Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions☆
Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
It is established that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage-vacancy contracts, and there exists an equilibrium satisfying a Monotonic Expected Utility property which is efficient.About:
This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory.The article was published on 2012-05-01 and is currently open access. It has received 18 citations till now.read more
Citations
More filters
Posted Content
Competitive Search Equilibrium
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions, which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters.
Posted Content
On the game-theoretic foundations of competitive search equilibrium
TL;DR: In this paper, the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure firm strategies in a finite version of the competitive search model was proved. But this result was not extended to general production and matching specifications.
Journal ArticleDOI
Directed search and optimal production
TL;DR: This work considers a model of directed search where strategic sellers advertise general trading mechanisms and provides closed form solutions for equilibrium prices, profits, and the matching function under any parameter values.
Journal ArticleDOI
On the game-theoretic foundations of competitive search equilibrium**
TL;DR: In this paper, the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure firm strategies in a finite version of the competitive search model was proved. But this result was not extended to general production and matching specifications.
Journal ArticleDOI
Directed search and firm size
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose an optimal size associated with a firm: a firm suffers a penalty by not operating at its optimal size, and if this penalty is sufficiently large the size differential will be obtained.
References
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study an industry with demand uncertainty which prompts risk-neutral firms to act both as employers and as insurers of homogeneous, risk-averse laborers, and find that firms are more likely to specify full employment the more of the following conditions prevail.
Journal ArticleDOI
Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine some implications of two postulates for firms' wage and employment policies, namely that firms or stockholders have easier access to capital markets at lower costs or higher returns than do small investors, such as workers, and that there are important mobility and turnover costs incurred when a worker moves from one firm to another.
Posted Content
Competitive Search Equilibrium
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions, which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters.
Journal ArticleDOI
Competitive Search Equilibrium
TL;DR: In this article, the authors construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions, which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters.
Journal ArticleDOI
Pricing and Matching with Frictions
TL;DR: In this article, the authors considered the matching function for symmetric and non-symmetric equilibria and showed that the standard matching function in the literature is misspecified and discussed implications for the Beveridge curve.