Showing papers on "Constitutional law published in 1971"

Traditional and Constitutional Law: A Study of Change in Laos

Abstract: Two years of observation-participation in Laos by the author revealed that social problem-solving occurs within two systems of law. On one hand a traditional unwritten law, taught by the family and Buddhist monks, operates within the Lao village. In addition there is the written code of the central !government, practiced in special government buildings located at the provincial capitals, serving to further isolate it from the people. Both systems of law coexist in time and space. Certain problems fall naturally within the province of traditional law, while others are relegated to the law of the central government. This paper seeks to demonstrate the situations appropriate to each system and to show their separate yet integrated modes of operation. Specific examples mostly originate from Vientiane province. The Royal Kingdom of Laos has a population of between 1.5 and 2.5 million people within its 91,000 square miles. About half the population are ethnic Lao; the remainder are comprised of a variety of Mon-Khmer, protoMalayan, Lao-Thai, and Sino-Tibetan tribal groups. Popularly chosen headmen, called nai ban, lead the 200-400 people in the village. Consensus, rather than mere majority vote, is sought among all adult men in the village in problems of community concern. Several villages within a day's walk are similarly led by a tasseng, also chosen by the local populace for his individual character and abilities. Superimposed on this highly democratic local government is the central government. Its legitimacy originates in the person of the monarch, who because of his civil and supernatural authority is the temporal proprietor of the country and its people. A constitution, written in 1947 and revised in 1956, has been signed by the king. It delegates executive power to a prime minister and his cabinet, legislative power to a popularly elected National

Regina v. drybones and equality before the law

Abstract: J.C. Smith considers the meaning of equality before the law in light of the Drybones decision, which he considers to herald a new role for the Supreme Court with greater potential than ever before to use the principles of fundamental justice towards the enrichment of basic rights and liberties. The author then elaborates six possible definitions of equality, and proffers a further set of six criteria that any theory of equality adopted by the Supreme Court in the future ought to meet.

Some New Concerns of Legal Process Research within Political Science

Abstract: Political science has generally been divided into the fields of political theory, comparative government, international relations, public administration, policy formation, state and local government, and public law. The public law or legal process field has also been called the law and politics field to emphasize that it is the study within political science of the judicial process, constitutional law, and related subjects. Law and politics research has changed greatly since 1955 in both methodology and substance. It is the purpose of the articles in this symposium to illustrate some of the more recent trends in law and politics research, particularly trends of interest to law professors, sociologists, and others in the broader area of law and society research. The methodology of public law within political science as of 1955 consisted almost exclusively of the analysis and synthesis of Supreme Court opinions relating to cases in constitutional law (McCloskey, 1957). In the following eight or so years, many political scientists supplemented this legalistic method with an anecdotal method emphasizing stories of what happened behind the scenes with regard to events preceding (Vose, 1958, and Murphy, 1964) or following (Peltason, 1961) the Supreme Court opinions. This anecdotal analysis became the basis for new textbooks and courses in the Judicial Process (Murphy and Pritchett, 1961). Likewise, other political scientists supplemented the legalistic method by using the same Supreme Court opinions to quantitatively measure differences among the judges (Schubert, 1958 and 1965) or differences among the facts in the cases (Kort, 1957 and 1968). This measurement analysis became the basis for other new textbooks and courses in Judicial Behavior (Schubert, 1964). Since approximately the early 1960's, there has been an attempt to go beyond legal synthesis, anecdotes, and mere meas-

Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut

Abstract: Boddie v. Connecticut held that filing fees could not bar access to divorce courts by the poor. This article summarizes the events leading up to the decision, the positions of the parties; the opinions of the Justices; and the implications for other cases. It particularly develops the competing due process and equal protection theories in the case. Although limited by the Court's subsequent decision in In Re. Kras, Boddie remains today one of the most frequently cited due process decisions by the Supreme Court.

The Neutrality of Adherence to Precedent

Abstract: One tradition of law in China insisted that an emperor ideally governed by setting an example for others through living virtuously himself.1 His conduct was thought to provide a model for the conduct of his subjects not only with respect to social but also with respect to aesthetic concerns. Imperial appreciation of works of art, a duty often pursued with an indiscriminate enthusiasm which lesser men could hardly emulate, was typically celebrated by affixing a seal and perhaps an inscription to the object admired. Since some rulers were particularly indefatigable observers and since the tastes of successive rulers as Well as of other connoisseurs who similarly recorded their experiences were not widely disparate, the seals and inscriptions superimposed on many of the more prestigious older paintings obscure much if not most of the beauty to which these markings presume to attest. 2 More than a decade ago Professor Wechsler argued that constitutional adjudication should be evaluated primarily in terms of the neutrality of the principles on which the decisions are based.3 The response to his argument is reminiscent of, if not so reverential as, the reception accorded works of art in China. His initially elusive contribution has been additionally obscured by the mass of commentary concerning it.4 However, the continuing discussion of