Showing papers on "Public diplomacy published in 1986"
Book•
15 Dec 1986
TL;DR: The U.S.-USSR Cultural Agreement signed at the Geneva summit in 1985 signalled the resumption of a broad range of cultural exchanges suspended in 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The U.S.-USSR Cultural Agreement signed at the Geneva summit in 1985 signalled the resumption of a broad range of cultural exchanges suspended in 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Mr. Richmond describes the history of the various areas of exchange—in the performing arts, popular media, academia, public diplomacy, science and technology
19 citations
TL;DR: This article examined the case of Britain, a key NATO ally with its own nuclear deterrent, unique for its intermediate position as both onlooker and independent participant in the arms control process between East and West.
Abstract: Since the late 1970s Western policy-makers formulating policies on arms control have found it necessary to take into account the impact that those policies will have on public opinion in the NATO countries. Public opinion became a particularly important issue in the early 1980s, in connection with NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) initiative. NATO's original 'twin-track' decision of 1979, to deploy ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles, also incorporated an arms control dimension in an attempt to avoid public outcry like that caused by President Carter's proposal of 1977 to deploy neutron bombs in Western Europe. President Reagan's radical 'zero option' of 1981, which proposed to get rid of all the Soviet SS-20 and Western cruise and Pershing missiles, was in part a tactic to steal the thunder from the growing European nuclear disarmament movements; and as the deadline for INF deployment approached in 1983, Paul Nitze, the American negotiator, pleaded desperately for some more flexibility in the Western arms bargaining position as opinion polls showed ominous results.1 Policy-makers fear that if Western governments are seen to be unforthcoming in arms control, their reluctance may be made into political capital and used by the Soviet Union and political opponents at home to undermine public support for existing security policies. At present there appear to be good grounds for this anxiety. Some West European opposition parties have taken a radically anti-nuclear line. The new Soviet leader, Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, has been conducting energetic public diplomacy and has offered several proposals for halting the arms race. In the early 1980s President Reagan's administration proposed 'deep cuts' in both superpowers' strategic arsenals, but tlhese have been overshadowed by the President's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and by American allegations that the Soviet Union has not been complying with the terms of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Rather than laying foundations for new agreements, these developments are threatening to undermine the existing ones. In these circumstances it is salutary to make a closer examination of the issue of public opinion about which such sweeping claims are often made in the arms control debate. What exactly is public opinion, and how may it be measured? What difference does arms control make to the public at large? Who is winning the propaganda war? Is the public swayed more by sweeping 'disarmament' proposals or by the less ambitious but historically more practical approach of 'arms control'? This article will examine the case of Britain, a key NATO ally with its own nuclear deterrent, unique for its intermediate position as both onlooker and independent participant in the arms control process between East and West. It will be argued that the attitudes and
1 citations