. This essay attempts to explore the senses in which religious meanings may be understood to be grounded ontologically and in which they may be validly accepted as true. It begins by outlining Wolfhart Pannenberg's proposal for conceiving the scientific status of theology and his formulation of the question of theological truth. Then certain epistemological presuppositions are challenged in light of Michael Polanyi's theory of knowledge. Finally a revised understanding is proposed in Polanyian terms. Here in their primordial sense religious meanings are based in the act of breaking out toward the ground of our tacit foreknowledge. In their primary sense religious symbolizations are accepted as human creations and judged to be valid insofar as they integrate meaningfully all the disparate elements of our experience.

Truth in religion: a polanyian appraisal of wolfhart pannenberg's theological program

too supernaturalistic, and too rigid. But this is not to deny that the meaning of revelation can be mediated through true propositions, as we shall see below. The second major approach to revelation in current theology is designated as historical. There are several forms of this theory, but for the present I shall advert only to the most extreme, which would hold that God reveals Himself not just by inspiring a prophetic interpretation of ambiguous events but by producing in history events with a clear meaning accessible to all reasonable observers. In the 1950's the biblical theologian George Ernest Wright maintained that revelation was originally and adequately imparted through God's deeds in history. More recently Wolfhart Pannenberg and his circle have contended that revelation is objectively given in historical events which, under the cool scrutiny of reason, can be unequivocally interpreted as having a specific meaning. It is basic to this theory that revelatory events are self-interpreting: God speaks the language of facts. In opposition to the first school, Pannenberg denies that revelation is actually given in the form of words. Words, he holds, can promise a revelation yet to be given; they can subsequently report what has been revealed through deeds; but they are not themselves revelation. On this second theory there is, again, no particular problem in seeing how revelation can be true. The truth of the deed is that of its evident significance. When translated into propositional statements, historical revelation has the speculative kind of truth that attaches to philosophical judgments about the import of history. Pannenberg's own doctrine of revelation is in essence a comprehensive theory of the meaning and end of universal history. Pannenberg's theses, however, are subject to serious objections. Important though history may be as a medium of revelation, it is doubtful whether an academic historian, unmotivated by religious concerns, could be convinced by the biblical accounts, contemplated in the light of universal reason, that revelation had in fact occurred. Nor does it seem that the biblical authors themselves regarded historical events, apart from any inspired interpretation or prophetic commentary, as a sufficient channel of revelation. According to a third modern theory, much in vogue in the early part of the present century, revelation occurs essentially through an inner experience of the divine, quasi-mystical in character. Such is, in a general 5 G. E. Wright, God Who Acts: Biblical Theology as Recital (London: SCM, 1952). 6 W. Pannenberg and others, Revelation as History (New York: Macmillan, 1968) esp. 132-33. In order to bring out what is distinctive in Pannenberg's position, I have inevitably simplified it, especially in view of his own subsequent explanations, e.g., in Basic Questions in Theology 2 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971) 28-64. 54 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES way, the position of distinguished spiritual writers and philosophers such as Baron Friedrich von Hugel, Dean William R. Inge, Evelyn Underhill, and William Ernest Hocking. Writers such as these commonly assert that God Himself, immediately experienced by the religious consciousness, is the real content of revelation, and that the credal statements and doctrinal tenets of any specific community are merely human interpretations. As Evelyn Underhill has it, "The particular mental image which the mystic forms of his objective, the traditional theory he accepts, is not essential. Since it is never adequate, the degree of its inadequacy is of secondary importance We cannot honestly say that there is any wide difference between the Brahman, Sufi, or Christian mystic at their best." This approach, with its nonconceptual view of religious truth, paves the way for an easy reconciliation among the world's religions and even between religion and humanistic psychology, as the work of Abraham Maslow bears witness. The theory, however, rather summarily dismisses the specific witness of particular religious traditions. Furthermore, it may be doubted whether psychological peak experiences, even of a very intense kind, deserve to be called revelation; for, as William James pointed out, such experiences have no clear content. They admit of a wide variety of interpretations, theistic, pantheistic, polytheistic, and even atheistic. A fourth typical theory of revelation, too subtle and complicated for coherent analysis in these schematic remarks, is the dialectical. Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Rudolf Bultmann, and several associates, writing in the wake of World War I, vehemently rejected the optimistic liberalism which lay at the root of the theories of Auguste Sabatier and many Modernists. At the same time they refused to return to the orthodoxy of traditional dogmatism. Revelation, they maintained, is God's free act in Jesus Christ, to which the Bible and Christian proclamation bear witness. Written and spoken words, being creatures, could never be revelation in themselves, but they can become revelation when it pleases God to speak through them. God's word, being identical with God Himself, cannot be contained in history, even though it may touch history at a dimensionless point, as a tangent touches a circle. Nor can religious experience be rightly called revelation, for God is knowable only through faith in His word. The truth of revelation, for this school, is of a unique kind having no analogy in other spheres. Revelation is a dark and mysterious meeting 7 E. Underhill, The Essentials of Mysticism (New York: Dutton, 1960) 4. 8 A. H. Maslow, Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Univ., 1964) 19-20, 28. 9 W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Mentor, 1958) 326, 387. 10 For a good summary with ample references, see the section "Revelation in Dialectical Theology" in G. O'Collins, Foundations of Theology (Chicago: Loyola Univ., 1971) 31-44. SYMBOLIC STRUCTURE OF REVELATION 55 with God in faith. The revealed God, said Barth, is also the hidden God. He is revealed precisely as the hidden one. Dialectical theology aroused considerable enthusiasm in the period between the two World Wars and brought about a remarkable revival of interest in revelation as God's address to man. But many critics found that the theory was too polemically oriented against other schools, that it lacked internal coherence, and that it failed to answer the critical questions arising out of ordinary experience. While its vivid contrasts between faith and reason, between God's word and human words, and between revelation and religion were rhetorically effective, these contrasts were difficult to carry through in a systematic way. The unknown God of dialectical theology was all too similar to the "dead God" of "Christian atheism." For these and other reasons dialectical theology steadily declined in popularity after World War II and has few supporters today. Yet, as we shall see, many of the insights of the dialectical theologians have abiding value.

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The Symbolic Structure of Revelation

The question of 'ethics' is an extremely important one in the philosophic position being developed by Michael Polanyi. His critique of contemporary epistemology was, in fact, generated by an ethical problem: the damage he thought this epistemology was doing to our moral ideals. Yet he has never brought all the facets of his 'ethics' into definitive focus at any place in his writings. His readers have therefore had to gather what he thinks about 'ethics' mainly from his discussions of what he takes to be the moral issues raised by our current frames of reference, and from the analogies he sometimes draws between 'morality' and 'science' and among 'morality' and 'art' and 'religion.' But there are difficulties involved in trying to bring together his views on 'ethics' in this way-especially for those who may not have read him widely. For one thing, he holds that the realm of the moral occupies a certain level of reality-and also that the modes or methods of thought by which we apprehend the different levels of reality are substantially the same. Therefore he has been misunderstood by some of his critics to hold that moral 'realities' are of the same sort as scientific. Frank Knight wrestled with problems engendered by such a misunderstanding back in 19491 after his study of Polanyi's Science, Faith and Society. In spite of everything that Polanyi has written since that time, much of which might have been expected to shed more light on his meaning in this area, it appears that the same misunderstanding still prevails. James Buchanan2 has recently raised a number of the same problems that Knight had been concerned with earlier.

Truth in religion: a polanyian appraisal of wolfhart pannenberg's theological program

References

The Symbolic Structure of Revelation

Polanyi's Ethics

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