Showing papers on "Abductive reasoning published in 1960"

On Error in Deductive Reasoning

Abstract: Errors in deductive reasoning have been accounted for by several assumptions: ( a ) that persons are unable to reason logically (e.g., 2 ) ; (b ) that errors are only apparent since the logic employed follows laws different from those of Aristotelian logic (Von Domarus, Arieti); and ( c ) that alterations occur in the premises, so that if one knows everything that enters into the thinking process, one can often recast it into syllogistic form (1; cf. also 3 ) . Graduate students of psychology ( N = 46) were asked to evaluate the logical adequacy of deductions presented in the context of everyday problems. The data, now being analyzed, suggest that where errors occurred, they could often be accounted for by such processes as the following: ( a ) evasion of the logical task or failure to distinguish between a factually correct conclusion and a logically sound one; ( b ) slipping in of additional premises, for example, ones which are so taken for granted that they escape attention; ( c ) omission of a presented premise; ( d ) restatement of a premise or conclusion so that the intended meaning is changed. The results thus suggest that when a person arrives at apparently incorrect conclusions, it is often because he is reasoning from premises different from those intended. The frequency of error in making logical inferences may be less than is often assumed; and in the light of the present study, the assumption that deductive thinking follows a logic qualitatively different from Atistotelian logic seems to be gratuitous. These findings may be relevant not only ro the problem of the nature of error, but also to that of the relation of logic to thinking and to such specific issues as the influence of attitudes on cognitive processes.