Showing papers on "Managerial economics published in 1980"

Method and Appraisal in Economics

Abstract: The central problem of the essays in this volume is the problem of theory appraisal in economics. In the history of economic theory we find few widely recognised theoretical achievements and in the history of the methodology of economics we find little agreement concerning the standards by which we should judge a theory as an improvement on its predecessors.

Managerial Economics: Analysis and Strategy

Abstract: Decision making under risk and uncertainty demand theory, analysis and estimation - consumer behaviour, market demand analysis for decision making, estimation of the demand functions production and cost analysis - production functions and cost curves, cost concepts for decision making, cost estimation and forecasting pricing analysis and decisions - models of the firm's pricing decisions, pricing decisions in practice, new product pricing, bids and price quotes topics in managerial economics - advertising and promotional decisions, product quality and competitive strategy, capital budgeting and investment decisions.

Economics and Corporate Strategy

Abstract: This book, first published in 1980, discusses corporate strategy for those interested in applying economic analysis to business problems. Drawing on a wide range of economics and management literature, the book shows how an understanding of industrial economics can help in analysing strategic decisions. Furthermore, the author explains how a firm's development must be adapted to its environment, its history and the experience of its personnel. Other topics discussed include integration and diversity, the growing importance of multinational operations, the strategic role of mergers, and innovation.

The Economics of Markets: A Simple Model of the Market-Making Process

Abstract: Markets have played a central role in economic analysis at least since the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. Various forms of market organization-pure competition, duopoly, oligopoly, and monopoly-have been considered in great detail in the literature, and virtually every course in macroeconomic theory devotes a substantial amount of time to explaining the nature and implications of these different kinds of markets. The traditional approach in economic analysis has been to assume a particular form of market organization and then to analyze output, price, and cost behavior in the context of the assumed market form. A closely related matter, though one which seems to have received less attention, is the question of where the market comes from in the first place. The process of making a market is, after all, itself an economic activity in the sense that it uses scarce resources. In the usual A simple model involving two traders, each of whom stands to gain by trading, is developed. The traders must expend resources to find each other so that trade can take place. The effects of changing the gains and costs from trading on the amount of "marketing" effort expended by each of the traders are examined. It is found that increasing the gains from trading need not increase the amount of search expenditures made by the traders and may in fact result in a reduction in the probability that trade occurs. This is because there are external effects that the traders do not take into account when making search decisions that are optimal from their individual viewpoints. These externalities suggest that both traders may gain from the emergence of a middleman who acts as a market maker and takes the externalities into account. * This paper was written for the Rochester Conference on Interfaces between Marketing and Economics, April 7-8, 1978. The author has received several useful comments from members of the Applied Price Theory workshop at the University of Chicago and from the Economic Theory seminar at the University of Toronto. Comments and suggestions from Thomas Borcherding, Dennis Carlton, Jack Carr, Arthur De Vany, George Haines, Albert Madansky, Naser Saidi, and Lester Telser have been particularly helpful. All errors are, of course, the responsibility of the author.

A Note on Capital Budgeting and the Three R's

Abstract: STUDY CENTER IN MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCE Working Paper 28-79 A Note on Capital Budgeting and the Three R's by J. Fred Weston Nai-fu Chen November 21, 1979

Managerial Economics: Analysis, Problems, Cases

Abstract: PART 1. THE FIRM AND ITS ENVIRONMENT.1. Introduction, Basic Principles, and Methodology.2. Revenue of the Firm.3. Demand Analysis and Estimation.4. Economic Forecasting.PART 2. PRODUCTION, COST, AND PROFIT MAXIMIZATION.5. Production Analysis.6. Cost of Production.7. Profit Analysis of the Firm.PART 3. MARKETS AND THE BEHAVIOR OF THE FIRM.8. Perfect Competition and Monopoly: The Limiting Cases.9. Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly.10. Games, Information, and Strategy.11. Topics in Pricing and Profit Analysis.12. Factor Markets and Profit-Maximizing Employment of Variable Inputs.PART 4. ANALYSIS OF PROJECT DECISIONS.13. Fundamentals of Project Evaluation.14. Risk in Project Analysis.PART 5. THE FIRM AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR.15. Economics of Public Sector Decisions.16. Legal and Regulatory Environment of the Firm.Appendix A. Mathematical Appendix.Appendix B. Interest Factor Tables.Appendix C. Answers to Selected Odd-Numbered Problems.Glossary.Index.

Taxes and the Pricing of Treasury Bill Futures Contracts - eScholarship

Abstract: STUDY CENTER IN MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCE Working Paper 6-80 TAXES AND THE PRICING OF TREASURY BILL FUTURES CONTRACTS by Bradford Cornell July, 1980

The Economics of Information

Abstract: This chapter contains sections titled: Information and Individual Decision Making: Information as Value and as Cost, Organization as an Economy in the Acquisition of Information, The Economic System as an Organization, The Problem of Incentives, Editors' Postscript

The crumbling of apartheid: An application of managerial economics

Abstract: The thesis of this examination of Apartheid in the Republic of South Africa is that the sophistication of capital structure, whether viewed macro-economically or at the level of the firm, passes nigh-irrestible power to even unorganized workers. This non-Marxist social system model is empirically substantiated by South African economic history but, more particularly, from managerial decisions in respect of the production function – especially in the critical gold-mining industry – over time. This leads to the logical conclusion that the dynamic intensification of foreign capital investment in the Republic alone can end that country's system of Apartheid.

Positive Economics: The Logic of Neo-Classical Economic Theory

Abstract: Positive Economics, as a theory of the logic of neo-classical economic theory, was a post-war invention. By then the claim that economic theory is a positive, as opposed to normative, field of inquiry was already well-established. But this claim is neither the sole methodological criterion, nor the exclusive distinguishing feature of Positive Economics, even though some of its adherents (and critics) seem to believe that a mere distinction between fact and value is sufficient for its methodological requirements. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Positive Economics has now come to connote both the method and the substance of economic theory. In fact, it is intended as a logical positivist interpretation of the method of neo-classical theory. Nevertheless, it has partially confused the criteria of logical positivism in theory; and it has seldom adhered to them in practice. In retrospect this post-war marriage of neo-classical theory with logical positivist philosophy seems somewhat strange. For, if interpreted consistently, the methodology of Positive Economics stands the pre-war theory of economic method on its head. Yet it does so with little or no change in the content and analytical procedure of neo-classical theory which both these views have claimed to describe. More explicitly, if economic method was what von Mises and Robbins had described it to be (although, to Robbins’s credit, the two views were not entirely identical), then it would not be strictly consistent with the rules of logical positivism. This inconsistency between the two views would become very pronounced if we add the rejection by Hayek and Knight of the distinction between fact and value in social and economic knowledge.