Showing papers in "The Strategic Review for Southern Africa in 2020"

Global Coloniality and the Challenges of Creating African Futures

Abstract: 1. Introduction This article grapples with the interconnected and intertwined issues of coloniality of power, knowledge and being as constitutive elements of global coloniality as a power structure which makes it difficult for Africans to create their own futures. The central arguments are articulated in five sections. The first section sets the scene on how global coloniality tried to disable African agency, how Africans were deliberately colonised mentally so as to make them reproduce coloniality as they tried to make history, and how Africans have been portrayed as 'bystanders' in the making of history. All this has direct and indirect implications on present day African struggles to create African futures. The second section unpacks and explains what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) posed as the 'political constitution of the present' and what Noam Chomsky (2011) rendered as 'how the world works'. An analysis of both the constitution and workings of modern global power is an important intellectual task because global coloniality has direct implications on African initiatives aimed at creating African futures. The concept of coloniality of power is deployed in section two to assist in critical examination of the construction, constitution, architecture, configuration and workings/practices of the current asymmetrical global power structures. The third section focuses on the pertinent issues of what Claude Ake (1979) described as knowledge for equilibrium that sustains the present status quo through colonisation of African imaginations of the future. The concept of coloniality of knowledge is mobilised and utilised to systematically interrogate epistemicides that enabled the dominance of imperial/colonial reason and explaining how these processes culminated in colonisation of African minds and destabilisation of African imaginations of the future. The fourth section deals with the fundamental issue of racialisation of notions of being that make it hard for Africans to realise their full potential as active subjects capable of shaping their futures. The concept of coloniality of being is used to reveal the complex processes of subjection and subjectivity that play a role as Africans try to create African futures. The last section is the conclusion and it underscores the need to intensify the 'incomplete' struggles for decolonisation of the modern world system and deimperialisation of the current global orders so as to open the way for African people to create their futures unencumbered by global coloniality and its resilient racism ideologies. 2. The present as the future The African Union's (AU) Agenda 2063 envisions an African future of pan-African unity, integration, prosperity, and peace. This vision is placed in the hands of African people as drivers and dynamic forces operating within the global arena. Pan-Africanism is identified as the overarching ideological framework for unity, self-reliance, integration, and solidarity (African Union 2013). This future will not be a game of chance. It will be a product of present day struggles ranged against coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being as constitutive elements of global coloniality. Thus thinking deeper about the possibility of Africans creating their own futures, taking charge of their own destiny, and mapping their own autonomous development trajectory reminds one of Karl Marx's arguments about people making history but under circumstances they have not chosen. This is the situation within which Africans are struggling to create African futures. They are doing so within the context of global coloniality. This means that for the AU to realise its Agenda 2063 it has to struggle ceaselessly against global coloniality. Only after defeating global coloniality can the AU then lead Africans in creating African futures. This is important precisely because, in a historical sense, the modern world system and its shifting global orders is largely a creation of Europeans and North Americans. …

The dynamics of epistemological decolonisation in the 21st century: towards epistemic freedom

Abstract: The problem of the 21st century in the knowledge domain is best rendered as the ‘epistemic line’. It cascades directly from William E B Dubois’s ‘colour line’ which haunted the 20th century and provoked epic struggles for political decolonisation. The connection between the ‘colour line’ and the ‘epistemic line’ is in the racist denial of the humanity of those who became targets of enslavement and colonisation. The denial of humanity automatically disqualified one from epistemic virtue. This conceptual study, therefore explores in an overview format, how Africa in particular and the rest of the Global South in general became victims of genocides, epistemicides, linguicides, and culturecides. It delves deeper into the perennial problems of ontological exiling of the colonised from their languages, cultures, names, and even from themselves while at the same time highlighting how the colonised refused to succumb to the ‘silences’ and fought for epistemic freedom. The article introduces such useful analytical concepts as ‘epistemic freedom’ as opposed to ‘academic freedom’; ‘provincialisation’; ‘deprovincialisation’; ‘epistemological decolonisation’; ‘intellectual extroversion’; and ‘epistemic dependence’. It ends with an outline of five-ways-forward in the African struggles for epistemic freedom predicated on (i) return to the base/locus of enunciation; (ii) shifting the geo-and bio-of knowledge/moving the centre; (iii) decolonising the normative foundation of critical theory; (iv) rethinking thinking itself; and finally (v) learning to unlearn in order to relearn.

Regional Hegemonic Contention and the Asymmetry of Soft Power: A Comparative Analysis of South Africa and Nigeria

Abstract: 1. Introduction In the past couple of years, there have been rigorous attempts by scholars to examine the power architecture within Africa drawing largely from general international relations theories and frameworks to make inferences about the location and exercise of power and influence (Ogunnubi 2013; Flemes 2009; Habib 2009; Adebajo and Mustapha 2008; Hassan and Omotola 2008; Bach 2007; Mazrui 2006; Alden and Mills 2005; Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan 1998). Since the celebrated entry of South Africa into the African democratic space, the resultant implication has been a change in the contours of power and leadership equations in Africa. At the recently concluded 80 years celebration of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), (1) specific attention was paid to dissecting the increasing role of pivotal states such as South Africa and Nigeria within Africa and the global South. On the other hand, Nigeria has just emerged as Africa's biggest economy--a profile its officials are quick to allude to as qualifying it as Africa's 'Gulliver'. What is evident from the above is that, despite inherent domestic flaws, the influence of both Nigeria and South Africa has been on the ascendancy particularly in the last two decades. Scholars have remained undecided about the best concept to describe the influence of both Nigeria and South Africa with a number of suggestions ranging from middle power, emerging middle power, pivotal states, regional power, to regional hegemon, secondary power, regional hegemonic power etc (see Sidiropoulos 2014; Ogunnubi 2013; Flemes and Wojczewski 2010; Habib 2009; Flemes 2009, 2007; Van der Westhuizen 2007; Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan 1998). For the purpose of this article, we identify both countries as regional hegemonic powers defined not only by their superior power advantages, political, economic capabilities and ideational membership within Africa, but also their combined capacity for considerable influence on their regional neighbours. A regional hegemonic power thus enjoys a measure of acceptance of its regional leadership although this is not deemed a prerequisite for the exercise of influence. Operating within a regional hegemonic system, a regional hegemonic power is considered a powerful actor that wields a superior level of influence within a delimited region which it belongs to (Ogunnubi and Uzodike 2015). However, despite the rich literature on regional studies, there seems to be a dearth of literature on a comparative study of regional leadership, particularly in Africa, resulting in a lack of empirically verifiable conclusions. Relatedly, the theme of soft power in Africa is under-researched both by Western and African scholars. In fact, hardly any study exists that comparatively examines the nexus between soft power and regional hegemony (especially for Africa). This comparative study of both Nigeria and South Africa therefore affords us the opportunity of offering a more nuanced geo-political assessment of the requirements for regional hegemonic status that fits into an African context. While a comparative analysis of the soft power potentials and capabilities of two of Africa's biggest powers provides some insight into the soft power potentials of the continent given its rich cultural history, it also gives an indication of who between Nigeria and South Africa, is more likely to become Africa's hegemon through an effective use and management of hard and soft power capabilities. Therefore the article contends that soft power presents a reasonable yardstick for a proper estimation of Nigeria and South Africa's legitimate claim and regional acceptance of their continental hegemonic position among other countries within the African region as primus inter pares. However, this is not unmindful of the fact that soft power is a partial and qualified barometer of power especially given the problem of measurement and the assortment of soft power elements different countries possess. …

Critical themes in south africa's foreign policy: an overview

Abstract: 1. Introduction In his state of the nation address on 14 February 2013, President Jacob Zuma re-iterated some of the essential leitmotifs which have shaped South Africa's foreign policy since 1994 and echoed very similar values, emphases, and priorities as those which underpinned the presidencies of his predecessors, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. He talked, inter alia, about contributing to a stronger African Union (AU), supporting efforts to build a more stable and peaceful continent, building the pillars of South-South cooperation through BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), and strengthening North-South relations particularly with the United States (US), Europe, and Japan (Zuma, 2013). In short, President Zuma was referring to the very strong foreign policy foundation and legacy he had inherited in promoting South Africa's international engagements and external relations, a foundation that is essentially held together by the mortar of its moral capital, normative agency, and political stature. However, there are legitimate concerns that this capital, agency, and stature are fast depreciating because of recent missteps and strategic blunders in the conduct of South Africa's foreign policy, especially under President Zuma's watch (Le Pere, 2013). While obviously subject to debate and contestation, reference is often made to South Africa's controversial tenure on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the ongoing Dalai Lama visa debacles, the misguided and divisive campaign to win the chair of the AU's Commission, and the tragic military misadventure in the Central African Republic. But probably most egregious was the embarrassment of 'Guptagate' when a planeload of private wedding guests arriving from India was allowed to land at a secure military base in Pretoria, officially designated as a 'national key-point' rather than the international airport outside Johannesburg. Media innuendo flew fast and furious that the plane was allowed special landing-rights at the military base since the wedding guests were family and friends of the dynastic Gupta family who not only had accumulated enormous wealth since settling in South Africa but were closely associated with Jacob Zuma who allegedly had sanctioned circumventing official protocol. These are worrying trends since the country's foreign policy over nearly two decades since its democratic transition is, arguably, one of the most successful and inspiring areas of post-apartheid public affairs and has been built on the paradoxical legacy of the racialised apartheid state and the values of the African National Congress (ANC)-led liberation movement. Above all, South Africa's activist foreign policy agenda since 1994 has been premised on a belief in the compatibility of human rights, democracy, solidarity politics and its own development needs. This is buttressed by multilateralism and adherence to international law and conventions as the strategic anchors for pursuing foreign policy goals and implicitly, by the enduring notion of South Africa's presumed status as one of the de facto leaders of the African continent and indeed, of the global South (Alden and Le Pere 2009). The orthodoxies and axioms which guided the first two presidential periods it seems, have been maintained and affirmed in the era of Zuma albeit with a more streamlined and less ambitious menu and shorn of the ideological and crusading shibboleths that had characterised the Mbeki presidency. At least this is what the last two ANC party conferences resolved at Polokwane in December 2007 and at Mangaung in October 2012. The Zuma era has thus been adaptive and continuous in terms of the normative charters which guided his predecessors, with the centre of gravity less concentrated in the Presidency than was the case during the Mbeki years. The Zuma Presidency was itself a product of intense intra-party politics and factionalism but which ultimately sought to place renewed emphasis on the welfare concerns of the ANC's broader constituencies, particularly in addressing the legacies of poverty, inequality, and unemployment. …

