Showing papers in "Psychological Inquiry in 1996"

Self-Regulation Failure: An Overview

Abstract: The major patterns of self-regulatory failure are reviewed. Underregulation occurs because of deficient standards, inadequate monitoring, or inadequate strength. Misregulation occurs because of false assumptions or misdirected efforts, especially an unwarranted emphasis on emotion. The evidence supports a strength (limited resource) model of self-regulation and suggests that people often acquiesce in losing control. Loss of control of attention, failure of transcendence, and various lapse-activated causes all contribute to regulatory failure.

Personality, Modernity, and the Storied Self: A Contemporary Framework for Studying Persons

Abstract: As the scientific study of the individual person, personality psychology historically has struggled to provide the kind of broad conceptual framework capable of orienting theory and research around human individuality in cultural context. This article presents a new integrative framework for studying persons that brings together recent advances in the field of personality with the emerging social science emphasis on the narrative study of lives, while situating personality inquiry within the cultural context of contemporary modernity and the unique problems of the modern self. The frame-work builds on a clear distinction between the "I" and the "Me" features of personality in the modem world and the delineation of three relatively independent levels on which modern persons may be described. In personality, the I may be viewed as the process of "selfing," of narrating experience to create a modern self whereas the Me may be viewed as the self that the I constructs. Personality traits, like those included w...

Self-Regulation Failure: Past, Present, and Future

Abstract: (1996). Self-Regulation Failure: Past, Present, and Future. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 90-98.

Failures in self-regulation: Energy depletion or selective disengagement?

Abstract: (1996). Failures in Self-Regulation: Energy Depletion or Selective Disengagement? Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 20-24.

Explorations of Narrative Identity

Abstract: (1996). Explorations of Narrative Identity. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 363-367.

Searching for Order in Social Motivation

Abstract: Regularities in social motivation are derived from a causal analysis of the ability-effort distinction, which has implications for perceptions of responsibility. A responsibility analysis is then extended and applied to reactions to the stigmatized, help-giving, and aggression. The relation between explanation in terms of processes and mechanisms versus function is examined. Finally, an attempt is made to integrate social motivation with some aspects of intrapersonal motivation.

Toward an Explanation of the UFO Abduction Phenomenon: Hypnotic Elaboration, Extraterrestrial Sadomasochism, and Spurious Memories

Abstract: Autobiographical memories are often suspect. For example, a surprisingly large number of people report having been abducted by extraterrestrials. We offer a prototype of the abduction experience and an assessment of the frequency of such reports. These accounts are hard to dismiss on the basis of mendacity or insanity, but there are ample reasons to doubt their literal accuracy. We offer a cognitive-motivational explanation for how spurious memories of unidentified flying object (UFO) abductions can be created and maintained. The motivational roots lie in the desire to escape from ordinary self-awareness, and this explanation is supported by parallels between UFO abduction accounts and masochistic fantasies. The cognitive bases involve the integration and elaboration of hallucinations, general knowledge, and contextual cues into full-blown accounts, usually with the aid of hypnosis. Due to the pitfalls of hypnosis, people develop a high degree of confidence in the veridicality of spurious UFO abduction me...

Free Traits, Personal Projects and Idio-Tapes: Three Tiers for Personality Psychology

Abstract: (1996). Free Traits, Personal Projects and Idio-Tapes: Three Tiers for Personality Psychology. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 340-344.

Life Stories and the Four Needs for Meaning

Abstract: (1996). Life Stories and the Four Need for Meaning. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 322-325.

Who Controls Whom When "I Control Myself"?

