Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy
Volume 10 Number 1 Article 5
1-1-1984
Another View of Family Con;ict and Family Wholeness Another View of Family Con;ict and Family Wholeness
C. Terry Warner
Terrance D. Olson
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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation
Warner, C. Terry and Olson, Terrance D. (1984) "Another View of Family Con;ict and Family Wholeness,"
Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy
: Vol. 10 : No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/irp/vol10/iss1/5
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Another
View
of
Family Conflict and
Family Wholeness**
C. Terry Warner and Terrance
D.
Olson
*
A family
iife
<ducaloTs
suggesled
solulions of family
problems
will
spring
from
his
btliefs aboullhe
soums
of human conflict. This
pap.,.
shlchts a
Iheory
of
conflict
Ihal
is
rooled
in
Ihe
individual's
bdTayal
of his/her
own
fundamenlal valuts. Hypocrisy and stlf-
dectplion
tnsue, and individuals insidiously provoh
each
olhtr
10
do
Ihe
very
Ihings
for
which
Ihey
blame
one
anolhtr. This means thai
people
can
dtsisl
from
Ihe
alliludes Ihatthrow
Ihem
inlo conflicl and
live
harmoniously. Bul btcaust of
Iheir
stlf-deceplion, suing
how
10
do
this is nol easy.
Ullimattly,
Ihe
solution lies in moral
mponsibilily. Implicalions
for
family life educalors art
e:rplortd.
Whatever we
do
in teaching people to live together
productively
and
lovingly in families will
depend
upon
our
beliefs about why things go wrong in family situations. A
family life educator's practice is tied to his
or
her theory,
even though that theory may not have been explicitly
formulated. Does
he/she
think
that people whose families
are
in
conflict
can
be
victims
of
one
another
and
the
situation, or
do
they collaborate in the problems from
which they suffer, even when they seem to be victims? This
is
the root question because its answer determines
whether
such
people
can in fact
do
anything
to
eliminate
the
problems,
and,
therefore,
determines
what
educators
should
teach
about
how
a
healthy
family
life
can
be
achieved.
We
think
the
next
decade
will
witness
revolutions in traditional thinking
about
this issue,
and
these revolutions will dictate new practices in all the so-
called helping services, including education.
A basis for this hope
is
a new theory of
human
behavior
that appears in a forthcoming book
and
includes a
new
way
of
accounting
for conflict.
According
to
the
theory,
participants in conflict situations systematically deceive
themselves
about
the sources of their difficulties.
The
book
explains how, in
our
era, we have tended to
import
these
self-deceptions into
our
theories
about
human
conduct;
our
prevailing conceptions of
humanity
tend to partake of
our
self-deceptions.
To
these culturally
dominant
conceptions
of humanity there
is
an alternative that
is
shown to be
conceptually more powerful than any of them and that
unifies in a single point
of
view the manifold observations
of social behavior that have led many to regard
human
beings as hopelessly complex.'
This
presentation
does
not
set
forth
the
alternative
theory of which we speak, for doing so would require a
careful
dismantling
of
some
of
our
fundamental
presuppositions about people. Instead, we will provide a
simple sketch of the outlook on
human
conflict that the
new theory suggests.
Our
purpose will have been achieved
-c.
Terry
Warner
is Professor
of
Philosophy
and
Terrance
D.
Olson
is Professor of Family Sciences at Brigham
Young University.
15
if
the reader acquires a sense of how this outlook differs
from the ways in which we usually perceive people.
Because its theoretical underpinnings are not included
here,
the
sketch
may
appear
deceptively
simple;
its
implications may not be readily
apparent
to everyone.
However,
the
theory
from
which
the
sketch
is
drawn
accounts
for
much
of
what
Freud
called
the
"psychopathology of everyday life," including the difficult
problems
of
modern
family life,
and
it
sets
forth
the
conditions that must be satisfied
in
order for families to be
healthy and whole.
