Showing papers on "Pyrrhonism published in 2018"

Life without Belief: A Madhyamaka Defense of the Livability of Pyrrhonism

Abstract: Despite the striking similarities between Pyrrhonian skepticism and Madhyamaka Buddhism, few lessons have been drawn from the parallels between the two traditions. Here, it is argued that Madhyamaka Buddhism verifies the livability of Pyrrhonian skepticism. After establishing that Pyrrhonism and Madhyamaka can be understood as undertaking the same project, it is shown that Madhyamaka philosophy is able to refute objections to the viability of Pyrrhonism. Finally, it is demonstrated that Madhyamaka is still a lived practice in Tibetan Buddhism, and it is argued that this constitutes empirical support for the livability of Pyrrhonian skepticism.

Skepticism and Religious Practice in Sextus and Nāgārjuna

Abstract: The second-century Pyrrhonian sceptic, Sextus Empiricus, says that piety of a certain kind is compatible with the Pyrrhonian – i.e. radically skeptical – way of life. The contemporaneous founder of Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, Nāgārjuna, also embodies a form of sceptical practice in pursuit of the spiritual goal of non-attachment, including non-attachment in intellectual matters. After some preliminary remarks on the relevance of this chapter to ethics and anatta (non-self), I give an overview of the issue of how skepticism can relate to religious practice in the texts of Sextus and Nāgārjuna. Then I show how Sextus and Nāgārjuna represent a kind of religiosity without belief that is in contrast both to conventional views about the relation between belief and religious practice as well as some contemporary views in philosophy of religion concerning belief and faith. After considering some objections to my claim that Sextus and Nāgārjuna represent a distinct category of religiosity, I end with reflections on what the study of Sextus and Nāgārjuna could add to contemporary philosophy of religion.

Early Pyrrhonism as a Sect of Buddhism? A Case Study in the Methodology of Comparative Philosophy

Abstract: We offer a sceptical examination of a thesis recently advanced in a monograph published by Princeton University Press entitled Greek Buddha: Pyrrho’s Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia. In this dense and probing work, Christopher I. Beckwith, a professor of Central Eurasian studies at Indiana University, Bloomington, argues that Pyrrho of Elis adopted a form of early Buddhism during his years in Bactria and Gandhāra, and that early Pyrrhonism must be understood as a sect of early Buddhism. In making his case Beckwith claims that virtually all scholars of Greek, Indian, and Chinese philosophy have been operating under flawed assumptions and with flawed methodologies, and so have failed to notice obvious and undeniable correspondences between the philosophical views of the Buddha and of Pyrrho. In this study we take Beckwith’s proposal and challenge seriously, and we examine his textual basis and techniques of translation, his methods of examining passages, his construal of problems and his reconstruction of arguments. We find that his presuppositions are contentious and doubtful, his own methods are extremely flawed, and that he draws unreasonable conclusions. Although the result of our study is almost entirely negative, we think it illustrates some important general points about the methodology of comparative philosophy.

Wittgenstein Studies and Contemporary Pyrrhonism

Abstract: Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s statement ‘whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ and consequences of rule-following paradox is the topic of this article. The revision of Wittgensteinian approach to the relations between speech and mind, and approaches to the speech by Vygotsky and Austin allow approving the disagreement with Wittgenstein and exhibit the cases when is necessary ‘to break silence and speak’. Argument is based on the hermeneutical approach to the skeptical image of Wittgenstein studies that disclose the meaning of hypothetic relevance between performative utterances and impulses generated by inner speech. Wittgenstein’s ideas are demonstrated as the contemporary version of a Pyrrhonism. Classical skepticism intensifies procedures for justification of philosophical knowledge, because philosophy tries to disprove skeptical claims. Wittgenstein studies play approximately the same role. Interpretation of the proposition ‘whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ in a view of performative utterance allow coordinating the inner philosophical speech made by Wittgenstein, and the speech made by his commentators and critics.