How and why zanu-pf won the 2013 zimbabwe elections

Abstract: 1. Introduction In the March 2008 'harmonized' elections in Zimbabwe, (1) the Movement for Democratic Change (Tsvangirai) (MDC-T) scored the narrowest of victories over the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in the race for the House of Assembly, by 100 seats to 99, with the splinter Movement for Democratic Change (Mutumbara) (MDC-M) winning another 10 constituencies, with one more taken by an independent. (2) In the Presidential race, MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai outpaced incumbent Robert Mugabe, by officially taking 47.9 per cent of the poll compared to the latter's 43.2 per cent. However, the long delay of five weeks between the close of polls and the official announcement of the result implied strongly that the margin of difference between the two front-runners had actually been larger. Nonetheless, official denial that the challenger had won more than 50 per cent of the poll (plus one vote) meant that the two leading candidates were forced into a presidential run-off, and as is well known, the level of violence subsequently orchestrated by the ruling party was so great that Tsvangirai ultimately pulled out of the contest to save his supporters' skins. But now the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) decreed that his withdrawal had happened too late, and that the election would continue, and with MDC supporters cowed, Mugabe officially went on to record a 90.2 per cent victory. ZANU-PF had bludgeoned its way to a win in the election that really mattered (the executive long having subordinated the legislature to its will in Mugabe's Zimbabwe), and the scene was set for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to negotiate a Global Political Agreement (GPA), signed in September 2008, which installed a coalition government, with Tsvangirai serving as Prime Minister but Mugabe retaining the presidency. How different things were in 2013! The elections, held on 31 July, saw Mugabe trouncing Tsvangirai by 61.1 per cent to 33.9 per cent in the first round presidential poll. This was matched in the Assembly elections, ZANU-PF securing a landslide in the Assembly elections, winning 160 constituencies to the MDC-T's 49 (with a further seat won by an independent). In addition, ZANU-PF won 37 out of 60 extra seats which, with the promulgation of a new constitution in January 2013, were reserved for women, each of the country's ten provinces electing six candidates according to the proportion of the total votes won by parties' constituency candidates. Overall, therefore, in a National Assembly comprising 270 seats, ZANU-PF secured a total of 197, compared to 70 for the MDC-T, 2 for the MDC-M, and the one independent. Likewise, in the elections to the Senate, elected proportionately in the same way as proportional representation seats for women in the Assembly, ZANU-PF trounced the MDC by 37 to 21. In sum, this meant that ZANU-PF had won more than the two-thirds majority required for amending the recently agreed constitution. (3) ZANU-PF thereupon claimed that voters' had 'come home' to the party of liberation, and that Zimbabwe was back on course after the confusions and compromises of the GPA coalition period. Both wings of the MDC cried foul. Local monitoring groups, such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), (as well as a report by the SADC lawyers' association) (4) supported them, their principal complaint being that ZANU-PF had grossly manipulated the voters' roll and had used its longstanding control of government to subvert the entire electoral machinery in order to secure its victory. Western commentators, including the United States (US) and the British government, together with the European Union (EU), largely agreed with them, although they had been officially barred from sending official monitoring and observer groups. However, despite stating that they had their reservations about the conduct of the poll, the observer groups sent by the African Union (AU) and SADC, declared the elections as credible and fair. …

"A Festival of Brigands": In Search of Democracy and Political Legitimacy in Mali

Abstract: 1 Introduction: A surprise collapse Mali is a nation with a proud history, of legendary empires and kings dating back over centuries, of vast quantities of gold and of fabled conquests Since its independence from France in 1960, however, Mali has been a beggar on the world stage, among the poorest of the world's modern nation-states In terms of climate and geography, its people face daunting handicaps: malaria is endemic, regular droughts threaten agricultural production in southern Mali, while in its arid northern regions farming is only possible in a few irrigated zones along the Niger River The country has always been highly dependent on foreign aid, annual disbursements of which ranged between US$500 and $1 000 million in constant dollar values, amounting to 12 per cent of gross national income in 2009 (Van de Walle 2012: 3-4) Nonetheless, for most of the last two decades Mali was widely hailed as a good example in an otherwise troubled region In 1991 a popular uprising culminating in a coup mounted by an army colonel named Amadou Toure (usually known in Mali as 'ATT') ended the 23-year reign of General Moussa Traore, the country's autocratic president An era of multiparty politics and liberalisation followed the adoption of a new constitution in 1992 Alpha Konare, who won free presidential elections that year, reformed state institutions and negotiated an end to a long-simmering rebellion by nomadic Tuareg in the north, where no central government had ever had much control Konare stepped down in 2002, respecting a constitutional two-term limit The election to succeed him was won by ATT, whom many Malians fondly remembered for driving out dictatorship 11 years earlier He belonged to no political party, and characterised his governing style as consensus-based rather than partisan He was elected to a second five-year term in 2007 In sub-Saharan Africa, where heads of state routinely change their constitutions to acquire more power or remain in office indefinitely, Mali stood out Most observers believed the country had successfully negotiated the transition to democracy Malians were still poor under Konare and ATT, but were believed to be subject to the rule of law rather than the whims of Big Men Mali was stable and, most foreign observers (including me) believed, heading in the right direction--toward a more responsive government, greater freedom, and better lives for its citizens Mali was a donor favorite and an international tourist destination, the venue of trendy cultural and music festivals Then, on 21 March 2012, Malian troops at the barracks in Kati, just outside the capital city Bamako, launched a mutiny after a visit by their defence minister The issue appeared to be the government's two-month old campaign against a resurgent Tuareg rebellion in the north: rank-and-file soldiers distrusted their commanders and accused officials in Bamako of withholding equipment and support After one contingent of mutineers took over the state broadcasting facility in the afternoon, another stormed the presidential palace President Toure went into hiding, just weeks before scheduled elections to choose his successor (Jeune Afrique 2012b) Malians who tuned in to state television the next morning saw what looked like a throwback to an Africa of decades past, as a lieutenant in camouflage fatigues announced the suspension of the constitution and the creation of a ruling military authority, "putting an end to the incompetent and disavowed regime of Mr Amadou Toumani Toure" (ORTM 2012) An army captain, his camouflage cap pulled low over his eyes, then read a brief appeal for calm; a caption identified him as Amadou Haya Sanogo, the leader of Mali's new ruling junta Governments throughout Africa, Europe and North America, along with international organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), quickly condemned the Bamako coup …

Thoughts on xenophobia, disruptive nation and “Man on Ground”

Abstract: Stories of Africans displaced by war taking high risks to get to an often inhospitable Western Europe are frequently in the news. But sub-Saharan Africa is the region which hosts the largest population of refugees in the world. Refugees who flee to sub-Saharan African countries are also frequently subjected to xenophobic exclusion and violence by people who sometimes claim to be defending rights and privileges associated with national belonging. My aims are to point out new avenues for novel insights into the interrelations between xenophobia, disruption and nation by giving attractive detail and depth to the discussion using Director Akin Omotoso's Man on Ground (2011); putting forward arguments against xenophobic stereotypes and violence; pointing out some pitfalls of nation-building; and by finding and imagining human ground amidst disruptive nationhood. What is offered is a new synthesis of philosophical insights that defies distinctions between African and Western philosophy. Going beyond nativism and xenophobia, this synthesis speaks of the need and possibility to craft common human ground that enables people to become the most they can be. 1. Introduction Stories of Africans displaced by war taking high risks to get to an often inhospitable Western Europe are frequently in the news. Readers of the news can be forgiven for forgetting that according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as of June 2015 the 4.1 million refugees in sub-Saharan Africa make it the region which hosts the largest population of refugees in the world (McConnel 2015: 2). Those refugees who flee to sub-Saharan African countries are also frequently subjected to xenophobic exclusion and violence by people who sometimes claim to be defending rights and privileges associated with national belonging. While noticing how the nation-state has associations with nationalist violence, I will neither discuss this view critically nor will I assume an extreme view against the current and ongoing necessity of the nation-state. Instead I hold a priori that the nation-state has assumed the role of securing the safety and well-being of those who live within its legitimated boundaries, and that it plays a role in regulating interstate relations. Pursuant upon recognising the disruptive forms of the nation-state, my aims are to point out new avenues for novel insights into the interrelations that bind xenophobia, disruption and nation by giving attractive detail and depth to the discussion using Director Akin Omotoso's Man on Ground (2011); (1) putting forward arguments against xenophobic stereotypes and violence; pointing out some pitfalls of nation-building; (2) to finally finding and imagining human ground amidst disruptive nationhood. I will not pursue traditional philosophical 'family squabbles' about the nature and form of African philosophy, the role of government in building its citizenry, etc. Instead I am interested in the believable issues that affect everyday lives--issues that Man on Ground creatively portrays. What will materialise is a new synthesis of philosophical insights that defies distinctions between African and Western philosophy. There is something desirable, I reckon, about how such an outcome coheres deeply with my, arguably, cosmopolitan concern to recognise and make cultural gains from the materials our shared humanity gives us. 2. Man on Ground In Man on Ground action is set in the context of fictionalised xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The narrative follows the strands of experience of several key actors in a way that effectively relate how, even in the difficulties of their everyday hardships, people are actively engaged in strategically and tactically thinking, feeling, experimenting and negotiating right action. It takes place against the backdrop of xenophobic mob violence that has regularly taken place in South Africa. …

