious ways in which military actors engage in the political economy of African societies. Indeed, such a role is not only made possible by the liberation credentials of some militaries and by their relative monopoly on violence, but by the contemporary African trend towards state involvement in economies as evident for example in the resource nationalism debate.Continued differentiation is therefore perhaps the most important "master narrative" in Africa. Accordingly, this paper considers the abovementioned taxonomy of African militaries, highlighting in turn where and how external parties might play a useful role. But, first, how has the role of African militaries changed and how does this relate to the overall governance record?African Militaries and SecurityOne consequence of the degeneration of politics during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was the high incidence of violence in Africa. The end of the Cold War enabled some conflicts (e.g. in Angola, Namibia and Mozambique) to eventually wind down, but there was also an intense period of strife after 1990, as the geopolitical cards were reshuffled. …

Confronting the Threat of Corruption and Organized Crime in Afghanistan: Implications for Future Armed Conflict

Abstract: As the conflict in Afghanistan has evolved over the last decade, it has become apparent that of the many challenges the country and its international partners face, few are as complex, pervasive, and threatening as corruption and organized crime. Together, corruption and organized crime have undermined efforts to build Afghan institutions, consolidate security gains, achieve political progress, encourage economic growth, and set conditions for enduring stability. These problems, however, are not unique to the war in Afghanistan. Conflicts elsewhere in recent decades have revealed that states engaged in or emerging from insurgencies and civil wars-especially those in which institutions are weak, rule of law is minimal, and substantial international resources have been injected with inadequate oversight-are particularly susceptible to the proliferation of corruption and organized crime.The Afghan experience is rich with lessons for the American military and foreign policy establishment as it considers the likely nature of future armed conflict. In the years ahead, the U.S. may again be compelled to assist or intervene in weak states experiencing protracted instability or rebuilding after years of violence. In such environments-as in Afghanistanthere is a pressing requirement not only for seamless integration of civilian and military efforts to establish security, enable law enforcement organizations, and promote the rule of law, but also for full coordination in the pursuit of transparency and accountability within the critical institutions of the state in, or emerging from, conflict. All of these efforts, meanwhile, must be grounded in a thorough understanding of that state's politics, and tailored to generate the necessary will among its key leaders to undertake complementary reforms.This article outlines the nature and origins of the current problems of corruption and organized crime in Afghanistan, as well as the effect they have had on the mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It then discusses the measures ISAF has taken to address these threats. It concludes with a review of the lessons and implications of the Afghan counter-corruption experience for future armed conflict and stability operations.The Nature and Extent of Corruption and Organized Crime in AfghanistanThe prevailing level of corruption across Afghanistan's public and private sectors presents a grave threat to United States interests in the region and the viability of the Afghan state. Corruption undermines the legitimacy, effectiveness, and cohesion of the Afghan government; it fuels discontent among the population, generating active and passive support for the insurgency; and it prevents the growth of a strong licit economy, thus perpetuating Afghan dependence on international assistance. Corruption and organized crime directly compromise the United States' fundamental interests in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. Long-term U.S. objectives-including the elimination and prevention of transnational terrorist safe-havens-remain dependent upon strengthening the Afghan state and hardening its institutions against the resurgence of the Taliban, the onset of further civil conflict, and the interference of the country's neighbors.Afghan leaders increasingly acknowledge the scale of the problem and the threat it presents. Although President Karzai has often tolerated corruption as part of a complex political strategy, he has vocalized growing frustration with the problem. "The permeation of corruption and a culture of impunity have undermined the development of institutions in terms of strength and credibility," President Karzai warned at the December 2011 Bonn Conference in Germany.1 Corruption in Afghanistan is not an intrinsic cultural phenomenon. It exists today at unprecedented levels as a result of the events of the past thirty years (and particularly the decade of Taliban rule), including chronically weak governance and rule of law institutions, social structures fractured by sustained conflict, and in more recent years, a fragile war economy sustained by international aid, security assistance, and the narcotics trade. …

From Multilateral Champion to Handicapped Donor-And Back Again?

