Showing papers in "Symbolic Interaction in 1983"

Network and meaning: an interactionist approach to structure

Abstract: Social network is a concept interactionists might use to link individual behavior to the larger social system. A symbolic interactionist formulation of network would: 1) approximate the original, anthropological usage better than the current structural conception does, 2) offer symbolic interactionists a unit of social organization better suited to their perspective than the small group, and 3) allow symbolic interactionists to deal with “macro” sociological concerns. Network is conceived of as a set of relationships which people imbue with meaning and use for personal or collective purposes. By emphasizing subjective meaning and the investigation of multi-purpose and weak ties, the interactionist formulation provides theoretical insights into those aspects of society which “structural” approaches overlook. One of the major developments in sociology during the 1970s was the growth and popularity of the network construct to describe social structure.’ Many network analysts, particularly those in sociology, regard themselves as structuralists and rely heavily on mathematical models and statistical methodologies. However, despite its current usage, we argue that the network consrruct is compatible with the symbolic interactionist conceptualization of social structure. In fact, we claim that the symbolic interactionist approach fits anthropologists’ original conception of network better than the structuralists’ approach does. Following the formulations of British social anthropologists (Radcliffe-Brown, 1940; Barnes, 1954; Nadel, 1957), social structure (as network) is seen as a set of relationships between individuals. Symbolic interactionism, like the network formulation, suggests a relational approach to understanding social order. From the symbolic interactionist perspective, social order is constructed through meaningful, self-other interaction. “Society as symbolic interaction” (Blumer, 1969) is equivalent to the view (in network theory) that social structure is grounded in relationships-the self-other relationship is the basic

Identity: Its Emergence within Sociological Psychology*

Abstract: Identity is an oft used technical term in sociological social psychology. Yet, its rather recent emergence remains uncharted. Discussion of its origin in the post World War II period from the writings of Erikson leads to recognition of its rapid development in the 1960's and 1970's. Five theoretical sources are currently informing the development and use of the concept. Its continued strength is apparently in response to the need to interpret contemporary American society. By the 1980's, identity serves as a powerful bridging concept stretched across micro and macro levels of theory and reaching from laboratory analyses to cultural criticism.

Symbolic interactionism vs. ethnomethodology

Abstract: Are ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism essentially the same? An examination of these perspectives suggests that each offers a unique contribution to sociological knowledge. Although both perspectives have been influenced by pragmatism, ethnomethodology shares affinity with James' philosophy while symbolic interactionism is allied with Dewey's and Mead's. Both perspectives emphasize meaning and constraints, but each offers critically different conceptualizations of them. Symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology share a verstehen outlook, yet each perspective uses different methods to gain “understanding.” Hence, these perspectives differ philosophically, conceptually, and methodologically.

Justice as Interaction: Loose Coupling and Mediations in the Adversary Process*

Abstract: Among the guiding metaphors of judicial adversary proceedings, that of due process is the most salient. ’ Ideologically, organizationally, and behaviorally, this metaphor provides general goals which shape and justify courtroom procedures. Judge Jerome Frank’s work (Frank, 1949, 1970; Frank and Frank, 1957) pioneered the concept of the “basic myth of law,” which challenged the belief in the attainability of precise and certain legal procedures and outcomes. It may be, however, that the formal goals of due process and the practices available to attain them are in fact contradictory. As Wolf (1981) has argued in a subtly brilliant work, judicial practices may in fact be incompatible with scientific and discursive norms conventionally employed in inquiry. This suggests that forms of interaction in courtrooms (as law students quickly learn from texts on criminal proceedings) contribute dramatically to these contradictory norms. Such interaction reflects a type of mediating activity that decouples the metaphor of due process from the organizational and ideological structures which this metaphor supports.

