Showing papers in "Theoria-revista De Teoria Historia Y Fundamentos De La Ciencia in 2006"
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce three conundrums that a theory of scientific representation has to come to terms with and then address the question of whether the semantic view of theories, which is the currently most widely accepted account of theories and models, provides adequate answers to these questions.
Abstract: It is now part and parcel of the official philosophical wisdom that models are essential to the acquisition and organisation of scientific knowledge. It is also generally accepted that most models represent their tar- get systems in one way or another. But what does it mean for a model to represent its target system? I be- gin by introducing three conundrums that a theory of scientific representation has to come to terms with and then address the question of whether the semantic view of theories, which is the currently most widely accepted account of theories and models, provides us with adequate answers to these questions. After hav- ing argued in some detail that it does not, I conclude by pointing out in what direction a tenable account of scientific representation might be sought.
194 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose that scientific representation is a special case of a more general notion of representation, and that the relatively well worked-out and plausible theories of the latter are directly applicable to the sci- entific special case.
Abstract: We propose that scientific representation is a special case of a more general notion of representation, and that the relatively well worked-out and plausible theories of the latter are directly applicable to the sci- entific special case. Construing scientific representation in this way makes the so-called "problem of scien- tific representation" look much less interesting than it has seemed to many, and suggests that some of the (hotly contested) debates in the literature are concerned with non-issues.
121 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the structural concept of representation is defended against its main objections, namely: logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation and failing necessity, and the copy theory objection, arguing that homomorphic representations are not necessarily "copies" of their representanda.
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to defend the structural concept of representation, as defined by homomor- phisms, against its main objections, namely: logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, the objection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. The logical objections can be met by re- serving the relation 'to be homomorphic to' for the explication of potential representation (or, of the repre- sentational content). Actual reference objects ('targets') of representations are determined by (intentional or causal) representational mechanisms. Appealing to the independence of the dimensions of 'content' and 'target' also helps to see how the structural concept can cope with misrepresentation. Finally, I argue that homomorphic representations are not necessarily 'copies' of their representanda, and thus can convey sci- entific insight.
80 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors claim that the notion of cognitive representation and scientific representation is irreducibly plural and show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation.
Abstract: In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in par- ticular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies be- tween the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.
18 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the motivations behind, and ex-pectations to, a theory of quantum gravity are entangled with central themes in the philosophy of science, in particular unification, reductionism, and the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and that there are no good reasons to think that a quantum theory of gravity, if constructed, will provide a fundamental theory from which all physics in principle can be derived.
Abstract: This paper investigates some of the philosophical and conceptual issues raised by the search for a quan- tum theory of gravity. It is critically discussed whether such a theory is necessary in the first place, and how much would be accomplished if it is eventually constructed. I argue that the motivations behind, and ex- pectations to, a theory of quantum gravity are entangled with central themes in the philosophy of science, in particular unification, reductionism, and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. I further argue that there are —contrary to claims made on behalf of string theory— no good reasons to think that a quantum theory of gravity, if constructed, will provide a theory of everything, that is, a fundamental theory from which all physics in principle can be derived.
8 citations
TL;DR: In this paper some classical representational ideas of Hertz and Duhem are used to show how the di- chotomy between representation and intervention can be overcome.
Abstract: In this paper some classical representational ideas of Hertz and Duhem are used to show how the di- chotomy between representation and intervention can be overcome. More precisely, scientific theories are reconstructed as complex networks of intervening representations (or representational interventions). The formal apparatus developed is applied to elucidate various theoretical and practical aspects of the in vivo/in vitro problem of biochemistry. Moreover, adjoint situations (Galois connections) are used to explain the re- lation between empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new way.
8 citations
5 citations
3 citations
TL;DR: The authors reconstructs the argumentative context in which these views are put forward, and, after men- tioning some drawbacks of both views, as these have been advanced to date, suggests a new view that may be regarded as a compromise between the contenders.
Abstract: A significant part of perception, especially in visual perception, is characterized by particularity (roughly, the view that in such cases the perceiver is aware of particular objects in the environment). The intuition of particularity, however, can be made precise in at least two ways. One way (proposed by Searle) is consistent with the view that the content of perception is to be thought of as existentially quantified. Another way (the "demonstrative element" view championed by Evans, Campbell and others in diverse ways) is not. This paper reconstructs the argumentative context in which these views are put forward, and, after men- tioning some drawbacks of both views, as these have been advanced to date, suggests a new view that may be regarded as a compromise between the contenders.
