Showing papers on "Exit strategy published in 1995"

After Enterprise in Higher Education – holding the ground or sustaining the momentum

Abstract: Raises the question, will the success of EHE continue now that funding has ceased? Summarizes the thrust of the EHE programme at Middlesex University and explores the legacy of enterprise in the university, whether the exit strategy worked, the robustness of enterprise values, and whether there is a post‐EHE agenda.

Financial Accounting: EITF Update: Accounting for Certain Restructuring Charges in Connection with a Purchase Business Combination

Abstract: This month's column lists new EITF consensuses adopted July 20-21 and September 20-21, 1995 (see the sidebar on page 91). In addition, earlier consensuses on the recognition of liabilities in connection with a purchase business combination are summarized. ISSUE NO. 95-3 The EITF addressed liability recognition of certain restructuring costs in EITF Issue no. 94-3, Liability Recognition for Certain Employee Termination Benefits and Other Costs to Exit an Activity (including Certain Costs Incurred in a Restructuring) (see EITF Update, JofA, Mar.95, page 89). Now, in Issue no. 95-3, Recognition of Liabilities in Connection with a Purchase Business Combination, the EITF addresses the accounting for certain restructuring costs in connection with a purchase business combination under Accounting Principles Board Opinion no. 16, Business Combinations. The issue is what types of direct, integration or exit costs should be accrued as liabilities in a purchase business combination under Opinion no. 16, when to recognize those costs and what financial statement disclosures should be made. The EITF identified three types of costs that, if certain conditions are met, should be recognized as liabilities assumed in a purchase business combination and included in the allocation of the acquisition cost in connection with a purchase business combination under Opinion no. 16. These include costs of a plan to (1) exit an acquired activity ("exit plan"), (2) involuntarily terminate acquired employees ("termination plan") or (3) relocate acquired employees ("relocation plan"). Costs to exit an activity of an acquired company. The EITF reached a consensus that an exit plan exists if all of the following conditions are met: 1. As of the consummation date of the acquisition, management having the appropriate level of authority begins to assess and formulate a plan. 2. As soon as possible after the consummation date, management having the appropriate level of authority completes the assessment of which acquired activities to exit and approves and completes the combined company to the plan. Although the time required will vary with the circumstances, the plan cannot be finalized more than one year after the acquisition's consummation date. 3. The exit plan specifically identifies all significant actions to be taken to complete the plan, acquired activities that will not be continued (including the method of disposition and location of those activities) and the plan's expected completion date. 4. Actions required by the plan will begin as soon as possible after the plan is finalized, and the period of time to complete the plan indicates that significant changes to it are unlikely. The EITF also reached a consensus that a cost resulting from an exit plan should be recognized as a liability assumed as of the acquisition's consummation date only if the cost is not associated with or is not incurred to generate revenues of the combined entity after the consummation date and it meets either criterion (1) or (2) below. The EITF observed that these criteria are essentially the same as those in Issue no. 94-3 for the recognition of exit costs. (See EITF Abstracts, exhibit 94-3A, for examples illustrating the application of the criteria in Issue no. 94-3, which may be helpful in applying the criteria below.) 1. The cost has no future economic benefit to the combined company, is incremental to other costs incurred by either the acquired or acquiring company in the conduct of activities before the consummation date and will be incurred as a direct result of the exit plan. The notion of incremental does not contemplate a diminished future economic benefit to be derived from the cost but rather the absence of the cost in either company's activities immediately before the consummation date. 2. The cost represents an amount to be incurred by the combined company under a contractual obligation of the acquired company that existed before the consummation date and will either continue after the plan is completed with no economic benefit to the combined company or be a penalty incurred by the combined company to cancel that contractual obligation. …

We Aren't the World: An Exit Strategy from U.N. Peacekeeping

Abstract: Just the other day, it seems, the national debate about the U.S. role in the United Nations turned for the most part on the issue of money--on U.S. contributions and U.N. waste, and how reducing the former might diminish the latter. That issue remains. In 1994, the U.S. spent no less than $3.5 billion on a largely dysfunctional U.N. system--with scant returns as measured by U.S. national interests. (See sidebar, next page). But the debate has a scary new dimension. The U.N. is reinventing what used to be called "peacekeeping." In the last several years, that do-good concept has been stretched to encompass a range of U.N. operations that typically involve the use of force, even the waging of war. Moreover, President Clinton's U.N. representatives are willing collaborators in developing a one-size-fits-all justification for multilateral interventions that bear only the most attenuated relation to U.S. interests--if any at all. And that, along with peacekeeping's mounting bills, adds up to serious business indeed. It is now the business of the 104th Congress. As a component of its Contract with America, the House of Representatives already has passed the National Security Revitalization Act, which reins in the wild proliferation of U.N. peacekeeping, limits U.S. participation in these operations, and imposes some controls on U.S. contributions to the U.N. generally. The next orders of business are to fend off efforts in the Senate to weaken these provisions--which constitute only a minimal package--and then to be vigilant about implementation. The question still to be answered is what the U.N. is worth to us--whether, that is to say, the U.S. gets back in national priorities anything commensurate with its $3.5 billion annual investment. Ten years ago, there was a consensus in the United States that radical surgery was called for. Numerous studies and investigations, many of them instigated by the U.N. itself, had revealed a pattern of waste, mismanagement, and duplication (see sidebar, page 66). The U.N.'s socioeconomic agenda called for the redistribution of wealth from the industrialized democracies to the less-developed countries of the Third World. On the political side, national-liberation movements (good) and colonialism (bad) were the buzzwords of choice. As a result, a Democratic-controlled Congress in 1984 overwhelmingly approved the Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment to the authorization of the U.S.'s 25 percent share of the U.N.'s administrative budget. The terms of the amendment seemed unambiguous: Shape up, impose fiscal discipline on yourself, and move toward some form of weighted voting on the U.N. budget in the General Assembly, with "bonus" votes for big contributors in rough proportion to their contributions, or else suffer an annual 20 percent withholding of the U.S. payment. Now, let the record show that Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) and Representative Gerald Solomon (R-NY) had the right idea then--that the U.N. had to be reformed if ever it were to become a useful agent of world order--and it is the right idea still. But for the most part, Kassebaum-Solomon failed. Congress is now back at work on the problems of a dysfunctional U.N., using the power of the purse as one lever of reform. The problems have deepened, however, both in complexity and in their deadly import. The U.N. has recently engaged in the promiscuous use of force under the authority of resolutions that may violate its own charter, and the Clinton administration has been willing, even eager, to plunge into the resulting swamp. THE PEACEKEEPING TRAP Kassebaum-Solomon redux is embodied in the new House act; and, in the Senate, a companion bill covers some of the same ground. Both are reasonable first cuts at shaping a long-term policy. U.S. costs and U.N. waste are still at issue. But these bills focus on U.N. peacekeeping--which is itself a misnomer, and a dangerously misleading one. The U. …

Precursor systems analyses of automated highway systems. final report. activity area j: ahs entry/exit implementation

Abstract: This activity focuses on the traffic operational impacts of Automated Highway System (AHS) entry/exit facilities at the points where they interface with the local street network. Information and results from several of the other Precursor Systems Analyses (PSA) activity areas are utilized in the conduct of the entry/exit research. Various strategies of AHS entry and exit are considered and their attributes identified. Analyses determined the operating conditions based on AHS volumes and ramp volumes from other PSA studies. Measures of effectiveness were established to allow comparison of different entry and exit strategies.