APPRAISAL THEORIES OF EMOTION
Appraisal theories of emotion: State of the art and future development
Agnes Moors
1
, Phoebe C. Ellsworth
2
, Klaus Scherer
3
, Nico Frijda
4
1
Ghent University
2
University of Michigan
3
Geneva University
4
Amsterdam University
Author Note: Preparation of this paper was supported by Methusalem Grant BOF09/01M00209 of
Ghent University.
APPRAISAL THEORIES OF EMOTION
Appraisal theories of emotion: State of the art and future development
Although a scholarly topic over the centuries, emotion was first scientifically
approached by Darwin (1872), who advocated a functional approach. Soon after, James
(1890) started a debate about the elicitation and differentiation of the emotions and even
about the very definition of the term emotion, that still continues. There have been periods of
dominance for certain theories, like Tomkins’ (1962) revival of Darwin’s ideas in the form of
discrete or basic emotion theory, a revival of peripheral theories by Schachter (1964), and
various revivals of Wundt’s (1896) dimensional theory. In the 1960's, Arnold (1960) and
Lazarus (1966) pioneered a new theoretical approach called appraisal theory, which is in
essence a systematization of ancient ideas about emotion, reflecting the ideas of Aristotle,
Hume (1739-40), Spinoza (1677), and Sartre (1939). In the 1980's this approach took on new
vigor, with a number of theorists proposing variants of appraisal theory, developing concrete
predictions, and testing them empirically. Since then, “appraisal” has become a household
word in emotion research, but the term is used in widely different forms and different
theoretical and atheoretical contexts. This special issue attempts to delineate the fundamental
architecture of a family of theories that can be rightly called appraisal theories in a strict
sense. In this issue we discuss the design features of these theories, their current development,
and the empirical support for them, as well as unresolved issues, new developments, and
critical objections. Four major contributions outline the scope of the current debate and a
group of commentators provide a critical echo.
In this special issue we will focus on the theories of Arnold (1960), Lazarus (1991),
Scherer (1984, 2009), Smith and Ellsworth (1985, Ellsworth, 1991), Frijda (1986, 2007),
Roseman (1984), and Clore and Ortony (2000). The basic premise of appraisal theories is that
emotions are adaptive responses, which reflect appraisals of features of the environment that
are significant for the organism’s well-being. Many other emotion theories also see emotions
APPRAISAL THEORIES OF EMOTION
as adaptive responses to the environment and some also toss in the term appraisal. Yet not all
theories qualify as appraisal theories. We first describe appraisal theories and the criteria that
differentiate them from other theories. Then we map out some of the diversity within the
family of appraisal theories.
Basic Description of Appraisal Theories and Differentiation from Other Theories
Contemporary appraisal theories define emotions as processes, rather than states.
This is reflected in the fact that the term emotion is often used as shorthand for an emotional
episode. Appraisal theories are componential theories in that they view an emotional episode
as involving changes in a number of organismic subsystems or components. Components
include an appraisal component with evaluations of the environment and the person-
environment interaction; a motivational component with action tendencies or other forms of
action readiness; a somatic component with peripheral physiological responses; a motor
component with expressive and instrumental behavior; and a feeling component with
subjective experience or feelings. The emotion process is continuous and recursive. Changes
in one component feed back to other components. For example, changes in appraisal may lead
to changes in physiological and behavioral responses. These may, in turn, lead to changes in
appraisal, either directly or indirectly (via a change in the stimulus situation). As a
consequence, several emotional episodes may run in parallel. Some appraisal theories build in
the notion of immediate efference (e.g., Ellsworth, 1991; Scherer, 2009): The processes in
each of the components do not need to be completed before they can produce changes in later
components.
Appraisal theories are not the only theories that treat the emotional episode as a
process of changes in components. Many emotion theorists casually mention the term
appraisal and some even describe it as a component (e.g., Russell, 2003; Ekman, 1994;
Matsumoto & Ekman, 2009). The mere mention of appraisal or even the inclusion of an
APPRAISAL THEORIES OF EMOTION
appraisal component is not sufficient for calling a theory an appraisal theory. In the remainder
of this introduction, we will point to important differences between appraisal theories and
other theories. Major differences include (a) the definition of appraisal, in terms of both
content and type of process, (b) the role of appraisal in emotion and predictions about the
relation between changes in appraisal and changes in other components, and (c) predictions
about individual, cultural, and developmental differences.
Definition of appraisal
Appraisal is a process that detects and assesses the significance of the environment for
well-being. Significance for well-being is best conceptualized as the satisfaction or
obstruction of concerns (Frijda, 1986, 2007). "Concerns" include the individual's needs,
attachments, values, current goals and beliefs (Frijda, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2004).
They include everything that an individual cares about (Frankfurt, 1988). It follows that
appraisal is inherently transactional: It involves an interaction between the event and the
appraiser (Lazarus, 1991).
Unlike other emotion theories that vaguely propose that cognitions contribute to
emotions (Schachter, 1964; Barrett, 2009; Russell, 2003), appraisal theories specify the
appraisal criteria or variables that are most important in differentiating emotions. In addition
to the variables of goal relevance and goal congruence (which refer to the relevance and
congruence of events for goals or, more broadly, concerns), most appraisal theories include
the variables of certainty, agency (event caused by oneself, someone else, or impersonal
circumstances), and coping potential or control. For example, a person sees her neighbor as
the cause (agency) of her lack of sleep ( goal incongruence) and does not know (certainty)
whether she can change the situation (control). Some appraisal theorists also propose that
novelty, expectancy, urgency, intentionality, legitimacy or fairness, and/or norm compatibility
contribute to differences in emotions. Appraisal is a process by which values are produced
APPRAISAL THEORIES OF EMOTION
for one or more appraisal variables. There is fair, but not complete, agreement among
appraisal theorists on the number and identity of these variables. These theorists do not claim
that their list is exhaustive, nor that it covers all people, cultures, or emotions.
Appraisal theories specify not only the contents of appraisal, but also the process of
appraisal in terms of the underlying mechanisms, the nature of the representations on which
these mechanisms operate, and the degree of automaticity. Appraisal theorists have proposed
two or three mechanisms underlying appraisal, endorsing a dual or triple mode view of
appraisal. Dual mode views (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 2000) distinguish between (a) a rule-based
mechanism, consisting of the on-line computation of one or more appraisal values, and (b) an
associative mechanism (also called schematic mechanism), consisting of the activation of
learned associations between representations of stimuli and previously stored appraisal
outputs (individual values or entire patterns). Triple mode views (e.g., Leventhal & Scherer,
1987) add a sensory-motor mechanism, consisting of the activation of unlearned associations
between sensory features, hedonic feelings, and motor responses, for example, the association
between the sensation of the earth shaking under one’s feet, unpleasant feelings, and muscle
contraction.
Although some critics have mischaracterized appraisal as a non-automatic, rule-based
process that operates on symbolic representations, appraisal theorists generally agree that
various mechanisms can underlie appraisal and that they can operate on a wide range of
representations: conceptual and/or propositional vs. perceptual and/or embodied; symbolic vs.
subsymbolic; locationist vs. distributed. They believe that appraisal often proceeds
automatically (i.e., uncontrolled in the promoting or counteracting sense, unconscious,
efficient, and/or fast, Moors, 2010), but can also sometimes proceed non-automatically.
Appraisal does not consist primarily of abstract cognitive principles, and often involves the
recognition of action affordances in perceived events (Gibson, 1979) – the perception that an