There are two axes along which the theory intersects the
theme of this issue.
One
concerns what we teach
about
the
nature of family life and the other concerns how we teach
it. We have chosen to concentrate on the first of these axes
and
to
defer
to
another
context
a
discussion
of
new
directions in learning that are implied
by
our
theory.
Values
and
Conflict
First, conflict among people
is
related to their values; we
can act either in accordance with, or contrary to, those
values. In
particular
situations
we
can
feel
morally
summoned to
do
a particular thing, or constrained not to
do
something;
it
is
in such situations that
our
values make
contact with
our
conduct. These feelings to
do
or to desist
may be called "moral imperatives."
Such felt moral imperatives do
not
necessarily express
what others expect of us, or even the general morality of
our community, but
embody
values that are personal
and
perhaps unique to us.
We
are not saying that there are
universal moral imperatives,
but
only that people do, from
time to time, feel morally constrained to
do
or not to
do
particular things. Examples: a father feels that it is right to
spend time, this evening, helping his
daughter
with
her
mathematics assignment. An uncle senses that he
is
called
upon
by
his conscience to apologize to a
nephew
whom
he
has treated demeaningly. A teacher
understands
that she
is
obligated to
do
the best she can to help her
students
learn
and grow. There
is
nothing inherently immoral
about
refusing to help one's daughter or failing to apologize or
even teaching moderately
but
not
superbly
well,
but
for
these individuals, in these particular situations, the actions
we've described would constitute actively going against
their own commitments; for them, the actions would be
immoral. We call this strictly personal immorality "self-
betrayal," in order to convey the idea implicit in it of being
untrue to oneself.
Not
surprisingly,
this
inauthenticity
shows
up
in
whatever one does in carrying
out
one's self-betrayal.
One
will conduct oneself hypocritically-will live in a
lie-in
an
effort to make the personal wrong that
is
being
done
seem
AMCAP
JOURNAL/JANUARY
1984
Sara:
Sara:
Sara:
Howard:
Now in
our
tradition
of
human
behavior studies, as in
our
daily life, we
tend
to
take
Howard
at
his word. In his view,
circumstances,
either
in
his
own
make-up
or
in
the
environment,
are
responsible
for
his
conduct;
he
has
become angry
because
Sara has
been
pestering him,
or
because
he
wanted
to watch the game,
or
because
of
his
hard
day. As observers,
our
assumption
is
that
we
understand
Howard
when
we
can
explain,
by
reference
to
factors
outside his control,
why
he acted as
he
did
and
that
those
factors
make
his
irritability
and
impatience
understandable. In
the
last
analysis-so
this traditional
doctrine would have us
believe-Howard
is
not
an
agent
so
much
as a
patient.
He does
not
act
but
is
acted
upon.
He
is
not responsible for his behavior
toward
his
daughter,
for
there are extenuating circumstances
which
excuse
him
for
his conduct.
Against
this
standard
view
of
the
situation,
we
are
suggesting that
the
way
Howard
sees
and
feels
about
Sara
is part of his
endeavor
to justify himself.
He
is actively
insisting
that
he is Sara's victim. For if in this altercation
with
her
he is
seen
as a
patient
rather
than
as
an
agent-if
his perceptions
and
feelings are
seen
as
caused
by
her
or
the
circumstances
rather
than
produced
by
him-then
he
cannot be held responsible. He is
exonerated.
Thus,
his
upset feelings are
part
of
the
lie
he
lives;
they
are
evidence
that
something
outside
himself-his
work,
Sara's
inconsiderateness,
etc.-is
responsible for
the
trouble
that
he is, in fact, stirring up.
"See
how
inconsiderate
you
are,"
is the message he is conveying to her,
"to
produce
this
much
anger in me?"
