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Showing papers on "Principal (commercial law) published in 1971"


Book
01 Feb 1971
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the law and practices relevant to the principal forms of international business and commercial transactions, including negotiating business transactions; the law governing international sales of goods; structuring international sales transactions; financing such transactions, especially through letters of credit; technology transfers; the initiation, operation, and termination of, as well as the limitations imposed on, foreign investments; property takings, including the options for protecting against and remedies for such actions; the extraterritorial regulation of International business; anti-corruption law; and the resolution of international disputes, whether through litigation
Abstract: This work examines the law and practices relevant to the principal forms of international business and commercial transactions. It includes chapters on negotiating business transactions; the law governing international sales of goods; structuring international sales transactions; financing such transactions, especially through letters of credit; technology transfers; the initiation, operation, and termination of, as well as the limitations imposed on, foreign investments; property takings, including the options for protecting against and remedies for such actions; the extraterritorial regulation of international business; anti-corruption law; and the resolution of international disputes, whether through litigation in domestic court or through international arbitration.

3 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
Guido Calabresi1
TL;DR: The New York plan as discussed by the authors is the best first-party system that has yet been proposed, but it does not provide for the imposition of non-insurable tort fines, and it is vulnerable to early obsolescence due to inflation.
Abstract: The New York plan is, in my opinion, the best first party system that has yet been proposed. It has, to be sure, some weaknesses. For instance, a complete system of automobile accident law must provide for the imposition of noninsurable tort fines, preferably income-related, to supplement the enterprise or market deterrence that can be achieved through an intelligent allocation of accident costs.1 The New York plan does not provide for such a system of tort fines.2 It is not my purpose, however, to devote this article to a consideration of possible omissions of this kind. Nor do I propose to discuss those characteristics of the plan that I think are especially desirable, for example, that it, unlike the Keeton-O'Connell plan, is not subject to early obsolescence because of inflation.3 Rather, I intend to discuss the two principal criticisms that have been made of the New York plan, and to suggest a free choice modification which, if worked out in detail, might meet these objections. It is assumed, of course, that the objections that have been made to the plan are motivated by good faith and not by an interest in retaining the status quo. The first asserted objection to the New York proposal is that the public does not want a nonfault insurance plan that does not provide for compulsory compensation for pain and suffering; in short, despite all its deficiencies, people prefer the present tort liability system. The second asserted objection is that the administrative cost savings envisaged under the New York plan are, as a practical matter, illusory; they would be more than overcome by increases in the number of serious accidents which opponents of the plan assert would follow its adoption. This latter objection implies that the advocates of a nonfault plan are selling a pig in a poke which, once bought, cannot be returned. Both of these objections would be overcome if it were possible for individuals to choose either to remain under the existing tort liability system or to opt for the nonfault coverage proposed by the New York plan. In either

1 citations