Abstract: Baumeister and Heatherton's target article on selfregulation failure reminded me of my first attempt to bake bread. My mother had told me all the ingredients but I did not know how to put them together: The result was closer to some sort of cereal pudding than to bread, but grandpa liked it because it was easy to swallow. Because we are still in the childhood years of experimental research on human volition, it is a remarkable achievement to present virtually all the ingredients that seem necessary for a theory of volition and volitional impairment (self-regulation failure). Nonetheless, the authors are far from explaining how all the phenomena they cite make a theory of volition. Such a theory should be able to resolve some of the paradoxes they mention and it should answer even more basic questions they forget to ask. For example, are the authors correct in stating that eating or drinking binges are cases of successful self-control "because the person thinks that eating or drinking will remedy the emotional distress" or are these symptoms examples of self-regulation failure as may be more in accordance with common wisdom? Do self-regulation failures like broken diets, sexual acts one later regrets, smoking and drinking, and the most violent and impulsive crimes occur late at night because if "people are generally fatigued late in the evening, then self-regulation should break down more at such times than at others"? Or do people do these things at night because they have excellent selfregulatory skills that enable them to delay these "attractive" activities until the evening when they can be more successfully exercised than during the day? Self-regulation research is indeed beset with theoretical ambiguities to such an extent that many scholars have yielded to the temptation of "solving" all problems by a simple method: proclaiming volitional concepts as unscientific and reducing them to basic, nonvolitional concepts or even banning them from scientific psychology altogether (Allport, 1980; Allport & Styles, 1989; Ryle, 1949; Skinner, 1971). Despite the many conceptual confusions and operational problems involved in this research, I am convinced that psychologists will never be able to explain complex phenomena of human behavior without concepts like volition, willpower, self-regulation, and self-control. I also believe that such concepts will again be neglected or banned by the scientific community unless we find better solutions to the theoretical and methodological problems raised by these concepts. There is much we can learn from phenomenological reflections as illustrated by approaches that have been even more systematic than Baumeister and Heatherton's (mainly phenomenological) approach (e.g., Ach, 1910; Dennett, 1984; Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen, 1991, p. 175). However, there are limits of introspection when we try to model the architecture and processes underlying human behavior in general (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and self-regulated behavior in particular. From my own research I have learned that, for resolving some of the paradoxes of volition,' we need both introspective and objective data; we need not only phenomenological, but also functional concepts that are derived from a systems-oriented design perspective (Allport & Styles, 1989; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kuhl, 1984, 1986; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994b; Shallice, 1988). The latter approaches search for the architecture and mechanisms underlying self-regulation. Searching for this architecture amounts to asking more and more specific questions concerning the who or what that does the regulation in self-regulation. I describe, in a nutshell, attempts to resolve some of the difficult conceptual and methodological questions left untouched in Baumeister and Heatherton's target article. At the outset of my own research program, I described volitional competence as somehow related to the ability to stick to an intention and shield it against competing action tendencies (Kuhl, 1981, 1983a; cf. Mischel & Baker, 1975; Patterson & Mischel, 1976). The first important thing I learned was that concepts like self-regulation and volition do not refer to a unitary mechanism or function. I postulated and later confirmed that self-regulatory ability can be decomposed into several mechanisms and strategies people use to maintain their goals (and their selves): They focus on information supporting their active intentions (attention control), they modify their motivation when they

Some Jangly Remarks on Baumeister and Heatherton

Abstract: (1996). Some Jangly Remarks on Baumeister and Heatherton. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 28-32.

Integrating the Levels of Personality

Abstract: Chapman, L. J., & Chapman, J. P. (1969). Illusory correlation as an obstacle to the use of valid psychodiagnostic signs. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 72, 193-204. Mayer, J. D. (1993-1994). A system-topics framework for the study of personality. Imagination, Cognition, and Personality, 13, 99-123. Mayer, J. D. (1995a). The system-topics framework and the structural arrangement of systems within and around personality. Journal of Personality, 63, 459-493. Mayer, J. D. (1995b). A framework for the classification of personality components. Journal of Personality, 63, 819-878. Mendelsohn, G. A. (1993). It's time to put theories of personality in their place, or, Allport and Stagner got it right, why can't we? In K. H. Craik, R. Hogan, & R. N. Wolfe (Eds.), Fifty years of personality psychology (pp. 103-115). New York: Plenum. Nisbett, R., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Who is regulating what and why?: Motivational context of self-regulation.