Does this mean,
then,
that
Howard
"really
knows"
what
he's
doing?-that
he's just playing a
part?-that
he
doesn't
actually feel angry? No,
he
is
not
merely
pretending;
he
is
not
harboring a secret
knowledge
that
he
is living a lie. His
emotions are aroused
and
could be
measured
by
a galvanic
skin indicator. But
there
is nevertheless a
sense
in
which
his emotion
is
not
genuine; for,
contrary
to
what
he
thinks,
nothing external is
making
him
angry.
Howard's
anger
is
genuine in
that
it is felt,
but
inauthentic
in
that
it is
not
caused
by
anything
that
is
happening
to
him.
He
becomes
angry as a non-verbal
means
of
proving
that
circumstances
are
making
him
angry.
Of
course we
wonder
about
Howard's
authenticity
when
we
hear
his
sudden
pleasantness
on
the
telephone
with
Fred (especially since Fred's call comes
as
Howard's
team
gets the ball, first
and
goal,
on
the
opponent's
eight
yard
line).
If
we have just
entered
the
room
we will
not
guess
that
a
moment
earlier
he
was
angry.
But
we
do
not
need
to
observe
how
chameleon-like
Howard
is in
order
to
see
that
he is inauthentic. He is giving off clues constantly.
We
can
see this
by
comparing
him
to
another
father,
whom
we
may
call
"Howard
II,"
who
simply
helps
his
daughter
when
he
feels
he
should.
Howard
II
will have
no
occasion to
carry
on
defensively, to blame Sara II,
or
to
value
the
televised
game
inordinately.
He
will
simply
help.
The
same
is
true
of
yet
another
Howard,
Howard
III,
who
when
asked
by
Sara
III
for help, feels, for
her
sake,
he
should
not
help. So
he
says
simply, "You
need
to
work
that
out
for yourself." Again,
no
defenSiveness,
no
accusation,
no
inordinate
lust
for
television. Proving themselves justified is
not
an
issue for
these
other
fathers, because
their
justification is
not
put
in
question
by
what
they
are doing.
The
telltale clues
that
Sara:
Howard:
Sara:
Howard:
Howard:
right.
This
inauthenticity
can
take
such
forms
as
depression,
low
self-esteem,
bitterness,
irritability,
jealousy, and
many
other maladaptive attitudes.
We
have
chosen to illustrate it initially with a very
ordinary
instance
of family selfishness:
Sara: Daddy, I can't figure this
math
problem
out.
Howard: (her father, watching
Monday
night
football,
and
feeling
that
he should help Sara) Sure
you
can. You've justgot to struggle with it.
But I've tried,
and
I'm getting nowhere. If
you
could
...
(Sara begins to cry,
her
head
on
her
book.)
You're
trying
to
take
the
easy
way.
They
wouldn't
give you the
problem
if
they
hadn't
taught
you all you have to
know
to solve it.
(His voice rising)
Why
do
you wait until I'm
right in the middle of watching
my
game? In
fact, you
should
be in bed, young lady.
Why
do
you
leave
your
homework
'til
the
last
minute, anyway?
I
didn't
think
it
would
take me very long
...
Well,
ask
your
sister upstairs.
She
had
the
same math last year.
She's
going to
know
it
better
than
I am.
But I've just got
one
question.
(his anger blossoming) Sara, I'm tired
of
you
trying to get me to
do
your
work
for you.
Now
I've told you
what
you
need
to
do
to get
that
done
and
you're
just avoiding doing it.
(pouting)
When
Danny
asks for help
you
help
him
...
Oh
boy
...
Look,
if
you
would
do
what
you
are
supposed
to do, I would be glad to
help
you.
There
is a difference
between
helping
Danny
after
he's
struggled
with
something
and
helping
you
when
the
only struggle
you've
had
is
to
ask
me to
do
your
work
for you.
But
Danny's
smart.
He
doesn't
have
to
struggle
...