Abstract: The global financial crisis triggered by the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and its aftermath in the subsequent five years has made visible and telling two new realities of the 21st century. First, the United States and its western allies no longer represent the single canonical example of the economic and political model of a free market democracy that other countries ought to strive to imitate. The crisis was triggered in the United States in part by a failure of monetary and financial regulatory policy, many emerging market economies, including China, India and Brazil, recovered relatively quickly from the global crisis in part due to so-called heterodox policies inconsistent with the U.S. model. Second, the global economy is no longer dependent on growth in the traditional western democracies; it is growth in China and other emerging market economies that has fueled the global recovery. For the first time in over 100 years, there is convergence between the per capita incomes of the richest and at least some large developing countries.One key outcome of these new 21st century realities is that global development can no longer be thought of solely as a matter of financial transfers from rich to poor countries to reduce poverty. The world's poor are no longer concentrated in "poor" countries, nor are the world's rich solely in rich countries. For many countries, rich and poor, reducing poverty is a matter of reducing the concentration of wealth and income at home.2 For most of the last century, credit and capital flowed from the transatlantic powers to poorer countries; today capital flows "uphill" from developing to advanced economies. That it is the rich and not the developing world that is struggling with looming public debt and the burdens of aging populations only drives home further the shared nature of the challenge. Rather than a matter of transfers from rich to poor countries, global development is now as much a matter of meeting a set of challenges shared by all countries, both at home and through cooperation in managing a globally integrated and interdependent global market.The cross-border challenges range widely - from financial crises, volatile food prices, disease pandemics, policing of drug and sex trafficking, microbial resistance to drugs, to climate change. All of these in one way or another constitute challenges to progress against poverty and inequality in the developing world. At the same time, without development in the form of state building in low-income and front-line states, they constitute challenges to global stability and the long-term security of Americans. Put simply, economic globalization has created dependence of citizens everywhere on decisions elsewhere, and individual well being, material prosperity and security itself, depend increasingly on successful international cooperation.In this paper we argue that the United States cannot afford not to revisit and re-emphasize cooperation with other countries, or multilateralism, in its development programs and policies. The approach the United States takes to development needs to adjust more quickly to its diminished comparative advantage as a provider of foreign assistance, and the growing premium on cooperation with other countries, including China, India, Brazil and other large and rapidly growing emerging markets, in shaping climate, immigration, financial and trade policies at the global level that are more development-friendly than current regimes.We begin by describing briefly the history of U.S. leadership in multilateral cooperation for development, beginning with the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions and the creation in 1960 of President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, and the more recent reluctant multilateralism, at least in the approach to foreign assistance. We then explain the structural difficulties the United States faces in providing effective aid to a major recipient of U.S. bilateral aid, Pakistan, and the constraints that one of the largest and most prominent U. …

