Showing papers on "Pyrrhonism published in 2016"

Outlines Of Pyrrhonism

Abstract: Thank you very much for reading outlines of pyrrhonism. Maybe you have knowledge that, people have search hundreds times for their chosen readings like this outlines of pyrrhonism, but end up in malicious downloads. Rather than enjoying a good book with a cup of coffee in the afternoon, instead they cope with some harmful virus inside their computer. outlines of pyrrhonism is available in our book collection an online access to it is set as public so you can get it instantly. Our books collection hosts in multiple countries, allowing you to get the most less latency time to download any of our books like this one. Merely said, the outlines of pyrrhonism is universally compatible with any devices to read.

The Role of Skeptical Evidence in the First and Second “Meditations”. Article 1. The Doubt according to Descartes and Sextus Empiricus

Abstract: The first article of the cycle “The role of skeptical evidence in the First and Second ‘Meditations’” compares the Cartesian and Sextus Empiricus’ concepts of doubt in, respectively, “Metaphysical meditations” and “Outlines of Pyrrhonism”. The article starts with the current state of the problem “Descartes and skepticism” and admits the existence of consensus about Cartesian perception of skeptical tradition: Cartesius (1) was influenced by all skeptical movements, known in his time, and (2) created a generalized notion that contains elements of both Academic and Pyrrhonian origin. This consensus is the source of many contemporary studies on how different skeptical doctrines influenced certain parts of Cartesian philosophy. This article attempts to analyze possible Descartes’ use of Sextus Empiricus’ notion of phenomenon. Sextus clearly states in “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” that one cannot doubt phenomenon as something perceived directly. The article proves that (a) Sextus’ thesis about the “sensory” nature of phenomenon is metaphorical, so far as it includes (without distinction) both sensuality and the experience of thinking; (b) the phenomenon is realized through a wide range of passive states of mind that all have irresistible force of influence; (c) the impact of phenomena is always mediated by our self, because all skeptical phrases are strictly correlated with the first person singular. Some researchers distinguish Sextus’ isostenia, as one of such insurmountable states, from Cartesian doubt at the First Meditation, which is allegedly based on a purely volitional decision. The article proved that this argument is artificial, since Descartes’ volitional decision is caused by initial inability to take the dubious as if it were certain. Thus, Cartesian approach can be considered a specific kind of isostenia. Such parallelism is a reason to assume a key role of Sextus’ understanding of insurmountable power of phenomena in Cartesian anti-sceptical argumentation. This assumption will be tested in the following articles of the cycle.

Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the Middle Ages

Abstract: This paper examines the authorship and reception of the medieval translation of Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism . It is shown that its traditional ascription to Niccolo da Reggio (born ca. 1280) cannot be maintained, because the translation must have circulated already in the late 1270s. Its author is difficult to identify: the closest stylistic parallels are found with the anonymous translator of Aristotle’s De partibus animalium . With Alvaro of Oviedo († ca. 1282) and the otherwise unknown Johannes de Peretis two early readers can be named. Though a copy was accessible in Viterbo at this time and another copy possibly travelled around in Italy in the 1320s, no philosophical or other impact can be determined. A single reference is found in Peter of Auvergne’s Quaestiones -commentary on Aristotle’s Politics . Its origin is difficult to assess.

Apraxia, Appearances, and Beliefs: The Pyrrhonists’ Way Out

Abstract: According to the objection of inactivity (apraxia), the skeptics cannot live their skepticism, since any attempt to apply it to everyday life would result in total inactivity, while any action they would perform qua skeptics would be a sign that they abandoned their skepticism. In this paper I discuss the ancient Pyrrhonists’ response to the objection as is presented in the writings of Sextus Empiricus. Sextus argues that the Pyrrhonists are immune to the apraxia objection because it is based on the misunderstanding of their position, that is, on the wrong assumption that they live in accordance with philosophical logos. To live in accordance with philosophical logos includes two things. First, it includes the idea that one should apply one’s philosophical tenets, concepts and recommendations to ordinary human life and use it as a practical guide. However, the only item that survives skeptical philosophy, appearance, is not used in this way: its role as criterion of action is different. Second, it includes the idea that ordinary human life can be, and should be, described in philosophical terms. However, the skeptics refuse to describe their actions in philosophical terms. More specifically, they refuse to describe their actions in terms of beliefs: from the Pyrrhonists’ point of view, the question “Do you have beliefs?” is misplaced, since any answer to it, affirmative or negative, is as credible as any other, since it is about something non-evident.