Howard feels
that
he
ought
to help Sara,
but
is
refusing
to do so. His
encouragement
of
her
to struggle with
the
problem
until
she
can
figure
it
out
might
in
other
circumstances be good advice,
but
in this case
he
is giving it
as part of
an
effort to
mask
and
justify his
own
moral
failure-to
make
it
seem
right.
He
also
accuses
her
of
procrastinating, complains
that
she
is
intruding
unfairly
on
his
time,
and
gets
angry
and
impatient
over
her
inconsiderateness of his
own
needs
and
desires.
Howard
is
not
pretending;
he
is
not
acting a lie.
He
is,
as
we sometimes say,
living
a lie.
The
very
way
he
sees Sara,
as
inconsiderate
and
intrusive, is
part
of
the
lie,
and
so is
the
anger
he
feels
about
her
inconsiderateness.
In
this
particular case
the
value
he
is placing
on
watching
the
football game, which
makes
her
request
of
him
insensitive
and
unreasonable,
is
part
of
the
lie.
These
are
all
interconnected aspects of
the
lie
he
is
living-the
self-
deception he is in.
The
way
he
sees
and
feels
about
the
situation
is
part
of his effort to justify
himself
in
not
doing
what
he
himself feels is right.'
From Howard's point of view, Sara's
inconsiderateness
and
procrastination is
the
problem;
or
else
the
pressure
he
felt
at
work,
or
else his
strong
desire to
watch
the
game.
AMCAP JOURNAL/JANUARY 1984
16
Howard gives off are
his
protestations
and
accusations-his
stylizing
of
himself
as
being wronged.
This
would
be
true
even
if
Sara
IDUt
lazy
and
inconsiderate,
as
he
says,
and
even
if
the
game
IDUt
the
greatest
superbowl
contest
of
all
time. Self-justification
of
the
sort
we
are
studying
is a sign
that,
by
the
individual's
own
values,
something
is
not
right.
Another point
about
Howard's
self-deception
needs
to
be
understood.
The
features
of
conduct
that
we
have
described
do
not
OCCIIT
in
5tqlltnct;
they
are
not
mental
steps
he
goes through in
order
to
blame
someone
for
what
he
himself is doing.
He
does
not
first feel
he
ought
to
help
Sara,
then
betray himself,
then
cast
about
for a lie
to
live
as
a cover for this self-betrayal,
and
then
work
up
an
emotion
to
show
that
he
is Sara's victim. Rather, his self-betrayal
is
the living
of
such
a lie,
the
working
up
of
such
an
emotion.
It takes neither planning
nor
particular intelligence to
do
it;
Archie Bunker, for example, is as
adept
as
anyone
you
couldmeel.
So
one
can't
"catch
oneself'
in
the
process
of
producing
the
sort
of
encompassing, behavioral lie we are describing.
To
betray oneself is already to be living it. Self-betrayal, in
this sense, is a resistant perceptual style freely
chosen
by
the
individual.
There
is
more
to say
about
the
trouble
that
Howard
creates
and
his
method
of
creating it to
make
himself
seem
innocent
By
seeing Sara as inconsiderate
and
by
feeling
inconvenienced, irritated
and,
finally,
angry
about
her
inconsiderateness,
he
makes
himself
out
to
be
her
victim.
By
this
means
he
makes
it
clear
that
he
bears
no
responsibility for the
trouble
he is helping create. But
of
course
if
he
is
her
victim
then
she
is his victimizer.
Howard
is accusing his
daughter-letting
the
family
think
she
is
insensitive, lazy,
and
disorganized-as
part
of
exonerating
himself in his
own
failure to act responsibly.
What
about
Sara's
feelings
in
the
scene
we
have
presented? How would you feel if you
were
Sara-fairly
dealt
with
or
put
down?
Would
you
want
to
take
responsibility to
do
your
homework?
Whether
or
not
Sara
started
out
acting responsibly
and
unself-consciously in
seeking
her
father's
help,
she
did
not
do
so
once
he
attacked her.