Response to the Decade of War

Abstract: Last summer, in response to a directive from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Martin Dempsey, the Joint Staff issued a short summary of lessons learned from the past decade of military operations. The document, entitled Decade ofWar, Volume 1 frankly and cogently acknowledges mistakes made over this period, and particularly during the first half of the decade, that is to say between the invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 and the surge of troops into Iraq in early 2007. Among the admitted deficiencies were the failure to adequately grasp the operating environment, a reliance on conventional tactics to fight unconventional enemies, an inability to articulate a convincing public narrative, and poor interagency coordination. The document is testimony to the capacity of the American military for self-criticism and eventual correction, albeit not always in time to avoid costly setbacks.This Joint Staff critique nevertheless fails to address two of the most serious errors of that first half-decade. The most glaring mistake was the decision to attack Iraq on the basis of an erroneous intelligence assessment. Surely there can be few greater failings than to invade a country by mistake. Blame for this failure has fallen principally on Central Intelligence Agency and its then Director, George Tenet. Yet among the multiple American intelligence agencies, several of the most important of which are lodged in the Defense Department and headed by serving military officers, only the tiny intelligence bureau of the State Department demurred from the judgments that Saddam Hussein had active WMD programs and indeed actual such weapons, neither of which turned out to be true.The second major point on which Decade of War is silent is any judgment regarding the level of forces originally committed to the post-conflict stabilization of Afghanistan and subsequently Iraq. The document acknowledges that the planning for this phase of both operations was inadequate, but it makes no mention of the most serious effect of that flaw, which was the failure to deploy forces numerous enough for the purpose in either country. As with the flawed assessment of Iraqi WMD, the Bush administrations civilian leaders were ultimately responsible for this error as well. Some senior officers, most notably then Army Chief of Staff Erik Shinseki, argued for a larger occupation force, but his was a rather isolated voice within the country's top military leadership.This second omission maybe the more consequential than the first, since it represents not simply a glossing over of a now widely acknowledged failure, but rather reflects a continued inability to come to closure on a still controversial issue. No one contests that American intelligence estimates on Iraq were flawed. As a result, measures have been put into effect to reduce the prospect of any repetition. By contrast, there is continued debate between those who argue that the United States put too few troops into Afghanistan and Iraq in the immediate aftermath of conventional conflict, and those who argue that it put in too many.By 2011 United States had ten times more soldiers in Afghanistan than it had in the year after its entry. In Iraq American commanders actually began to reduce the number of troops as soon as Baghdad fell. That decision was reversed as an insurgency developed, but the American troop presence in Iraq only reached its peak of 160,000 in late 2007, four years after the emergence of a violent resistance movement. In both countries, local insurgencies were thus given abundant space and time to recruit, organize, and intimidate the population, leaving the United States to belatedly reinforce its military presence only under threat of strategic defeat.Decade of War acknowledges those early military setbacks, but blames them solely on insufficient situational awareness, inappropriate tactics, poor public communications and inadequate interagency coordination. …

Egypt in Transition: The Third Republic

Abstract: On January 25, 2011, the Egyptian people took to the streets and in 18 days were able to bring down the 30-year corrupt dictatorial regime of Hosni Mubarak, using entirely peaceful means That revolution set the Arab Republic of Egypt on a hopeful path to democracy After Mubarak resigned, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) became the custodian of the transition In June of 2012, in Egypt's first free and fair election, Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi was elected President Slightly more than 50 percent of registered voters actually voted, and those voters gave Morsi a majority of just less than 52 percent Having won by this slim margin, Morsi was sworn in as President on June 30, 2012, and thus the Second Republic came to be1The Second RepublicFive months later, Morsi declared his decisions beyond judicial review, and thus his authority unchallengeable In December, 2012, he pushed a pro-Islamist constitution through a popular referendum; it passed but with less than 30 percent of the popular vote There was no constitutional way to recall, impeach, or remove Morsi The path to democracy was taking a turn towards theocratic autocracy The serving People's Assembly (Majliss al-Sha'ab) had been elected under a law later declared unconstitutional Over 60 percent of the members of the new parliament were Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Salafists To many both in and outside of Egypt who view the values of secular democracy and Islam as overlapping, such values were at risk of being compromised by an Egyptian theocracy ruled by the MB The MB's democratic rise to power, however, had to be respected Regrettably, the Second Republic was short-livedInsofar as there was no way for popular democracy to change the theocratic course of events, on June 30, 2013, the Egyptian people reacted in the only way possible, with their feet in the streets In response to the general deterioration of the political and economic situations, youth groups launched the Tamarud (Rebel) movement, gathering 22 million signatures petitioning for Morsi's resignation They along with other opposition groups planned protests demanding the president's resignation, a revocation of the 2012 Constitution, and a temporary return to the 1971 Constitution until a new constitution could be drafted, and new parliamentary and presidential elections held Thirteen million people took to the streets calling for Morsi's ouster Had a constitution been in place, an impeachment process would have been possible The controversial new 2012 Constitution provided for such a process in its Article 156, but this could only be pursued before the People's Assembly, which had not yet been elected Consequently, there was no constitutional process in place through which impeachment could have been pursuedBetween July 2 and 3, 2013, the army intervened in support of the popular demand that Morsi be deposed and took Morsi into custody, selecting a new temporary president who was immediately sworn in The majority of the Egyptian people supported what the military did US Secretary of State John Kerry responded on August 2, 2013, from Islamabad, Pakistan, stating that the military had restored Egypt to the path of democracy Relying on formal legality, the MB disagreed vehemently, holding that this was a military coup without legitimacy2 The MB initiated a wave of civil resistance, but also engaged in violence and disruption of public order A number of violent incidents occurred; no one knows exactly how many persons were killed and injured Both sides accuse each other of initiating the violence, and there is no doubt that an impartial and fair investigation is needed3 Excessive force appears to have been used by the security forces and the military The human consequences were appallingThese protests and demonstrations have had a crippling effect on the life of Egyptians, and prevented the country from moving forward While such events led to some sympathy for the MB and attracted support outside of Egypt, they galvanized more Egyptians to support the military and security forces, adding to the country's already significant level of polarization and radicalization …

