Showing papers on "Military intelligence published in 1997"

Stability in South Asia

Abstract: : This research effort seeks to understand the logic and prospect of deterrence breakdown in South Asia. It examines the nature of the security competition between India and Pakistan; the military capabilities of both states and the impact of such capabilities on decisions relating to war and peace; the national strategies of both countries and how those strategies contribute to the ongoing competition; and the key indicators that the intelligence community, and DCSINT analysts in particular, should focus on when tracking the problem of South Asian instability.

Current and Future Efforts to Vary the Level of Detail for the common Operational Picture

Abstract: : The Joint Staff developed the C4I for the Warrior Concept in 1992 which stated that the warrior needs a fused, real-time, true representation of the battlespace. To help accomplish this vision, the Global Command and Control System was created. It provides the Common Operational Picture described above, but only down to the level of the Unified Commander. This thesis is a comprehensive report that gives a complete review of the current situational awareness systems available to the commander in addition to current and future efforts to bring a common operational picture to all levels of command. These thesis is designed to give situational awareness to all levels of command. The detailed discussions in the thesis of these systems will help students and researchers in the Joint C4I curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School develop a better understanding of the difficulties in getting a true common operational picture to all services at all levels.

Medusa's Mirror: Stepping Forward to Look Back "Future UAV Design Implications from the 21st Century Battlefield"

Abstract: : This paper intends to explore the differences between a general purpose and a functional design approach, and will attempt to answer the question of which of these approaches will best serve the needs of the services on the twenty-first century battlefield. Currently, UAVs are seen in the Army as generic intelligence gathering devices which can be tailored to the mission at hand. Fielding a general purpose UAV retains a certain amount of flexibility in the way that we have initially integrated the UAV concept Another possible alternative is to build functionally specific UAV designs, each for a different purpose.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Abstract: : Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by section 113 and Chapter S of title 10 United States Code this Directive reissues DoD Directive 5105.21 May 19 1977, to update the responsibilities functions relationships and authorities of the DIA. It establishes the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) with mission organization responsibilities, functions and authorities as prescribed herein.

Operational Art and Intelligence: What is the Relationship?

Abstract: : This monograph discusses the role of intelligence in support of operational art. Intelligence support at all levels of war is critical for the commander to successfully apply force to achieve the established goals and objectives. This is particularly true at the operational level where the operational commander must translate strategic objectives into tactical actions. This monograph examines the characteristics and nature of intelligence support to the operational artist. The monograph first determines the definition of intelligence and its principles and characteristics. Intelligence is defined as information or knowledge of the enemy and environment, both of which are packaged for a specific customer's use in decision making. Furthermore, the principles of intelligence are based on the component parts of knowledge, otherwise identified as the verb know. The principles are detect, recognize, and understand, representing levels of perception higher than the previous. Finally, the characteristics of intelligence are identified as relevant, timely, accurate, and predictive. Since operational art is rooted in theory, the monograph then briefly discusses the theoretical basis of the terms center of gravity, decisive point, and indirect approach from the standpoint of Carl Von Clausewitz, Antoine Henri Jomini, and Sun Tzu respectively. These concepts provide the basis to discuss operational art, or maneuver warfare. The monograph defines operational art as the conduct of military activities at the operational level through the translation of strategic objectives into tactical actions. More importantly, the tasks of the operational artist are defined.

Surprise and Intelligence Towards a Clearer Understanding

Abstract: : The thesis of this article is that strategic surprise is difficult to prevent, even in the face of accurate and timely intelligence (including overhead imagery), because it is based on exploiting a leader's or nation's personality and characteristics as well as the bureaucracies that serve them. Historical evidence seems to indicate that strategic surprise in the twentieth century has rarely been prevented despite a plethora of available intelligence. If the presence of reliable and timely intelligence does not prevent surprise, then a reevaluation of our current thinking is in order. Strategic surprise, in this case, may not only be possible, it may be inevitable. This is a sword that also cuts both ways. while we may not be able to prevent strategic surprise, we can expect to use this principle of war to our military advantage. This article examines the elements of strategic surprise-its foundation, nature, and potential. It proposes a notional definition for strategic surprise that offers a more relevant application to the military art. Additionally, it identifies and examines the validity of assumptions that form the basis for military doctrine on strategic surprise. It uses historical case studies to test the assumptions of current doctrine that link the availability of intelligence to strategic surprise. Finally, it draws conclusions and makes recommendations for those at the operational level and those involved in restructuring a shrinking military force.

