Showing papers on "Military threat published in 1982"

Managing the Ethnic Factor in the Russian and Soviet Armed Forces: An Historical Overview

Abstract: : This report examines the history of Russian (pre-Soviet) and Soviet attempts to empty and manage national minorities in military establishments and campaigns. The analysis concentrates on policies and practices adopted to involve minority manpower in the military while maintaining Slavic dominance of and control over the armed force of the state. In particular, the study traces how the number of ethnic groups drawn into the military has consistently expanded throughout the centuries, identifies the types of units and operational roles to which minorities have been assigned, and discuss the difficulties encountered by virtue of lanugage differences and the potential unreliability and disloyalty of non-Russian soldiers. This study should be of special interest to military analysts and intelligence consumers generally who are concerned with future Soviet military capabilities and behavior, as well as to those who analyze Soviet military manpower issues in the light of current demographic shifts in the USSR. (Author)

Factors Favoring Military Unions in the United States Armed Forces.

Abstract: : The paper examines three questions: Should members of the Armed Forces be denied the right to collectively bargain when Federal civilian employees can? Do military unions degrade morale, discipline or combat effectiveness of Armed Forces? Is PL 95-610 (denying the right of military members to join unions) constitutional? The thesis is that the military members should not be denied this right. The fact that they are, is based on a presumpt of that unions would undermine command authority and present a clear threat to morale and readiness. A review of unionized armed forces of a number of European countries, however, refutes this contention. In fact, military unions have generally been a force for solving problems without ill effect. As to the legality of PL95-610, it is still an unknown as the law has not been challenged in the courts. Unionization of the US Armed Forces is a dormant issue, but not a dead one. (Author)

International military force

Abstract: This chapter describes International Military Force. States have combined their military forces for a specific operation on several occasions. Examples are the three-power, namely, Britain, France, and Spain military expedition against Mexico in 1861. However, it was in connection with the supervision of plebiscites after World War I that States combined their military forces for an international purpose rather than to promote their own interests. Whilst the costs of maintaining international forces are met in part by the States which contribute contingents, and in part by voluntary contributions, most operations result in a financial burden on the organization. The Soviet Union had also opposed the degree of freedom which UN organs have in practice left to the Secretary-General in such matters. Although in recent practice the Secretary-General's actions have been more circumscribed, the matter remains controversial within the Special Committee on Peacekeeping.

Institutional and Political Impediments to Spain's Settlement of the American Rebellions

Abstract: Spain's imperial government, in facing the political and military threat posed by the Wars of Independence in America, could be no stronger than the sum of its parts. Among the important questions not previously detailed concerning Spanish American independence, a significant one is why metropolitan Spain itself responded so weakly and indecisively to the danger. There were, of course, severe constraints on resources as well as limitations in terms of the leadership. These two elements, however, while they were certainly real, need not have been automatically decisive. After all, despite incredible hardship and difficulty, the Spanish Comision de Reemplazos—the Cadiz-based supply committee made up of merchants—alone and by its own tally between 1811 and 1820 dispatched thirty expeditions of peninsular troops to America involving more than 47,000 men and a cost of 350 million reales. The Morillo expedition in 1815involved 12,254 men. The so-called “Great Expedition” that gathered at Cadiz for use in Buenos Aires consisted of 14,000 men before it revolted in January 1820. In July 1820 the minister of War told the Cortes that Spain had sent a total of 27,342 troops to America since the king's restoration in 1814. Thus there was a military response from the metropolis, to say nothing, of course, of the more critical military mobilization of the American viceregal governments. One could also argue that, despite the undoubted failings of individual Spanish leaders under both the Cortes and the absolutist regimes, the political chaos at least brought a number of differing political persuasions to power. After all, Spain experienced in these years six major transformations of its political system. The leadership ran the gamut of political ideology, from extreme conservatives to extreme liberals. Pintos Vieites, in an attempt to revise Ferdinand VII favorably, even argues that the king in the first restoration purposely appointed moderates in order to hear their advice. While the parliamentarians of 1812 and 1820 tended to be young and relatively inexperienced, most of the ministers had served in the previous reign or had substantial experience.

US conventional forces

Abstract: Because of Soviet-American strategic parity, the burden of deterring Soviet military action during the 1980s will fall increasingly upon American and European conventional forces in Europe and upon American forces elsewhere. This statement summarizes an important argument being heard in the West at present.1 It implies, of course, that the United States, along with her allies, should improve and possibly build up land, air and sea forces to defend the West’ s interests against a growing Soviet military threat.