Showing papers on "Deterrence theory published in 1970"

The Missile Gap Controversy

Abstract: The disputes surrounding the formation of military policy are not famous for their clarity, yet, even so, the controversy over the missile gap stands out as a muddled issue. The controversy arose in the late 1950S as a result of intelligence estimates that between 1960 and 1964 the Soviet Union might have more intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) operational than would the United States. Assuming the existence of a missile gap, opponents of the Eisenhower administration argued the existence of a deterrence gap, that Soviet supremacy in ICBMs was so great that the American strategic forces could be eliminated in a single massive attack. Administration spokesmen generally conceded the missile gap but denied a deterrence gap on the grounds that the American strategic forces were too numerous and varied to be eliminated by a single attack and that the leaders of the Soviet Union were aware of this fact. We now know that the administration's contention that a missile gap did not necessarily imply a deterrence gap was never tested, since the missile gap itself never developed. Therefore it

The Administrative Foundations of the Chinese Fiscal State

Abstract: On subjects ranging from trade to democratization, there has lately been a wave of laments about China's development belying Western expectations. Yet these disappointments often come with misunderstandings of the very institutions that China was expected to adopt. Chinese taxation offers a sharp illustration. When China introduced a tax system suited for the market economy, it fully intended tax collection to rely on self-assessment, audits, and the rule of law. But this Western approach was quickly jettisoned in favour of one that emphasized monitoring of taxpayers and ex ante interventions, at the expense of deterrence and truthful reporting norms. The Chinese approach surprisingly matches recommendations made by recent economic scholarship on tax compliance and state capacity. China's massive but little-known explorations in taxation highlight the distinct types of modern state capacity, and raise challenging questions about the future of taxation and the superiority of institutions based on rule of law.

Political considerations and analysis of military requirements for chemical and biological weapons.

Abstract: Introduction.-Chemical and biological warfare has been increasing in the news. There are numerous issues. Among these are research and development and especially open-air testing, Congressional appropriations, ratifying the 1925 Geneva Protocol, using tear gas in Vietnam, Presidential policy reviews, and the chemical-biological disarmament treaty recently proposed by the Soviets. All of us seek to prevent chemical or biological war. Some believe the best way to prevent the use of these so-called horror weapons is not to have the weapons. This argument is appealing in its simplicity. Rather than come to this conclusion in ignorance, we should understand the complexity of the problem. The issue I will discuss is whether to have a capability, whether to allocate resources to chemical and biological capabilities. We must recognize that these weapons and their cost would be in addition to, and not a substitute for, other weapons. While money enters into my analysis, it is not a major factor. We are talking about a dollar magnitude of only hundreds of millions of dollars annually. This is insignificant in an $80 billion Defense budget. On the other hand, these funds could instead be spent on other scientific or medical research, on welfare, or on housing. Ml\y objective today is, first, to describe a framework for analyzing whether to have chemical and biological capabilities. Second, by using that framework, to identify the key issues about which each of you must make a value judgment. When making those value judgments, you will be deciding for yourself whether the United States needs each of four kinds of chemical or biological capability. You must recognize that reasonable men may differ on these value judgments. I have tried to avoid advocating any one value judgment. My policy preference probably will show, but it need not distract you from the analysis. The framework has two elements. First, we must recognize our objectives. These are non-proliferation, deterrence, and limiting damage. We all benefit when few or no nations have these weapons. Failing that, we can seek to deter nations from using the weapons. Failing that, we can reduce our losses by preparing a defense. The analysis mainly uses the non-proliferation and deterrence objectives. The framework's second element is distinguishing among four kinds of chemical and biological capabilities, that is, between chemical and biological, and between lethal and incapacitating. The framework's underlying premise is examining the problem in parts. I will examine four kinds of chemical and biological capabilities. This will result in a more reasoned conclusion. There is a fifth kind of weapon, which I will not cover. Defoliants, a form of anti-plant weapon, are being used extensively in South Vietnam today, covering thousands of square miles each year. The analytical framework would still apply. I hope you will not find my bluntness too unpleasant. Chemical and biologi-

Deterrence: A Theoretical Introduction

Abstract: Deterrence, in one sense, is simply the negative aspect of political power; it is the power to dissuade as opposed to the power to coerce or compel. One deters another party from doing something by the implicit or explicit threat of applying some sanction if the forbidden act is performed, or by the promise of a reward if the act is not performed. Thus conceived, deterrence does not have to depend on military force. We might speak of deterrence by the threat of trade restrictions, for example. The promise of economic aid might deter a country from military action (or any action) contrary to one’s own interests. Or we might speak of the deterrence of allies and neutrals as well as potential enemies — as Italy, for example, was deterred from fighting on the side of the Dual Alliance in the First World War by the promise of substantial territorial gains. In short, deterrence may follow, first, from any form of control which one has over an opponent’s present and prospective ‘value inventory’; secondly, from the communication of a credible threat or promise to decrease or increase that inventory; and, thirdly, from the opponent’s degree of confidence that one intends to fulfil the threat or promise.