Showing papers on "Philosophy of mind published in 1969"

Philosophical Disagreements and World Views

Abstract: There is not likely to be much disagreement about the fact that philosophical disagreements tend to be inconclusive. Thus few philosophers would disagree with a recent estimate that in ethical theory "concentration of effort by many acute analytical minds has not produced any general agreement .... On the contrary, . . . the wealth of proposed solutions, each making some claim to plausibility, has resulted in greater disagreement than ever before."' Most philosophers would probably allow that this description applies also in philosophy of mind, in metaphysics, in epistemology, in esthetics-indeed, in every field of philosophy. In this paper, I shall put forward an hypothesis to account for the fact that a "concentration of effort by acute minds" leads not to a consensus, as might be expected, but only to such a diversity of opinion that "certain schools of thought find it unrewarding, if not impossible, to communicate with each other". Specifically, I shall argue that the wealth of proposed solutions generated for any particular philosophical problem, be it in ethics, epistemology, or metaphysics, can be accounted for, at least in part, by differences in the world views of philosophers. By world view I mean a configuration of cognitive and evaluative sets, analogous to the perceptual sets that cause different aspects of the experiential field to "stand out" and become noticeable--analogous, that is, to the sort of set that

“Are Strawson’s Persons immortal?” A reply

Abstract: MR. GUSTAFSON gives an affirmative answer to the question "Are Strawson's persons immortal?"1 Strawson's persons may be immortal, but the two arguments advanced by Mr. Gustafson do not show that they are. He further argues that if Strawsonian persons are not immortal, then Strawson's analysis is incoherent. This final argument is also invalid. The First Argument "Because it is a requirement for something's being a person that predicates ascribing states of consciousness should be applicable to it, and since some65

The feasibility of hyperbolical doubt

Abstract: cannot infer 'x cannot perish.' That is, from the claim that somethin cannot be both a person and not alive, we cannot infer that persons are immortal. Plto, however, uses 'immortal' in an equivocal sense. In (6) it means simply 'cannot die,' whereas in (7), it means what is usually meant, i.e., 'cannot perish.' And as he has pointed out, something which cannot admit death may perish. 5 Philosophical Studies, 18:46. l bid.