The aftermath of the arab spring and its implication for peace and development in the sahel and sub-saharan africa

Abstract: 1. Introduction The Arab Spring that started in Tunisia, and quickly spread to other Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, is one of the greatest contemporary surprises of global political development, especially in the Arab world between 2010 and 2011. Borrowing from Huntington's 'Third Wave' democracy, one could conclude that the revolution that inundated the Arab states could in effect be considered a 'Fourth Wave' democratisation process, except for the fact that the aftermath was a movement from revolution to political uncertainty and instability. Having been under dictatorial and authoritarian regimes for such a long time, the sudden revolts in these countries were not expected to have taken place so rapidly. Scholars of Middle East and North Africa did not envisage that an all-ravaging Arab Spring was imminent and would cut across the whole region, even when all factors pointed to this possibility; in fact, they were busy analysing factors that had sustained autocrats like Mubarak, Gaddafi, Ben Ali, Al-Assad and the like when the revolution started (Gause 2011). However, the unanimity of the action and the spread were understandable. Countries in the region, particularly the Arab nations, share similarities in language (Arabic) and religion (Islam) which have given them a unique and homogeneous identity, making them see themselves as one--a oneness that has been demonstrated on several occasions against the United States (US), Western and Israeli interests. Further, the spontaneity of the Arab Spring has provoked academic interest with studies either addressing the collective Arab revolution, or individual state revolutions within the Arab states. For instance, Nwolise (2011) interrogated the causes and curses of the Arab Spring in five Arab states--Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen--and implications for Sub-Saharan African countries. Aday et al (2012) explored how the media was used to execute the revolution in four Arab states, namely Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen. In turn, Honwana (2011) investigated the role of the youth and other factors responsible for the success of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, while Sharqieh (2011) suggested imperatives that must guide a successful peace-building process in post-revolution Libya. For years to come, the Arab Spring will continue to provoke academic interest and discourse, not only from the angle of the eruption and explosion of peoples' power that uprooted age long autocratic regimes when it was least expected, but also because there are many issues that scholarship is yet to unravel. For instance, while the revolution ended the most enduring autocratic regimes in the MENA region, the end of the regimes in some countries like Libya liberalised access to small arms and light weapons, which found their way to the Sahel and other parts of Africa. In most cases, weapons get into the hands of rebels and terrorist groups who have continued to use arms against already fragile states. It is against this backdrop that this paper interrogates the implication of the aftermath of the Arab Spring for the peace, security and development of the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa. 2. The Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa The Arabic word sahil literally means the "shore", describing the appearance of the vegetation of the Sahel as a coastline delimiting the sand of the Sahara. The Sahel is the eco-climatic and bio-geographic zone of transition between the Sahara desert in the north and the Sudan Savannas in the south, having a semi-arid climate. It stretches across the north of the African continent between the Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea. The Sahel spans some 5 400 km (3 400 miles) from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Red Sea in the east, in a belt that varies from several hundred to a thousand kilometers (620 miles) in width, covering an area of 3 053 200 [km.sup.2] (1 178 800 sq mi). The post-colonial Sahel states comprise Burkina Faso, Chad, D'Jibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. …

Zimbabwe's Democracy in the Wake of the 2013 Election: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives

Abstract: 1. Introduction It is tempting to say that Zimbabwean democracy--in both its thin (liberal and multi-party) and thick (expanding modes of participation in all spheres of social existence) modes--has breathed its last. (1)) ZANU-PF's (2)) tricks, coercion, populism, regional peers' collusion, and the opposition's lackadaisical campaign resulted in a 31 July 2013 'victory' so big that even the party that has ruled Zimbabwe since 1980 was flabbergasted. A 61 per cent presidential count for the 89 year old Robert Gabriel Mugabe registered against the 61 year old Morgan Tsvangirai's 34 per cent. ZANU-PF's 197 seats in the national assembly to 70 for the MDC-T (3)) sealed nearly five years of a stalemated 'transitional inclusive government' (TIG), in which the two main parties 'shared' government (along with a deputy prime minister in a party splintered from the main MDC but that managed to keep its name: no one is quite certain how Arthur Mutambara, once the 'MDC's' leader but now without a parliamentary place got that post!) but in fact ZANU-PF used to rebuild its power (Raftopoulos 2013). Little of a democratic process has arrived in TIG's stead. ZANUPF may well hold on to the levers of state for the foreseeable future (Moore 2005; 2013b). The Open Democracy website positing 'farewell to Mugabe' just before the 2008 election has now been replaced by something like 'goodbye democracy' (Chan 2007; Bracking 2013--the latter being the most interesting and creative of analysis among scores of commentary on the election). As Henning Melber (2013) wrote "if we accept this as 'African democracy', we can kiss good-bye to the free will of the people and surrender our right to make choices to those who do not care for the people anyway". (4)) Melber then cited ZANU-PF's history of taking power even when losing popular votes, judicial malfeasance (most recently, the Constitutional Court upheld the ZANU-PF's request to hold the election far before meeting the stipulations of the Global Political Agreement (GPA)--the 'roadmap' to TIG--including, fundamentally, reform of the military-dominated registry and electoral commission), marshalling of the military and militia to its cause, torturing, killing, and raping (especially in the 2008 runoff), manipulating TIG, hiring a foreign gang of election mercenaries, and convincing its neighbours that such shenanigans (5)) deserved regional and international support. For the Solidarity Peace Trust (2013), the July election was 'the end of a road'. Yet democracy in Zimbabwe may not be dead. It might just be taking time to be born. 2. The explanation: Ideology or politics? Even the most dilatory reader of Antonio Gramsci or collector of his quotes knows that morbid symptoms are thrown up whilst new sociopolitical orders are on their way. And as Marx might well have said about the array of revolutionary possibilities these days--and it could well be argued that 'democracy' is or would be 'revolutionary' in many African countries--there is a shortage of good midwives. Indeed, one must enter the rocky terrain of whether the problems in (liberal) democratic consolidation lie in its unsuitability for 'African' social patterns, culture, ideology or if it is 'politics' wherein the stumbling blocks occur. The two spheres are intertwined of course, but an ideological 'base' does not determine a political 'superstructure' (of course, one will note that the 'economic' base is being ignored here--and it will remain to the side for the duration of this article). Indeed, to suggest that it does is to elude the space of agency that is politics--and the hard work it demands. ZANU-PF ideologue George Charamba (2013) (6)) performs such an illusion. Soon after the election he picked up Gramsci gleefully, writing in his weekly opinion piece in the state-run Herald that sometimes ideologies--and by implication the politics accompanying them --just don't fit the societies on which they are imposed, or into which they are imported from the centres of empire, so they can act at best as a cautionary note to those working within and on them. …

Asymmetrical conflict and human security: Reflections from Kenya

Abstract: This paper focuses on contemporary challenges to the human security framework through an examination of asymmetrical conflict generated by extremist insurgents, specifically Al Shabaab in Kenya. The political and security dynamics generated by extremist groups often find reinforcement in local contestations over power and territory, resulting in an interaction between local and 'external'. It is the product of these interactions in the form of opportunities, resultant discourses, responses and what they offer to an expansion of normative ideas about human security and conflict that this paper focuses on. Using Kenya as a case study, this paper explores the interface between the growth of Al Shabaab, securitisation of governance and political elite consensus on the policy relationship between human security versus a state security model. This paper pursues the argument that the rise in the intensity and nature of Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya has influenced the interpretation of the country's security threats and the application of strategies. Rather than aiding the application of human security as central to national security, it has rolled back previous gains.

Reconciliation in Zimbabwe: The Conflict between a State-Centred and People-Centred Approach

Abstract: Fieldwork was undertaken by the first author for her Master's dissertation on reconciliation in Zimbabwe titled, "The politicization of reconciliation in Zimbabwe: a case study of the Nkayi District". The second author, as supervisor of the Master's, participated in the fieldwork for a brief period. (http://hdl.handle.net/2263/43770)

China in Africa: A Threat to African Countries?

