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Journal ArticleDOI

There are no ordinary things

Peter Unger
- 01 Jun 1979 - 
- Vol. 41, Iss: 2, pp 117-154
TLDR
In this article, the authors argue that none of these things exist, and so that the view of common sense is badly in error, and argue for this negative belief of mine.
Abstract
Human experience, it may be said, naturally leads us to have a certain view of reality, which I call the view of common sense. This view is t empered by cultural advance, but in basic fo rm it is similar for all cultures on this planet, even the most primitive and isolated. According to this prevalent view, there are various sorts of ordinary things in the world. Some of these are made by man, such as tables and chairs and spears, and in some ' advanced ' cultures also swizzle sticks and sousaphones. Some are found in nature such as stones and rocks and twigs, and also tumbleweeds and fingernails. I believe that none of these things exist, and so that the view of common sense is badly in error. In this paper , I shall argue for this negative belief of mine. It shall not be my business here to offer arguments concerning the question of whether there are any people, or conscious beings. I contras t these putat ive entities with mere things, and trust that my usage of the latter te rm follows one common way of allowing for such a distinction. Further, among such things, I shall discuss only those which are not living or alive; perhaps I may call them ordinary inanimate objects. Nothing of basic importance depends upon any such a division; it serves only to restrict my topic conveniently. A second restriction I impose on mysel f is not to discuss certain more general concepts which are intended to delineate in a 'thing-like way ' suitable portions or aspects of ' the external world ' , or of 'physical reality' . Accordingly, while I shall argue that our concept of a stone, for example , is devoid of application, I shall not make any such claim for our concept of a physical object, or for any similarly general idea. So far as these present arguments go, then, there may well be various physical objects , indeed, even of a great variety of shapes and sizes. But whatever the shapes and sizes of any such objects , none will ever be a table, a stone, or any ordinary thing. At

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Journal ArticleDOI

Realism and Human Kinds

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors draw out exactly in what ways the realist paradigm of mind-independent objects fails, and show that not all cases of reference to these kinds can be pro ceed along a purely causal model.
BookDOI

Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science

Shahid Rahman
TL;DR: This chapter discusses Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science: An Encyclopedic Project in the Spirit of Neurath and Diderot Shahid Rahman and John Symons, and some of the contributions from Non-Classical Logics.
Journal ArticleDOI

Vagueness in the World

TL;DR: This paper argued that vagueness is a form of referential indeterminacy: a vague term is a term that has more than one candidate referent, none of which the term exclusively refers to.
Book

One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness

Graham Priest
TL;DR: One is about what it is to be one as mentioned in this paper, and what it means to be a one can itself be many things; and to each sense of one, there is a corresponding sense of many.