Showing papers in "Sophia in 1987"

A theistic proof of perfection

Abstract: The pinnacle of traditional theism is its claim that God is " tha t than which no greater can be conceived". As it has come to be interpreted in recent times, this is understood as the claim that God is a greatest possible, or maximally perfect, being? Now, this characterization of God has been thought by some to be the loftiest reMization of truth ever vouchsafed to human minds. I t has been seen by others, standing in the tradition of Hume, to be nothing more that the ultimate expression of the most obsequious human proclivity for fa tuous f lat tery and appeasement. Theists themselves are sometimes a bit ambivalent about the concept of divine perfection. Is the ascription of perfection to God anything more than, in McTaggart 's memorable phrase, "a piece of theological etiquette"? Is it a superadded bit of what Matthew Arnold called "over-belief"? Or on the contrary, can it be seen as a natural capstone to independent theistic convictions, an idea in which the theistic metaphysical vision culminates? In this short essay, I want to a t tempt to show how a number of metaphysical beliefs together can entail that God is a greatest, even the greatest possible being, beliefs which severally can be independently plausible to theists who may otherwise feel uncertain about the explicit claim of maximal perfection for God. I shall do this by laying out a simpl~ deductive argument whose premises will be the metaphysical claims which can be independently plausible to theists of a traditional bent, and whose conclusion will be the claim of perfection for God. Each premise will be briefly commented upon.

Berkeley's theocentric mentalism: Pantheism?

Abstract: By \"theocentric mentalism\" I mean Berkeley's version of idealism in which the world and everything in it, except finite spirits, is an idea in the mind of God, dependent upon God's \"perception\" for existence at every moment. Finite spirits, themselves necessarily dependent upon being perceived by God, or some other conserving mentalistic activity of God, are also in the mind of God, or an aspect of God's mlnd--whatever and wherever else they may be. They are not themselves ideas in the mind of God, since Berkeley maintains that spirits are \"entirely distinct\" from ideas. Even the sensible objects that are dependent for their existence upon being perceived by finite spirits are ultimately dependent upon their status as ideas in the mind of God, since it is God who sustains such objects. Sensible objects, including persons, are perceived by finite spirits because God causes the ideas that are those objects, eternally present in God's mind, to be perceived. Accordingly, creation consists not in the creation of ideas, since these are eternal, but in causing finite spirits to perceive those ideas. Pantheism is the view that there is one all-inclusive unity and that the unity is, in some sense, divine. Is Berkeley's theocentric mentalism a form of pantheism? Is it possible to be a Berkelean without being a pantheist? The answers to these questions depend upon more general issues. When is one object \"ontologically distinct or independent\" from another? Does Berkeley's view entail that the world is not ontologically distinct from God, and if so, is this a necessary or sufficient condition of pantheism? None of these question can be answered fully in the present context, but I intend to show that Berkeley's views are