3 citations
TL;DR: This paper propose a notion of mnemonic content that can account for the rationality of both beliefs and argue that they have difficulty with the second one. But they do not consider the second belief.
Abstract: If I remember something, I tend to believe that I have perceived it. Similarly, if I remember something, I tend to believe that it happened in the past. My aim here is to propose a notion of mnemonic contentac- counts for these facts. Certain proposals build perceptual experiences into the content of memories. I argue that they Have trouble with the second belief. Other proposals build references to temporal locations into mnemonic content. I argue that they have trouble with the second one. I propose a notion of mnemonic Content that can account for the rationality of both beliefs.
3 citations
TL;DR: Cavailles as mentioned in this paper argued that mathematical practice can indeed be described as constructions in intuition, but these con- structions are not imbedded in the space and in the time of our Sensibility, as Kant believed: they take place in other structures which are engendered in the history of mathematics.
Abstract: This paper is concerned with Cavailles' account of "intuition" in mathematics. Cavailles starts from Kant's theory of constructions in intuition and then relies on various remarks by Hilbert to apply it to modern mathematics. In this context, "intuition" includes the drawing of geometrical figures, the use of al- gebraic or logical signs and the generation of numbers as, for example, described by Brouwer. Cavailles ar- gues that mathematical practice can indeed be described as "constructions in intuition" but that these con- structions are not imbedded in the space and in the time of our Sensibility, as Kant believed: They take place in other structures which are engendered in the history of mathematics. This leads Cavailles to a criti- cal discussion of both Hilbert's and Brouwer's foundational programs.
TL;DR: The authors defend a simple, externalist account of knowledge, incorporating familiar conditions men- tioned in the literature, and respond to Timothy Williamson's charge that any such analysis is futile be- cause knowledge is semantically un-analyzable.
Abstract: This paper defends a simple, externalist account of knowledge, incorporating familiar conditions men- tioned in the literature, and responds to Timothy Williamson's charge that any such analysis is futile be- cause knowledge is semantically un-analyzable. The response, in short, is that even though such an account may not offer a reductive analysis of knowledge—by way of more basic, non-circular concepts—it still has an explanatory advantage over Williamson's own position: it explains how belief can fail to be knowledge.
TL;DR: In this paper, a panoramic view of the main problems and options in the philosophy of perception is presented, and the notion of "camou-flage" is introduced as an interesting and promising alternative in order to explain the nature of the intentional objects of perception.
Abstract: This paper is about perception and its objects. My aim is to suggest a new way to articulate some of the central ideas of direct realism. Sections 1 and 2 offer from different perspectives a panoramic view of the main problems and options in the philosophy of perception. Section 3 introduces the notion of "camou- flage" as an interesting and promising alternative in order to explain the nature of the intentional objects of perception. Finally, section 4 makes use of this new notion in the analysis of the relationships between the intentionality of perception, the intentionality of thought, and the intentionality of language.
TL;DR: In this paper, two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider are discussed and analyzed in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties.
Abstract: We discuss and analyze two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider respectively. According to the first one, strong supervenience would imply necessary coextension of properties (i.e., reduction). According to the second, this would be also the case of global supervenience. Kim and Sider make essential use of their respective notions of maximal properties, which we analyze here in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties. Under this interpretation, in terms of model theory (see § 4), we obtain different possibilities of formal relations between the superveniencie theses and reduction, depending on the logic we use. Under at least one interesting interpretation, the arguments of Kim and Sider are not correct and we become the conclusion that these arguments are not valid in general.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend the legitimacy of historicist philosophy of science, defined as the phi- losophic study of science that takes seriously case studies drawn from the practice of science.
Abstract: My task in this paper is to defend the legitimacy of historicist philosophy of science, defined as the phi- losophic study of science that takes seriously case studies drawn from the practice of science. Historicist philosophy of science suffers from what I call the 'evidence problem'. The worry is that case studies cannot qualify as rigorous evidence for the adjudication of philosophic theories. I explore the reasons why one might deny to historical cases a probative value, then reply to these reasons on behalf of historicism. The main proponents of the view I am criticizing are Pitt (2001) and Rasmussen (2001).
TL;DR: In this article, the authors offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy.
Abstract: In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.