A U.S. Asian-Pacific Pivot Point: Burma's Natural Resources

Abstract: Ship me somewheres east of Suez, where the best is like the worst,Where there aren't no Ten Commandments an' a man can raise a thirst;....On the road to Mandalay, Where the flyin'-fishesplay,An' the dawn comes up like thunder outer China 'crost the Bay!from Kipling's MandalayBurma wavers on the cusp of a transition from conflict, plunder, and risk towards peace and a more open, stable society. A half-century of armed warfare, largely financed by the rapid exploitation of high-value natural resources, may be coming to an end in mainland Southeast Asia's largest nation. The use and extraction of environmental assets will continue, however, to determine Burma's political and economic future. Unfortunately, natural resources too often play a perverse role in preventing needed reforms in countries emerging from protracted conflict. In an era of fiscal constraint, "sequestration," and a decade of Iraq and Afghanistan nation-building fatigue, how can the U.S. best aid Burma's transformation? The on-the-ground situations in Burma, namely, ethnic conflicts, land grabs, internally displaced persons, each undergirded by a deep distrust of the central government, are as varied as they are fluid. U.S. foreign policy issues regarding the nation also known as Myanmar, beginning with that nation's toponym,2 are so complex as to defy the Interagency and Tactical Conflict Assessment Frameworks, respectively vaunted by U.S. government civilian agencies and military services.Advancing business investment is paramount to continue advancing human rights interests in Burma. Significant challenges to U.S. foreign policy aims of improving human rights and promoting responsible investment are legion. Illicit transnational business networks hinder national reconciliation and societal integration. These well-entrenched networks, including the Burmese military, also impede building an effective civil society that would promote shared benefits and responsibilities of managing Burma's natural resource wealth. Along Burma's borders lurk resource-hungry neighbors, two with billion-plus populations, eyeing the U.S. foreign policy "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific region with suspicion. Burma has attracted a deluge of foreign aid and commercial interest, ostensibly invited in as new trading partners to balance competing interests among China, Thailand, India, etc., but with ravenous resource appetites of their own. In response the Burmese government is enacting new laws and policies, including in resource governance, and is beginning to receive some donor support for reforms. Good governance, encompassing both business and human rights agendas, provides just the anchor that U.S. foreign policy needs to interface with, as opposed to intervene in, "the new Burma."This article argues for strengthening land tenure and community-based property rights and agreements for the equitable sharing of natural resources as a point of entry for the U.S. to support Burma's transition. As that fragmented nation faces its ethnic divisions and the arduous tasks of reconciliation and peace building, natural resource governance provides direction and substance to democratization and tangible investment incentives. With landlessness among Burma's rural population ranging from 30-50 percent,3 and a dearth of capacity and experience in land administration and dispute resolution, the challenge is a daunting one. The prospect of an open, prosperous, and stable Burma, based on rule of law, hinges on its capacity to manage its natural resources sustainably for the benefit of the entire nation of 55 million people and not its small but powerful and well-connected elites.Burma: at the Crossroads of South and Southeast AsiaIn the late 19th century, Rudyard Kipling penned Mandalay, a poem that British soldiers in Burma identified with licentious freedoms to enjoy its exotic beauty. The 21st century may well see a Road to Mandalay, but in the form of a high-tech information highway, both physical and cyber; in other words, an Indo-Pacific-Corridor that links India to Thailand via Burma. …