She
began to
sob
softly.
She
made
excuses.
She followed
the
very
pattern
of
her
father's self-betrayal:
she
was
defensive
and
accusing.
From
her
point
of
view
her
father
and
the circumstances
were
responsible
for
the
trouble. She is
not
the
agent
that
he
accuses
her
of being.
She is a patient.
This
brings us to a
surprising
and
important
principle:
the responsibility--evading, accusing
attitude
of
the self-
betrayer-Howard
in this
case-tends
to proooh
in
thO;i
hi
"CCIIS6
Iht
otTlJ
bth"oioT of
IDhich
ht IICCII5<S Ihnn.
If
they
accept
the provocation,
as
Sara did,
then
the
self-betraver
has
his
proof
that
they are to blame
and
that
he
is
innoc~nt.
Clearly
Howard can say
that
he
is
not
simply
imagining
that
Sara is
irresponsible.
Her
behavior
even
now
proves
that
she
is-
she whimpers,
she
makes
excuses,
she
tries
to
say
that
he
is
being
unfair.'
The
variations
upon
this
theme
are
many. For example,
the
style
of
self-betrayal
that
we
have
described
for
both
Howard
and
Sara we call
"childish."
But
Howard
might
act
self-righteously instead
of
childishly.
In
such
a case
he
might ceremoniously switch off
the
television-his
team
still has first
and
goal
on
the
opponent's
eight-and,
with a
17
feeling
of
self-sacrifice
and
moral nobility,
work
out
the
problems with Sara.
He
would
condescendingly
answer
her
questions.
His
explanations
would
be
attended
by
a
strained patience. Inwardly,
he
would
be
congratulating
himse1f
on
his self-control.
In
15
minutes
the
homework
would
be
done,
and
Howard
would
have a sense of having
risen above
the
selfish level
on
which
most
fathers
operate
and, in spite
of
his
daughter's
irritating irresponsibility,
done
his duty. But
he
would
have given
Sara
everything
except himself. His would have
been
a refusal
to
help
her
in
the
guise
of
"doing
all
he
could."
Moreover, Sara would not
have
felt
helped.
The
attitude
of
her
father would
have
put
her
down, just as, in
the
actual
case,
his
anger
did.
She
would
not
have
responded
well-would
not
have tried
hard
to solve
the
problem
for
herself. In
the
future she
would
probably
be less inclined to
ask
for help
when
she
needed
it.
And
this
would
have
given
Howard more justification for feeling
that
his
daughter
was
irresponsible
and
that
he
wa;,
,,~thoutlosing
his
temper
or
even uttering a
harsh
word, rising
above
adversity.
So
whether
Howard
is childish
or
self-righteous, he
provokes Sara to
do
what
he
blames
her
for,
and
thus
validates in his
mind
his self-justification. In
both
of these
cases she
is
reciprocally
provoking
him
by
the
way
she
evades
her
responsibility
and
accuses
him
in
her
heart.
Whatever
their
styles
of
self-betrayal,
they
are
both
provoking the
other
and
by
this
means
extorting
validation
for the lie being lived.
We
can represent this
situation
in the following
diagram:
F~'.~
Collusion
We
call this
kind
of destructive cooperation ",1/"5io",.
y,,'hen people collude-when each
provokes
or
entice~
the
other
to
do
the
very thing
he
says
he
hates-each
is
making
himself
out
to be
the
other's
victim. Each is
constanth'
ready to take offense at
what
the
other
does.
"'ithouttheir
collusive self-betrayal,
there
would be
no
occasion for
enmity
between
them.
Lest it
appear
that
the
simple
model
we
have
been
developing is simplistic, let us
consider
a
more
involved
and
convoluted
instance.
The
marriage
of
Robert
and
Marcia was
on
the verge
of
ending. Marcia was
at
the
end
of
her
tether
because Robert was insensitive,
thoughtless,
and
un\~~ling
to
"communicate."