Abstract: China's growing presence in Africa has led to a debate about whether China is becoming a threat to African countries or not. While some argue that China is not posing any threat to Africa, others believe that China is not only a threat but also becoming a new coloniser. By exploring the existing literature, and the relevant information about China in Africa, this article demonstrates that there is an emerging contradiction in China's growing presence in Africa. This contradiction is manifest by the Chinese state's official policy toward Africa and the Chinese non-state actors' behaviour on the ground. While the former has long-term comprehensive interests in Africa, and therefore works toward building an equal and win-win Sino-African partnership, the latter, who in many cases are actually agents for the former to realise that partnership, have short-term 'for-profit interests' in Africa and therefore behave like an exploiter. This is one of the reasons why there are conflicting findings about China in Africa: while observers focusing on the Chinese government's official policy toward Africa tend to find that China is no threat to Africa, those who pay attention to the words and deeds of the Chinese non-state actors in Africa would find the opposite. The discussion of this contradiction is not only academically worthwhile but also practically important. In order to develop and maintain the 'constructive relations' with Africa, this contradiction in China's growing presence in Africa is arguably one of the largest challenges that the Chinese government has to deal with today. 1. Introduction China is a rising power in the world today. Its influence can be observed not only in its relations with other major powers, especially the United States (US), but also through its interactions with those developing and underdeveloped countries outside the 'core'. With the expansion of China's global economic, political, and military presence, the debates about the so called 'China Threat' have spread from the developed core and the regions around China to those as far away from China, such as Africa. China's rapidly growing relations with African countries are among the latest indicators of the 'rise of China'. China's involvement in Africa has become more and more vigorous since 2000 when the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held in the Chinese capital city of Beijing where the Chinese leaders met with their counterparts from 45 African countries. The growing Sino-African relations since then are bringing the aforementioned debate over the rise of China to Africa to the forefront with some welcoming China's presence while others are opposed to it. Among those who are worried about China's growing presence in Africa are those who believe that China is becoming a new coloniser on the continent, repeating what Western imperialists used to do to Africa. This, given China's perceived effort to extract African resources and then dump the Chinese products back to the continent, all of which are for China's own economic development without caring about the African population's welfare. Is China really becoming a new coloniser or threat to Africa? Several studies have been conducted to deal with this question, but findings vary. This article argues that the points for and against China's presence made by the existing literature are all valid to a great extent, and the conflicting findings are the result of the observers taking different units of analyses into account. More specifically, those focusing on the Chinese government's official policy toward Africa would find that China seems to have no intention to be a coloniser or threat of any kind while those exploring the Chinese companies' business conduct in Africa would find that China is behaving like a coloniser and posing a threat to the local population. By taking both of China's state and non-state actors into account, this article demonstrates that there is an obvious contradiction emerging between the former's official policy and the latter's behaviour in Africa. …

Post-gaddafi repercussions in northern mali

Abstract: 1. Introduction When I was doing research (2) in the tiny West-African country of Guinea-Bissau in the spring of 2011, some North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries started bombing military installations and army units in Libya in order to support the Libyan 'revolution'. Libyan rebels had followed the example of their Egyptian and Tunisian neighbours and had risen against the country's 'leader', Gaddafi. The events in North-Africa had repercussions throughout the continent, especially in West Africa where Gaddafi had either invested in respective national economies, or had performed on numerous occasions the role of 'traditional chief' by distributing considerable amounts of money to a number of individuals, thus dispensing largesse as one of the most important tools of power of traditional leadership. Colleagues and friends from the national research institute in Bissau, the country's capital, suggested at the time organising a public conference to which I was invited. The conference, attended by mainly scholars, academics, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and development agencies, aimed at shedding light on the Libyan events and the impact on West Africa. Participants fervently discussed the events in Libya and possible prospects for a post-Gaddafi era in West Africa. Most of them argued against the NATO intervention in Libya and in favour of Gaddafi; with only few supporting the Libyan rebels and the Western forces. At the time, it seemed as if the Libyan events would present an important historical turning point able to change the course of Africa's political history. About one year later, in June 2012, the Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Centre in Accra, Ghana, in collaboration with the Nordic Africa Institute of Uppsala University, Sweden, invited a number of scholars, military officials and political decision makers to explore the post-Gaddafi repercussions in the Sahel. I was asked to speak about the possible impact of the Libyan events on Northern Mali. Here, the National Liberation Movement of Azawad (MNLA--Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l'Azawad) had been joined by former Libyan soldiers or militia of Tuareg origin after Gaddafi's defeat and the leader's death in August 2011. Other Tuareg returnees, who had likewise served in the Libyan Army, demanded (and received) integration into the Malian Armed Forces. On 17 January 2012, the MNLA started attacks in the northern regions of Mali and succeeded in two and a half months of fierce fighting to conquer all towns and villages in the north, and to defeat the Malian army. In April, the movement declared the independence of Northern Mali, announcing the formation of a new state 'Azawad'. (3) Although the link between the Libyan revolution and the Malian events seems to be all too obvious, I will argue differently. It is more than problematic to establish causal links between the Libyan events and what recently has happened, and still is happening, in Northern Mali. There are two principal reasons for that: Firstly, phenomena of collective violence are indeed very dynamic and, in the course of violent events, the motive to take up arms or to conclude alliances can change rapidly. This is all the more evident the longer a violent conflict lasts; in long lasting wars, the original causes or motives that led conflicting parties to start a war tend to be almost forgotten (Van Creveld 1998: 217). This is to say that any kind of aetiology of collective violence is difficult to establish. Attempts to reconstruct phenomena of collective violence from presumed causes (or even root causes) are likely to fail (Klute 2001). As a consequence, we have to be rather prudent in drawing causal links between the Libyan and the Malian events. The same is true for any prognostics of future events. Today, about one year after the murder of Gaddafi, the situation in Northern Mali is still as dynamic and evolving so fast that we can only speculate about possible outcomes. …

Revisiting china's developmental state: lessons for africa

Abstract: 1. Introduction Recent reports on Africa's development displayed high levels of optimism. This is different from previous pessimistic accounts about the future of the continent. The new view on the African political economy is mainly promulgated by international development agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They perceive the rapid economic growth of some African countries as a sign of economic development. Seven of the 13 fastest growing economies in the world are African (World Bank 2015). This growth lies at the heart of what some commentators and politicians describe as "Africa rising". However, Africa remains behind in almost every human development indicator. According to the United Nations Development Project --UNDP (2013), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was ranked the lowest in the annual Human Development Index (HDI). There has been minimal improvement in key areas such as health, education and inequality (Gumede 2010a). Furthermore, SSA states have low levels of social protection, high unemployment, poverty and pervasive food insecurity (FAO2014; UNDP 2014; ILO 2015). Critics of the African growth thesis have argued the abovementioned evidence illustrates that the region's growth path is not inclusive and sustainable. It is characterised by low levels of human development, and driven by ecologically destructive economic extractivism. Hall (2011: 198) describes this accumulation model as one based on: "non-sustainable forms of resource extraction that are repatriated as profits to corporations outside the locality". Her account resonates with Harvey's (2004) notion of "accumulation by dispossession", which highlights how global capitalism continues to expand by reproducing socioeconomic underdevelopment in less developed countries. His observations raise the question of whether Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a sufficient measure of development. Socio-economic indicators in SSA clearly illustrate that it is not. Fioramonti (2013) provides concrete evidence that justifies why less developed regions (like SSA) should use other indicators, which place human development at the centre of growth strategies. He urges policy-makers to identify and address the underlying systemic challenges of their various political economies. The following section will therefore briefly discuss the structural causes of the crisis in the African political economy. 2. Structural causes of the African crisis Africa's developmental impasse is mainly attributed to the dominance of economic liberalism in global development discourses. It coincided with what Butler (2007) describes as New Right policy revolutions. These prioritise free trade, privatisation, market-led development, deregulation, and financial liberalisation. Proponents argued that the implementation of these principles accelerate economic growth and socio -economic development (Hayek 1979; Schumpeter 1954). Olayode (2005: 25) claims that British and US-American political parties in the 1970s and 1980s "led a systematic and sustained ideological and policy agenda to dismantle the capacity, scope and role of the state that developed in the post-World War Two period". The policy agenda was also supported by the Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank and IMF), which sought to fortify the newly created global market-based economic system. This paradigm also influenced the economic policy prescripts that came along with financial assistance provided by these institutions. Developing countries had to accept these as part of their lending conditionalities (Gumede 2010a). The main objective was to significantly reduce the role and capacity of the state. The private sector received pre-eminence in the new development approach, characterised by privatisation of most of state-owned enterprises and contracting out service delivery. Many scholars argue that Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) may have aggravated the deterioration of human security in SSA. …

