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Showing papers in "Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement in 1970"


Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: Generation as discussed by the authors is a word with such a tangle of related and overlapping meanings attached to it that it is surprising to find that it goes on being used without qualificatory adjectives.
Abstract: I choose this somewhat awkward title because it seems to me to be necessary to insist on the uncertainty, the lack of structure, in the connection between the generations. This is due to a large extent of course to the multiple character of the expression ‘generation’ itself; it is a word with such a tangle of related and overlapping meanings attached to it that it is surprising to find that it goes on being used without qualificatory adjectives. Let us look at a few of the notions which ‘generation’ covers.

9 citations


Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: The mass media of communications have often been charged with making our life more vulgar than need be as discussed by the authors, and the assumption which underlies what I have to say is that the influence of unique artistic sensitivities on society has also been increased by the mass media.
Abstract: The mass media of communications have often been charged with making our life more vulgar than need be. The assumption which underlies what I have to say is that the influence of unique artistic sensitivities on society has also been increased by the mass media of communications. This is good news and I am aware of the risk I am courting when I attach importance to a promising kind of social change: the academic respectability of pursuing optimistic lines of thought is strictly limited in sociological circles.

1 citations


Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a speaker (S) says something in a language (L) and one of the listeners (A) knows L but another (B) does not, then, normally, A will understand what S said but B will not.
Abstract: If a speaker (S) says something in a language (L) and one of the listeners (A) knows L but another (B) does not, then, normally, A will understand what S said but B will not. What is it, exactly, that A, but not B, succeeds in doing in this case, and how to account for the difference? This is a fundamental problem, which the philosophy of language should be able to solve, yet, to my knowledge, has not done so to date.

1 citations