Using Intelligence Data for Environmental Needs: Balancing National Interests

Abstract: In the post-cold-war era, there is a growing awareness that intelligence data such as imagery could contribute to environmental programs, management of natural resources, and even disaster relief. A key question facing policymakers and intelligence community managers is whether (and how) to balance routine unclassified environmental surveillance with traditional intelligence missions. This report discusses the stakeholders, interests, opportunities, and risks for the United States in greater use of intelligence data for environmental purposes by civil agencies, universities, and industry. After discussing alternative approaches to providing intelligence data for environmental uses and evaluation criteria, the authors offer summary observations, open questions, and recommendations on actions the U.S. government and the intelligence community should and should not take. An appendix includes three government policy statements on using intelligence data for environmental purposes.

Intelligence Planning for Airborne Operations: A Perspective from Operation Market-Garden,

Abstract: : This monograph discusses the complex relationship between intelligence and operational planning from the perspective of a World War II combined and joint operation, Operation Market-Garden. Operation Market-Garden was the largest airborne operation in history and is an excellent example of the use of airborne forces in an operational role. This monograph first examines the uniqueness of airborne operations and the added complexity of planning and executing these operations. The operational setting in which Market-Garden was executed is also discussed to provide a comprehensive understanding of the causes and effects behind the failure of this operation. It also investigates the importance of the effects of terrain and weather on airborne operations and specifically how they effected Market-Garden. Next this monograph investigates the widely held "myth of an intelligence failure" in Operation Market-Garden. The use of intelligence for Market-Garden planners and decision makers is evaluated using the intelligence cycle found in U.S. Army Field Manual 34-3, Intelligence Analysis. This monograph also examines why Allied leaders made decisions that in retrospect seem senseless based on the information available to intelligence planners and decision makers. Finally, this monograph discusses the linkage of World War II airborne planning to XVIII Airborne Corps intelligence planning, and provides insight on the differences in planning for airborne operations since Operation Market-Garden.

Information As an Operational Factor.

Abstract: : The student of operational art would say that to achieve the freedom to act the operational commander must properly balance time, space and forces - the classic operational factors. But these factors alone do not adequately address all the issues in achieving strategic and operational objectives. This paper will not challenge the validity of time, space and forces as operational factors but will focus on the examination of information as a separate operational factor. Through identification of major key elements of the operational factor, information: information infrastructure, information warfare, intelligence, the media and adversary knowledge, analysis will be presented on how these elements influence a commander's freedom to act. Evolving doctrine, classic writings and historic examples will be cited to support exploration of the central thesis. Additionally, a short analogy will be utilized to relate operational factor requirements of a surgeon to that of an operational commander. The conclusion reached in this paper is that information is indeed an operational factor. With the complete assimilation of data provided by the operational factor, information, the commander will be empowered by a clear perception of the situation and will possess the essential knowledge to support appropriate and timely application of the proper mix and quantity of force. On the other hand, failing to appreciate information as an operational factor may lead the commander to a fallacious belief that overwhelming conventional means are required to subdue an adversary resulting in a potentially tragic asymmetric application of force. This failing may result in inordinately protracted conflicts and a potential for unnecessary risk and loss of life; two conditions which the American people will not accept.

Dominating Time in the Operational Decision Making Process.

