Showing papers on "Animal rights published in 1980"

Beyond Conspecifics: Is Brer Rabbit Our Brother?

Abstract: Burghardt is professor of pscyhology, zoology, and ecology, Department of Psychology, College of Liberal Arts, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37916. He is also a research associate at the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute. Herzog is an assistant professor with the Department of Psychology, Mars Hill College, Mars Hill, NC 28754. This article is a revised version of a paper entitled "Beyond Conspecifics: Ethology and Animal Rights," read at the June 1979 meeting of the Animal Behavior Society at Tulane University. The work was supported, in part, by NSF Research Grant BNS 78-14196 to Burghardt. ? 1980 American Institute of Biological Sciences. All rights reserved. has added to the traditional moral arguments of vegetarians. The widespread questioning of government support for basic research has been intertwined with suspicions about the use and worth of any studies on animals, even those purporting to help understand human medical and behavioral problems. New evidence of higher cognitive faculties in some animals including reason, language, and emotional sensitivity have resonated throughout the scientific and lay press (e.g., Gallup 1977, Lawick Goodall 1971, Griffin 1976, Lilly 1975). Ethological work on animal and human behavior has thus eroded the key foundation for the age-old rigid distinctions between human and nonhuman (see Regan and Singer 1976 for an excellent anthology). The "study of the animal mind" is again fashionable (Burghardt 1978), as evidenced by the highly technical contributions constituting an entire 1978 issue of The Behavioral and Brain Sciences (Vol. 1, no. 4). Philosophers, theologians, scientists, and many organizations are now grappling with the issues involved in our treatment of animals (e.g., Allen and Westbrook 1979, Curtis 1978, Henig 1979). We think the issues are basic ones that have serious implications for research (see Broad 1980). Furthermore, we see little consensus on them within the biomedical, psychological, and animal behavior communities. When Aronson's work at the American Museum of Natural History on sexual behavior in cats was under serious assault (Wade 1976), differences within the scientific community itself on both the procedures used and the value of the studies prevented strong support for him. The controversy was surely a factor in the abolition of the Animal Behavior Department, of which he was the last head, by the museum authorities earlier this year. Similarly, Hutchinson's studies on electric shock-induced aggression in animals (including monkeys and people) led to Senator Proxmire's ridicule and "Golden Fleece" award, resulting in a celebrated suit (Holden 1976) and Proxmire's eventual public apology. Although the research community seems pleased with the outcome, many animal behavior researchers are clearly ambivalent about the scientific and ethical aspects of this kind of work. Indeed, Ulrich (1978), who had performed similar work in the same laboratory, published an apologetic disavowal of his efforts in this field on moral grounds. The research establishment is going to have to formulate a thoughtful response, or it may lose the respect of a new generation of students, researchers, and politicians even when it wins in the courts. Alienation has begun: Already eminent researchers have complained to us that students, particularly in Europe, are becoming "too moral."

On the use of Animals in Psychological Research

Abstract: This paper briefly examines some of the inconsistencies and distortions associated with Bowd’s (1980) opposition to psychological research on animals. By examining the vast amount of neglected animal suffering which occurs as a consequence of human existence, coupled with the potential benefits of animal research, we argue that the efforts of many animal rights advocates are misconstrued and misdirected. Moreover, the evolution of moral and ethical behavior in man may be such that it is not applicable to other species. While we do not condone needless suffering in animals and would welcome the suggestion of viable alternatives, we argue that there is far more of a moral imperative to continue to do animal research than to abandon it.

Regulation of animal care and research? Animal science, welfare and animal "rights".

Abstract: Problems concerned with the general welfare and adaptability of farm animals to intensive/confinement systems, the need for a holistic approach in research design and development of new systems and the question of optimal environments and objective evaluation of the fitness of various species and strains are discussed. Suggested codes of practice and husbandry practices which need to be reevaluated in relation to the welfare of farm animals are detailed.