Abstract: movement and its shortand long-term derailments and (b) provide an appreciation of what it takes to get the system humming. Most good auto mechanics know that when all the parts of an internal combustion engine are in their proper place and connected, the car may yet not work as desired. Likewise they know that car troubles do not bear a simple linear relation to small, isolated defects but often occur suddenly in response to patterned changes in system functioning over time. Psychologists can and should take a lesson from them. Thus, if we are to move toward a working conceptualization of motivational resonance, a critical reexamination of all extant theories of self-control and self-regulation is in order. Nevertheless, a noteworthy difficulty with the present formulation stems from its minimal attention to a normative model (i.e., to a conception of how self-regulation normally operates). Before we consider systems failure, do we not need to model systems success? Baumeister and Heatherton discuss "ingredients" of self-control but do not offer much of a recipe or metatheory to guide the derivation of "failure principles." Similarly, in the book-length treatment by Baumeister, et al. (1994) only two pages are devoted to setting forth the so-called basic ingredients of self-regulation. The fact that hypothesized causal elements (e.g., strength, false assumptions, or choking under pressure) tend to be paradigmatically isolated and, to a degree, reified is a direct result, I think, of a disregard for foundational modeling. Although their separate discussions of diverse clinical problems and critical ingredients of failure is probably necessary for didactic reasons, the scientist and practitioner nonetheless need considerably more guidance in order to understand how the systems elements connect and interact. Increased discussion of boundary conditions (e.g., the role of language and environmental affordances) would also help. Finally, although the authors address individual differences in control-relevant instrumental skills, perhaps more needs to be said about the skills and habits of goal representation in order to capture a greater portion of the variance in motivational resonance.

What This Framework Can and Cannot Do

Abstract: Many students in personality courses think that it is a good idea to be eclectic when it comes to theories. In an effort to challenge that position, I begin the last chapter of my textbook in personality, The Person (McAdams, 1994, p. 794), by quoting the Book of Revelations (3:15-16): "I know all about you: you are neither cold nor hot. I wish you were one or the other, but since you are neither, but only lukewarm, I will spit you out of my mouth." Although the author of Revelations was not thinking about personality psychology, his point is instructive when considering the dangers of easy eclecticism in theorizing about persons. Blend a bit of Freud with a little Bandura and add a dash of existentialism and a pinch of trait theory and you will probably create a tepid and rather tasteless porridge. I heartily agree, therefore, with Loevinger when she suggests, and here I have to switch metaphors, that conflict among different personality theories provides our discipline with a good deal of its elan vital. Singer and Lamiell are both right, too, when they suggest that eclecticism-run-rampant is too nondiscriminating to advance a scientific field. Lamiell and Weigert quote Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) when he likens eclecticism to the jackdaw's propensity to drag anything and everything into the nest. But theoretical parochialism can be just as bad. With all due respect to the great (but pre-Darwinian) Goethe, the jackdaw does not drag everything and anything into the nest. Some things simply cannot be dragged. Others might threaten the jackdaw's survival. And evolution has accentuated the likelihood that the jackdaw will drag in pretty much what she needs in order to assure her reproductive fitness and the viability of her progeny. Likewise, good theories and frameworks "drag" in only what they need to build a useful, sensible, and generative conceptual product. In building this conceptual framework, I have drawn widely from many different viewpoints in order to consider what a comprehensive description of human individuality in modern societies should entail. Although Lamiell and Weigert believe I have sampled too broadly, Mayer suggests I have left too much out. In my view, I have offered a wide-ranging but eminently coherent framework-in-progresssomewhere between parochialism and the most promiscuous forms of eclecticism. In Hermans's terms, I have sought to provide a centripetal force in an intellectual environment that has experienced too much of the centrifugal in recent years. My framework offers a conceptual space wherein the conflicting theories and the different constructs that are regularly invoked by personality psychologists to describe human individuality can, as Loevinger would wish, do battle. The space offers some common language and clarifying distinctions that may lead to ever more fruitful "conflicts" in the future. I should add, furthermore, that there is nothing like writing a textbook in personality psychology to make you at least a little more eclectic than you were before. In studying carefully the works of others, you come to realize that they were not as stupid as you originally thought. In this regard, the field owes Lamiell a debt of gratitude for resurrecting William Stern (1871-1938). Stern is surely one of the forgotten men in the history of personality psychology. But one should note that there are other forgotten or underappreciated men and women, as well-McDougall, Prince, Roback, Stagner, Clara Thompson, and Robert White, to name a few. It

