Showing papers on "Pyrrhonism published in 2017"

Scepticism and self-transformation in Nietzsche – on the uses and disadvantages of a comparison to Pyrrhonian scepticism

Abstract: Scepticism is central to Nietzsche’s philosophical project, both as a tool of criticism and, through its role in self-transformation, as a tool for responding to criticism. While its importance in his thought and its complexity have been acknowledged, exactly what kind of scepticism Nietzsche calls for still stands in need of analysis. Jessica Berry’s [Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011] comparison between Nietzsche and Pyrrhonian scepticism recognized the importance of the practical dimension of Nietzschean scepticism but distorted Nietzsche’s philosophy in attempting to paint it as Pyrrhonian in character. Earlier discussions recognize Nietzsche’s opposition to Pyrrhonian suspension of judgement and tranquillity. They have not, however, explored in sufficient detail Nietzsche’s sceptical practice and how it affects the individual. In this article, I combine Berry’s emphasis on scepticism as a practice with attention to the important differences...

Nos in diem vivimus : Gassendi’s probabilism and academic philosophy from day to day

Abstract: In “Nos in Diem Vivimus: Gassendi’s Probabilism and Academic Philosophy from Day to Day,” Delphine Bellis challenges Popkin’s twofold reading of Gassendi. On Popkin’s account, Gassendi was first a Pyrrhonian, and later in his career became a mitigated “sceptic” who tried to elaborate a specific epistemology in order to overcome the sceptical crisis of his time. Bellis shows that, beyond the role played by Pyrrhonian arguments in rebuking Aristotelian theses, Academic philosophy (in particular as conveyed by Cicero) played a much more constructive role in building Gassendi’s own philosophy right from its beginning. Academic philosophy offered to Gassendi a probabilist model of knowledge which, contrary to Pyrrhonism, opened the possibility of a natural philosophy conceived as a science of appearances, i.e. as based on experimentation on appearances, in the line of the Academic notion of “inspected” or “scrutinized” appearances. By showing the long-lasting permanence of Academic philosophy as a source of inspiration for Gassendi’s own philosophy, Bellis demonstrates how probabilism became central to his epistemology and natural philosophy. In addition to Gassendi’s erudite interest for Cicero and Charron, Academic probabilism suited Gassendi’s own practice as a natural philosopher in the realms of meteorology and astronomy. But first and foremost, Gassendi’s preference for Academic philosophy rather than for Pyrrhonism was motivated, early in his philosophical career, by ethical concerns: the importance of preserving his libertas philosophandi, combined with his personal incapacity not to incline toward one opinion or another, led him to formulate his epistemological probabilism and to claim the freedom to revise his opinions from day to day.

Again on Sextus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence

Abstract: Abstract This paper engages with Svavar Svavarsson’s recent essay, “Sextus Empiricus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence,” arguing against both (i) his interpretation of whether two rival arguments appear equipollent to the Pyrrhonist because he himself is equally persuaded by both of them, and (ii) his interpretation of the way in which the argument from possible disagreement is supposed to induce suspension of judgment in the Pyrrhonist. In so doing, I aim to dispel some serious misunderstandings regarding key aspects of the Pyrrhonist’s skeptical outlook and argumentative practice.

Was Pyrrho a Pyrrhonian

Abstract: Abstract This paper attempts a reconstruction of the views of Pyrrho of Elis. Many recent commentators, most notably Richard Bett, have made Pyrrho out to a metaphysical dogmatist who thinks the world is fundamentally indeterminate. Despite some criticisms of this view by Brennan and others, this metaphysical reading has continued to gain adherents. But there are serious textual and logical problems with these dogmatic interpretations. According to the evidence we have, a better view is that Pyrrho was an agnostic skeptic, i.e. one who refused to make assertions about the world outside of perceptual or intellectual appearances. But this does not mean that the traditional view of Pyrrho is correct either: the kind of skepticism Pyrrho endorsed is not Pyrrhonian, because it is grounded in the nature of our epistemic faculties rather than opposition between equally plausible theories, arguments, beliefs, or appearances. A secondary thesis of this paper is about methodology. Rather than focus on the most ambiguous and contentious passages in isolation, we should base our interpretation on the whole corpus, beginning with the easiest passages. Faulty interpretations of Pyrrho go wrong, I argue, partly by failing to follow this method.