Insights into Independent Zimbabwe: Some Historiographical Reflections

Abstract: 1. Introduction This article reviews some shifting historical paradigms on Zimbabwe's experiences after independence, focusing on three topical issues rather than a singular historiography (Ranger 1968; Isaacman 1990). It deliberately looks at issues of nationalist/patriotic narratives and their counter-narratives, the historiography of the land as well as accounts of the crisis in Zimbabwe. It is based on a talk given during the PhD round table session at the Africa Day colloquium hosted by the Centre for Africa Studies of the University of the Free State on 22 May 2013. (2)) While there are works focusing exclusively on patriotic history debates or other issues such as land, for example, this article summarises the broad historiographical landscape. Arguably, the narratives of independent Zimbabwe are informed by issues that were shaped by topical subjects of politics, the land issue and the unfolding crisis. Of late, issues relating to the environment, gender and migration have also become important. Earlier historiography in the 1970s, for instance, was marked by path breaking political economy studies or economic and social history (Phimister 1979) that demolished the writings of such scholars as William Barber (1961), Lewis H Gann (1965) and others, informed by modernisation theory, and who viewed colonial capitalism from W Arthur Lewis' development economics paradigm as progressive, even for Africans. Most of this critical new literature was spurred by Giovanni Arrighi's 1970 seminal paper (1970) which was subsequently appraised and advanced by such scholars as Duncan Clarke (1975), Charles van Onselen (1976), and Ian Phimister (1988). The political economy paradigm became increasingly influential in the 1970s. Nationalist history also emerged, and was propelled by Terence Ranger's book Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-97 (1967). This was followed up by numerous other accounts which were then adopted as official historical narratives in the independent Zimbabwean state spurring the emergence of a narrower version of nationalist history, patriotic history through the works, for example, of David Martin and Phylis Johnson (1981), Aeneas Chigwedere, (3)) among others. Both Nationalist and patriotic history, however, came under attack in the course of the 1980s. However, the post-colonial state confronted challenges of nationbuilding, addressing the colonial legacy and attempting to create its own political, economic and social record. This came under the scrutiny of historians who have evaluated the trajectory of these developments. Some versions have celebrated the Zimbabwe African National Union --Patriotic Front's (ZANU-PF) record as the sole ruling authority since independence as one of liberation, empowering and transformation while others have argued that instead, its legacy is one authoritarian ism, division and ultimately political and economic crisis. This article presents an overview mapping the contours of the works on independent Zimbabwean history. 2. The State, Nationalist historiography and its counter narratives The production and reproduction of official historical narratives has its origins in the late colonial period in Zimbabwe and it became important with its adoption and deployment by the ZANU-PF state. Nationalist history originated with the earlier works of Terence Ranger (1967) which spawned numerous others, including patriotic history (Martin and Johnson 1981; Lan 1985; Frederickse 1983). The works largely portrayed the two chimurenga wars as consisting of a patriotic and heroic union of nationalists, guerrillas, peasants and religious/spiritual leaders leading to independence but was largely silent about the "struggles within the struggle" (Sithole 1979). Such histories were a product of the liberation movement in the 1960s and 1970s reflecting a strong element of scholar-activism, but that brand of history persisted beyond the attainment of the country's political independence. …

Northern Mali 2012 : the short-lived triumph of irredentism

Abstract: 1. Introduction Four rebellions led by Tuareg have taken place in Northern Mali. The most recent rebellion that broke out in January 2012 gave the rebels territorial control, enabling them to declare independence. While all or most previous rebellions were concerned with autonomy, only the latest rebellion had independence as a stated primary goal. Tuareg from the Kidal region of North-Eastern Mali have led rebellions against the Malian state since 1963, alleging discrimination and marginalization. The first rebellion was quashed, setting in motion an exodus of Tuareg from the affected area that continued to supply exile Tuareg disposed to foment uprisings. However, subsequent rebellions ended in peace agreements, even if preceded by drawn-out fighting and complex emergencies. The difference between previous conflicts and the January 2012 rebellion in terms of the ability and determination to demand independence thus calls for an explanation. I shall argue that a weak state presence in Northern Mali is what generally led to the repeated rebellions. But only with the state's collapse in 2012 was the immediate opportunity created to claim independence. In addition, the rebels' initial success was owed to exceptional circumstances. Tuareg having served as soldiers for Gaddafi returned to Mali during the last few months of 2011 with numerous weapons and heavy armament, and bolstered hard-liners from the rebellion of 2006. Organized as the MNLA (Movement National pour la Liberation de l'Azawad), these rebels enjoyed enough military success to produce massive discontent within the army leading to a military coup d'etat. It upset the chain of command of the Malian army. The rebels could thus advance while meeting scant resistance, take control of the regional capitals of Northern Mali, and declare this territory an independent state, Azawad. Other factors contributed to this outcome. An Islamist Tuareg group, the Ansar Dine, emerged shortly after the MNLA. It had a different agenda not independence, but instead sharia in all of Mali. The MNLA tried to extricate itself and rejected any notion of connections to Islamists, particularly the AQIM (Al-Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb). However, as I shall show, testimonies and evidence increasingly appeared, suggesting at the very least a tactical alliance with AQIM. In fact, the ability of the MNLA to establish territorial control was in large part due to the military strength of AQIM. At the same time, the presence of AQIM had been growing over the past decade, as it lost ground in Algeria and increasingly sought refuge in Mali. Efforts at dislodging it were only partially successful, the Malian state in Northern Mali being of limited capacity. Security problems pre-dated AQIM with complaints of insufficient state efforts in Northern Mali quoted by the MNLA as justification for their struggle. Yet despite the MNLA's insistence on independence, they started participating in attempts at negotiations shortly after their military victory. The Ansar Dine joined in not long after. Other Northern Malians, Tuareg and Arabs still expressed support for the Malian state, and some were even organized in movements to restore what they termed 'security' to Northern Mali. The state in Northern Mali dissipated because of its limited capacity. The aim of the present article is to show the peculiar character of the Malian state on its northern periphery in relation to a decades-long series of conflicts, and how its weakness allowed the rebellion of 2012 to become a short-lived success in terms of territorial control. It is therefore focussed on the first half of 2012 and on the combination of factors, including the Libyan connection, as well as the Islamists that either rekindled the impetus towards rebellion from the previous conflict of 2006 to 2009, or contributed to the rebels' success. As concerns subsequent events, from late June 2012 onwards, the MNLA were displaced from Northern Mali by the Islamists. …

Human security and the conceptualisation of south african defence: time for a reappraisal

Abstract: 1. Introduction In a recent article in the Strategic Review for South Africa, Sandy Africa argues that the human security paradigm has not prevailed in South Africa and that it may even be a waning value in the South African political and social fabric. She questioned whether we are in fact "... seeing a reversal of gains, and the return of the traditional security approach that had characterised the apartheid years" (Africa 2015: 178). Africa questions whether the human security agenda has been lost in the quagmire of political, economic and social changes confronting South Africa and whether it is possible to arrest the trend. This article does not challenge her observation. Instead, the intention is to highlight that the human security agenda did prevail in the South African military as the primary conceptual framework for thinking about the purpose of defence and questions the utility thereof as a conceptual tool for a defence establishment. Security paradigms and threat perceptions drive the security and defence planning processes--directly or indirectly in a more oblique manner. Security though, Annette Seegers (2010: 264) argues, has to be defined; it must be given content or substance. And as Seegers (2010: 264) points out "... power defines security" and "... all regime types define security in a self-interested, often anti-democratic manner" (2010: 267). How security is defined is in many cases the result of a dualistic process, an interplay, between a debate on security by academia in the scholarly environment and an executive function of government in the policy process. The problem is that officials and politicians are invariably biased; they cannot be objective in defining security (Wolfers 1952). In the definition of security, both the academic and the policy processes have to contend with two variables: domestic or internal vulnerabilities and threats from the outside, dangers lurking in the outer environment. Of course, the notions of security and threat perception, and of security and defence planning, are by implication adversarially defined; they are directed by the impossibility of overcoming uncertainty about the future when shaping the people, processes, and technologies for the security and defence of a nation; they are deeply-rooted human endeavours that are influenced by the political and bureaucratic preferences and values of those involved; and they are exercises in relativity--one only needs to be "good enough" to be successful, that is, better than the adversary (this is the central thesis of Gray 2014). Defence and military capabilities are, besides the security agenda, the other key ingredient of the security and defence planning processes (see Wilson 2003). Capabilities are developed against the backdrop of domestic political agendas. In contrast, though, the security agenda unfolds against the background of both the international political realm and domestic political environment. Thus, Buzan (1991) describes the threat perception as part of the new security agenda in terms of the interplay between international derived external threats and domestic or internal vulnerabilities. The idea of a security paradigm, doctrine or perception in this article is defined inclusively in terms of both threats and vulnerabilities. Perceptions of security and threats are derived from historical experience, political, strategic and contextual factors--geography for example--and are influenced by assumptions about the need for security and defence planning (Horelick 1974: 196). Obviously, defence and security decision-making are made easier in the presence of an obvious and clear security threat. Much harder are defence policy decisions in the absence of a clearly defined threat to security. Security and defence planning conducted under such circumstances is often subject to questionable assumptions and driven by domestic politics rather than strategic purpose (Mandel 1994: 54-55). …

The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between South Africa and Russia

Abstract: Following an international trend, South Africa and Russia entered into a "strategic partnership" in 2006 and in 2013 upgraded it to a "comprehensive strategic partnership". This article examines the formal architecture of the partnership by means of Wilkins's "strategic partnership model". One of very few analytical devices for the study of bilateral partnerships between states, Wilkins's template probes three phases in the development of such alignments, namely their formation, implementation and evaluation. Based on a set of international instruments devised by South Africa and Russia, the institutional features of their comprehensive strategic partnership are set out and a tentative evaluation of its operation is offered. A comparative dimension is introduced by referring to formal aspects of South Africa's strategic partnerships with its other BRICS partners, namely China, India and Brazil. 1. Introduction It is an age-old phenomenon that certain bilateral relationships between states are in some ways "special" or "privileged" and hence more important, better or closer than "ordinary" inter-state ties. In the 19th century, for instance, relations between Germany and Austria and between Russia and France were considered as exceptional by the parties involved (Evans and Newnham 1992:304). In modern times the notion of a 'special relationship', especially when written in capital letters, is reserved more or less exclusively for that between America and Britain (Evans and Newnham 1992:304). The term itself was coined by Winston Churchill in March 1946, when he was the leader of the Opposition in the British Parliament. In an historic address delivered in Fulton, Missouri, Churchill warned that "an iron curtain has descended across the Continent" (Europe) and that Western powers should stand together against the perceived Soviet threat. What he called "a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States" would be at the heart of a united front. Such a "fraternal association", as Churchill portrayed it, "requires not only the growing friendship between our two vast but kindred Systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship" in the military and security domains (Modern History Sourcebook, undated). The so-called Atlantic Alliance between Britain and America endured--with ebbs and flows --throughout the Cold War. In part due to the huge inequalities between the two partners in economic and military terms, the designation "special relationship" lost favour in recent years. In 2011, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister David Cameron opted for the expression "essential relationship" between the United States (US) and Britain (quoted by Blanco 2011:15). Many other states have since 1945 also claimed a form of "specialness" for their bilateral relationships. Consider, for instance, ties between some former imperial powers and their ex-colonies, which are said to constitute "families of nations" (Haugevik 2010: 2-3); the Commonwealth, born of the British Empire, is the best-known embodiment of such an historical association. Since the 1990s states began displaying a preference for the adjective "strategic" to depict bilateral relationships that are supposed to be deeper and stronger than "standard" interactions, but usually without extending to alliances (understood as formal agreements for military cooperation in the face of common threats). The terms "strategic partnership" and "strategic relationship" are nowadays used the world over (Blanco 2011:1-2). Among numerous examples are strategic partnerships/relationships between India and the US (Teja 2014: 183-194), Syria and Iran (Lawson 2007:29-47), the US and Israel (Miller 2013:16), the US and Saudi Arabia (Miller 2013:1-6), China and South Korea (Kim 2008: 97-121), and Brazil and Japan (Lessa 2010: 123). Variations on the "partnership" theme include "constructive strategic partnership" (as the US and China envisaged in the 1990s) (Shambaugh 2004: 97); "comprehensive strategic partnership" (as between Russia and South Africa); "privileged strategic partnership" (Russia and India); and "fundamental partnership" (the US and Brazil) (Lessa 2010: 120). …

