Showing papers on "Leasehold estate published in 1975"

Tenancy Patterns, Productivity, and Rentals in Malaysia

Abstract: Tenancy in developing countries is generally condemned by economists and government officials. The main criticisms on the part of Western scholars have been the inefficiency resulting from tenancy (sharecropping in particular) and the reduced incentives that tenants have to improve their land or to maximize the discounted stream of future income. Scholars and government officials in developing countries, while acknowledging these arguments, more often focus on the "exploitation" of tenants by landlords. They cite the high levels of rentals which keep tenants in perpetual poverty, and the unfair practices such as sharecropping, short-term leases, pin money, and harsh contracts. While the types of land reforms proposed vary enormously in complexity and coverage, frequent recommendations include regulating rental levels, insuring long-term leases, preventing ejection of tenants, abolishing sharecropping, and transferring land from landlords to tenants with full or partial compensation. Such viewpoints, however, are not universal. Some economists have emphasized that rural poverty is primarily due to the abundance of unskilled labor relative to the available land and capital and that some measures of land reform which do not influence the availability of resources do not get to the root of the problem. Analysis of tenancy has frequently combined the efficiency aspects with the redistributional aspects in terms of altering the relative incomes of tenants at the expense of landlords. The subject, therefore, has often been viewed with a welfare criterion in mind, while the efficiency aspects have been a secondary consideration.1 This paper examines the tenancy situation in the paddy economy of

The Theory of Share Tenancy Revisited

Abstract: The argument of efficient versus inefficient allocation of resources under share tenancy has received considerable attention in the literature. The purpose of this article is to show that share leasing does not result in inefficient resource use. This paper demonstrates that an arrangement in which rent is some percentage of farm output during a certain period of time for a given acreage yields an equilibrium solution with an efficient allocation of resources. A geometric proof, economic interpretation, and some general observations are provided.

Crop‐sharing economics in mandatory Palestine — part I

Abstract: The first part of this article showed that crop division in Mandatory Palestine incorporated two superimposed principles of tenure. The first of these was the crop-sharing compact between the traditionally acknowledged factors of production that shared in the produce: land, seed, ploughing stock and labour. In Northern Samaria both capital factorsseed and ploughing stock-were contributed by one party, who was said to have been awarded the shadd or cultivation. In other words, he was the farmer. The second principle of tenure was the muzara'a or co-cultivation compact between landowner and cultivator. In this compact the cultivator (the farmer) represented the other factors of production as far as the landowner was concerned, and assigned him his rent-share of the crop. Only as a second step was the rest of the crop divided among the other factors of production: and here the farmer represented the landlord. All in all, the farmer constituted the link between the two compacts and the linchpin of the landholding system. Accordingly, it is in terms of where the capital came from under each form of tenure, that we have found it most productive to visualize agrarian institutions and to follow the evolution of the land system in this article. We then classified the forms of tenure in Northern Samaria under the Mandate in descending order of involvement in farming on the part of the landowner: (a) cropping: the landowner retained the capital (the stock) the labour being performed by croppers; (b) joint-farming (partnership in the shadd): the landowner, who owned the stock, appointed a villager to operate the farm, made over a share in the stock to him, debited him its value, and split with him the crop share due to the seed and to the ploughing stock under the crop-sharing compact. The operator, whom we shall call jointfarmer, could either perform the labour himself or take on croppers; (c) share-rent farming: the landowner provided only the land, the farmer supplying the whole capital. The farmer in turn could, if he wished, take on joint-farmers or croppers or sub-farm out the land; (d) tenancy, in which cash replaced the share-rent. We were able to analyse crop division procedures on the basis of the accounts of Nazmi Hajj Tawfeeq 'Abdul Hadi who owned extensive lands both in the hill village of 'Arrabeh in Northern Samaria and in the lowland settlement of Zar'een in the Plain of Esdraelon. We learned from them that Nazmi awarded the croppers (crop-sharing labourers) a much larger part of his share of the crop than did Nazmi's joint-farmers. This differential persisted until the mid-1930's when the croppers apparently secured its elimination-again, at the expense of Nazmi, not of his joint-farmers. We also saw that while in principle the joint-farming form of association

A manual of the law of real property

Abstract: Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION Chapter 2 ESTATES AND FIXTURES Chapter 3 LAW AND EQUITY Chapter 4 THE STRUCTURE OF MODERN LAND LAW Chapter 5 REGISTERED TITLE Chapter 6 SALE OF LAND: CONTRACTS, CONVEYANCING AND LAND CHARGES Chapter 7 TRUSTS AND REAL PROPERTY Chapter 8 Co-OWNERSHIP Chapter 9 PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL Chapter 10 LICENCES Chapter 11 NATURE AND CREATION OF LEASE Chapter 12 DETERMINATION OF TENANCIES Chapter 13 RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PARTIES UNDER A LEASE OR TENANCY Chapter 14 LEASEHOLD COVENANTS Chapter 15 EASEMENTS, PROFITS AND INCORPOREAL HERIDITAMENTS Chapter 16 FREEHOLD COVENANTS Chapter 17 MORTGAGES Chapter 18 ADVERSE POSSESSION AND LIMITATION PERIODS

Mythology and land rights on wogeo

Abstract: According to Hogbin, the Wogeo believe that their culture heroes (nanarang), one of several classes of spirits, provide the ulimate supernatural sanction1 for their whole land tenure system. He divides the culture heroes into two species ? those still living on the island and those who left it in the past ? which have so little in common that he was surprised that a common name is used for them. He dismisses the existing culture heroes with a few words as having scarcely any relevance for the land tenure system and subdivides the departed culture heroes into four varieties. "The first two varieties between them give a sanction for the occupation of the island by the present population; the third gives the same type of sanction for the tenancy of the districts; and the fourth provides authority for the exercise of rights of residence and cultivation" (1939 40:151).

Analysis of the relative importance of some factors affecting house prices in a local market in 1970

Abstract: The object of this article is to study the effects that given factors had on house prices in the Sheffield area in 1970 with the use of a multiple linear regression model. The basic ingredient of this paper is the adjustment of the relevant qualitative information abstracted from the local newspaper advertisements. Figure 1 is a typical newspaper advertisement. The analysis shows that in this market at that time the most important factor affecting house prices was type, whilst the next most important factor was the location of the property. Then in descending order of importance were whether a property had a garage or not, number of bedrooms, central heating and whether freehold or leasehold.

Geothermal energy and the law. I. The Federal Lands Management Program

Abstract: A broad range of problems in the legal and institutional environment which hampers the development of the geothermal industry is discussed. The topics include: the development of geothermal energy; pre-leasing procedures--public vs. private assessment; exploratory permits and related strategies; the rate of geothermal leasing-past and future; compensation strategies; lessee qualifications; lands available for leasing; noncompensatory lease terms; ongoing leasehold and production requirements; problems of ''secondary'' geothermal uses; and water law conflicts. (LBS)