Unmitigated Skepticism: The Nature and Scope of Pyrrhonism

Abstract: The "scope" of Pyrrhonian Skepticism refers to the extent to which Skeptics bear epistemic commitments. There are two respects in which the debate between unmitigated and mitigated interpretations of Skepticism is significant. First, there is the philosophical question of which version of Pyrrhonism is more coherent and compelling when considered on its own merits. Second, there is the historical question of which sort of interpretation accurately characterizes Pyrrhonism itself, as it is presented in the works of Sextus Empiricus.My own arguments proceed accordingly. On the philosophical front, I argue (primarily in Chapters 2 and 3) that when the force of the Skeptical modes is fully understood, they are unmitigated in scope. On the historical side, I argue (primarily in Chapters 1 and 4) that an unmitigated interpretation of Pyrrhonism is consistent with the Sextan corpus. Throughout, my ultimate aim is to present a vision of unmitigated skepticism that is, if not an expression of the historical reality of Pyrrhonism, at least a direct descendant of it.The central argument concerns the Five Modes of Agrippa, which are widely regarded as comprising the most powerful argument of Pyrrhonian Skepticism: the "Pyrrhonian Problematic." The intuitive force of the Problematic lies in its generality. It threatens to cast into doubt every claim that can be advanced on every subject. According to the standard interpretation, the Problematic achieves this by constituting a declarative argument that consists of appealing premises and the conclusion that epistemic justification is impossible.I argue that this interpretation fails to capture the intuitive force of the Problematic in two ways: First, it is a mistake to interpret the scope of the Problematic as being narrowly restricted to the concept of epistemic justification. Second, and more importantly, it is a mistake to assume that the Problematic is an argument in the first place. Understanding its full potential requires that we instead interpret the Problematic procedurally, as a set of instructions that the Skeptic implements in engaging dialectically with an interlocutor’s claims.

Hume’s Academic Scepticism in Its French Context

Abstract: My main goal is to show how Hume’s mitigated scepticism fits within French scepticism in the early modern period. I argue that Hume wasn’t very familiar with ancient sources on scepticism, not even Cicero’s Academica. Instead, Hume could rely only on modern sources, mostly French ones, like Montaigne, La Mothe Le Vayer, Descartes, Pascal, Foucher, Huet, and Bayle. Faced with religious, scientific, and philosophical novelties, scepticism had to adapt itself to a new context and evolved in unpredictable ways. Though many modern sceptics (like Montaigne, Huet and Bayle) and philosophers (like Bacon, Malebranche and Pascal) didn’t think there was an important difference between Academics and Pyrrhonists, Hume (like Foucher) took the distinction very seriously, and drew a sharp distinction between them. Despite Hume’s assertion that there were no real sceptics, I suggest that Hume had particular thinkers in mind when he discussed these two kinds of scepticism. Next, I move to explain why Hume preferred to associate his own scepticism with Academic scepticism, despite his initial leaning towards Pyrrhonism. In this respect, Foucher’s Academic scepticism appears to be more important for Hume than usually assumed. Finally, I go on to show how Hume’s arguments against Pyrrhonism and in favour of a mitigated, Academic scepticism were based on his readings of Montaigne, Descartes and Pascal.

Reading Scepticism Historically. Scepticism, Acatalepsia and the Fall of Adam in Francis Bacon

Abstract: The first part of this paper will provide a reconstruction of Francis Bacon’s interpretation of Academic scepticism, Pyrrhonism, and Dogmatism, and its sources throughout his large corpus. It shall also analyze Bacon’s approach against the background of his intellectual milieu, looking particularly at Renaissance readings of scepticism as developed by Guillaume Salluste du Bartas, Pierre de la Primaudaye, Fulke Greville, and John Davies. It shall show that although Bacon made more references to Academic than to Pyrrhonian Scepticism, like most of his contemporaries, he often misrepresented and mixed the doctrinal components of both currents. The second part of the paper shall offer a complete chronological survey of Bacon’s assessment of scepticism throughout his writings. Following the lead of previous studies by other scholars, I shall support the view that, while he approved of the state of doubt and the suspension of judgment as a provisional necessary stage in the pursuit of knowledge, he rejected the notion of acatalepsia. To this received reading, I shall add the suggestion that Bacon’s criticism of acatalepsia ultimately depends on his view of the historical conditions that surround human nature. I deal with this last point in the third part of the paper, where I shall argue that Bacon’s evaluation of scepticism relied on his adoption of a Protestant and Augustinian view of human nature that informed his overall interpretation of the history of humanity and nature, including the sceptical schools.

Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Readings in Scepticism

Abstract: In his celebrated History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, Richard Popkin treats Pierre-Daniel Huet as above all an heir to ancient Pyrrhonism. This interpretation is currently being counterbalanced by readings of the influence of Academic scepticism on seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy, some of which go as far as to treat Pierre-Daniel Huet as a central figure in the revival of Academic scepticism. In this paper, I argue that it appears difficult to treat Huet as a disciple of either Pyrrhonism or Academic scepticism, because he made use of both these kinds of scepticism in a purely strategic manner. To demonstrate this point, it is essential to approach the meaning of his scepticism by inquiring into the sources available to him, and next to inquire into the use he made of it, in particular within his apologetic reflections focused on the relationship between faith and reason. Only in this way can we arrive at a clear view of his relationship with ancient scepticism, whether Pyrrhonian or Academic.