Abstract: : Time is one of the critical factors operational commanders must control in relation to the enemy to gain and maintain the initiative. The ability to make timely decisions and execute operations faster than the enemy enables the operational commander to dictate the tempo of the campaign. Controlling the tempo forces the opposing commander to react to the force with the initiative. To successfully stay ahead of the opposing commander, one must operate inside his decision cycle. This requires operational commanders to make decisions based on future conditions. These future conditions are filled with uncertainty. To make decisions about an uncertain future, the commander must make many assumptions. At the operational level, the quality of these assumptions have a large influence on the quality of the decisions one makes. Intuitive thinking is an important skill in the ability to make a sound assumption. Developing intuitive skills to improve assumptions, and increasing the speed and effectiveness of the operational decision making process will improve the operational commanders ability to dominate time.

Counterdeception and the Operational Commander.

Abstract: : Military Deception has been a component of warfare throughout history, and evidence shows that it is usually successful, despite the best efforts of the target to detect the intentions and capabilities of the deceiver. Such notable military thinkers as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz have written about the merits of deception, indicating that when applied successfully, it can enable smaller, weaker forces to master larger, stronger forces. Analysis of historical cases proves that the most successful deceptions are those keyed to the existing perceptions of the target, normally the opposing commander, and this fact is documented in current U.S. doctrine governing the conduct of deception operations. Because deception is employed so frequently, particularly as a tool to 'even the odds' when opposing forces are unevenly matched, and because commanders are the logical targets of such activities since they alone have the ability to make the decisions and take the action desired by their opponents, U.S. operational commanders should be prepared to encounter deception targeting them personally.

IU for military and intelligence applications: how automatic will it get?

Abstract: Over the last 30 years, there have been steady and reasonably extensive R&D activities applied to the problem of interpreting image data automatically. The goal of much of this research has been directed either at automatic target recognition (ATR) or at the automation of the functions of intelligence image analysis. These efforts have greatly advanced our understanding of the nature of image content and what is necessary to describe it using computer algorithms. On the other hand, the goal of automatic interpretation of complex scenes and the recognition of targets in the presence of clutter and occlusion is still not formalized at the level of an engineering discipline. This paper reviews what the key issues are in achieving the automation of image understanding and provides examples of both success and still-unattainable interpretation capabilities.© (1997) COPYRIGHT SPIE--The International Society for Optical Engineering. Downloading of the abstract is permitted for personal use only.

The Double Edged Sword: Information Superiority or Information Vulnerability of Joint Vision 2010

Abstract: : Joint Vision 2010 emphasizes the criticality of achieving information superiority in future military operations. With the global explosion of information age technology, the United States seeks a strategic and operational advantage through information while simultaneously denying an enemy any advantage. With no peer competitor to challenge the United States, adversarial nations may attempt to leverage the low cost, compared to high advantage, that information warfare has to offer. As the United States becomes increasingly reliant on the rapid flow of information, will the underlying infrastructure and deterrence effort provide sufficient security to ward off potentially devastating information warfare attacks? Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a methodology to identify hazard severity and probability from which to draw reasonable measures to reduce risk. (ORM)techniques can be adopted to assess information warfare (defense) hazards and assist in developing controls to minimize risks. Recommendations highlight the importance of educating personnel in information warfare, incorporating information warfare (defense)in war games, studying information infrastructure issues and applying ORM principles to reduce vulnerabilities.