Figure and ground in the analysis of social movements

Abstract: Social movements are great stinings that rattle and threaten the institutional order, attracting adherents whose motivations are diverse and producing manifold effects in society. The na’ive observer selects only certain of these motivations and effects and treats them as the significant, representative, or essential features of the movement. Commonsense explanations for the movement typically treat this highly selective picture as if it were a balanced or complete account of the movement. To a considerable extent the sophisticated observer and the social scientist follow a similar procedure, sorting adherent motivations and movement effects into figure and ground, and constructing a theory of movement dynamics to explain figure rather than ground. The assumptions underlying this separation between figure and ground are often not made explicit, and advocates of competing theories often debate their versions of movement dynamics as if they were competing explanations for the same phenomena, when this is not the case. In this article I wish to suggest that recent fashions in movement analysis incorporate to a large extent a revised image of what is figure and what is ground in movement effects. While debates have ranged explicitly about the utility of disproportionate or even exclusive attention to organization and the control of resources as explanatory variables, the reconceptualization of movement effects in terms of figure and ground has remained largely implicit. But the relevance of theory depends upon what it explains. So a clear statement of what is to be explained must preceed any assessment of the utility of competing approaches and theories. The body of recent work to which I refer consists of elaborations and applications of resource mobilization theory. In the earliest extended exposition of this approach, Oberschall ( 1973:27) suggests that social change and conflict be viewed as “mobilizing, converting, and transferring resources from one group and one arena of action to other groups and

Going astray with a logical scheme

Abstract: For purposes of clarification it is desirable to point out at the very beginning that the title of the Lewis and Smith book (“American Sociology and Pragmatism: Mead, Chicago Sociology and Symbolic Interaction”) is very much of a misnomer. On the basis of the title one would expect at least a modest coverage of the following significant topics: the distinctive nature of pragmatism as a form of philosophy; the importance of its particular picture of human action, based on functional psychology and reflecting the practical character of American frontier life; the ways in which this philosophical and psychological perspective played into the formation of early American sociology; the ways, in turn, by which early American sociological thought with its reform motif played back on pragmatic philosophy; the manner in which American pragmatism entered into and affected the development of sociological thought and research at the University of Chicago; the place of George Herbert Mead in the formation of that thought and research; and finally the ways in which the social psychological thought of Mead exercized influence on what has come to be called “symbolic interactionism.” But the book is far from presenting such an expected coverage. Instead, Lewis and Smith have picked out a recondite philosophical issue-the scholastic issue of “nominalism” versus “realism”-and used this issue to construct a narrowly conceived picture of pragmatism, Chicago Sociology, and symbolic interactionism. The result is a big void in their account. The nominalism-realism theme which Lewis and Smith use to give direction and substance to their book comes from the issue in scholastic philosophy as to whether “universals” (general items) are real or whether only “particulars” (individual objects) are real; for example, whether “redness” as a universal is real or whether only red objects are real. Philosophically, the position of “realism” is that universals are real while the position of “nominalism” is that only particular objects are real; for the nominalist, a universal (such as redness) is only a word or label that is attached to real individuals. The

G. h. mead's social behaviorism vs. the astructural bias of symbolic interactionism*

Abstract: Symbolic interactionism has been criticized for having an astructural bias. This paper presents a response to that criticism by examining the ontological stance contained in Mead’s social behaviorism and contrasting it with the ontological stance of symbolic interactionism’s chief architect, Herbert Blumer. Mead’s social behaviorism is shown to be a nondualist philosophy of conduct based solidly on conceptions of the human community and of individual conduct as organized on the basis of social acts-a view not shared by Blumer. Symbolic interactionists have been criticized in recent years for their predominately qualitative approach to empirical inquiry and for their failure to deal adequately with social structure. Many criticisms imply that these biases are inherent in the perspective of symbolic interactionism. McPhail and Rexroat (1979) systematically consider the charge of an epistemological bias favoring qualitative forms of empirical inquiry. They contend that criticisms of a qualitative bias are more appropriately leveled against Blumer’s (1969) version of symbolic interactionism than against Mead’s social behaviorism. Stryker (1980) addresses the charge that symbolic interactionists inadequately deal with the facts of social structure and power, implying that these criticisms are more true of Blumer than Mead. We examine Mead’s social behaviorism and its ontological stance in order to assess the criticism of an astructural bias in symbolic interactionism. We contend that Mead’s philosophy of conduct-social behaviorism-does not entail an astructural bias such as that found in Blumer’s symbolic interactionism. The argument proceeds in two main steps: 1) an exposition of Mead’s social behaviorism, its aims and concerns, central