Extending the Search for Order in Social Motivation

Abstract: (Deci & Ryan, 1991). Weiner's analysis focuses on the functions of coping and survival and is consistent with a reactive view of behavior. However, because much of human behavior is not reactive, but rather is aimed at actualization-at satisfying intrinsic needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness-his theory is too narrow to account for the range of human responses even to the emotions that he considers. Although one could argue that actualization and development have coping and survival value, the typical interpretation of survival does not incorporate such concepts. Thus, theorists must recognize that the functions of human action are not just coping and survival, but also include development, in order to make room in their theories for self-regulation.

Making Room for Self-Regulation: Some Thoughts on the Link Between Emotion and Behavior

Abstract: (1996). Making Room for Self-Regulation: Some Thoughts on the Link Between Emotion and Behavior. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 220-223..

A More Parsimonious Explanation for UFO Abduction

Abstract: (1996). A More Parsimonious Explanation for UFO Abduction. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 156-168.

Self Control: An Alternative Self-Regulation Framework Applicable to Human and Nonhuman Behavior

Abstract: (1996). Self Control: An Alternative Self-Regulation Framework Applicable to Human and Nonhuman Behavior. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 68-72.

Alleged Alien Abductions: False Memories, Hypnosis, and Fantasy Proneness

Abstract: (1996). Alleged Alien Abductions: False Memories, Hypnosis, and Fantasy Proneness. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 151-155.

Responsibility, Helping, Aggression, and Evil

Abstract: Weiner reviews his own and others' work, which indicates that people who are attributed responsibility for their actions or outcomes (e.g., failure) receive different reactions than people who are not seen as responsible. People who are seen as responsible for their failure on a task are judged more harshly, and even evoke anger if they are seen as lazy rather than low in ability. A drunk person who falls down in the subway receives less help, presumably because he is seen as responsible for his need, than a person with a cane who falls down. (However, the cost of helping may also enter in this case.) Attributions about aggressive behavior also affect reactions to the aggressor. Greater intention to cause harm evokes stronger punitive reactions, for example, than greater harm caused (presumably within limits). Weiner proposes the "perceptions of causal controllability as a key variable mediating between an event (state) and the elicited reaction." As he himself indicates, his basic point is quite familiar to psychologists and is part of the "naive" psychology of people in general. He suggests that the contribution of his article is the systematization of such knowledge, showing that these "phenotypically diverse phenomena can be comprised within the identical theoretical framework." Among the issues his article raises is that of the moral meaning of responsibility attribution for the group. He stresses its positive value. People are kept accountable for their actions. Even the laziness of a person has broad social ramifications, affecting other members of the group.