Can IPB Eliminate Mission Creep

Abstract: : Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, U.S. political and military involvements have increased. The specific missions vary from humanitarian operations to peacekeeping which are known as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The major challenge to military leaders and planners involves adapting our units, doctrine, and equipment to the successful accomplishment of OOTW. A phenomenon in the execution of these new missions is the idea of 'mission creep', which causes units to conduct operations that vary from original orders. The real challenge for commanders and staffs is how to deal with mission creep? This monograph examines the phenomena of mission creep in OOTW environments, and answers the question: in OOTW is it possible to eliminate mission creep through detailed and thorough Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)? OOTW operations are conducted by conventional units using standard doctrine; therefore, the monograph begins by examining existing IPB doctrine. The focus narrows to specific OOTW environments. Several different OOTW techniques are introduced and discussed in relation to doctrine. They are then compared and contrasted to each other to determine the effect of the techniques on the IPB process to allow the elimination of mission creep. In order to understand the practical application of IPB in OOTW environments two historical examples are examined, the 10th Mountain Division in Haiti and in Somalia. Finally the concept of mission creep is examined in the context of Ends-Ways-Means to determine if the root causes can be changed by the division commander. The monographs studies the phenomenon of mission creep, the possible causes of mission creep, and possible solutions in eliminating the problem. The monograph concludes by providing guidance which highlights the usefulness of IPB for eliminating mission creep in OOTW.

"The Berlin Crisis in 1961" : U.S. Intelligence analysis and the presidential decision making process

Abstract: : Intelligence analysis played a crucial role in the presidential decision making process throughout the Berlin Crisis. This paper focuses on how intelligence analysis might have aided or misled President Kennedy during the 1961 phase of the crisis, especially during the months of January to July. It also examines presidential leadership of the decision making unit. It considers excerpts of analysis and official correspondence received by the President and sets that advice in the proper historical context by considering its source and the time frame in which it was offered relative to the crisis. It discusses the options as President Kennedy had them presented to him in an effort to recreate the crisis environment in the mind of the reader, and to improve the current presidential crisis decision making process. This paper assumes a building block approach which can be broken down into four major areas of emphasis. First, it focuses on crisis management. It refines the period of time analyzed relative to the Berlin Crisis as a whole, then, Chapters 2 and 3 describe the international crisis management perspective and discuss the crisis background.

Etiology of an Intelligence Estimate.

Abstract: : This study deals with improving one of the United States defense intelligence community's most important tasks - assessments of potentially hostile nations future force capabilities. It is dedicated to the premise that intelligence can do a better job of meeting customers' needs for future estimates despite being in an era of significantly restricted budgets and reduced personnel. The approach taken is somewhat unique compared to most current literature about improving intelligence. Most, like the recent report by the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community, dated March 1, 1996, look at block diagrams and organizational charts to figure out better functional layouts. Other views, like General Kroesan's comments, take the customer's perspective as their approach to improve intelligence. By contrast this study looks at the internal intelligence process that produces estimates. This approach focuses on improving the internal ways futures estimates are done. The emphasis here is directly upon improving the process and the product, not on reorganizing the institutions.

Roger Nash Baldwin, the National Civil Liberties Bureau, and Military Intelligence During World War I

Abstract: (1997). Roger Nash Baldwin, the National Civil Liberties Bureau, and Military Intelligence During World War I. The Historian: Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 87-106.

Commanders' Survey: School for Command Preparation Feedback.

Abstract: : The School for Command Preparation, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS provides three sequential courses for battalion and brigade command selectees. All command designees attend the PreCommand Course (PCC). PCC provides common understanding of current doctrine, and up-to-date information on Army-wide policy, programs and special items of interest. In conjunction with PCC, spouses are invited to attend the Command Team Seminar (CTS). With commanders, they gain awareness of issues that impact families, the unit, and the community. The remaining two courses, the Tactical Commanders' Development Course (TCDC), and the Battle Commanders' Development Course (BCDC) emphasize warfighting skills and the art of battle command for tactical leaders. The Fort Leavenworth Research Unit developed a survey instrument to obtain commanders' assessment of courses following assignment to their commands. Commanders who had attended these courses in the previous 2 years were solicited for feedback. They gauged the usefulness of topics presented, and indicated their level of agreement with statements regarding the courses. They were asked what issues they felt were not addressed during the course and what they would share with incoming commanders. Responses (N=254) were compiled and analyzed. All courses received positive evaluations. Many commanders desired discussions with experienced commanders to cover OPTEMPO, resource constraints, and personnel management issues. Feedback provided useful suggestions and current trends.