Language and the Self: An Expanded View from a Symbolic Interactionist Perspective*

Abstract: Language and the self are two of the most important elements in Mead’s account of human development and action. Despite the importance of language and the self to symbolic interactionism, little attention has been devoted to exploring their interrelationhip, either theoretically or empirically. Some reasons for this neglect are suggested. By merging Mead’s view of language and the self with a functional linguistic perspective new possibilities are displayed for expanding our understanding of this relationship. These are developed by considering the: a) ontogenetic, b) categorical, c) expressive, d) performative, and e) transformative aspects of the interrelationship between language and the self. Within the symbolic interactionist tradition language and the self have been held as essential for understanding human action. While the self has been the object of much symbolic interactionist attention, and language relatively little, the relationship between the two has been virtually ignored. Little has been done by symbolic interactionists, or others, to expand on Mead’s original formulations regarding this relationship, despite its fundamental, though often implicit, importance for symbolic interactionist accounts of human behavior. With a few exceptions (Denzin, 1972; Nash, Thomas, and Weigert, 1973; Guy and Allen, 1976) these Meadian formulations have been taken as articles of faith rather than starting points for research. In the first instance this may be due to a failure to restate and clarify Mead’s general formulations regarding language and the self in any systematic fashion. Symbolic interactionists, in general, have been largely content to accept these formulations as preempirical assumptions rather than develop them to a point where testable propositions could be derived from them.’ The failure to take up this task may be due in part to its obvious linguistic implications. Sociologists’ sometimes stifling respect for disciplinary boundaries has led to a tendency to define concerns with language as the stuff of linguistics, not sociology (Labov, 1978). And although some symbolic interactionists deserve exemption from such criticism, as Grimshaw (1969) has noted, most sociologists simply find it easier to take language and speech for granted rather than venture into the mysterious world of linguistics.

The real nature of pragmatism and chicago sociology

Abstract: It has been some time since pragmatism was examined systematically by sociologists, and in American Sociology and Pragmatism J.David Lewis and Richard L. Smith attempt not only to revise ideas that the philosophies of C.S.Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead form a continuous tradition, but also that Mead, currently the most well-known of these pragmatists among American sociologists, was in fact marginal to the Chicago school of sociology with whom he now is so closely associated. Two other notable sociological studies of pragmatism that come to mind are C. Wright Mills’ posthumously published dissertation, Sociology and Pragmatism, and Durkheim’s Pragmatisme et Sociologie. Mills was interested primarily in examining the social context of pragmatism in American intellectual life, not its influences on the development of Chicago sociology, and Durkheim gave a lecture course in 1913-14 later published from student notes in 1955 as Pragmatisme et Sociologie. In these lectures Durkheim concentrated on James, Dewey, and F.C.S. Schiller, and to a lesser extent Peirce, but Mead is not even mentioned in Durkheim’s text. Similarly Mills devoted whole chapters to Peirce, James, and Dewey, and Mead is mentioned only in a few passing references, although Mills regretted his scant attention to Mead in a postscript. Though Mead may have exerted much influence on colleagues and students at the University of Chicago, these omissions suggest that he was not regarded widely as one of the major pragmatists until after the publication of his writings and lectures as books in the 1930s. American Sociology and Pragmatism attempts to carry out two purposes: first, to show two “clearly separable” forms of pragmatism-a realist version characterized by Peirce and approximated by Mead, and a nominalist variety illustrated by James and Dewey; and second, to separate Mead from the mainstream of early Chicago sociology and from symbolic interactionism. The authors’ argument hangs by a single thread, illustrated by their methodological statement that:

A Self‐Image Inventory: Its Theoretical Background, Reliability and Validity*

Abstract: Wylie (1974) points out that there is a lack of adequate theoretical development in the investigation of the self-concept. The result is a proliferation of operational definitions with no clear understanding of the relationship between operations, between constructs. and between the constructs and their operationalizations. In this article we make explicit the theoretical component of self to which this Self-Image Inventory relates. The article presents the inventory and twenty years of research experience with it. The inventory is found to be both reliable and valid for measuring the self-image as a role specific component of self.