Russia Is Back in Africa

Abstract: The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union brought an end to the ideology driven special relationship between Russia and various African states. However, after ten years these relations were resuscitated due to major changes on both sides. Under Vladimir Putin's presidency and the economic recovery that followed, Russia made efforts to reclaim a leading role in global politics, while various African states grew politically more stable and economically more successful. This time around, relations were focussed dominantly on economics and trade, rather than on ideology as during the Cold War period. Attracted by Africa's abundant resources, particularly energy and minerals, a small number of mega Russian companies started to do business with the continent at the turn of the century. This reengagement with Africa came somewhat belatedly, after major players, particularly China, the United States and the European Union, had intensified their engagement. At the same time, Russia and Africa found common cause in international political relations, as witnessed by similar policies in multilateral organisations, particularly aimed against Western hegemony in world finance and economy. And as pointed out in this article, Russia needs to embark on a more integrated, user-friendly, transparent and competitive engagement strategy to become a major role player in doing business with Africa. Russia and Africa need also familiarise themselves better with each other, particularly how to do business with one another. As yet, one cannot really speak of a visible Russian pivot towards Africa in its overall international relations. However, if conditions remain favourable, this may develop over time. 1. Introduction During the Cold War years, the Soviet Union (SU) was the ideological role model, ally and supporter of various African client states seeking self-determination and freedom, as well as diplomatic leverage in the struggle between West and East. Leaving aside the well-known negatives of the SU's involvement in Africa, its most lasting contribution was the important role it played in ending colonialism and racism on the continent, and helping to put African related issues squarely on the international agenda. But contrary to the colonial powers, which gave Africa the Anglophone, Lusophone, Francophone regions and lasting Eurocentric cultural traits, the SU did not leave much of a footprint in Africa. No socialist, Marxist or 'Russophone'-Africa survived the SU. On the up-side, however, the new Russia enjoyed the advantage of engaging Africa without the debilitating colonialist chip on the shoulder. The SU invested substantially in the promotion of strategic geopolitical relations with "progressive" governments in the underdeveloped southern hemisphere, particularly Africa. Bilateral relations with newly independent states benefitted particularly from Moscow's authentic anti-colonial stance by way of supporting the liberation course at the United Nations (UN), substantial material assistance to liberation movements, economic and technical aid. Various future African leaders received education in the SU. The Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow was started specifically for the purpose of training of African and other 'third world' students (Feuchtwanger and Nailor 1981: Chapter 4; Saivetz and Woodby 1985: Chapters 1 and 3). This involvement became largely undone when the SU disintegrated in December 1991, the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist dogma being no longer a motivational force, the Cold War over, democracy instated, a centrally planned economy replaced by a market-based economy, and Russia's global power and status utterly diminished. Henceforth the new Russia fundamentally reorganised and re-prioritised its foreign policy objectives and priorities. The ideological global ambitions and objectives of the old order were discarded and replaced by a much reduced regional Eurasian role. …

State–building, citizenship and the banyarwanda question in the democratic republic of congo

Abstract: Since achieving independence in June 1960, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been grappling with the question of the citizenship of Kinyarwanda and Kirundi-speaking populations settled on its territory at different historical periods, herein referred to as the Banyarwanda. While there is evidence of the presence of some Banyarwanda communities on current Congolese territory prior to the advent of Belgian colonisation in the area, the majority of the Banyarwanda currently living in the DRC are descendants of those brought into the country through colonial immigration and labour recruitment processes, political exile and refuge as well as clandestine migration. Using a historical perspective, this article analyses the manner in which the question of the citizenship of the Banyarwanda has been handled in the DRC since the establishment of the Congo Free State in 1885. The article locates the roots of the problem in the poorly designed colonial policies surrounding the relocation of these populations to the Kivu region. However, the article acknowledges that the sole shortcomings on the part of colonial authorities would have never had the current consequences if it was not for the inconsistencies of the different post-colonial governments that have ruled over the DRC. Instead of resolving the citizenship question in an effective and sustainable manner, all these governments have based their respective responses to the issue on short-term political expediencies as dictated by the balance of forces within the country, the Kivu area and the Great Lakes region at a particular juncture. 1. Introduction: State-Building, Citizenship and the Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo ... in order to get a better understanding of the present DRC conflict, the issue of citizenship needs some specific attention. The citizenship issue has to be understood as one of the main challenges of future peace efforts (Vlassenroot 2002:501). German Sociologist Max Weber (cited by Kabemba 2011: 23) defines the state as "a corporate group that has compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous organisation, and claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its population ...". In this regard, the state represents the societal framework that, within any society, supersedes all other societal organisations to which it can never be reduced. It "focuses on the need for the depersonalization of the exercise of power" (Young and Turner 1985: 12) while its raison d'etre consists of providing citizens with public goods, including security and order, health services, socio-economic opportunities, an equitable judicial system and infrastructure facilities such as roads and other means of communication. (2)) Inasmuch as societies are diverse around the world, so have there been different processes of state formation. Whereas state-building in Europe, for instance, was "associated with the pressures of war-making, the need to obtain greater tax returns and the emergence of a broad class of 'citizens' demanding institutions that act in the public interest" (OECD 2011), the state in much of Africa is a direct product of European colonisation on the African continent as precipitated by the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference. The external nature of the African state meant that the real process of state-building throughout the continent could only take off after the advent of independence. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2008: 13-14), state-building is a "purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups". It can be equated to state formation, which can be understood as "the dynamic, historically informed, often contingent process by which states emerge in relation to societies" (OECD 2008: 13). In other words, state-building is the process through which the overarching management body of a society establishes and entrenches the necessary institutions designed to ensure its exclusive control over the community and enable it to deliver collective goods expected by all members of the group. …

National Liberation in Postcolonial Southern Africa. A Historical Ethnography of SWAPO's Exile Camps (Christian A. Williams),

Abstract: Part I. Camp, Nation, History: 1. Liberation movement camps and the past of the present in Southern Africa 2. Revisiting an image of a camp: remember Cassinga? Part II. Camps and the Formation of a Nation: 3. Living in exile: life and crisis at SWAPO's Kongwa Camp, 1964-8 4. Ordering the nation: SWAPO in Zambia, 1974-6 5. 'The spy' and the camp: SWAPO in Angola, 1980-9 Part III. Camps and the Production of History: 6. Namibia's 'Wall of Silence': challenging national history in the international system 7. Reconciliation in Namibia? Narrating the past in a post-camp nation 8. The camp and the post-colony.

Human security in South Africa

Abstract: 1. Introduction The gains that can be attributed to the cause of human security since the end of apartheid are significant. The right to vote, to basic education and primary health care; the introduction of an extensive social security system that has lifted many people out of poverty; the provision of affordable housing and basic services to millions, are some of the undeniable achievements of 21 years of democracy. On the regional and international fronts, South Africa has shifted from being a source of insecurity to its neighbours to being an advocate for peace on the continent, playing a prominent mediation role in conflicts such as those in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Sudan. Yet the country remains dogged by unemployment and poverty, structural inequality in the economy, the failure of some state institutions to provide adequately for the needs of all people, and failures in the criminal justice system, to name several challenges. Moreover, South Africa's formal Pan-Africanist and internationalist posture has been sullied by recurring instances of violent attacks on migrants, many of whom have fled hardship in their own countries. It could be argued that human security has not prevailed, and might even be a waning value in the South African political and social fabric. Are we in fact, seeing a reversal of gains, and the return of the traditional security approach that had characterised the apartheid years? This commentary asks whether the human security agenda has been lost in the quagmire of political, economic and social challenges confronting South Africa, and if this is the case, what can be done to arrest the trend. 2. Africa's contribution to the global discourse on human security In the global discourse, 'human security' gained currency at a particular geo-political moment, soon after the end of the Cold War. At the time, South Africa's political transition was already underway, and ideas about what should replace the state-centred notion of apartheid, were an integral part of discussions. The poverty, racial discrimination, political repression and institutionalised violence that had characterised life for black people for centuries had been a focus of struggles and campaigns for decades. The state had clearly been a source of insecurity--this was conceded by the apartheid government during the negotiations in the early 1990s. The language in which discussions around a future security dispensation was framed, spoke resoundingly of a new era of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'--the language of human security. Whilst the United Nations' (UN) 1994 Human Development Report is often cited as a decisive moment in shifting the conceptual understanding of security, it was in fact part of a long continuum of global political thought and action. Anti-colonial struggles, the establishment of the UN, the international struggle against apartheid, all contained within them a desire to rid the world of physical violence and to establish inclusive, human and just societies. Not only were these aspirations expressed in the struggles fought by many peoples and movements, they also found expression in academic analyses." (1) Even before the 1994 UN Report, the relationship between security and development was captured in the seminal 1991 Kampala Document, which emanated from a meeting convened by the chairperson of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), President Yoweri Musoveni and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, who was then chairperson of the Africa Leadership Forum (Africa Leadership Forum 1991: 4). The meeting, attended by over 500 people including several serving and former heads of state, deliberated on the prospects for Africa in the 1990s and the 21st century. It proposed the launch of a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). It argued that the erosion of insecurity and instability were major impediments to economic integration and the socio-economic transformation of Africa. …

