Democratic theory with critical intent: reply to Newey

TLDR: The authors argued that the force of Newey's critique is neutralised once one attends to the important differences between Habermas' moral theory and his discourse theory of law and democracy.

Abstract: My critical assessment of competing views on the marching controversy at Drumcree is found wanting by Glen Newey for at least three reasons. The Habermasian approach I adopt is alleged to be motivationally deficient, politically ineffectual and blind to its own decisionistic partiality. Here I indicate that the force of Newey's critique is neutralised once one attends to the important differences between Habermas' moral theory and his discourse theory of law and democracy. I argue, furthermore, that Newey's critique is insufficiently attuned to the institutional context of my argument, and that his line of reasoning has troubling political implications.