Putting the Symbol in Symbolic Interaction1Sm: A Rejoinder

Abstract: From Copemicus to Darwin, the history of science is replete with evidence that the initial response of the scientific community to revolutionary ideas is often skepticism if not a quasi-religious sense of righteous indignation. The reception of American Sociology and Pragmatism has proven no exception. This is as it should be. Robert Merton, who quite probably understands the workings of modem science as well as any living sociologist, reminds us that the scientific community’s attitude of “organized skepticism,” as he terms it, functions to eliminate many theories which might otherwise clog the wheels of scientific progress. And yet, reflecting the Spencerian notion of survival of the fittest, a few ideas overcome this initial skepticism and repudiation, eventually becoming accepted as fundamentally important insights. As Peirce was found of saying, truth, like the phoenix, may be crushed to earth for a time but will rise again from its ashes so long as free and scientific minds continue inquiry. Thus, we are neither surprised nor disturbed by the skeptical reception of American Sociology and Pragmatism. Only history will tell which ideas from the book may be resurrected from their ashes and which will be deservedly left to bum. In the meantime, we can only hope to move the current debate forward by avoiding preoccupation with peripheral questions. The basic criticisms of Part 1 of the book are that the methodology is too restrictive or reductionistic and that we have misclassified the pragmatists and sociologists on the nominalisdrealism criterion or that the criterion is not applicable. In Chapter 1 of the book, we explained the advantages and disadvantages of the methodology we adopted. Those who investigate American pragmatism and sociology with different questions in mind may appropriately adopt different methodologies as we did in Part 2. We only ask that enough intellectual tolerance be exercised to allow us the

Credits and craft production: freelance social organization in the hollywood film industry, 1964–1978*

Abstract: This paper describes a system of work and patterns of productivity in the Hollywood film industry. Describing the social organization of the film industry entails two primary tasks. One is to describe the administration of work activities among technical specialists. The second is to investigate empirically the organization of those work activities. We argue that because of the particular needs of filmmaking, efficiency is achieved utilizing craft methods of work administration. An analysis of longitudinal data on film specialist’s productivity provides some preliminary answers to Becker’s theoretical idea of the recurrent nature of work activities in the production of art works. Finally, accounting for the disproportionate work contributions among specialists, some explanations are offered based upon an analysis of the process by which coalitions of specialists are joined. This is an empirical study of a major American industry organized along craft modes of production-specifically , a study of the freelance administration of work among producers, directors, screenwriters, and cinematographers in the film business. Our problem is to “understand” a rather extensive network of collective action in the crude, almost a-theoretical sense of being able to discern the shape of work distribution, to show how temporary work coalitions (the benchmark of craft organization) create enduring social structures, and to distinguish the highly productive participants from those who are not. We seek to clarify empirically the practice and outcomes of freelancing. The effort will be directed not to the formulation of a comprehensive analysis of craft production but to a detailed consideration of some aspects of it. Even a cursory review of recent literature on “art worlds” and “craft worlds” impresses the reader with a number of promising directions. Substantively, empirical research has directed attention to collective action in the recurrent work activities of newspaper,

Working for television: the social organization of tv drama*

Abstract: Data collected in a case study of a British TV play provide the basis for an analysis of the social organization of TV drama production. The perceived needs of mass audiences and the ways in which the technical requirements of television are interpreted and acted upon set the preconditions for the ongoing interaction between actors, directors and technicians. The conventions of TV production are upheld and reinforced by continued use, though subject to renegotiation by all participants.

Realism in Organizational Theory: A Reassessment*

Abstract: Among organizational theorists, the old debate concerning the reality of social groups has been largely settled in favor of a realist position, which portrays organizations as natural entities that have many of the properties of living beings. I argue in this article that an alternative, interactionist view has been too lightly regarded as a general framework for organizational analysis. This view is defended on descriptive grounds, and its normative advantages are discussed.