She
was
obsessed
with
the
idea that he was philandering,
or
at
least flirting;
she
was
sure
that
he
wanted
to
abandon
her
in
favor
of
someone
less
dowdy
and
more
exciting.
She
blamed
him
for
her
claustrophobic
feelings
in
the
confined
world
populated only
by
herself
and
her
children.
AMCAP
JOURNAl/JANUARY
1984
For a long time neither family nor friends
had
observed
evidence of what she accused Robert of;
on
the
contrary,
he
seemed to
them
to love her genuinely. In fact,
she
herself
never cited evidence of his
supposed
infideltiy;
she
simply
"knew"
that it was so: "A
woman
knows:'
she
often
said.
When
he protested his innocence,
she
accused
him
of
compounding his unfaithfulness with dishonesty.
When
friends
or
family
defended
him,
she
accused
them
of
collaboration. She sobbed
on
her
pillow
at
night
until
she
thought her heart would break.
Her
contention was
that
she grieved more
than
other
women
who
were similarly
situated
because
of
her
idealism
about
marriage
and
because she
had
"given
my
heart
totally to
my
husband."
She told her troubles to
anyone
that would listen,
asking
them
how she could possibly have
the
marriage
she
had
longed
for-how
she could possibly cherish, honor,
and
be
intimate with a
man
who was as self-interested
and
callous
as Robert.
o
'In
fact, despite
her
endless protestations, Marcia
never
lovingly gave Robert
her
heart.
Many
times
she
felt
that
she
ought to; "giving oneself" in marriage was
an
obsession
with her. But
she
did not.
The
moral imperative
that
she
felt, or placed
upon
herself, did
not
come to
her
in
the
form
of a general
requirement
to love Robert:
instead
it was
specific to situations. Sometimes
she
would feel
that
she
ought to prepare a favorite dish for him;
other
times to
touch him, to look into his eyes,
to
make
him
a gift,
or
to
thank
him for something
he
had
done.
On
these
occasions
when
she felt a particular action morally
required
of
her,
she violated
her
moral sensibility
and
did
not
act as
she
felt.
The
result was that she saw
him
through
accusing eyes.
From her point of view, even the expressions
on
his face
were irritating. It
wasn't
simply
in
her
manner
that
she
insisted
that
Robert was preventing
her
from loving him, it
was in the very way
she
saw
him
that
she
carried
out
this
insistence.
No one will be
surprised
to learn
that
this
continuous
hostile behavior
of
Marcia's
provoked
Robert's retaliation.
Feeling
wounded
and
unfairly
dealt
with,
he
viewed
coming
home
as a trial by fire,
and
stayed
away
as
often
as
he could.
The
more
he
stayed
away,
the
more
Marcia
had
her proof that
he
didn't
love
her
and
the
more
reason
she
had
to
complain,
to
withhold
her
favors,
and
to
feel
depressed. For his part,
the
more
Marcia
attacked
him,
the
more reason Robert
had
to feel
abused,
and
the
more
justified
he
felt in
not
wanting to
come
home. So
Robert
and
Marcia
helped
each
other
create
the
forces
that
separated
them
from each other.
To each
of
them
it looked like
the
other
was
at
fault,
and
an
outside observer
might
well have said
that
they
were
incompatible. But
our
view is
that
each
engaged
in a series
of free acts of self-betrayal
that
not
only
took
the
other's
behavior as
an
excuse
but
actually
provoked
the
other
to
that
behavior.
What
we
have
been
exploring
here
is a
way
of
understanding
human
conflict
that
differs from
traditional
explanations.
We
are suggesting that,
at
least
in
many
cases,
human
beings are
not
the
victims
of
provocations;
situations
do
not
overcome
them.
