Why Do Populist-Outsiders Get Elected? A Model of Strategic Populists
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In this article, a simple framework is presented that shows how and why a populist outsider can be elected to office, and under what conditions he is more likely to be elected under.Abstract:
The existence of populist regimes led by outsiders is not new in history In this paper a simple framework is presented that shows how and why a populist outsider can be elected to office, and under what conditions he is more likely to be elected The results show that countries with a higher income and wealth concentration are more likely to elect populist outsiders than countries where income and wealth are more equally distributed It is also shown that elections with a runoff are less likely to bring these populist outsiders into officeread more
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Populist Leaders and the Economy
TL;DR: The authors found that the economic cost of populism is high and after 15 years, GDP per capita is more than 10% lower compared to a plausible non-populist counterfactual.
ReportDOI
Populism in Latin America
TL;DR: The authors explored the phenomenon of populism in Latin America, taking into account the realities of inequitable wealth distribution, rampant corruption, the rise of indigenous movements, Latin American views on the state's role in society, emerging norms for civil-military relationships, globalization & trans-nationalist entities, and ubiquitous over-indebtedness.
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Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective
TL;DR: Populism has a long and storied tradition dating back to Juan and Eva Peron in Argentina (1946-1955) and most recently to Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (1999) as discussed by the authors.
References
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ReportDOI
Protection For Sale
Gene M. Grossman,Elhanan Helpman +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a model in which special interest groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy, and studied the structure of protection that emerges in the political equilibrium and the contributions by different lobbies that support the policy outcome.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Populist Zeitgeist
TL;DR: In this article, a clear and new definition of populism is presented and the normal-pathology thesis is rejected; instead, it is argued that today populist discourse has become mainstream in the politics of western democracies and one can even speak of a populist Zeitgeist.
Book
The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the institutional structure of democratic regimes and the failure of presidential democracy in Latin America due to the breakdown of Democratic regimes, and discuss the challenges of democratic transition and consolidation.
MonographDOI
The macroeconomics of populism in Latin America
TL;DR: The authors analyzes two instances of populism, Chile under Allende and Peru under Garcia, and concludes that expansionary policies must reflect awareness of capacity constraints and must rely for financing on an extremely orthodox fiscal policy and rigorous tax adminsitration.
Journal ArticleDOI
Electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies.
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