“za dusha”: an interpretation of funeral practices in macedonia*

Abstract: Anthropologists and sociologists have generally approached an understanding of funeral rituals in terms of their psychological or social consequences. Such functional analyses have typically depended on regarding ritual behaviors as learned reponses that symbolically create or affirm the society’s organizational “rules”. An alternative or supplemental approach is the view that ritual behavior, and thus ritual content, results from purposive interactions between individuals determined by their interpretations of the ritual’s interactive situation. An elaboration of this view is offered in an examination of funeral practices in the developing city of Skopje in Yugoslav Macedonia where the many commemoratives for the dead typically result in great costs of time, money and effort. Variations and changes in funeral rituals are related to different strategies of adjustment to the city, and, in particular, to the creation and maintenance of relationships within a network of specific others that is essential to urban adaptation. Ritual is also described as providing a means of social boundary maintenance, in addition to the creation of these social networks, thus limiting obligations and claims on resources.

The informed client: a case study in the illusion of autonomy*

Abstract: Much of the sociological literature on the client-physician relationship makes two assumptions. The first is that clients are socialized to passivity in the relationship while physicians are socialized to dominance. The second is that a client is constrained from being informed about his or her own condition and from acting on that information autonomously (see, for example, Mechanic, 1978; Parsons, 1951; Suchman, 1965). Today, there is evidence of a consumer movement among health care clients which suggests that the passive patient may be a vanishing species. First, there is written material available which enables patients to assume a more active role in their own health care. Three kinds of books appear frequently in libraries and bookstores: critiques of the medical profession; blueprints for evaluating care in specific crises; and self-help manuals. The “critiques” vary in form and focus, but may have the generalized effect of spreading doubt about the efficacy of medical procedures, the precision with which doctors work, and the ethics which motivate their actions (see, for example, Kotelchuk, 1976; Millman, 1977). As an example of the “blueprint” literature, Crile’s What Women Should Know About the Breast Cancer Controversy (1973) warns women against blind acceptance of a doctor’s advice. The “self-help” manuals suggest that laypeople can and

A case study of two types of officer‐inmate interaction in a correctional establishment*

Abstract: The paper argues that because studies of correctional institutions favor a focus upon inmates rather than a concentration upon the interaction between inmates and officers, it is quite likely that many accounts of prison life are distorted. Therefore, a focus upon this interaction is recommended in order to achieve a fuller and more accurate description of correctional social structure. An illustrative case is presented which compares officer interactions with two types of inmates in a minimum security institution in the United States Northeast. These two types of interactions present the bases of order and disorder in a correctional establishment from the perspectives of both officers and inmates. The case study is linked to recent correctional literature to propose some generalizations concerning social order in correctional institutions.

Role Performance and Person Perception: Toward an Interactions Approach

Abstract: This paper examines and critiques the manner in which one strand of attribution theory has addressed the relationship between role performances and person perception. An interactionist approach is formulated as an alternative, and an experiment is designed to test its viability. The experiment supports our hypothesis that the informational value of “in-role” performances is similar to the informational value of “out-of-role” performances, and that neither type of performance is consistently more informative than the other. Further, it is suggested that the informational value of role performances is not adequately explained by the in-role/out-of-role dichotomy. The interactionist conception of role, combined with a notion of informal role types, provides a more accurate understanding of role performance and person perception. Attribution theory is concerned with how common-sense actors explain social action and its consequences. A fundamental distinction is made between those lay explanations which emphasize “external,” “environmental,” “situational,” or “contextual” causes, and those that stress “internal,” or “personal” factors. Drawing inspiration from the seminal work of Heider (1944, 1958), and adopting the well-known Lintonian conception of role, one strand of attribution theory has established the theoretical and empirical parameters for the study of the relationship between role performance and person perception. This position holds that the relative causal hegemony of personal factors versus role expectations determines the degree to which acts are “informative” about the personal characteristics of actors. Acts determined primarily by role expectations are not informative about persons. Acts caused primarily by personal factors are very informative. We propose that recent experimental studies of attitude attribution, considered in conjunction with important innovations in role theory, provide a better basis for understanding the dynamics underlying this relationship. We question attribution theory’s basic explanatory