Their
provoked
responses-whether
of
impatience,
resentment,
anger,
irritation, self-pity,
or
fear-are
not
effects
of
causes
that
lie
beyond
their control
but
are
instead
means
of
justifying
AMCAP JOURNAL/JANUARY 1984
18
themselves. "See how irresponsibly
you
have
been
acting:'
Howard
seems
to
say,
"in
order
to
irritate
me
to
this
extent!"
Their
responses to
one
another
are
not
passive,
but
purposeful. In an
enormous
variety
of
ways
people
make
themselves
unhappy
in
order
to
justify themselves in
the
compromises they are
making
of
their
own
values.
The
Self-Betrayer is
Self-Deceived
In considering this possibility
that
we
conspire
with
others
to produce
the
unhappiness
that
afflicts us, we
encounter
a
pec;uliar problem.
The
problem
is
that
this conspiratorial
behavior does
not
look like
what
it is. From
an
observer's
point
of
view it
appears
that
either
Howard
is sincerely
put
out
by
the
unreasonable
request
of
an
irresponsible
daughter
or
else
that
he
is
producing
his irritated
behavior
"on
purpose."
If
he
is producing it
on
purpose,
he
is
merely
pretending-play-acting,
if
you
will-and
is
not
really
unhappy
at all. If he is sincere,
then
the
explanation
we are
giving
of
his behavior is far off
the
mark.
Thus,
it
appears
that
our
explanation
can't
be
right;
Howard's
irritation is
either intentional,
and
he's
not
really
irritated,
or
else
he's
really irritated
and
not
acting intentionally.
Howard
can't
be actually making himself miserable.
This conclusion is
not
valid. In
the
new
personality
theory from which this article is
drawn,
it is
shown
that
the
conclusion is fallacious because it is
based
on
Howard's
own
self-deceiving way
of
seeing
the
situation.
Howard
and
Marcia blame others
as
being
causes
of
their
feelings.
They
are, therefore, deceiving themselves as
to
the
fact
that
they
themselves are
producing
these feelings as
means
of
accusing Sara
and
Robert.
They
are, therefore,
not
simply
pretending to
be
irritated; being deceived,
they
are
in
earnest
about
it.
Their
irritability
or
suffering is
something
they
actually
fetl,
in spite
of
the
fact
that
it is a falsification
(neither Sara
nor
Robert is really causing it).
But if we were to
ask
Howard
if
he
is
being
completely
honest in his interaction
with
Sara,
the
only
way
as a self-
deceiver
he
could
interpret
our
question
would
be:
"Do
you
sincerely feel
put
out,
or
are
you
merely
pretending?"
Since
it is obvious to
him
that
he
is
not
pretending,
he
thinks
our
question is ridiculous;
he
wonders
why
we
mistrust
him.
''Howard, we
think
you
are
blaming
Sara so
you
'can
cover
up
your
unwillingness to
help
her
as
you
should."
''You
think
I'm
just
pretending
to
be
upset
so
I
can
watch
the game?
Is
that
what
you
think?"
"No, you're really
upset
all right."
::rhat's
ri~~t!
So I
can't
be
just
pretending,
can
I?"
Well,no.
"So
quit
accusing
me
of
being
dishonest.
Look,
I'm
so
aggravated I
haven't
even
enjoyed
the
game."
Even
if
no
such
confrontation
takes place,
Howard
may
succeed
in
deceiving
us
as
well
as
himself
by
his
performance.
This
he
does if
we
accept his self-deceiving
viewpoint, which is
that
either
he
is sincere, really feels
put
out, is Sara's victim
and
is
not
responsible,
or
else is
only
pretending
to feel this way, is cynically
manipulating
and
misusing Sara,
and
is, therefore, responsible.
From
Howard's
point
of
view,
if
he
is
not
being
honest
it
can
only
mean
that
he
isn't
really upset.
He
cannot
be
both
upset
and
responsible. So if, like
Howard,
we
let
the
issue
become,
'1s
he
sincere
in
his feelings
or
not?"
then
we
also