Definition of the Concept of "Humane Treatment" in Relation to Food and Laboratory Animals

Abstract: The very title of this talk makes a suggestion which must be forestalled, namely the idea that laboratory and food animals enjoy some exceptional moral status by virtue of the fact that we use them. In fact, it is extremely difficult to find any morally relevant grounds for distinguishing between food and laboratory animals and other animals and, far more dramatically, between animals and humans. The same conditions which require that we apply moral categories to humans rationally require that we apply them to animals as well. While it is obviously pragmatically impossible in our current sociocultural setting to expect that animals should be so treated, this idea should be kept before us as a moral ideal toward which to strive. In this vein, it seems morally necessary that the use of animals in research be constrained by two principles, which ought to be codified as law: the utilitarian principle and the rights principle. It might be thought that such constraints would serve as an intolerable burden to researchers, but such a worry is primarily based upon a faulty understanding of the nature of science which can be refuted by an examination of the history of science. Imagine going to a conference on human pain and suffering and finding a session entitled: "Morality: Definition of the Term in Relation to Negroes." This would not perhaps have sounded odd 125 years ago when it was widely taken for granted that blacks were a lower form of life. But today, it would jar and repel us, because it implies that whatever moral categories we have for people in general do not apply to black people. Similarly, it is clear that the title of this session does not jar most of us. Morally, most of us today are, relative to animals, in the position of most people of years ago relative to the Negro. Let us recall the famous Dred Scott case of * Dr. Rollin is Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Physiology and Biophysics at Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado 80523. This paper was prepared for and presented at The Institute for the Study of Animal Problems Symposium on Pain, Stress and Suffering: Definition, Quantitation and Application to Animal Welfare Issues, Orlando, Florida, November 7, 1979. 234 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 1[4) 1980 B. E. RollinConcept. of "Humane Treatment" Original Article 1856, in which the Supreme Court denied citizenship to blacks on the grounds that they were "a.subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dommant race." The court reflected a widespread view. We owned Negroes, we bred them, raised them, took care of them; therefore they were ours, they were property. to do with as we saw fit. A similar vi.ew is held by most of us with regard to animals in general, but most strongly w1th regard to laboratory and food animals, as the title of this address implies. The view is this: These animals have, after all, been brought into existence by us, their very existence depends on us. We have shaped their bodies and behavior genetically. We give them life and determine the course of their lives. They would have no lives at all were it not for us. Their raison d'etre their very nature, is to serve us. Surely then, we can treat them as we see fit. ' Implicit in this way of seeing things are a number of interesting points. One i~ an assum~tion that any life is better than none, and that those who give life-the ult1mate gift-to something may dispose of it as they see fit. Second is a distorted awareness that animals have natures; the natures of food and laboratory animals being to serve as means to human ends, as tools for humans as "animal models," etc. Often, those natures have been developed and shap~d by us. These assumptions must be looked at quite carefully, for implicit in them are a number of profound issues which need much unpacking, if we are to answer the question posed. Let us consider the idea that being responsible for the life of s~met_hing give~ one absolute right over that being. (Interestingly enough, the anCient 1dea was JUSt the oppositeif a person saved another's life he or she was responsible for taking care of that life forever.) Suppose 1 discove; a woman who is about to have an abortion. I pay her a large sum of money to have the child and turn it_ over to me. I raise the child, house it, feed it, cap its teeth, educate it. When 1t turns 16, I decide that I am going to cook and eat it, or use it to study the long term effects of asbestos on the lungs. After all, without me it would have had no life at all! Or. consider another scenario. After I buy the child, having decided to eat it, or use 1t for research, I care for it exclusively according to economic considerations, taking no account of its human nature except to keep it alive and reasonably· healthy. "!e obviously "':'auld not accept this approach to human beings. (In fact, we are d1rectly responsible both for the existence and the traits of our children, yet we do not feel we can dispose of them as we see fit.) We do not accept such an a_pproach regarding blacks even though we bred them for servitude for generations. Why, then, do we accept it vis a vis animals? The obvious answer is "There is a difference between people and animals." But the key question then b~comes :'~hat is this difference, and why does it license different treatment?" Obviously: 1t 1s not enough to duck the issues by saying it is illegal to treat people that way. The reason that it is illegal is that we consider it absolutely wrong morally. There are many differences between humans and other animals which are ~uit~ obvious. Humans are the only creatures that play golf, fry their food, ~ear l1pst1ck, etc. Clearly,these differences do not seem to have any moral relevance. What does this mean? Let me illustrate: Suppose I walk up to you throughout my tal.k and punch you periodically. You ask me why. I say, "Because you have curly ha1r, that's why. It's okay to hit people with curly hair." Obviously, this is unac/NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 1{4) 1980 235