MEHTA, COLEMAN ARMSTRONG, “A Rat Hole to be Watched”? CIA Analyses of the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948-1950. (Under the direction of Dr. Nancy Mitchell.) This thesis studies Central Intelligence Agency analyses of the June 28, 1948, Tito-Stalin split. It discusses the many issues that the CIA confronted after the first public breach of a heretofore united Communist monolith. This thesis also places these analyses in context, examining the problems faced by the newly created CIA as it struggled to find a place in the national security bureaucracy. After the Agency was established in 1947, its very existence was consistently challenged by the Departments of State and Defense, organizations which were unwilling to cede any bureaucratic control away from their own intelligence operations. The Secretaries of State and Defense used their superior status on the National Security Council to bolster their positions, while the Agency’s ad hoc organizational structure and uncertain mandate provided a weak case for more authority. Along with its administrative struggles, the early CIA was also marked by a series of high-profile intelligence failures, among them the Tito-Stalin split. Despite its ongoing bureaucratic struggles, the CIA quickly recovered from the shock of the split. It provided remarkably prescient analyses of the rift’s consequences. Using a collection of newly declassified CIA files, as well as a series of interviews with the CIA Station Chief in Belgrade from 1948 until 1951, this thesis analyzes those reports. It follows a year-by-year progression between 1948 and 1950. The first chapter, covering 1948, discusses the CIA’s initial post-split analyses, in which the possibility was broached of provoking more “Tito” defections throughout Eastern Europe. It also discusses the initial likelihood of a Soviet or Sattelite invasion of Yugoslavia in order to depose Tito, Stalin’s initiation of “Titoist” purges in the Sattelite states, and the initial repercussions of Yugoslavia’s aid to Greek Communist rebels and disputed claim to Trieste. Concomitant with the deteriorating relations of the United States and Yugoslavia before the split, the CIA during 1948 considered Yugoslavia “a rat hole to be watched.” By 1949, that perception was beginning to change. The second chapter discusses CIA analyses of Tito’s staying power, as well as the harm this entrenchment caused to the Soviet-led International Communist Movement. CIA analyses of Stalin’s options for interference in Yugoslavia are again considered, with the addition of reports discussing possible Soviet-led insurrection in Yugoslav Macedonia. American economic and military aid, needed to offset a Soviet-Satellite blockade of Yugoslav trade, also receives consideration. In 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War caused a reassessment within the CIA of Stalin’s willingness to go to war in the Balkans. Chapter Three discusses these analyses, as well as the process by which the United States used a severe drought in Yugoslavia to offer military assistance. The beginning of each chapter offers context, noting major Cold War events and significant occurrences within the CIA. The thesis ends in early 1951, with the establishment of a joint Yugoslav-American intelligence sharing agreement. “A RAT HOLE TO BE WATCHED”? CIA ANALYSES OF THE TITO-STALIN SPLIT, 1948-1950 by Coleman Armstrong Mehta A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of North Carolina State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan

"A Rat Hole to be Watched"? CIA Analyses of the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948-1950

(1991). ‘A highly commendable action’: William J. Donovan's intelligence mission for Mussolini and Roosevelt, December 1935‐February 1936. Intelligence and National Security: Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 334-366.

‘A highly commendable action’: William J. Donovan's intelligence mission for Mussolini and Roosevelt, December 1935‐February 1936

Many of America's most significant political, economic, territorial, and geostrategic accomplishments from 1776 to the present day came about because a U.S. diplomat disobeyed orders. The magnificent terms granted to the infant republic by Britain at the close of the American Revolution, the bloodless acquisition of France's massive Louisiana territory in 1803, the procurement of an even vaster expanse of land from Mexico forty years later, the preservation of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' during World War I—these and other milestones in the history of U.S. geopolitics derived in large part from the refusal of ambassadors, ministers, and envoys to heed the instructions given to them by their superiors back home. Historians have neglected this pattern of insubordination—until now. Rogue Diplomats makes a seminal contribution to scholarship on U.S. geopolitics and provides a provocative response to the question that has vexed so many diplomatic historians: is there a distinctively “American” foreign policy?

Rogue Diplomats: The Proud Tradition of Disobedience in American Foreign Policy

In April 1941, Ante Pavelic, the fascist leader of the Independent State of Croatia, and his paramilitary force, the Ustase (“rebels”), began a genocide that killed at least 330,000 Serbs and essentially eliminated Jews and Roma from Croatia. The American response to genocide in Croatia provides a fuller context for examining Washington's reaction to the Nazi genocide. By the summer of 1941, the US government had reliable information that genocide was taking place in Croatia. Washington expressed little interest in this slaughter, except insofar it affected Croatian–American and Serbian–American relations; made no direct public statement condemning the Ustase's actions; and offered no protest to the Vatican. Croatian events, however, propelled the FBI and the Office of War Information to suppress pro-Ustase supporters in the United States.

/pdf/the-united-states-response-to-genocide-in-the-independent-xsez92lbnz.pdf

The United States' Response to Genocide in the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945

: Recent historiography has almost universally denounced the tactical prowess of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). However, a detailed analysis of the performance of the 42nd Division's 165th Infantry Regiment tells a surprisingly different story. Despite the challenges of the WWI battlefield, the 165th Infantry Regiment compiled a remarkable record of tactical effectiveness in its 180 days of combat. During its six campaigns, the regiment repeatedly held the line and seized objectives against veteran German units in a variety of situations and under various conditions. At the regimental level, a de facto adoption of trench warfare doctrine enabled the unit to synchronize the combined arms and avoid the doctrinal dysfunction that plagued the majority of the AEF. At the tactical level, the Irish platoons and companies rapidly became adept at using Indian-style or infiltration tactics to advance, seize terrain, and destroy German positions. In addition, superb leadership throughout the regiment and stellar unit cohesion played significant roles in the unit's superior tactical proficiency. In sum, these four factors enabled the 165th to achieve a level of tactical effectiveness second to none among the non-regular regiments of the AEF and equal to the best units within the German Army. A bibliography of 38 books, 11 journal articles, 18 government documents, and 9 other sources is included. Appendixes provide a table showing the organization of the 42nd Division, a chronology and casualties of the campaigns, and maps of the following 1918 campaigns: the Irish defensive sector at Luneville, France, 21 Feb-21 Mar; the 165th's defensive sector at Ancerville, France, 31 Mar-21 Jun; the Irish defensive sector at St. Hilaire, France, 15-20 Jul; the 165th's attack across the Ourcq River, near Seringes-et-Nesles, France, 25 Jul-6 Aug; the 165th's axis of advance during the St. Mihiel offensive, 12-16 Sep; and the Irish sector at St. Georges, France, 12-19 Oct. (4 figur7

http://www.worldwar1.com/dbc/pdf/165thInfAEF.pdf

The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan

Citations

"A Rat Hole to be Watched"? CIA Analyses of the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948-1950

‘A highly commendable action’: William J. Donovan's intelligence mission for Mussolini and Roosevelt, December 1935‐February 1936

Rogue Diplomats: The Proud Tradition of Disobedience in American Foreign Policy

The United States' Response to Genocide in the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945

Fine Conduct Under Fire: The Tactical Effectiveness of the 165th Infantry Regiment in the First World War

Related Papers (1)

Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency