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The Original Understanding of Original Intent

H. Jefferson Powell
- 01 Mar 1985 - 
- Vol. 98, Iss: 5, pp 885
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Powell as discussed by the authors examined the historical validity of the claim that the framers of the Constitution expected future interpreters to seek the meaning of the document in the framer's intent.
Abstract
When interpreting the Constitution, judges and commentators often invoke the “original intent of the framers” in support of their positions. Many claim that such an interpretive strategy is not only currently desirable, but indeed was the expectation of the Constitution’s drafters and early interpreters. In this Article, Professor Powell examines the historical validity of the claim that the framers of the Constitution expected future interpreters to seek the meaning of the document in the framers’ intent. He first examines the various cultural traditions that influenced legal interpretation at the time of the Constitution’s birth. Turning to the history of the Constitution’s framing, ratification, and early interpretation, Professor Powell argues that although early constitutional discourse did contain references to “original intention” and the “intent of the framers,” the meaning of such terms was markedly different from their current usage. He concludes that modern resort to the “intent of the framers” can gain no support from the assertion that such was the framers’ expectation, for the framers themselves did not believe such an interpretive strategy to be appropriate.

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