Heavy Brigade Offensive Reconnaissance Operations: A Systems Perspective.

Abstract: : The U. S. Army over the past ten years, has enhanced the ability of heavy brigades to conduct offensive reconnaissance operations, yet brigades have not significantly attained a higher rate of success. Success is defined as the commander receiving the intelligence he requires in time to make and execute operational decisions. Systems theorist have developed a technique called 'systems thinking' to gain perspective on such difficult problems. This monograph will determine if systems thinking can identify the source of the reconnaissance problem. The Army began to recognize the reconnaissance problem at the National Training Center (NTC) when it began training rotations in the early 1980s. This monograph will examine four studies that examined this reconnaissance problem at the NTC. The first three studies observed training rotations in the mid-1980s. Their conclusions and recommendations were largely implemented by the Army by the early l99Os. Unfortunately, the fourth study, published in 1996, determined that the heavy brigades still had significant problems conducting reconnaissance operations. Using a theoretical systems model based on the physical and moral environment of war, the monograph examined the mental model of the reconnaissance studies and found that the true problem is not seen. The cybernetic feedback process in the complex-adaptive command system acts as a stabilizing force. In the NTC mental model, this stabilizing force does not exist. A solution to recognize this system feedback is to educate leaders and soldiers in the moral aspects of war and its enabling and disabling effects. The training scenario should incorporate these effects as much as possible and discuss them in after action reviews. Additionally, commanders need to combine the synergistic effects of all the ground, air, and technical reconnaissance assets.

Operational Art in the Success of the Malayan Counterinsurgency Campaign.

Abstract: : LS.Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to answer the question: in operational art terms, why was the Malayan Counterinsurgency Campaign successful? The following facets of operational art are examined in relation to this: critical factors for both the insurgents and the British; operational intelligence of the British; operational command and control of the British; and the desired end-state o% the British. It is concluded that the 'Briggs Plan,' which was implemented in 1950, was the main source of the British success. It contained an intuitive appreciation of critical factors, operational intelligence and operational command and control. The guarantee of Malayan independence also played a large part in the British success. Finally, a warning is given that this paper does not give a prescription for success in counterinsurgency. It only gives a method of analyzing the problem of counterinsurgency which may lead to success.

National-Level Intelligence Support to Targeting.

Abstract: : Major air operations will play an increasingly important role in future major regional conflicts. Intelligence support, especially national-level intelligence support, will play a significant role in determining the success of air operations and the overall campaign. This document reviews the present doctrine on intelligence support to targeting operations. It reviews national-level intelligence support for air operations in DESERT STORM as a case study. Recommendations are made in the final section to improve future support.

Battlespace situation awareness for Force XXI

Abstract: Timely battlefield digitization and battlespace visualization is a requirement to keep pace with ever-diminishing military decision cycle times driven by evolving weapons systems and pacing military doctrine for Force XXI. One ingredient to battlefield situation awareness is imagery intelligence. This paper proposes a novel architecture for an imagery analysis environment to seamlessly provide imagery intelligence. A critical component of this proposed architecture is emerging intelligent software agent technology levering human-computer interface (HCI) technology. This combination enables a modular, scaleable, and reconfigurable battlefield situation awareness and exploitation environment. The consequent impact of this paper is the definition of an entirely new method to support military intelligence, planning and execution processes. The proposed architecture effectively provides real-time/near real-time sensor fusion, sensor management, and battle management in a single collaborative environment. This paper provides the design and describes the technologies necessary to make this system a reality. The proposed design employs the following emerging technologies: . open agent architecture --information gathering/data mining, processing, and dynamic aggregation of agents; S multimodal data entry with command and query interfaces -- interact/communicatethrough voice, writing or gestures; . speechrecognition and natural language understanding --speech recognition and speech-to-text translation; . proceduraland evidential reasoning --dynamic process control, planning, spatial reasoning, and correlation and behavior; and . collaboration — shared work space and applications, wireless and hardwired networks, multiple and distributed participants In the image analyst-centric environment, this state-of-the-art system will manage automatic and assisted target recognition, and imagery exploitation components, while providing a system capable of ingesting and fusing available tactical, national, and commercial imagery sources. It will also enable fusing multi-intelligence source data. With the addition of collaboration and shared multimedia display the system is capable of redefining the interactive imagery exploitation paradigm. Further, in a military doctrinal sense, our proposed concept provides the potential to blur the dividing line between operational command and control (C2) and its supporting intelligence activities. Keywords: intelligent software agents, human-computer interface, situation awareness, imagery exploitation, collaboration