Strength of Will

Abstract: that Baumeister and Heatherton point out (e.g., failures of monitoring, although I think that most drinkers know the limits of their own monitoring capability) and the special case of acute psychosis may be argued. Apart from these, even the case of action that seems self-destructive in its result need not be considered a failure of control. Of course, there are gamblers who lose, criminals who get caught, and addicts and drinkers who ruin their lives. They are people, often demoralized people, for whom talk of transcendence or delay of gratification is meaningless and for whom therefore the immediate relief or the short-term gain is what counts. In any case, it is a mistake to imagine, when we talk of so-called self-destructive action, that short-term gains and longterm consequences are always calculated. They are not. In fact, such calculations are often avoided: A few drinks, an abruptness of action with a quick completion, a rationalization that emphasizes the single and relatively safe instance of a general and risky pattern-all these diminish one's sensation of making a risky choice. They are ways in which people (some people particularly but all of us sometimes) can avoid asking themselves questions to which, they dimly suspect, the answers will be unpleasant.

Distinguishing Memory From Fantasy

Abstract: In attempting to explain the unidentified flying object (UJFO) abduction phenomenon, Newman and Baumeister touch on several themes important to contemporary psychologists. We examine one such issue. Many observers probably find it hard to believe that people of sound mind could suppose that they were abducted and assaulted by aliens. Why do the purported abductees apparently accept the validity of their memories, and why do Newman, Baumeister, and probably most other people presume the falsity of these recollections? Our thesis is that both believers and skeptics use "truth" criteria to evaluate abduction memories. By differentially weighting these criteria, as well as relying on divergent assumptions, the parties come to different conclusions. Our discussion proceeds as follows. First, we observe that people generally believe their own and other people's retrospective reports. People's distrust of abduction memories is thus a fairly rare reaction. Second, we list truth criteria that people use to evaluate memories when their accuracy is called into question. Third, we detail evidence relevant to each criterion and point out how the abductees and Newman and Baumeister could use that information to come to opposite conclusions. Fourth, we offer some observations about the characteristics of abduction memories as well as their relation to a superficially similar phenomenon-"recovered" memories of childhood sexual abuse.

Contextualizing the Storied Self

Abstract: (1996). Contextualizing the Storied Self. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 372-376.

"Memories" of Anomalous and Traumatic Autobiographical Experiences: Validation and Consolidation of Fantasy Through Hypnosis

Abstract: duction Project. Journal of UFO Studies, 3, 59-90. Spanos, N., Cross, P., Dickson, K., & DuBreuil, S. (1993). Close encounters: An examination of UFO experiences. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102, 624-632. Stolorow, R. 0. (1992). Context of being: The intersubjective foundation of psychological life. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press. Strieber, W. (1986). Pain. In D. Etchison (Ed.), Cutting edge (pp. 269-290). New York: Doubleday. Strieber, W. (1987). Communion: A true story. New York: Avon. Terr, L. (1994). Unchained memories: True stories of traumatic memories lost andfound. New York: Basic. Uyeda, S. (1971). The new view of the Earth (M. Ohnuki, Trans.). San Francisco: Freeman. van der Kolk, B. A. (1987). The psychological consequences of overwhelming life experiences. In B. A. van der Kolk (Ed.), Psychological trauma (pp. 1-30). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press. van der Kolk, B. A. (1994). The body keeps the score: Memory and the evolving psychobiology of posttraumatic stress. Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 1, 253-265. Westrum, R. (1982). Social intelligence about hidden events. Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization, 3, 382. Wilson, J. P. (1990). Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and experienced anomalous trauma (EAT): Similarities in reported UFO abductions and exposure to invisible toxic contaminants. Journal of UFO Studies, 2, 1-17. Wilson, S. C., & Barber, T. X. (1978). The Creative Imagination Scale as a measure of hypnotic responsiveness: Applications to experimental and clinical hypnosis. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 20, 235-249. Wilson, S. C., & Barber, T. X. (1983). Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings. Framingham, MA: Cushing Hospital.

The ordinary nature of alien abduction memories

Abstract: (1996). The Ordinary Nature of Alien Abduction Memories. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 132-135.

People Who Fail at Self-Regulation: What Should We Think of Them--and How?

Abstract: (1996). People Who Fail at Self-Regulation: What Should We Think of Them--and How? Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 40-46.