A core element of the Reagan Administration’s defense buildup lies in its plan to increase the size of the U.S. Navy to 600 ships.’ This 600-ship force is purportedly required to implement “The Maritime Strategy,” which is the Navy‘s blueprint for fighting a global conventional war against the Soviet Union. It is being built at the expense of American air and ground forces in Central Europe, which have not been significantly strengthened during the Reagan Administration’s tenure, even though the Administration has expressed the view that the NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional balance in Europe clearly favors the Pact.2 Serious controversy has surrounded both the naval buildup and its attendant Maritime Strategy. Critics have charged that the Maritime Strategy is not coherent or complete, and does not provide an adequate rationale for

The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea

A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe

I F o r the past five years, U.S. Navy officers and their civilian colleagues have been taking to heart the centuries-old dictum of the first great theorist of conflict, Sun Tzu: they have been studying war. While military reformers have focused on the need for improved military strategy in a land campaign, a renaissance of strategic thinking has been taking place within the U.S. Navy. This renaissance has been marked by a series of internal and external discussions and debates in which naval strategy has received more attention than in any peacetime period since the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan.’ One important result has been to weave traditional naval thinking into a coherent concept for using early, forceful, global, forward deployment of maritime power both to deter war with the Soviet Union and to achieve U.S. war aims should deterrence fail. The concept, which has come to be called ”The Maritime Strategy,” was initially codified in classified internal Navy documents in 1982

Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy

background

/pdf/alliance-naval-strategies-and-norway-in-the-final-years-of-4wrwmgqvxu.pdf

Alliance Naval Strategies and Norway in the Final Years of the Cold War

As the United States maritime strategy was developed and articulated in the 1980s, some critics and commentators argued that it was not in fact a military strategy but a programmatic document to justify the 600-ship navy. Moreover, it was asserted, to the degree that the strategy was intended to govern the actual employment of naval forces, it was inconsistent both with nationally approved concepts of operations and war plans and with Alliance commitments.1 Although these charges were not without substance, they failed to grasp the significance of the maritime strategy in shaping national security perspectives and fleet operations.2

Fleet Renewal and Maritime Strategy in the 1980s

The maritime strategy and the atlantic alliance

/pdf/the-role-of-the-navy-and-marines-in-the-norwegian-sea-yfo1q5zzo9.pdf

The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea

Citations

A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe

Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy

Alliance Naval Strategies and Norway in the Final Years of the Cold War

Fleet Renewal and Maritime Strategy in the 1980s

The maritime strategy and the atlantic alliance

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