Experiencing Tradition versus Belonging to It: Gadamer’s Dilemma

TLDR: Gadamer's view of experience has been examined in this article, where the author argues that if we can have experiences of our traditions, will these experiences not affect the way we stand or participate in them? How can we value experience but deny that it has any effect?

Abstract: We "BELONG" TO TRADITION, Gadamer says, (1) and he insists, "The conceptual world in which philosophizing develops has already captivated us in the same way that the language in which we live conditions us." (2) The historical and cultural traditions in which we participate orient us toward our world and form the bases for our assumptions and expectations about how that world works. Understanding is always preoriented; we anticipate the meanings things have for us and we already possess a language for what we understand before we consider it more explicitly. At the same time, Gadamer emphasizes the importance of experiences that thwart our expectations and undermine our assumptions. In this negative sense of experiences, one "has" them; something surprises us in our normal routines and leads us to reconsider the possibilities of the situation in which we find ourselves. Likewise, experiences of historical tradition provoke us to rethink our views and allow us to go beyond the limits of our previous understanding. These two elements of Gadamer's hermeneutics seem to move in opposite directions. On the one hand, our socialization into historical traditions means that we are part of them and that they set the terms for our orientation toward our world. On the other hand, we can have experiences of our historical traditions in which they surprise and challenge us. Yet if we are part of historical traditions, how can we experience them in this way? If they already orient us how can they also surprise us? Conversely, if they do surprise us, does this surprise not reflect some difference from them, some way in which we are not or are no longer part of them? If Gadamer is to stress the way we always belong to historical traditions, must he not give up on the possibility of experiencing them? In this case, will he not have to question whether we can learn from them to go beyond the previous limits of our understanding? Alternatively, if he is to stress the way historical traditions can surprise us, must he not concede that we possess some independence from them and thus moderate his claims about the extent to which we belong to them? Gadamer's dilemma here is significant. In the introduction to Truth and Method he claims that his aim is to show "how little the traditions in which we stand are weakened by modern historical consciousness," (3) by which he means methodologically oriented social and historical sciences. Nevertheless, if we can have experiences of our traditions, will these experiences not affect the way we stand or participate in them? How can Gadamer value experience but deny that it has any effect? In his original response to Truth and Method Jurgen Habermas questions whether Gadamer sufficiently appreciates the power of reflection to alter the way we stand or participate in traditions. The question here, however, is whether, in this regard, Gadamer sufficiently appreciates the implications of his own account of experience. (4) He models his account of our relation to tradition on our relations to the Thou or what he also calls the Other. I therefore want to explore the question by examining this relation. I begin, however, with a more extensive account of Gadamer's view of experience. I In the empirical sciences experiences are methodically set up as experiments that are designed to test well-formulated hypotheses. Confirming the results of these tests depends upon the capacity of others to repeat the experience or experiment and to achieve similar results. The significance of any experience thus depends, first, on the strength of the experimental design and, second, on the ability of others to replicate the scientific results. Gadamer does not question the importance of confirmatory experiences. (5) Nevertheless, he is more interested in negative experiences that are not designed and that cannot be repeated. Here experiences are events and even journeys. (6) When one "has" an experience in this sense, it simply happens: we enter into a situation with expectations and assumptions and are suddenly caught up short. …