Public Affairs: A Facet of Operational Art?

Abstract: : Undeniably, the relationship between the United States military and the news media is of vital interest to the operational commander. If the news media is not satisfied with the commander's effort to provide access to military operations, unnecessary difficulties for the commander and adverse press for the military are inevitable. Military media experiences during Operations Urgent Fury in Grenada and Just Cause in Panama suffered from poor public affairs (PA) planning. Commanders of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti learned from the mistakes of Grenada and Panama, and implemented a successful PA plan. Lessons from these three operations significantly influenced the formulation of current Department of Defense instructions and Joint Chiefs of Staff publications that detail PA, including media relations guidance. Operational commanders must embrace this guidance and integrate PA planning with operational planning processes throughout the range of military operations. Furthermore, the education and training of all operational staff members about PA enhances the likelihood of beneficial military media relations. Clearly, with the proven significance the media plays in planning and executing military operations, and with the influence the media has on U.S. public opinion, commanders should consider public affairs a facet of operational art.

Joint Force Tracking -- The Impact on Regenerating Combat Power.

Abstract: : Joint Force Commanders (JFC) face significant challenges in future conflicts. These challenges stem not only from an unidentifiable enemy but also from changes in U.S. force structure. While regional instability grows throughout each Commander-in-Chief's area of responsibility (AOR), austere U.S. defense budgets and political mandates shrink military force structure, reduce U.S. forward presence, and move the JFC further from his AOR. These trends magnify the importance of joint force tracking and its impact on regenerating combat power. Lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm identified the lack of joint force tracking capability as a U.S. military weakness. Emerging Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) technology provides a framework within which a force tracking system is being developed. The system will enable the JFC to 'see' forces, equipment, and logistics that are in transit or that are already in the theater of operations. The system must be simple, easy to use, integral with the joint global Command and Control System (GCCS), and most importantly, invulnerable to enemy Information Warfare. A general understanding of system capabilities is important, however, the main purpose of this paper is to synthesize force tracking concepts and analyze the impact of operational factors on the JFC's ability to regenerate combat power quickly and effectively.

Enhancing Battlespace Awareness By Centralizing National Imagery and Mapping Databases: A Force Multiplier.

Abstract: : One band of the battlespace information spectrum particularly relevant to operational activities and the operational commander is geospatial information (i.e. mapping, charting, geodesy, imagery, and imagery intelligence). The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NINA) was established on 1 October 1996 by Congress to provide improved geospatial information management for the Department of Defense (DoD). Seven organizations were consolidated to make NINA, with the goal of centralizing mapping and imagery databases. The effectiveness of centralizing the geospatial databases is measured in this paper by evaluating its impact on products, using the attributes of intelligence quality as a guide. The impact to the operational commander is that commanders at all levels in each service will have the same references and the same information. In addition, with all data sources placed in a common geospatial framework, the commander will be able to fuse all data sources, and thereby have the opportunity to develop a dominant awareness of the battlespace. The commander's route to the geospatial databases is being broadened during the next several years. To effectively use all aspects of the new geospatial information infrastructure, the commander will need to understand the changes that are being implemented. Towards that end, a review of the infrastructure is given here. The changes in all facets of the geospatial information domain are profound in that they have the effect of a force multiplier for the operational commander.