The Pyrrhonian Roots of Hume’s Scepticism

Abstract: A strong influence of Pyrrhonism on Hume’s thought explains why he so easily accepted the weakness of reason as a predicament we have to live with. Hume’s corrected (for some, perfected) version of Pyrrhonism follows on the sceptical principle that we cannot see behind appearances, but newly asserts the power of natural inclinations in life. Hume’s principal correction of Pyrrhonism consists not in diluting radical (excessive) scepticism in epistemology, but in allotting intense reflection and instinctive beliefs their own domains. Hume daringly asserted a disparity that involves a division of labour between reason and nature in place and time. In contrast to the old Pyrrhonism Hume set out to redefine ataraxia from a state of life lethargy to embracing life with all its pleasures. Hume teaches how to be happy, moral, socially active citizens and how to promote tolerance in all these areas of human behaviour. It is in common life, in moral and social areas, that mitigated scepticism has its role – it put us in a pleasant frame of mind, makes us feel agreeable and cultivates calm passions.

The Rebirth of Pyrrhonism in Hume’s Time (and Before)

Abstract: The revival of Pyrrhonism in Western Europe was facilitated by Latin translations of the work of Sextus Empiricus in the sixteenth century, and further promoted by Michel Montaigne who brought scepticism to the forefront of philosophical interest. Ancient Pyrrhonism began to subvert all the established dogmas as a matter of principle and was thus a fuse that accelerated both the decline of scholastics and the formation of the new position based on the confident self. After all, even though scepticism was a destructive method, based on subversive arguments concerning the reliability of our senses and reason, these arguments had their source in man’s own ability to think. Pyrrhonian scepticism found a fertile ground in France, in the works of natural philosophers like Pierre Gassendi and Samuel Sorbiere and, in the next generation, Pierre-Daniel Huet and Simon Foucher. They accepted the fact that Pyrrhonism could not be defeated and tried to find some operational space for science within its framework by replacing the ideal of certainty of knowledge by probability and in calling for modesty in our knowledge claims. Hume drew on these ideas but proposed a more radical, unmitigated form of scepticism inspired by Bayle.

Cartesian Humility and Pyrrhonian Passivity: The Ethical Significance of Epistemic Agency

Abstract: While the Academic sceptics followed the plausible as a criterion of truth and guided their practice by a doxastic norm, so thinking that agential performances are actions for which the agent assumes responsibility, the Pyrrhonists did not accept rational belief-management, dispensing with judgment in empirical matters. In this sense, the Pyrrhonian Sceptic described himself as not acting in any robust sense of the notion, or as ‘acting’ out of subpersonal and social mechanisms. The important point is that the Pyrrhonian advocacy of a minimal conception of ‘belief’ was motivated by ethical concerns: avoiding any sort of commitment, he attempted to preserve his peace of mind. In this article, I argue for a Cartesian model of rational guidance that, in line with some current versions of an agential virtue epistemology, does involve judgment and risk, and thus which is true both to our rational constitution and to our finite and fallible nature. Insofar as epistemic humility is a virtue of rational agents that recognise the limits of their judgments, Pyrrhonian scepticism, and a fortiori any variety of naturalism, is unable to accommodate this virtue. This means that, in contrast to the Cartesian model, the Pyrrhonist does not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of cognitive disintegration. The Pyrrhonist thus becomes a social rebel, one that violates the norm of serious personal assent that enables the flourishing of a collaborative and social species which depends on agents that, however fallible, are accountable for their actions and judgments.