Governance and urban service delivery in Zimbabwe

Abstract: It is contended that service delivery is the core function of developmental local government. The provision of services such as waste management, water and health services is closely associated with the well-being of urban dwellers. In the period leading to the adoption of Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution, many people supported the devolution of services and functions to local government. It was a major victory when local government was elevated and given constitutional protection. There was great expectation that service delivery would improve in the cities, towns and smaller urban centres. Seven years later, that expectation appears not to have been realised. Instead, indications are that urban service delivery is experiencing a downward spiral. Using open-ended questionnaires, closed-ended questionnaires and the focus group discussions research methods, the article investigates the drivers of inadequate service provision in four urban areas in Zimbabwe. The paper also proffers suggestions for improving service delivery. The results of the study underscore that the causes of insufficient service provision are multi-pronged and not necessarily limited to inefficiency and ineffectiveness on the part of urban councils. In fact, a major recurring finding is that national government policies are big factors contributing towards the decline of urban service delivery.

Towards a trade policy for development : the political economy of South Africa's external trade, 1994-2014

Abstract: 1. Introduction South Africa's external trade policy and level of openness to the world economy occupies an increasingly prominent position in political economy debates about the country's growth and development path. The government's most auspicious economic policies--namely the National Development Plan (National Planning Commission 2011), the New Growth Path (Economic Development Department 2010), and the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) and its annual Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007)--all call for more 'developmental' trade policies to shift the structure of the economy onto a more sustainable, diversified and labour-absorbing industrial development path. The government's focus on a more strategic trade policy stands in contrast to the immediate post-apartheid years, when extensive tariff and trade reforms were pursued without any overarching industrial policy framework. The trade liberalisation project of the 1990s that initially drove South Africa's post-apartheid global economic re-integration has now stalled amid growing liberalisation scepticism and de-industrialisation concerns. Whereas trade liberalisation was complementary to the austere macro-economic reform agenda of the initial post-apartheid years, industrial policy considerations have been the hallmark of the second decade of democracy. These measures, designed to strengthen and diversify South Africa's productive capabilities rather than outward-oriented reforms, continue to provide the overarching framework for South Africa's external trade agenda and negotiations. This emphasis on more development-oriented trade policies reflects sensibilities by the governing tripartite alliance led by the African National Congress (ANC) and a progressive global epistemic community that more strategic trade and tariff policies are instrumental for achieving industrial development (UNCTAD 2006; UNCTAD 2014). This view is consistent with the structural transformation experiences of the East Asian and other late-industrialising developmental states (Amsden 2001; Chang 2002). This article critically reviews the evolution of South Africa's trade policy as an instrument of industrial policy over the two post-apartheid decades. South Africa's trade regime may be characterised as consisting of three pillars: trade policy (including tariffs and trade remedies (1), trade agreements or negotiations, and regional integration in Africa. The central argument of the article is that each of these policy pillars has been strategically recalibrated to support and reinforce the central objective of industrial development. To advance this argument, the article is divided into four sections. The first section outlines how trade policy broadly defined has been integrated into South Africa's national development strategy as an instrument of industrial policy. The second section explores how South Africa's trade negotiating agenda at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels is increasingly geared towards not only leveraging improved market access, but preserving and expanding policy space in international agreements to support the country's industrial development objectives. The third section outlines a fundamental shift in thinking on regional integration away from a conventional market-led model premised on the European Union's (EU) experience, to a 'developmental integration' approach that concurrently prioritises market integration, infrastructure development and structural economic transformation (DTI 2010). The article concludes with some observations about the future direction of South Africa's trade agenda during the third decade of democracy. 2. From Smith to Keynes and developmental trade policies In 1994, the democratic government led by the ANC and its alliance partners inherited an economy in stagnation and crisis. Notwithstanding episodic trade policy reforms since the 1970s (Bell 1997; Edwards 2014), the new government confronted the challenge of building a modern, vibrant and outward-oriented economy that is internationally competitive, while also addressing the massive backlogs in access to social and economic services. …

A "Culture of Conservatism": How and Why African Union Member States Obstruct the Deepening of the Integration

Abstract: 1 Introduction Officially launched in 2002, the African Union (AU) is still a young organisation While it has made some progress, for example, with regard to the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the organisation lags behind its ambitions of political, economic and social integration The establishment of the African Economic Community, for instance, originally envisaged for 2023 by the Abuja Treaty of 1991, is far behind schedule Similarly, the establishment of African Regional Stand-by Brigades has been constantly deferred in several regions It seems that the majority of African states does not want the continental integration project to gather further momentum, but wants to maintain the status quo--at least in several policy realms As a result, a 'culture of conservatism' has emerged and the AU will remain an intergovernmental organisation in the foreseeable future, by and large dependent upon the will of its members, who shape and shove the organisation and sometimes even undermine it In its current shape, the AU is far removed from Kwame Nkrumah's (and later on Muammar al-Gaddafi's) vision of a United States of Africa The reasons for the 'culture of conservatism' and the AU member states' general reluctance to engage in the deepening of continental integration are various They include an unwillingness to cede sovereignty, an unwillingness of national leaders to give up personal power, a lack of capacities and resources, as well as the fact that regional economic communities, which are developed simultaneously at the sub-regional level, are often more beneficial for its member states than the AU 2 The Status Quo in a Nutshell The AU has come a long way since the foundation of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in 1963 While the OAU was a loose alliance of states that strictly adhered to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, the AU has since its formal launch in 2002 developed into a stronger institutionalised and diversified structure This includes a relatively strong Commission, a Pan-African Parliament (PAP) with consultative functions, and several institutions which promote peace and security Particularly the well-advanced security architecture, comprising the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System, the regional Stand-by Brigades, (1)) and the Panel of the Wise, leaves observers with the impression that some progress has been made (Packer and Rukare 2002: 365-379; Ankomah 2007: 10-12; Makinda and Okumu 2008; Akokpari 2008: 85112; Williams 2007: 253-279; Franke 2009; Engel and Porto 2010; Franke 2010: 179-200) Beyond that, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a monitoring process that looks inter alia into the political and socio-economic developments of voluntarily participating states, has been introduced and implemented in several African countries The South African based Business Day praised the AU in its early days for "present[ing] an opportunity for the continent to shrug off the interlude of denigration that some believe should be the continent's eternal fate" (Business Day, 16 August 2002) Generally speaking, there had been high hopes in Africa and beyond that the continent would move towards peace, stability, and socio-economic development after the AU superseded the OAU Contrary to the OAU, a strident defender of national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in other states' internal affairs, Article 4(h) of the AU's Constitutive Act allows for the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council (African Union 2000) As a result of this reorientation, the AU sent peacekeeping missions to Burundi (2003), Darfur (2005), Somalia (2007), the Comoros (2008), and most recently to Mali (2013) and the Central African Republic (2013) …

Introduction: Post-Gaddafi repercussions in the Sahel and West Africa

Abstract: 1. Introduction The areas south of Libya have experienced more than their fair share of conflict and rapid social change. In earlier times, the main routes of trade, commerce and pilgrimage between West African and the Arab Peninsula passed through this region, also once inhabited by mighty warrior empires (see for example Bawuro 1972). However, as the empires along these routes faded away, and international ocean shipping opened up this part of Africa to the forces of global trade and capitalism, the centres of authority that once controlled this region also vanished. What remained was an almost open territory: unwelcoming and hard, but also a place of possibilities and the freedom to roam for those who had mastered the art of survival under such difficult conditions. This was the land of the Tuareg and other semi-nomadic groups who controlled cities and important trading posts such as Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal in contemporary Mali. This is the world of the Sahel and the parts of Western Africa that straddles Libya, and a region that currently includes Southern Algeria, Northern Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania and parts of Northern Nigeria. These are therefore also the countries and areas that have come to experience the full effect of what we define as post-Gaddafi repercussions. 2. Gaddafi and the Sahel/West Africa How can we speak of such a thing as post-Gaddafi repercussions, may well be asked? A dictator is gone, and not just any dictator, but a source of regional and global instability who used his oil wealth to support all kinds of rebel movements around the world; from trafficking weapons, to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), to establishing training camps for warlords such as Liberia's Charles Taylor and Sierra Leone's Foday Sankoh. Gaddafi was a man who on more than one occasion went to war against Chad to claim the Aozou Strip in the North on the border with Libya (see St John 2011). This is one part of the Gaddafi legacy we do not deny, and we are neither trying to revise his international image. However, we also claim that in his later years Gaddafi's Libya was much less a source of regional instability. In fact, increasingly, it had become not only a bastion of stability in a volatile and unruly region, but also at times a constructive actor in peace agreements in neighbouring countries (for example in the cases of Mali, Niger, and in the troubled relationship between the rulers in Chad and Sudan that includes the issue of Darfur). In the latter case, Gaddafi intervened several times using his influence to moderate the positions taken as the rulers of Chad and Sudan harboured and made use of rebel groups with bases in each other's territory. If not necessarily a peacemaker, Gaddafi and his Libya played a role in bringing some stability to the region, recognised by President Idriss Deby of Chad and his external opponents (for example, Sudan's Bashir), but also by Chadian opponents to Deby who themselves tried to gain Gaddafi's attention (Boas 2013). Thus, during his later years in power (particularly after 1995), Gaddafi and Libya went through a marked transition. From being a centre of violent manipulation and subversive actions directed against a series of regimes in the region, Gaddafi gradually started to play a different role, prioritising diplomatic approaches and foreign direct investments (FDI) over his previous military interventions and support for insurgencies. His prominent role in the African Union (AU) attests to this. Regionally it is also vividly illustrated by the relationship between Gaddafi and Idriss Deby of Chad. Even if never intimate or close, they still managed to establish a working relationship as they both had reached the conclusion that they needed each other (ICG 2011). Thus, in the case of Chad, we clearly see the two faces of Gaddafi. The military approach from the 1970s and 1980s that slowly changed during the 1990s to a softer approach, combining diplomatic measures through negotiations and foreign direct investment. …

South Africa's Approach to Conflict Management in Burundi and the DRC: Promoting Human Security?

Abstract: 1. Introduction Africa's investment in peace and security over the last two decades has undoubtedly yielded many peace dividends. The number of civil wars decreased by half (although on an upward trend again from 2013), many countries gained the status of being democracies (from three in 1990 to 25 in 2013), human development indicators improved, income per capita increased and there is a promise of abundance through new gas and mineral finds (August 2013). These achievements give credence to the assertions of 'Africa Rising'. However, without diminishing these accomplishments, they remain tenuous in the face of persistent instability in African countries deemed post-conflict. There is a rise in election-related violence, mounting terrorism and insurgency attacks, relentless gender based violence and expanding local and transnational conflicts across the continent. According to the Institute for Security Studies, African conflicts are becoming "increasingly fragmented and the number of actors, particularly non-state factions, involved in conflicts is rising" (Cilliers and Shunemann 2013: 3). Persistent insecurity on the continent, and the ineffectiveness of peacebuilding interventions to prevent the relapse of states into conflict, necessitate that we revisit the dominant approaches to managing violent conflict in a bid to discern why they are not yielding sustainable human security. This article contends that a key part of the explanation resides in the propensity towards stabilising states instead of building peaceful resilient societies, pursuing dated methods in the face of new challenges, continued linear modelling and a seeming inability to rethink and transform conflict management mechanisms and processes. South Africa is at the forefront of Africa's peace and security endeavours. After 1994, it was able to quickly transform itself from international villain to Pan-Africanist peacemaker and it has since played an instrumental role in both shaping and setting the normative agenda of the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community's (SADC) peace and security architectures as well as undertaking in-country conflict management interventions, or what Van Nieuwkerk (2014) refers to as 'Peace Diplomacy'. Scholars have provided detailed accounts of South Africa's engagement in peacemaking and peacekeeping, and to a lesser extent, its experiences with peacebuilding (Shillinger 2009; Miti 2012; Neethling 2003; Landsberg 2012; Hendricks and Lucey 2014). Their work highlights several factors. These include, for example, the motivation for South Africa's engagement (foreign policy, history, values and principles, economic and military stature, commercial interests, moral legitimacy, and so forth); South Africa's preferred forums for intervention (bilateral, trilateral and multilateral institutions and processes); its role as a 'reluctant hegemon'; the strengths and weaknesses of specific interventions, noting in particular its lack of resources, dated equipment, domestic challenges and exportation/imposition of its own conflict resolution model. Some others seek to compare the approaches of the different administrations (viz, Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma). Few of these studies reflect on the assumptions, conceptions and methodology underpinning South Africa's approach to conflict management or provide human security impact assessments of its interventions. South Africa's interventions were largely hailed as success stories, but what was meant by success in these contexts? Evidence is mounting that the countries in which it has intervened remain fragile and/or have relapsed into conflict. Yet, South Africa continues to be "the interlocutor and destination of choice for African leaders and rebel leaders eager to cut deals" (Van Nieuwkerk 2014: 3). It is important to begin to pay closer attention to South Africa's conflict management approach for a number of reasons. First, it is called upon to manage conflicts in many African countries. …

Knowledge production and decolonisation — not only african challenges

Abstract: The following arguments are in support of a “renegotiation of the terms of knowledge production” (Horakova 2016: 47). By doing so, this essay sides with demands by others (for example, Keim et al 2014) that “the need to move towards non-hegemonic forms of cooperation between academic realms and forms of knowledge is a practical-material as well as an intellectual task”, while “no success can be achieved without relentless criticisms on inhered spurious certainties” (Lagos 2015). Last but not least, this reasoning is influenced by the conviction that ‘neutral’ knowledge in a value-free vacuum detached from social interests does not exist: “ways of knowing and resulting bodies of knowledge are always historical and they are deeply political” (Bliesemann and Kostic 2017: 6). By pointing to the relevance of hierarchical structures and power, this essay concurswith Halvorsen (2016: 303) that, “the academic profession must rid itself once and for all of the notion that knowledge is invariably ‘positive’, that every question has one correct answer (the truth), and that this is to be obtained through one correct method”. After all —… knowledge of Africa has been produced within what we might define as a Western episteme. The theoretical, conceptual and methodological resources through which Africa is to this day rendered visible and intelligible speak from a place, about that place and in accordance with criteria of plausibility that use that particular place as the normative standard for truth (Macamo 2016: 326).I concur with Smith (1999) that true decolonisation is supposed to be concerned with having a “(m)ore critical understanding of the underlying assumptions, motivations and values that inform research practices” (Wilson 2001: 214). This is a necessary reminder that we should always include critical reflections when interStrategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 40, No 1 Henning Melber rogating our own internalised value systems, which we often tend to understandand apply unchallenged as the dominant (if not only) norm.

Zimbabwe between the referendum and the elections

Abstract: "Has any Zimbabwean election ever solved anything?" "The problem is not the constitution but who counts the votes." (Local voices) (1)) 1. Introduction The recent overwhelming 'Yes' vote in the constitutional referendum on 16 March has led to two seemingly contradictory developments. The way has opened up for elections later in the year (the date has to be announced by 29 June), but it is unlikely that these will occur in a free and fair environment as demanded by the regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and by international donors who may provide the funding. By law Zimbabwe has to have set an election date by the end of June 2013 and before such elections the regional body SADC insisted that there be a referendum on a new constitution as agreed in inter-party negotiations after 2008. This took place peacefully, although amid a wider climate of intimidation and arrests, (2)) and the electorate voted overwhelmingly in favour. (3)) The negotiations over the latter in the Parliamentary Constitutional Select Committee (COPAC) have dragged on since 2009. Finally a draft constitution was agreed in mid-January 2013 with all parties making concessions at the last minute. The sticking points were choosing presidential running mates (a big problem for both Mugabe and Tsvangirai given faction fighting), devolution, a Constitutional Court, a National Prosecuting Authority separate from the partisan Attorney General, and reducing the powers of the executive. Many see the draft as very flawed but with little choice but to accept it. As things stand, if elections are not called in the first half of 2013 the government becomes ultra vires. (4)) There has always been a tendency in ZANU-PF to maintain the semblance of legality (even if post-hoc on occasion) despite its methods. There has been no significant progress towards security reforms/governance to prevent the violence of the 2008 elections being repeated or other reforms to ensure a free(ish) and fair(ish) election such as a truly autonomous electoral commission (ZEC) and reform of the degraded voters roll. Legislation to establish a Human Rights Commission passed through Parliament but its provisions on impunity for abuses until recently attracted much civil society criticism. Western donors seem very keen to re-engage Harare despite the volatile human rights situation. In February 2013 we had four years of the 'Inclusive (or Unified) Government' (IG/GNU) following the signing in September 2008 of the 'Global Political Agreement' (GPA) between the former sole ruling party ZANU-PF and its challengers, the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Many activists see that ZANU-PF has used the space of the GPA better to consolidate its previously shaky rule, even if its support base is low. Its control of the major organisations of state with the exception of the Ministry of Finance remains firm especially with the additional, largely undeclared revenues from the diamond mines. Its ideological stance of indigenisation, sovereignty and empowerment is at least clearly understood while that of the MDC is unclear, including its Jobs, Upliftment, Capital Investment and Ecology (JUICE) programme for growth. It remains susceptible to the charge repeated endlessly by its coalition 'partner' and the state-controlled media of being Western puppets. There is, however, an alternative scenario that both MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai and President Mugabe fear more the enemy within (that is, in their own parties) than that without. This might lead to possible realignments according to some. While some are sceptical about this, proponents point out that no-one is posing a way to unlock the process whereby a yes vote leads to the elections with little having changed and the supposedly democratic elements of the constitution have had no chance to bed in. The alternative therefore is an elite pact avoiding ructions within the parties giving that few actually really want elections anyway. …